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INTRODUCTION 
 
Shaping the future 
 
We are shaping the world faster than we can change ourselves, 
and we are applying to the present the habits of the past. 
(Winston Churchill) 
 
 Preface 
 A philosophy of science 
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 Empirical insights 
 Précis 
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Preface 
 
This thesis began as an exploration into the security implications of a wave of large-scale 
land acquisitions in developing countries led by foreign investors – now generally known as 
the ‘global land grab’ – which came about as result of the 2008 Global Food Price Crisis. Not 
much was known at the time about these ‘land grabs’ and speculation was rife with 
accusations of ‘neo-colonialist’ practices that served cash-rich resource-poor states; which 
were believed to be the main investors. Soon it turned out, however, that many deals were in 
reality driven by wealthy transnational corporations seeking to invest in the suddenly 
emerging lucrative market of food and biofuel production. But as the research further 
progressed it became clear that these topics posed some fundamental questions about the state 
of the world food system, and the role of emerging non-traditional challenges and threats to 
our future food security. At the same time it became apparent that the security studies 
perspective that underlies the approach taken in this thesis had a rather uncomfortable 
association with the study’s main subject matter of ‘food security’. This made it necessary to 
pre-empt any empirical enquiries into the phenomenon of land grabs with a solid theoretical 
foundation that elucidates the multifaceted relationship between food and security. Of vital 
importance in this exploration was to ensure that the analysis would not merely recount the 
history and development of the concept of ‘food security’. Above all, it asked for a thorough 
assessment of food as a matter of security; posing the central research question: “how does 
contemporary security theory change our understanding of ‘food security’?” In other words, 
what happens to ‘food’ and ‘food security’ when we approach these topics as security 
questions? Keeping in mind, however, that contemporary challenges – such as ‘land grabs’ – 
necessitated the security explorations to surpass conventional conceptions of international 
security (as purely strategic and military) by emphasising the significance of environmental 
security, and above all, underscore the role of human security in relation to food. This indeed 
required transgressing any traditional disciplinary boundaries of security studies by utilising 
more critical and contemporary views of what amounts to security. Yet at an even more 
holistic and philosophical level, these perspectives on food and security are informed by 
certain ontological and epistemological views of the world. With precisely these elementary 
views at the fundamental level of the philosophy of science we need to begin this thesis’ 
journey of exploring the future of food as a matter of security. 
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A philosophy of science 
Social research is fundamentally based upon our philosophical view of the world (A. Collier, 
2005). This means that our perceptions of reality can take many forms and shapes, and that in 
every case, either consciously or unconsciously, our research is fundamentally based upon 
these perceptions of the world. Hence, any and all research ultimately originates from a 
specific ontological perception of the world as it is which we interpret through an 
epistemological acuity of the world as we know it. While it may seem apparent that we can 
only ponder over what we can know (epistemology) if we have established what there is to 
know (ontology), it appears, as Crotty (1998) points out, that these ontological and 
epistemological issues often tend to emerge together. Notwithstanding the intricacy of 
untangling ontology and epistemology, Patomäki and Wight (2000) note that allowing 
epistemological priority over the ontological question has the practical effect of 
impoverishing the ontology, something – they point out – both Hume and Kant fell afoul of. 
In International Relations a similar ‘mistake’ is often made in the debate surrounding 
the choice of the most suitable paradigm to conduct proper research. Patomäki and Wight 
give a clear account of the debate in this field between (1) positivists’ naïve believe in a 
world ‘out there’, (2) post-positivist socialists who believe in making the world ‘all in here’ 
and (3) constructivists that take the so-called middle ground. The key issue in International 
Relations is the tendency to frame the debate primarily around epistemological issues, which 
brings Patomäki and Wight to suggest that “perhaps a more ontological focus could facilitate 
a move forward” (Patomäki & Wight, 2000, p. 215). This proposed focus on ontology should 
be read as philosophical ontology rather than scientific ontology, since the development of 
scientific and social ontology depends ultimately on preceding philosophical underpinnings. 
Hence, it would be wise to start by addressing some of these issues related to ensure we do 
not fall foul of making the same prioritisation error. 
On the most fundamental level of epistemology we should consider the most 
appropriate ‘method’ that allows us to utilise our knowledge to make sense of the world. Yet, 
if we seek to explain and understand land grabs in relation to security we first need to devise 
a proper way to approach the world, and consider how we see (i.e. ontologically perceive) the 
relationship between ourselves and the phenomena we seek to understand (Sayer, 1992). 
More specifically, how does social science relate to society and in what practical context do 
we actually place knowledge? Sayer argues that “knowledge – whether adequate or not – 
never develops in a vacuum but is always embedded in social practices and we can more fully 
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understand the former if we know the latter” (Sayer, 1992, p. 12). The role of knowledge in 
this study broadly revolves around the understanding and explanation of the societal impacts 
surrounding food security and land grabs, framed in a security perspective. Thus if we follow 
Sayer in this regard, we first need to focus on social practices (through empirical 
observations) in order to gain a full understanding of the ultimate knowledge sought in 
relation to the phenomena under investigation. 
In concrete terms ‘social practices’ refers to real-world occurrences; the empirical 
domain. This means that a mere focus on food security and land grabs as subjects of study 
will not enhance our knowledge much without consideration of its impact on society – and 
along the same line its security implications. Even more, the opaque nature of land grabs does 
not easily allow for testing general statements or controlled tendencies, necessitating an 
approach fit for the study of real world entities focussing on both explanation (Erklären) and 
understanding (Verstehen) (Bransen, 2001). The implications of food (in)security and land 
grabs are obviously entities of the real world, occurring in an open system of infinite 
tendencies and conjunctions. Reducing the tendencies to controlled and closed systems for 
experimental testing will see many of the real world conjunctions – in terms of security 
implications – diminish significantly in practical value. Hence, this requires a social science 
approach that allows placing the central subjects ‘food’ and ‘land grabs’ as well as their 
societal and empirical impacts in a philosophical framework aimed at critically understanding 
the world. This points to the logical prerequisite of first clarifying a suitable ontological 
position, namely, what can we know of the world? To this end we need to decide if the world 
should be seen as an objective reality waiting to be discovered (i.e. uncovering the truth) or if 
the world rather exists solely in our minds as subjective versions of reality (i.e. social 
constructs).  
 
Critical Realism 
We have established that research in the social sciences is fundamentally informed by a 
certain philosophical understanding of the world and our knowledge of the world (A. Collier, 
2005). Most scholarship, however, lacks explicit recognition of this fact and simply follows 
conventional methods often based on dualistic perspectives. This means, in a nutshell, that 
the scientific approach is limited to an ‘either-or’ choice, such as the quantitative method or 
the qualitative method, theoretical research or empirical research, and the philosophy of 
science or the practice of social science (Danermark, Ekström, Jakobsen, & Karlsson, 2002, 
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pp. 2-3). In some disciplines there is much discussion surrounding the choice in philosophy 
of science and applicable methods. For the most security studies does not explicitly touch 
upon these ‘unhappy dualisms’. Balzacq’s Constructivism and Securitization Studies is, 
however, a worthy exception (Balzacq, 2010). The dualistic approach is common and 
widespread in the social sciences, however, Critical Realism provides a promising alternative 
approach with answers to most of the conventional dichotomies of the social sciences. 
Critical Realism is therefore what Danermark et al. refer to as a “both-and” approach that 
challenges the conventions of dualism by “[attempting] to create something new out of a 
number of different – sometimes irreconcilable – perspectives” (Danermark et al., 2002, p. 2). 
Collier explains that this entails that “[C]ritical [R]ealism can be seen as providing a middle 
way, which incorporates what is true in conflicting positions, though it does this partly by 
challenging their shared assumptions” (A. Collier, 2005, p. 334). While Critical Realism 
covers an invariably complex area in the philosophy of science, but a brief and clear-cut 
outline of the philosophy is in place. 
As a philosophy of science, Critical Realism recognises the intimate relationship 
between philosophy and methodology, perceiving philosophical issues inherently functioning 
at the same level as methodological issues (Dobson, 2001). While mostly seen as a movement 
in the social sciences, Critical Realism was originally invented by Roy Bhaskar “as an 
attempt to give the sciences the philosophy they deserved” (A. Collier, 2005, p. 328). As 
such, Critical realism draws on both perspectives of uncovering the truth and social 
constructs by incorporating causality and contradiction appearances while at the same time 
focussing on social realities, ideas and intentions (A. Collier, 2005). This allows for a causal 
and explanatory study into the topic of food security and phenomenon of land grabs, while at 
the same time enabling a societal study into the relations and perceptions of individuals. 
Critical Realism is basically constructed out of ontological and epistemological 
elements which together offer a meta-theory that informs us what structures, entities and 
mechanisms make up the social world (Burnett, 2007). Theory and knowledge production are 
according to the Critical Realist therefore always a social production (López, 2003). One of 
the main practical tenets of Critical Realism is that it “challenges the possibility of a purely 
inductive or deductive process of theory development” and gives the social sciences a way to 
reconcile explanation (Erklären) and understanding (Verstehen) (Welch, Piekkari, 
Plakoyiannaki, & Paavilainen-Mäntymäki, 2011).  
As such, Critical Realism provides an alternative to the opposition between realism 
and idealism about the ontological status of the world. In realism the reality is ‘out there’ and 
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exists independently of our knowledge of it. Idealism, on the other hand, asserts that the 
world and all its entities spring from the human mind, believing there is no external reality 
only a mentally-constructed immaterial reality. Critical Realism builds a synthesis of these 
conflicting positions by proposing that there is both a world real and independent of our 
knowledge, and a mind dependent dimension determined by our social knowledge of the 
world. This ontological position is stratified into three domains of reality: the Real, the Actual 
and the Empirical (Bhaskar, 2008, p. 46).  
In the domain of the Real we find causal structures and generative mechanisms, they 
generate the events that occur in the domain of the Actual regardless if we experience them or 
not, which in turn is the source of our direct and indirect experiences and perceptions that are 
located in the Empirical domain (Danermark et al., 2002, p. 20).  
The Real should therefore be seen as the most abstract level, it is the realm in which 
natural and social objects with their structures and powers exist – regardless of our empirical 
observation or understanding of them. Objects in the Real can be either concrete or abstract 
structures or mechanisms, inhibiting causal powers which may or may not be exercised at any 
time (Burnett, 2007). The Critical Realist idea of the Real can be exemplified by addressing 
the security objects of the “Nuclear Bomb” and the “Nuclear Threat”. The former exists as a 
natural object, an empirically observable fairly large egg-shaped metal object of which we 
understand (to a certain degree) that it contains a mechanism with enormous nuclear powers. 
So the nuclear bomb is a concrete object carrying significant causal powers – which likely 
(and hopefully) will never be exercised. Conversely, the nuclear threat only exists as an 
abstract mechanism, but also contains significant causal powers. In this case we find that 
causal powers of the nuclear threat can be exercised in International Relations to shift the 
power balance. 
We get to the domain of the Actual when structures and powers of objects are 
activated or exercised. Again following the same example, when a nuclear bomb exercises its 
power and becomes a nuclear explosion it belongs to the domain of the Actual. Similarly, 
when a nuclear threat shifts the power balance or evolves into nuclear warfare it has left the 
realm of the Real and entered the domain of the Actual. Along these lines Iran’s nuclear 
program, for instance, has changed Iran’s position in international affairs, instigated wide-
spread fear, and necessitated United Nations Security Council sanctions. Hence, the powers 
of the nuclear threat were exercised and operating in the Actual. 
The last stratification in Critical Realism is the Empirical, defined by Sayer (2000, p. 
12) as the domain of experience. Perceptions of objects, structures, mechanisms and powers 
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through the use of our senses create our Empirical reality. Hence, by its very nature the 
Empirical domain can be very misleading, since the brain can erroneously interpret 
inaccurate sense-observations (Burnett, 2007). The way we inform ourselves is thus often 
based on false or distorted observations of reality, not representing situations adequately or 
even resulting in illusions. Thus, as Sayer concludes, “in order to understand and explain 
social phenomena, we cannot avoid evaluating and criticizing societies’ own self-
understanding” (Sayer, 1992, p. 39). 
Altogether, these “mechanisms, events and experiences ... constitute three overlapping 
domains of reality” (Bhaskar, 2008, p. 46) and possess “powers by virtue of their inner 
structures, even if these powers are not exercised” (A. Collier, 2005, p. 335). This means that 
not only exercised powers are real, “hidden mechanisms, unexercised powers, and unrealized 
possibilities are all real and can have effects” (A. Collier, 2005, p. 335). Consequently the 
implication is that “this [realist] ontology is the recognition of the possibility that powers may 
exist unexercised, and hence that what has happened or been known to have happened does 
not exhaust what could happen or have happened” (Sayer, 2000, p. 12). So the virtue of this 
ontological position is that it enables us to appreciate that “we could be or become many 
things which currently we are not” (Sayer, 2000, p. 12), which implies an intrinsic 
emancipatory potential. 
Cleary, this is where the Realist ontology draws upon Critical Theory by using critical 
evaluations to explain social phenomena and society. But as we see, Critical Realism goes a 
step further, as Sayer contends that the ‘social sciencea’ should entail more than merely 
gaining knowledge of the world, “[it] should develop a critical self-awareness in people as 
subjects and indeed assist in their emancipation” (Sayer, 1992, pp. 41-42). The idea of 
emancipation propelled by critical evaluation also features prominently in critical security 
studies, especially in the work of the Welsch School (Bilgin, Booth, & Wyn Jones, 1998; 
Booth, 1991a, 1991b, 1999, 2005a, 2007). For now, it suffices to appreciate that this critical 
stance culminates in “[making] it possible to understand how we could be or become many 
things which currently we are not: the unemployed could become employed, the ignorant 
could become knowledgeable, and so on” (Sayer, 2000, p. 12). 
Besides its apt ontological and epistemological foundation, Critical Realism thus also 
offers an emancipatory potential. Bhaskar contends that the social sciences are not neutral, 
and makes the case that they contain an “essential emancipatory impulse” (Lacey, 1997). In 
Bhaskar’s words 
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It is salutary to remember that there is a logical gap between ‘knowing’ and ‘doing’ 
which can only be bridged by ‘being able and wanting to do in suitable 
circumstances’. It is my contention that that special qualitative kind of becoming free 
or liberation which is emancipation, and which consists in the transformation, in self-
emancipation by the agents concerned, from an unwanted and unneeded to a wanted 
and needed source of determination, is both causally presaged and logically entailed 
by explanatory theory, but that it can only be effected in practice. (Bhaskar, 2009, pp. 
177-178) 
 
This passage bears witness of the transformative potential in critical realism that allows 
explanatory theory to transform practice (Burnett, 2007, p. 6). Like so, Bhaskar contends 
“emancipation ... depends upon the transformation of structures, not the alteration or 
amelioration of states of affairs” (Bhaskar, 2009, p. 178). This conception of emancipation 
demonstrates the transformative potential of theory and accordingly fits well with the Welsh 
School’s theory of emancipatory realism. Booth describes emancipation as “the freeing of 
people (as individuals and groups) from those physical and human constraints which stop 
them carrying out what they would freely choose to do” (1991a, p. 319). Initially these ideas 
about emancipation developed as “an attitude of mind” which he referred as ‘utopian realism’ 
that sought to synthesize the dialectical opposition of ‘utopia’ and ‘reality’ (Booth, 2007, p. 
90). Subsequently this progressed into the realisation that merely an attitude of mind is 
insufficient; theory, he realised, with its “powers of explanation and prediction” also plays a 
crucial role (Booth, 1991b, p. 534). This led to the formulation of ‘emancipatory realism’ as 
“a systematic set of ideas about being, knowing, and doing” that brings together “’theories of 
the good life’, and ‘theories of survival’ into a comprehensive approach to security in world 
politics” (Booth, 1991a, p. 322). 
Emancipatory realism thus resonates strongly with the Critical Realist idea of the 
“possibility of transformational social activity”, which is based on the view that the nature of 
the world is of dual character: an interactive relationship between society and individual 
(Burnett, 2007). This means that “there is the opportunity for individuals to impact on society 
whilst recognising the impact society does have on individuals” (Burnett, 2007, p. 3). But, as 
Booth argues, in this process we should not become overburdened by the idea of unattainable 
‘end-point utopias’; rather though, we need to focus on how ‘process-utopias’ can give us 
“benign and reformist steps calculated to make a better world somewhat more probable for 
future generations” (Booth, 1991b, p. 536). 
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Third, it is important to touch upon epistemological relativism in terms of how 
“retroductive judgements provide possible but historically contingent explanations of certain 
states of affairs”(Al-Amoudi & Willmott, 2011, p. 30). The process of retroductive 
judgement should be understood as the criteria we employ “for preferring one explanation 
rather than another [which] is, at least in part, dependent on the historico-cultural community 
in which debates about competing claims are staged” (Roy Bhaskar in Al-Amoudi & 
Willmott, 2011, p. 30). Applied to ‘food’ in relation to ‘security’ this helps to explain why 
actors (i.e. states, individuals) differ in their perception of the possibility of an existential 
threat in relation to our ability to feed ourselves. Simply put, the experience of ‘hunger’ is 
mind and event dependent as well as historically and culturally transient; meaning that it is “a 
product of our position, perspective, and histories” (Al-Amoudi & Willmott, 2011, p. 30).  
This explains why, at least to a degree, the Western world appears so oblivious to the 
idea that food could possibly become scarce in the next 50 years and ultimately even play a 
role in an existential global struggle for survival. Contemporary consumers in developed and 
Western countries lack an appreciation for the abundance and diversity of cheap food 
available to them. For many this is tied to a dangerous expectation that there will always be 
enough affordable food. Due to the unexercised power of the causal mechanism that is ‘food 
insecurity’ there seems to have been has gradually downgrading in the ‘securitiness’ of food; 
from existential to important, and nowadays perhaps even to almost trivial. Consequently we 
seem to have lost the ability to recognize the existential relationship between food and 
survival. So employing “retroductive  judgements provide possible but historically contingent 
explanations of certain states of affairs” (Al-Amoudi & Willmott, 2011, p. 30). In this case it 
sheds light on our reluctance to recognise that ‘food’ may not be in abundance forever, and 
that ceteris paribus a scarcity of food may have severe security ramifications. 
The potential of this ontology can have a transformative impact on our understanding 
of food security and land grabs in relation to the realm of security studies. Critical self-
scrutiny of individuals and society should therefore be key in any bottom-up security 
approach, but there is another vital element in Critical Realism, namely, “the possibility that 
powers may exist unexercised, and hence that what has happened or been known to have 
happened does not exhaust what could happen or have happened” (Sayer, 2000, p. 12). This 
leads us to the concept of causal powers and causal analysis – generally associated with the 
empiricist philosophy of causation (Kurki, 2007). Conventionally causal analysis is mostly 
concerned with observing and finding repeating patterns in empirical data to show 
regularities and prove causation. However, as Sayer (2000) asserts, causation has nothing to 
10 
 
do with the number of times something occurs, it is the discovery of causal mechanisms and 
identification of when and how they operate which eventually allows us to explain a social 
phenomenon. 
While the Critical Realist may have to rely on “abstraction and careful 
conceptualization” in order to make sense of the world, it requires a continuous movement 
between philosophy and the process of research, facilitating a constant interplay between 
theory and reality (Sayer, 2000, p. 19). This depicts some stark methodological similarities 
with ‘systematic combining’ (Dubois & Gadde, 2002) which offers a useful research 
structure to ensure a dynamic and evolving framework. Systematic combining offers a useful 
research structure that ensures a dynamic and evolving framework by using ‘abduction’ as a 
mode of inference and characterised by the continuous movement between an empirical 
world and a model world (Dubois & Gadde, 2002). The most significant feature of this 
method is its focus on directing and redirecting the research process by matching and 
confronting theory with reality – which ought to be the main objective of research. 
Systematic combining has a stronger reliance on theory than pure induction, since “investing 
in theory might improve the explanatory power of case studies”(Dubois & Gadde, 2002, p. 
555).  
However, to sophistically build a deep understanding of society while at the same 
time searching for explanations of societal phenomena requires the critical and realistic 
approach of Critical Realism. The multi-layered structure of society, and the world for that 
matter, is cleverly addressed through the stratification of reality. The actual research process 
of gathering empirical information should therefore be performed in a case-based study. 
Before we further details the valuable match of case-based research with a Critical Realist 
approach, a brief note on the role of Critical Realism in theory development is in place.  
 
Empirical insights 
The foregoing exploration has introduced a critical and realistic branch within the philosophy 
of science that provides a useful theoretical foundation for the following chapters. Yet, 
relying on theory and scholarship alone offers a limited understanding of the world. Ideally a 
qualitative study always comprises of a fieldwork component. Besides invaluable empirical 
data collection from the field, Neumann also rightfully observes the importance for a 
researcher to become acquainted with “a basic level of cultural competence to recognize the 
shared understandings that create a common frame of reference” (Neumann, 2008, p. 64).  
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At the start of the present study in 2009, there were few reports that comprehensively 
documented the wave of large-scale land acquisitions. The now famous 2008 report Seized: 
the 2008 land grab for food and financial security compiled by GRAIN is considered the first 
exposure of the ‘global land grab’. Subsequently local and international media has played a 
prominent role in uncovering the extent and magnitude of the global land grab, but 
unfortunately a great deal of media reports lacked credibility due to sparse details, 
unverifiable accounts, and sometimes dubious information. The empirical component of this 
study was therefore conceived in the absence of solid and verifiable accounts on the empirical 
nature of ‘land grabs’ and their implications for food and security. 
The Kenyan case study on land deals that follows in Part II, therefore allowed for a 
familiarising with the empirical nature and cultural significance surrounding land deals in 
Africa. At the same time it granted a better appreciation of how the historical framework of a 
developing country informs its food security problems and policies in the face of challenges 
like climate change, population growth and environmental destruction. More so, even, it 
explains why people act the way they act in relation to one another (Neumann, 2008). Booth 
formulates the matter of cultural competence more succinctly and to the point when he says 
“insight comes from experience more than literature” (Booth, 2007, p. 3).  
What’s more, scholarship generally supports the loudest representations to become 
the key source of information, privileging one perception as the dominant perspective 
(Neumann, 2008). And indeed, as we will come to see in chapter 6, the dominant perspective 
appeared to be a singular viewpoint amongst many underrepresented opinions, but certainly 
the loudest. Trying not to pre-empt too much of what follows on Critical Theory in chapters 1 
and 3, Cox sensible observed that “all theories have a perspective. Perspectives derive from a 
position in time and space, specifically social and political time and space“(Cox, 1981, p. 
128). Most importantly to remember, as Cox eloquently remarked, “theory is always for 
someone and for some purpose” (Cox, 1981, p. 128). Another important caveat is made by 
Cotula et al. in their land grab research, which should be echoed here: “while contracts are 
important legal documents, they are not always applied to the letter, an what happens on the 
ground often deviates from the content of the contract” (Cotula, Vermeulen, Leonard, & 
Keeley, 2009, p. 22). Thus without feet on the ground and eyes on the (rice)fields, it is 
extremely difficult to establish the actual situation and assess the level of controversy, tension 
and conflict. 
Turning now to the empirical component of this thesis, land grabs – or more broadly 
and neutrally ‘foreign agricultural investments’ – offer a contemporary and exciting area in 
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the study of food in relation to conflict. Since 2008 a growing number of reports have tried to 
make quantitative assessments of these land deals, and some expressed more qualitative 
views on the possible implications of these large-scale land acquisitions. But despite these 
efforts, has not been much academic work on the real-life human security implications of 
land deals. With this in mind, academic research on new and less well-developed research 
areas – particularly where examination of the context and the dynamics of a situation are 
important – calls for employing research approaches with robust empirical elements (Darke, 
Shanks, & Broadbent, 1998; Dobson, 2001). A qualitative case-study into an instance of 
foreign agricultural investment therefore provides the empirical environment that gives us the 
purpose and audience Cox identified. But case study research only offers a broad empirical 
framework, and is arguably more of an ideal empirical research type than an actual method 
(Gerring, 2004). Still, as a qualitative analysis the case study approach allows gathering rich 
knowledge that can provide a start for building theory (N. Beck, 2006; Mahoney & Goertz, 
2006; Shah & Corley, 2006). Yin, regarded as one of the authorities on case research, 
describes the case study as “an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real life context, especially when the boundaries between the 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 1994, p. 14). 
Even more, the case study approach is found to be a perfectly suitable research 
strategy for collecting rich empirical data in the Critical Realist paradigm (Easton, 2010). 
However, we should start by asking the question ‘what exactly is case research?’ Dubois and 
Araujo explain that “the notion of case research can be understood from a variety of 
epistemological positions leading to different appropriations of the methodology” (Dubois & 
Araujo, 2005, p. 208). Easton (2010) in this regard agrees that it is a difficult question to 
answer, but draws upon Gerring to make the point that the case study approach is fuzzy 
around the edges and has not hard and fast rules. Nonetheless, it seems that the general 
intention of qualitative case research is to gain an in-depth understanding of social 
phenomena by observing it in a real world setting (Dobson, 2001). Yet the purpose of 
understanding specific real world cases depends on the underlying research approach. In this 
respect Stake defines three distinct qualitative case research approaches: the intrinsic, the 
instrumental and the multiple case study (Stake, 2005).  
The intrinsic case study is focused on gaining a deep understanding of one particular 
case. Stake asserts that the purpose of an intrinsic case lies neither in theory building nor in 
coming to understand abstract constructs or generic phenomena through the study of the case. 
The purpose of this approach is to tease out and understand the curiosities of the specific case 
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without caring “what it is a case of” (Stake, 2005, p. 444). Accordingly, this allows for a 
detailed narrative to explore the case and depict its every detail, by means of employing 
Geertz’ ethnographic method of ‘thick description’ (Geertz, 1973). 
The instrumental approach, on the other hand, does not have a vested interest in case 
specific details but is concerned with understanding particular underlying issues that can be 
drawn from the case. Hence, the interest originates from abstract concepts and embedded 
elements featured in the case that can advance the understanding of an underlying issue. It is 
therefore that instrumental case research more often has a greater interest in generalisation 
than intrinsic studies.  
Even more detached from case specific interests is empirical research focused on 
investigating a particular phenomenon or general condition. In case-based research such a 
study mostly extends to multiple cases, accordingly amounting to a ‘multiple case study’ 
(Stake, 2005). Stake describes the multiple case study as an approach concerned with 
understanding, and potentially theorizing, about a ‘common characteristic’ believed to be 
present in the chosen cases. The selection and grouping of cases thus relies upon a certain 
object or phenomenon to be studied, this is what Stake likes to call a “quintain” and 
represents “a target, but not a bull’s eye” (Stake, 2006, p. 6). 
The distinction between these three types of case studies brings up the question 
whether case research should aim at explanation or description. Dobson rightfully remarks 
that this question “concerns ontological issues regarding the research object” (Dobson, 2001, 
p. 284). In this regard explanation as opposed to description and understanding supposes 
there is a truth ‘out there’ to be discovered, which fundamentally relies on an underlying 
Realist philosophy of science. At this point we can return to the Critical Realist view, which 
as we pointed out, has its own particular view on what we can know of the world. Critical 
Realism is compatible with a wide range of research methods, and can be classified as an 
intensive research method in Sayer’s classification (Sayer, 2000). Easton therefore concludes 
that “case research … is therefore entirely consistent with a critical realist ontology” (Easton, 
2010, p. 123). What’s more, the idea of a ‘contextualised explanation’ further establishes 
Critical Realism as an extremely useful approach to case-based research (Welch et al., 2011). 
As Welch et al. point out Critical Realism provides an ontological way to “reconcile 
explanation (eklären) and understanding (verstehen)” (Welch et al., 2011, p. 748). The use of 
the contextualised explanation gives herein way to a practical implementation of the Critical 
Realist tradition into a functional method to theorise from case studies. Specifically this 
means combining the inherent contextualisation strength of a case study with its potential to 
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generate explanations (Welch et al., 2011). This evidently narrows down the broad empirical 
framework Gerring describes and allows qualitative case research – in the form of a 
contextualised explanation – to go beyond being an “ideal empirical research type” to 
become a contextualising and explanatory research method (Gerring, 2004, p. 346). 
While the Critical Realist may have to rely on “abstraction and careful 
conceptualization” in order to make sense of the world, it requires a continuous movement 
between philosophy and the process of research, facilitating a constant interplay between 
theory and reality (Sayer, 2000, p. 19). This depicts some stark methodological similarities 
with what Dubois and Gadde define as ‘systematic combining’ (Dubois & Gadde, 2002). 
Indeed, systematic combining offers a useful research structure that ensures a dynamic and 
evolving framework by using ‘abduction’ as a mode of inference and characterised by the 
continuous movement between an empirical world and a model world (Dubois & Gadde, 
2002). The most significant feature of this method is its focus on directing and redirecting the 
research process by matching and confronting theory with reality, which, as they point out, is 
the main objective of any research. Systematic combining has a stronger reliance on theory 
than pure induction, since “investing in theory might improve the explanatory power of case 
studies”(Dubois & Gadde, 2002, p. 555). However, to sophistically build a deep 
understanding of society while at the same time searching for explanations of societal 
phenomena requires the critical and realistic approach of Critical Realism. The multi-layered 
structure of society, and the world for that matter, is cleverly addressed through the 
stratification of reality.  
The actual research process of gathering empirical information is therefore ideally 
performed through a case-based approach conducted as an in-depth study on the implications 
of foreign agricultural investment. The objective is to gain a detailed understanding of the 
(human) security implications of large-scale land deals for local communities and how their 
(food) security is affected. At the same time the study explores if, and how, a critical and 
realistic security approach can transform lands deals into projects that deliver sustainable 
food production equally benefiting the local community and investor. 
With this methodology in mind, it is important to emphasise the limitations of this 
study. Data collection was carried over a five-month period, from February to June 2011, 
with limited institutional and logistical support. Data was collected through obtaining 
relevant documents (reports, articles, contracts) and interviews were conducted with a wide 
variety of organisations and individuals involved or affected by the foreign investment 
project in the Yala Swamp in Kenya. Access to data was constrained by varying availability 
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and accessibility of respondents, limited publically available contracts, and an excess of 
inconsistent investment details and dubious narratives. Hence, verifiable information was 
hard to come by and much of the case study detail had to be induced from a multitude of 
(conflicting) stories. Given these limitations, the case study presented in chapters 6, 7 and 8 is 
likely to entail inaccuracies, biases, and gaps – which all are the sole responsibility of the 
author. However so, and in spite any inaccuracies, this case study on foreign agricultural 
investment in Kenya aims to paint a realistic picture of the impact of large-scale land 
acquisitions on food security, local communities, and the link between food and security. 
The qualitative nature of the proposed case study gives way to some restrictions on 
case selection. Equally important, however, is the perspective through which the case will be 
approached. Since the research focus is to identify the impacts of land deals on the human 
and food security of local communities, it is important to first of all make the community and 
individual level of food security the level of analysis. Within this level a phenomenological 
approach will be used to draw out the local community perceptions of land deals and their 
consequences. This approach will focus on matters of lived experience; what is the essence of 
the community’s and individual’s understanding of land deals. However, in turn this 
phenomenological approach will be analysed within the Critical Realist paradigm by placing 
it in the framework of critical security studies. In the end the case study should result in a 
local and cultural significant perspective on human and food security, but also a broader 
contextualised explanation of land deal implications on food and security through a critical 
and realistic prism. 
 
Précis 
Recognising the systemic failure to achieve global food security, this thesis appreciates “the 
need to pursue alternative perspectives and objectives as the means of achieving global food 
security” (Rosin, Stock, & Campbell, 2012). As such, this thesis sets out to approach ‘food 
security’ from an international security perspective by asking the question how contemporary 
security theory changes our understanding of, and solutions for, achieving ‘food security’. 
The resolution comes in two parts: first we bring the subject of ‘food’ into the security realm 
by approach it as a matter of security; and secondly, we follow theory with reality by putting 
the security approach to the test in a contextualised case study that critically assesses the 
(human) security implications of a ‘land grab’. The objective in the first part necessitates 
deconstructing ‘food security’ since the term presents some semantic and conceptual 
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challenges. As a concept it has been rendered imprecise by the ongoing evolution, 
development, multiplication, and diversification of our thought and understanding of food 
production, availability and access. In terms of semantics there appears to be a strong 
connotation with security studies, yet conventional security thinking has no place for non-
strategic and non-military threats. However, there is now a rapidly emerging recognition that 
an important way of improving ‘food security’ – in terms of achieving a world free of hunger 
– requires us to begin with recognising food as a matter of security. Indeed, there is 
increasing evidence that food can have severe impacts on national, human, and environmental 
security. 
One of the contemporary security impacts of food is evident in the phenomenon of 
‘land grabs’ in Africa and Asia. These investments in cheap agricultural land in developing 
countries have already caused serious political, social, and environmental turmoil. 
Governments have been toppled, communities have been (violently) displaced, habitats have 
been destroyed, biodiversity has been degraded, and fresh water bodies have been diverted. 
There is no question that the security implications of these ‘land grabs’ are manifold, which 
demonstrates how just one contemporary phenomenon falling under the wider umbrella of 
‘food security’ can have such a significant impact national, human and environmental 
security. 
At the same time, however, a more holistic argument runs throughout the work, 
propounding the notion that there may be no technical solution to the world food problem. In 
other words, the idea is put forward that the natural sciences are perhaps not capable of 
single-handedly safeguarding our future food security. To be more precise, instead a solution 
to the world food problem may need to emanate from a radically changed human vision, one 
that inspires new values, ideas, morality, and above all, a change in behaviour. 
To introduce the problems facing our future food security and frame the wider 
discussion pertaining solutions, the first chapter commences by describing the malfunctioning 
world food system and outlines two generic philosophical pathways. At the centre of the 
discussion is a call for profound change, which, as argued, needs to emanate from critical 
thinking about food and security. The point being, that to achieve a desirable future we no 
longer ought to apply the habits of the past to the present, but instead integrate our hopes for 
the future in our present behaviour. Reminding us that the future is nothing more than “the 
eventual culmination of the present” (Booth, 2007, p. 63). But in a world increasingly at risk 
of non-traditional challenges, what does this mean to our sense of security? 
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The second chapter picks up upon this question by looking at the role of ‘security’ in 
a resource-constrained world. First, some preliminary questions are brought up with regard to 
the purpose and principles of security, therein creating a foundation to frame ‘food’ as a 
matter of security. Subsequently the realities of food as power and as human security are 
discussed. In the following chapter, an effort is made to deconstruct and reconceptualise the 
concept of ‘food security’. We come to see that ‘food security’ is a rather broad and complex 
concept, and often not directly related to matters of security. But to highlight the 
‘securitiness’ of food, emphasis is placed on conceptualising food as a matter of security. 
Requiring, however, an appropriate theoretical foundation to move ‘food’ into the security 
realm. 
To take on this theoretical challenge, chapter 4 introduces the study of international 
security from a critical perspective. First, food is put to the test of securitisation theory. The 
logic and neatness of this critical approach comes off as appealing, but some of its limitations 
ultimately point toward incompleteness and insufficiency in its method. Considered by many 
as even more critical in nature, the body of scholarship known as Critical Security Studies 
emerges as a promising alternative. With ‘emancipatory realism’ at its heart, its strong 
normative approach fits neatly with the notion of ‘food as security’. In the end, however, 
even greater gains seem to be made by highlighting the complementarity between both 
approaches. A broader, stronger, and more comprehensive critical approach – in the form of 
‘consequentialist security’ – could benefit the process of bringing food into the security 
realm. 
At the heart of Critical Theory, one of the underlying notions of Critical Security 
Studies, it the notion that “theory is always for someone and for some purpose” (Cox, 1981, 
p. 128). The second part of the thesis therefore moves from the theoretical dimension into the 
realm of reality. Introducing in chapter 5 the most visible and contemporary phenomenon that 
showcases the faltering world food system, foreign agricultural investments – also popularly 
known as ‘land grabs’. This practice of large-scale land acquisitions demonstrates the failed 
attempts of short-term problem-solving approaches – applying indeed the habits of the past to 
the present. It turns out, however, that there are realistic possibilities for alternative pathways 
for development that could offer more wholesome security outcomes. Accentuating the vital 
link between land, food and security, the underestimated security concerns of ‘land grabs’ are 
discussed. 
The impact of foreign agricultural investment on the real lives of people is the central 
theme of the remaining chapters. Chapter 6 takes us to East Africa where we put our teeth in 
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an intricate foreign agricultural development project in West Kenya that superbly 
contextualises the food and security problems associated with ‘land grabs’. To begin, the 
chapter first frames the discussion historically and culturally in a country context. Which is 
followed by an account of the area’s history of opportunistic development that culminates in 
the arrival of a foreign investor. Marked as ‘an agent of change’, chapter 7 tediously outlines 
the tension and conflict that this foreign investor unintentionally unleashed in Kenya’s Yala 
Swamp. At the heart of the conflict we come to find the local community’s sense of injustice 
and a wide array of environmental concerns. Finally, the role of food, security and clashing 
visions is the central theme of chapter 8. 
To conclude, we broadly contemplate how to rise to the challenges of the times in the 
final chapter. Bringing together ‘critical security in practice’ with ‘a challenge to the status 
quo’ in the formulation of an emancipatory framework for action, the argument is put 
forward that ultimately the future of food as security is determined by our vision and 
behaviour toward a desired destiny. But above all, that achieving a ‘food secure’ world 
begins with acknowledging that food is a matter of security. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Two perspectives 
 
You see things; and you say ‘Why?’  
But I dream things that never were; and I say ‘Why not?’ 
(G. B. Shaw, 1921) 
 
 A malfunctioning world food system 
 A graveyard of aspirations 
 Profound change 
 The ‘Why’ dichotomy 
 Problem-solvers and critical visionaries 
 Taking a critical perspective 
 From seeing to being 
 Being secure? 
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This first chapter commences by describing a malfunctioning world food system and 
proposes that change should come from taking a critical perspective. It asserts that the 
productive and distributive elements in the greater scheme of the world’s food supply are best 
understood to function as a ‘food network of systems’ rather than as a fully integrated ‘world 
food system’. As it is, this global network of food systems is functioning sub-optimally and is 
deficient in providing every individual with access to safe nutritious food on a daily basis. 
What is more, this tightly integrated network of food systems remains highly vulnerable to 
disruptions and conflict by nature of its globalised character and dependence upon other 
global networks (McDonald, 2010). Without structural change to this perpetuating system, 
humanity’s prospect of a food secure future begins to look all the more bleak. 
Over the course of this chapter the case will be made that change is required to this 
malfunctioning global food network of systems, which, it will be argued, should not be 
sought in the traditional problem-solving approach but instead needs to emerge from a 
critical perspective. The rationale for this approach is straightforward in that “problem-
solving theory replicates society, whereas the analytical and political orientation of critical 
theory is rooted in change” (Booth, 2007, p. 48). As such, it follows that in order to feed 9 
billion people by 2050 (United Nations Population Division, 2011) we need to employ a 
critical approach to the global food network of systems by using the method of ‘immanent 
critique’. This method of analysis is central to Critical Theory and reveals the contradictions 
between the real and ideal in the food system. Herein it seeks to awaken the reigning ‘culture 
of contentment’ (Galbraith, 1992) that, for too long, has been entrenched in the paradox of 
‘seeing but not seeing’; a mindset of denial. Accordingly, this awakening ought to initiate a 
process of emancipatory action in order to bring change to the food system. However, first a 
reigning attitude of collective inaction needs to be overcome through the use of a ‘war of 
movement’ on the hegemonic ‘culture of contentment’. This requires a bottom-up 
emancipatory approach to build momentum for a massive dynamic that will allow the 
emergence of an alternative perspective on food. The central concept in this alternative 
perspective on food needs to be an appreciation of food as security. 
With a focus on the problematic of competing and clashing visions, we start with the 
‘Why Dichotomy’ as a first step in building a foundation to find a way to move to a new 
vision. After that, the chapter following will identify several clashing visions, all relating 
back to the challenge of feeding a world with a growing population. First things first, we need 
to establish a good understanding of our current predicament in relation to the world food 
system and our vision of ‘food security’. 
22 
 
A malfunctioning world food system 
Globalisation is trumpeted to have shaped our world into a cosmopolitan city; a place thriving 
on modern technology aimed at boosting our prosperity. As a result, the world in the twenty-
first century appears conveniently ‘flat’ in that it negates the classic importance of historical 
and geographical divisions that used to shape the global market (Friedman, 2007). But this 
process has deepened the dualistic nature of our world, enlarging the conspicuous inequality 
between rich and poor (Butler, 2009). Nonetheless, the world food system remains 
notoriously difficult to manage. It seems to require an ever more concerted approach from a 
multiplicity of sectors. Disciplines such as the fields of economics, agriculture, technology, 
and development are all intensifying their attention to the many new challenges and old 
problems facing the world food system, directing their expertise to find macro- and micro-
level solutions. But their predominantly problem-solving focused approach is compounded 
by the interconnected and highly complex nature of the food system. Both natural phenomena 
and man-made challenges are increasingly adding to the complexity of the situation, with 
challenges such as demographic variations, changes in climate, natural disasters, 
environmental degradation, changing diets, spreading diseases, and growing resource scarcity 
(Cribb, 2010; McDonald, 2010). But these are not only challenges of the future; the world 
food system is already malfunctioning. Our food systems are already “deeply dysfunctional” 
asserts Olivier de Schutter, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the right to food 
(United Nations General Assembly, 2011).  
The world food system has fallen ill to a string of malignant conditions. For one, the 
system operates on the basic condition that food goes where money is. While capitalism 
offers fertile ground for such a system to develop, no doubt it were neo-liberalist policies that 
encouraged market efficiency to flourish in the extreme – thereby deepening the gap between 
the well-fed and the hungry. Similarly, even though the debate over food has moved over the 
past decades from merely political-economic production concerns toward embracing broader 
social concerns, at the same time the international community’s grip and effort to make food 
widely available and accessible under the umbrella term of ‘food security’ has been 
sidetracked by the emergence of the world food market – which is “guided by an altogether 
different calculus” (Raj Patel, 2009, p. 664). Thus in terms of food, the capitalist context is 
increasingly characterised by an overdeveloped world with massive consumption, excessive 
wastage, and a waning ‘respect’ for food. This reality, that Galbraith (1992) termed ‘the 
culture of contentment’ and Booth (2007, p. 13) describes as “the comfortable world that 
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enjoys the riches of consumerist democracy”, is utterly at odds with the ideal of an optimally 
functioning world food system that benefits all, everywhere. 
This raises the question of whether we can even truly speak of a ‘world food system’. 
Numerous bilateral and multilateral trade agreements seem to imply the existence of a global 
food order, and globalisation has played a prominent role in tightening networks of food 
imports and exports. But if this is the ‘world food system’ then it miserably fails when it is 
most needed. When push comes to shove – as the Global Food Price Crisis of 2007/2008 
showed – the international food trading system barely functions. Countries simply defect 
from the normal trade system at times when food trade is most needed (Mark Thirlwell in 
Schultz, 2010). The swift return to the national interest at times of a looming crisis clearly 
evidences the lack of a holistic approach towards (world) food security. Hence, it suggests 
that there is indeed no definitive ‘world food system’, at best we have a somewhat organised 
system of food networks that brings together “agricultural and food production systems [that] 
are not a fully incorporated system in the sense that they are an integrated whole, but are 
perhaps best discussed as a network, or a set of interconnected systems” (McDonald, 2010, p. 
28).  
McDonald’s observation that the global food system is perhaps best described as a 
network of global connectivity and complexities is by far the best characterisation of the 
current food order (See also: World Economic Forum, 2012). It was the Global Food Price 
Crisis of 2007–2008 that bluntly exposed the shortcomings and vulnerability of this 
interconnected system. For one it showed that the tight connections in the ‘network of global 
food systems’ are highly susceptible to disruptions. Even more so, the food riots and violence 
that occurred in more than thirty developing countries throughout the price crisis (Dupont & 
Thirlwell, 2009) bear witness to the potential of global networks to “[amplify] traditional 
security challenges and [create] new forms of threat and vulnerability that can impact human 
security” (McDonald, 2010, p. 29). Worse, this failure of the system is increasingly 
recognised as “not a blip, but creeping normality” (Lang, 2010, p. 95). Thus, the absence of a 
coherent and integrated world food system indicates the dysfunctional and vulnerable nature 
of the system. 
 
A graveyard of aspirations 
Without doubt, the elimination of hunger and malnutrition has since long been central to 
human development. The challenge of achieving a hunger-free world, already envisaged by 
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the international community in 1974, has proven to be massively more complicated than 
anticipated. Then U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, famously asserted to the World 
Food Conference in 1974 that “within a decade no child will go to bed hungry, that no family 
will fear for its next day’s bread and that no human being’s future and capacities will be 
stunted by malnutrition”, but in reality the number of hungry people reached an 
unprecedented high in 2009. Despite a wide array of measures deployed by the international 
community to manage the challenges of the world food situation, close to 1 billion people 
now suffer now from malnutrition or hunger. The desire of the international community to 
achieve a hunger-free world is not in question, but Shaw patently characterised the 
international community’s approach as a ‘graveyard of aspirations’ (D. J. Shaw, 2007). 
We best begin to look for solutions to this malfunctioning food system by defining 
structural aspects of the world food system through highlighting key elements in its historical 
emergence. A succinct historical exploration of these elements will be a first step in “looking 
for the emergence of rival structures expressing alternative possibilities of development” 
(Cox, 1981, p. 137). An exceptionally detailed historical account can be found in Shaw’s 
(2007) World Food Security: a history since 1945 in which he distinguishes five distinct 
phases of food security policy and practice. He adds these phases to the three shifts in 
evolution in thinking about food security that Maxwell (1996) had already identified at an 
earlier time. Together this presents an authentic account of the historical emergence of our 
food system, one that offers a better understanding of the roots of our contemporary food 
problems. For the first part, Shaw contends that: 
 
Five phases of food security policy and practice have been detected: the 1970s, 
following the world food crisis and the 1974 World Food Conference when the 
objective was to establish a global food security system; the first half of the 1980s, 
with Amartya Sen’s food entitlement concept and the counterproductive effects of IMF 
and World Bank structural adjustment programmes; the second half of the 1980s 
when the Africa famine of 1984–85, UNICEF’s work on Adjustment with a Human 
Face, and the publication of Jean Dreze and Amartya Sen’s Hunger and Public 
Action renewed impetus to action on hunger and its causes; and the 1990s with its 
series of international conferences which emphasized poverty as the major cause of 
hunger and malnutrition and broadened the concept of food security. (D. J. Shaw, 
2007, p. 385) 
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Shaw outlines how the modern understanding of ‘food security’ made a first appearance 
when national food security was placed at the centre of attention in the 1970s. This was 
followed by a shift to individual entitlements that became characteristic of ‘food security’ in 
the 1980s (M. Smith, Pointing, & Maxwell, 1992). During the 1990s a deeper recognition for 
the role of poverty developed, and the concept of food security was expanded to include 
social-economic access to food as well as a focus on nutrition. Next and most recently, the 
first decade of the twenty-first century kicked off with a bold commitment to halve by 2015 
the proportion of people suffering from hunger (United Nations General Assembly, 2000). 
Yet, at the same time food prices radically escalated. With prices surging up, instead of going 
down, the halving of the proportion of people suffering from hunger by 2015 became 
suddenly an improbable proposition. 
Underlying these three shifts in thinking about food security and five phases of food 
policy and practice is a deeper, more fundamental, conceptualisation of the global history of 
our so-called ‘food regimes’. First formulated by Friedmann (1987), and more systematically 
conceptualised by Friedmann and McMichael (1989) and later Araghi (2003), “[food regimes 
theory] has been directed at understanding how agrarian structures and state agricultural 
policies developed over time in both the North/center and South/periphery” (Buttel, 2001, p. 
173). Pilcher aptly describes the food regime analysis pioneered by Friedmann and 
McMichaell as “[proposing] structured historical narratives–always subject to 
reinterpretation–that help situate the conditions of conflict and stability characterizing 
agrofood relations in a given moment.” (Lang, 2010, p. 375) As such McMichael outlines the 
usefulness of ‘food regime’ analysis; noting that it allows for: 
 
problematising linear representations of agricultural modernisation, underlining the 
pivotal role of food in global political-economy, and conceptualising key historical 
contradictions in particular food regimes that produce crisis, transformation and 
transition. In this sense, food regime analysis brings a structured perspective to the 
understanding of agriculture and food’s role in capital accumulation across time and 
space. (McMichael, 2009, p. 140) 
 
It is not hard to see how the features of this so-called ‘structured perspective’ on food and 
agriculture has been tremendously useful in tracing and explaining the emergence of 
political-economic and agricultural parameters that strategically position food in the world 
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capitalist economy. This makes food regimes a distinctive perspective in the sociology of 
agriculture, in the sense that it 
 
reflects periodic shifts in hegemonic regimes which are anchored in the politics of 
how commodity chains and production systems come to be constructed and 
coordinated over borders and boundaries of the constituent political units within the 
system. (Buttel, 2001, p. 173) 
 
Food regime theory has “effectively transformed the way in which the global political 
economy of agriculture [is] theorized” (Campbell, 2012, p. 39); becoming a widely accepted 
approach to historicising the global food system (McMichael, 2009). Buttel even contends 
that this “‘regime-type’ work has proven to be one of the most durable perspectives in 
agrarian studies” (2001, p. 173). Indeed, the rise and decline of global food regimes certainly 
offers a unique and valuable perspective on the contemporary failing world food system. 
Considering the scope of the present conceptualisation of ‘food as security’, however, we 
have to be careful not to get side-tracked into elaborate food analyses informed by political-
economy; food politics; and agrarian configurations of geopolitical power. Thus, while food 
regimes offer a valuable politico-historical perspective on food, the direction of the present 
work should remain focused on the objective of conceptualising food as a matter of security.  
That said, more contemporary contemplations of food regimes have slowly opened 
new doors; touching upon alternative social visions and social movements to offer a better 
understanding of the modern ‘foundational divide’; described by McMichael as 
 
a foundational divide between environmentally catastrophic agro-industrialisation 
and alternative, agroecological practices that is coming to a head now as we face a 
historic threshold governed by peak oil, peak soil, climate change, and malnutrition 
of the ‘stuffed and starved’ kind across the world. (McMichael, 2009, p. 141) 
 
McMichael’s point is, that the first formulation of ‘food regimes’ described the “juxtaposition 
of successive moments of British, and US, hegemony”; demonstrating how the original 
notion of the theory of food regimes embodies “a historical conjuncture comprising 
contradictory principles” (McMichael, 2009, p. 147). Now, with the dynamics of the twenty-
first century, a new central contradiction between a ‘global corporate food regime’ and ‘local 
smallholder food regime’ is revealed. When thinking about food as a matter of human 
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security the emergence of social food movements certainly bears some relevance to the 
present discussion.  
Friedmann already postulated a notion of ‘democratic food policy’ in 1993; 
describing it as ‘[emphasising] proximity and seasonality – sensitivity to place and time’, 
‘rooted in local economies’, ‘in harmony with nature’, ‘[to] reconstruct the diversity 
destroyed by the monocultural regions and transnational integration of the food regime’ 
(Harriet Friedmann, 1993, pp. 55-56). More recently, McMichael (2005) has also looked in to 
social movements that express alternative relationships to land, farming and food. It is the 
foundational divide of the corporate food regime that, according to McMichael, “embodies 
the tensions between a trajectory of ‘world agriculture’ and cultural survival, expressed in the 
politics of ‘food sovereignty’” (McMichael, 2005, p. 278). We return in more detail to the 
foundational divided in chapter 3, where food sovereignty is discussed. 
Prior to the formulation of ‘food regimes’, the paradox of the food system – and 
perhaps the underlying cause of the graveyard of aspirations – was already observed by Aziz 
in 1979: “food is a basic human need but it is also a commodity traded every year for billions 
of dollars. The World Food Conference [1974] emphasised the first aspect but did not grasp 
the full implications of the latter” (Aziz, 1979, p. 22). The international community stills 
seems to have difficulty in balancing the existential nature with the economic value of food. 
Over the most recent period in the history of food security we have seen the number of 
malnourished people in the world rise for the first time in history to over 1 billion in 2009 
(Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2009b). The unforeseen surge in 
food prices was caused by a myriad of underlying and interconnected conditions (Dupont & 
Thirlwell, 2009). As we have seen, the complexity of these conditions is associated with 
globalisation and has brought to the forefront the idea of perceiving the ‘world food system’ 
rather as a global network of food systems rather than as an functionally integrated entity 
(McDonald, 2010). Globalisation was king in the naughties, and it allowed for the ever 
increasing complexity of global networks of food systems to prosper. Yet, in doing so it 
cloaked the true nature of the food order for a long time, revealing only by the end of the 
previous decade that in reality we all along operated in the absence of a proper ‘world food 
system’. Perchance, this revelation informs a new approach towards food security policy and 
practice that will shape the present and future phases of ‘food security’. 
This concise historical account does not by far do justice to the uniquely detailed 
history of world food security offered by Shaw (2007), however, its purpose here is to 
highlight a series of advancements in the understanding and appreciation of the concept of 
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food security. The progression in the phases identified by Shaw shows a gradual movement 
of the international community towards a better understanding and deeper appreciation of the 
human entitlement to food and the impact of hunger on individual human lives. This general 
evolution in thinking about the concept of food security is distinguished by Maxwell in three 
broad shifts: “from the global and the national to the household and the individual”; “from a 
food first perspective to a livelihood perspective”; and “from objective indicators to 
subjective perception” (Maxwell, 2001). The first shift emphasises the importance of access 
to food over the conventional focus on production and supply. The second identifies a shift 
from thinking about food security as a short-term goal to alleviate hunger towards a view of 
food security as “the long-term viability of the household as a productive and reproductive 
unit” (Maxwell, 1996, p. 158). Thirdly, there has been a shift from objective consumption 
target levels towards individual subjective assessment of the required quantity and quality of 
food.  
The notion that globalisation has produced a complex global network of food systems 
instead of an integrated world food system, perhaps ought to alert us to the importance of a 
imminent fourth shift in our thinking about the concept of food security. This shift has to be 
two-pronged. First there will be the need for a stronger appreciation of food as a global 
matter of security for everyone instead of perceiving food as a developmental matter with 
limited relevance to the developed world. A gradual process of securitising food may bring 
into focus the virtually forgotten relationship between food and survival, chiefly by relating 
food as a subject for survival in perspective to the world’s growing population, resource-
constrained environment and climate challenges. Possibly a securitising move may even be 
sufficient to emphasis the close ties between food, survival, and conflict. McDonald (2010, p. 
29) mentions the amplification of security risks that come with increased connectivity of food 
systems – for instance the World Health Organization (2002) published the report Terrorist 
Threats to Food, but the notion of ‘security’ in relation to food is essentially more 
fundamental, even existential. 
Secondly, as we have seen the international community endeavoured for decades to 
eradicate hunger, but failed. This may indicate that we need to leave the graveyard of 
aspirations created by international high-politics and move the focus to emancipatory action 
at the level of the individual, which through an intensifying massive dynamic, could bring 
change to human behaviour and ultimately reform our understanding of ‘food security’. 
Accordingly, this broad shift in understanding will first need to reconstruct the concept from 
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‘food security’ to ‘food as security’ and then move from seeking solutions in high-politics, to 
finding emancipatory solutions. 
In a world with a faltering food system, or as we have seen rather more precisely a 
misaligned global network of food systems, the increasing complexity of globalisation has 
left us with many vulnerabilities that will unquestionably lead to disruptions – perchance 
even to conflicts in a not so distant future. In observing that the theoretical aim of world food 
security has so far not been met, Cochrane contends that “if current mechanisms are not 
facilitating the aim it may require consideration of entirely new models of how countries 
engage with one another” (Cochrane, 2011). This necessitates that we leave behind the 
prevailing social order, the existing power relationships, and move away from this 
unfortunate graveyard of aspirations. It appears that we cannot structurally change our food 
system by accepting the world and power relationships as we have found them (Cox, 1981). 
Rather, we need to reconceptualise our understanding of the food order to challenge 
regressive ideas and replace them with radical alternatives (Booth, 2007). Yet, as Booth 
contends, these alternatives should be “both more realistic about the state we are in and more 
rational about the practices that offer real hope” (Booth, 2007, p. 26). Not coincidently, the 
foregoing exploration of how the existing food order came about has already commenced the 
quest for feasible alternative scenarios that could potentially lead to a reconceptualised ‘world 
food system’. To change the food order we need to call into question not only the problems of 
the existing world but also dig into the origins of the social and political relationships that 
gave rise to the system, this transcending approach is known as Critical Theory (Cox, 1981). 
 
Profound change 
The twentieth century has been vividly awash with significant change. Humanity faced 
arduous social, political, and economic challenges, however, pushed forward boldly. Two 
World Wars shook the foundation of human society, and in its wake a bipolar security 
environment emerged, revolving entirely around geopolitical and military strategies 
concerned with doom-scenarios of nuclear warfare. As a result, mainstream discourse on the 
subject of mankind’s survival long revolved heavily around the gloomy possibility of nuclear 
annihilation. Finally, at the dawn of the twenty-first century, when the conventional security 
distractions of Cold War were out of the way, the international community began to take 
seriously a range of unconventional threats to the environment. One of the first prominent 
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materialisations of these concerns was the landmark 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro 
which focussed on the environment and development. 
Twenty years later world leaders have once again met, this time at the 2012 Rio+20 
summit, where they discussed what the world will look like in 20 years. In the run-up to 
Rio+20, themed “The Future We Want”, the topic ‘food’ was listed as one of the seven 
critical discussion points for the summit. The United Nations sustainable development 
website noted in this regard that: 
 
A profound change of the global food and agriculture system is needed if we are to 
nourish today’s 925 million hungry and the additional 2 billion people expected by 
2050. (United Nations, 2012) 
 
While a profound change in the global food and agriculture system is unquestionably needed, 
uncertainty prevails over the type of change required. For one, the above statement already 
limits the rationale that underpins the desire for change by arguing that it is required because 
we need to feed the hungry and the growing world population. Arguably, however, in its most 
fundamental sense the raison d’être for change depends principally on one’s vision of 
humanity and the world. We need to ask ourselves how profound do we want change to be? 
Are practical and technological fixes to the system sufficient, or perhaps we first need to 
change our vision of the future of humanity? 
Notably, we need to explore how the reigning vision of humanity – with respect to its 
position vis-à-vis others species and the world – has given rise to the present faltering global 
food and agricultural system. If this vision has brought us to our present predicament, then 
formulating the type of profound change to the food order requires us to begin by digging 
deeper into the roots of this vision. But contrary to common belief the vision that propelled 
humankind’s rise, development and expansion will in all likelihood also befall its collapse. 
Daniel Quinn (1992, 1996, 1997) has made an elaborate argument – in Socratic style – 
throughout his books Ishmael, The Story of B and My Ishmael which describes a particular 
cultural vision that underlies the problematic of the existing world, which has systematically 
shaped the – now malfunctioning – world food system. However, before engaging in a 
discussion of content of this vision, an outline of Quinn’s particular take on ‘visions’ and 
‘programs’ will be salutary to establishing a cogent foundation to further build upon. 
We can describe a ‘vision’, following Quinn, as the likes of a river flowing in a 
certain direction; with, in its stream, novel ideas bubbling up to open new doors to success, 
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all in pursuance of a desirable version of the future (Quinn, 1996, p. 57). Conversely, 
‘programs’ are found to “invariably run counter to vision” and are by nature provisional and 
temporary initiatives aimed at defeating a vision (Quinn, 1996, p. 55). In fact, programs are 
inherently reactionary, “they always follow, never lead” (Quinn, 1996, p. 57). Following the 
river analogy, programs are “sticks set in the riverbed to impede the flow” (Quinn, 1996, p. 
55). Quinn’s take on programs, however, seems somewhat too downbeat. While programs 
may indeed run counter to vision, the question is to which vision. After all, if programs are 
the sticks in the riverbed that impede the flow, one could imagine that if well placed they can 
redirect the flow and change the course of the river/vision. Even though Quinn indeed notes 
that programs are not inherently bad, he still regards them as merely ways of “[making] it 
possible to look busy and purposeful while failing” (Quinn, 1999, p. 16). Interestingly, this 
explanation of programs corresponds in great detail with Shaw’s (2007) impression of the 
international community’s ‘graveyard of aspirations’. At any rate, programs may in fact often 
defeat vision, though in doing they essentially support an alternative vision. 
With this in mind, the vision that Quinn highlights as ‘the problematic’ is found in 
nearly all human cultures; it is therefore the ‘cultural vision’ of human population expansion, 
or more generally even, a vision of growth. A caveat, however, is in place; this cultural vision 
of growth should not be considered as equivalent to being human. Differently formulated, 
this vision of growth is not inherently a characteristic of humanity, it is merely a vision that 
humanity adopted some 10,000 years ago with the introduction of (totalitarian) agriculture. 
Hence, this particular vision of growth and population expansion is merely one instance of a 
cultural vision – albeit that this specific vision is shared by a tremendous number of people. 
Incidentally, this cultural vision emerged from the misguided impression that 
humanity is at the pinnacle of evolution; the ultimate advancement of species on earth. By 
nature of this fallacious notion, the human species has claimed the right to own and rule the 
world. After all, the Bible tells us: “Rule over the fish of the sea and the birds of the air and 
over every living creature that moves on the ground” (Genesis 1:28, New International 
Version). And, with this belief that the world is made for men, humankind obstreperously 
inhabits and exploits the natural world. But for any other species population expansion is not 
problematic, since population size is naturally kept in check by the availability of food. Once 
population size crosses the threshold of food availability it will naturally decrease. Humanity, 
however, has found a way to defeat nature: totalitarian agriculture. By itself agriculture is not 
a harmful practice; it offers nothing more than a way to foster the regrowth of the foods that 
you favour. But totalitarian agriculture, as Quinn explains, is predicated on the notion that the 
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world belongs to us, we can take every piece of land, fence it off, and grow as much food as 
we want – to exclusively feed humanity (Quinn, 2005). The problematic is that this has 
fuelled a tremendous human population expansion, totalitarian agriculture is thus a technical 
solution to defeat nature’s feedback loop. The disastrous effect of totalitarian agriculture is 
simple: boosting food production leads to indefinite population growth, since “intensification 
of production to feed an increased population leads to a still greater increase in population” 
(Farb, 1978, p. 121). This would not be of any significance, if not, as Hardin said, “a finite 
world can support only a finite population; therefore, population growth must eventually 
equal zero” (Hardin, 1968, p. 1243). Quinn asserts that the key to zero population growth is 
contained in Farb’s observation, by pointing out that we need to cease our quest to increase 
food production because it only fuels a population explosion rather than feeds the starving 
(Quinn, 1992, p. 142; 2005). Simon (1990, 1998), however, disagrees and contends that in 
the long-run population growth is actually beneficial to humanity and even its ‘ultimate 
resource’. His theory states – in a nutshell – that “population will grow, knowledge will 
increase, economies will develop, liberty will flourish” (Simon, 1990, p. 100). Clearly this 
makes Simon a strong proponent for programs that offer technical solutions to our problems, 
since he is not inclined to see a compelling argument in Hardin’s objection against infinite 
population growth. The tendency nowadays, however, is for commentators to side with 
Hardin’s theory of ‘the tragedy of the commons’ rather than Simon’s notion of ‘the ultimate 
resource’.  
Going back at last to what the profound change to the global food and agriculture 
system should precisely consist of, it now appears that this wholly depends on the vision it 
originates from. An alternative ‘vision of harmony’ could begin by questioning the idea of 
feeding an additional 2 billion. Profound change in this alternative paradigm would include 
programs that focus on redistribution of food, enhancing access to food, and making existing 
agriculture sustainable – but certainly not intensifying or expanding food production. The 
predominant vision of growth (through human population expansion) pushes in all areas for 
programs that enable an intensification of food production – such as scientific research, 
farmland expansion, but also sustainable agriculture. Fundamentally, this vision is grounded 
in the belief that human growth is natural, and therefore, “the moral good of producing more 
food seems unquestionable” (Moon, 2005). 
But what are the implications for food and security contained in the vision of growth 
and the alternative vision of harmony? Both visions can have far-reaching implications for 
the future of humanity and the world, but most immediately, they also confer severe 
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ramifications to the food order and security environment. In terms of food, Lang (2003) 
points out that we already face competing visions for the future of food: food security or food 
sovereignty/democracy. As for international security, immediate security concerns should 
focus on high food prices, food riots, and land conflict, but the more existential security 
concerns pertain to a clash between the developing and developed world, food and water 
wars, and a the possibility of a global collapse. 
According to Quinn, a change in cultural vision depends on readiness or unreadiness, 
if the time is right a new idea “will sweep the world like wildfire” (Quinn, 1996, p. 56). It 
seems questionable, however, if a new vision will indeed automatically be self-spreading and 
self-sustaining with no more than right timing? Twenty years after the first Rio Earth Summit 
there are strong calls for action instead of discussion, raising the question of whether the 
summit is stuck in the old vision, or if the time is not yet right for a new vision. Even so, it 
remains to be seen whether any action proposed at Rio+20 will come in the form of another 
round of programs aimed at making a better future somewhat more likely, or indeed in the 
form of a more radical new vision for ‘the future we want’ – whatever that may be. 
 
The ‘Why Dichotomy’ 
Robert F. Kennedy famously paraphrased a line from Shaw’s (1921) Back to Methuselah in 
saying “there are those that look at things the way they are, and ask why? I dream of things 
that never were, and ask why not?” The phrase explicitly denotes a dichotomy in the way 
people look at the world.1 There are those people that see reality and ask ‘why?’ and there are 
those people that dream of alternative realities and ask ‘why not?’. Within both of these two 
groups of people there is another fundamental differentiating element: a comprehension of 
reality and interest in the world. This additional delineation, however, does not affect the 
original dichotomy between those who ask ‘why?’ and ‘why not?’ Even so, this amounts to at 
least four types of people who all play a role in our future prospects on food and security 
(Table 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 The use of the word ‘world’ here denotes the natural, ecological world; not the human, social order. 
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The ‘Why 
Dichotomy’ 
 
No comprehension of the world 
or interest in saving the world 
Comprehension of the world and 
interest in saving the world 
 
Sees reality 
(Why?) 
 
Helpless man 
(Looks in disbelief at the world) 
Leavers 
Scientist 
(Programs to improve the 
existing world) 
Problem-solvers 
 
Dreams alternatives 
(Why not?) 
 
Reckless man 
(Takes the world for himself) 
Takers 
Philosopher 
(Visions of an alternative world) 
Critical visionaries 
Table 1: The ‘Why Dichotomy’ 
 
The first group of people, those who look at the world and ask ‘why?’, fall broadly into two 
groups: helpless men and scientists. The helpless man struggles with comprehending the 
complexity of the world, he misunderstands the circumstances that affect life, and therefore 
feels victimised by the harsh realities of the world out there. Accordingly, he looks at reality 
surrounding him with a sense of helplessness, and asks in disbelief why? Conversely, the 
scientist is wholly interested in the functioning of world’s mechanisms that make up reality, 
he gathers facts on how things work, and asks questions like “’Why is that the situation?’, 
‘What do we do about that?’, ‘How do we solve that?’” (Horton, 2012). The scientist does 
not dream, rather though, he picks apart reality to comprehend the world and identify, analyse 
and respond to problems in a real way (Horton, 2012). This approach is best characterised as 
problem-solving, the scientist takes the world as he finds it and sets out to improve or modify 
some of its problematic conditions. 
The second group of people is those who dream of things that never were and ask 
‘why not?’ They question the world as it exists and dream of alternative realities. The 
reckless man questions the natural order of things and is convinced that he rules the world. 
With some comprehension of the world’s mechanisms, he dreams of ways to reap benefit 
from his powerful position by devising plans to take from the world what he beliefs rightfully 
belongs to him. For every new plan, he simply says ‘why not?’ and goes ahead. The reckless 
man is not interested in dreaming about a world that can be a better place for everyone; 
instead he endeavours to take the world for himself. The philosopher also questions the world 
as it exists, but takes a step back to critically assess reality, and then dreams of alternative 
possibilities for a future world and asks ‘why not?’. Like the scientist, the philosopher is 
interested in the problems that affect the world, however, he does not respond in real-time 
with problem-solving programs. Instead, the philosopher embraces the problematic at a larger 
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scale, by taking a wider, historically inspired, and critical perspective which informs a vision 
of feasible alternative realities. 
It must be noted, however, that these categories of people do not inherently define 
who we are, they are an indication of how we act. Certainly, some people find themselves 
(in)voluntary and (un)consciously locked into one of these roles, even so, for the most part 
people are free in choice of action. It is therefore important to emphasise that individuals 
inherently possess all of the above traits, but unfortunately often find themself confined or in 
close affinity with one of the particular groups. Similarly it is difficult to ‘map’ professions 
onto this framework, take for instance politicians and entrepreneurs, sometimes we chasten 
them for their madly reckless behaviour, at other times we praise their scientific problem-
solving approach, and occasionally we cannot but admire their vision and conception of a 
genuinely alternative reality. 
While both the helpless and reckless man play a part in the future of food and 
security, the scientist and the philosopher are the ones we may expect to lead the way in 
determining how we ought to proceed. This warrants a more elaborate look at the ways in 
which the scientist and the philosopher set out their approach to improve the world.  
 
Problem-solvers and critical visionaries 
As we have seen, scientists are mostly problem-solvers. They take as point of departure the 
world as they find it and use the natural sciences to produce technical solutions to problems 
facing humanity. Feeding a growing population is presently seen as one of humanity’s 
foremost challenges, but in doing so scientists have already given us an irrefutable example 
of the problem-solving approach: the Green Revolution. During the 1960s and 1970s the 
Green Revolution served as a technical solution to avert famine in the developing world by 
dramatically increasing crop yields to feed a rapidly growing population. The introduction of 
high-yielding hybrid strains of wheat, rice, and corn was the result of “years of painstaking 
scientific research” (Lobb, 2003, p. 155). Together with the hybrid crops, the science and 
technology behind the Green Revolution (pesticides, chemical fertiliser, irrigation, and 
modern equipment) has been lauded as a revolutionary technical solution for developing 
countries to depend less on food imports despite having a rapidly growing population (Moon, 
2005, p. 886). But, critics of the Green Revolution contend that it has failed the test of social 
justice and sustainability. Julian Cribb’s book The Coming Famine presents another recent 
example of the scientific approach. Cribb identifies and analyses the problems affecting our 
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present and future food security, and responds by proposing programs and technical solutions 
to steer clear from the prospect of a coming famine. Yet, if we do not also alter our cultural 
vision, these programs will only delay the onset of the coming famine. Admittedly, Crib does 
propose a program to create wiser consumers by introducing a ‘food year’ in the school 
curriculum (Cribb, 2010, p. 181). Yet the predominant focus on programs reveals the inherent 
problem of the problem-solving approach, namely that the sum of our solutions does not 
balance the weight of our problems. Even our finest intentions and best technical solutions 
will not produce a situation of ‘food security’ – since an increase in food production always 
triggers a growth in population. 
Philosophers, at the outset, also endeavour to resolve the problems facing humanity 
and the world. They, however, are not technical problem-solvers, but as critical evaluators 
they set out to change human values and ideas of morality, and above all, propose visions of 
alternative realities. To do so, though, requires a rejection of the existing framework as point 
of departure. Instead, it demands taking a step back to rethink the social order and critically 
assess reality with the aim of uncovering feasible scenarios for an alternative future. Though, 
these are not Philosophers in the traditional sense, the critical evaluative approach enables 
one to envision alternative pathways for development. But visions of realistic and feasible 
alternatives requires a critical approach, as Nye comments, “nearly everyone can think of 
seven impossible things before breakfast on any given day” (Nye, 1987, p. 245). 
To bring profound change to the food order and agricultural system who should we 
turn to, scientists or philosophers? As a species, humanity is, as Booth concurs, brilliantly 
innovative with the ability to imagine the infinite, whilst at once also being collectively mad 
and sometimes unable see what is in front of our eyes (Booth, 2007, p. 20). At present, 
though, the prevailing vision evidently favours the technical solutions of the problem-solvers 
(Bostock et al., 2010; Godfray et al., 2010; Piesse & Thirtle, 2010). After all, it is less 
demanding to take the existing reality and improve the problematic conditions in the world 
than to critically rethink the entire cultural vision that permeates humanity – even though the 
latter may more worthy of praise. But caution is advised, “’problem solving,’ as it is 
understood in our culture, is largely a matter of placing sticks in the river” (Bennett, 2011). 
Even more, the problem-solving approach has for long now been the dominant paradigm, 
which means that every ‘solution’ along the way has in some fashion been the origin of a 
problem. Ultimately, therefore, it is this way of thinking has brought us our present 
predicament (Bennett, 2011). 
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Taking a critical perspective 
Why do we need a critical perspective? The foremost reason for taking a critical stance on the 
problematic of the world food system is that with the use of Critical Theory we not only 
respond to empirical curiosity, but also have room to “pursue moral politics, and to rise to the 
challenges of the times” (Booth, 2007, p. 89). Thus the use of Critical Theory serves a 
distinct purpose. Cox notes that ‘theory’ generally serves two distinct purposes (Cox, 1981, p. 
128). The first purpose of ‘theory’ is to solve immediate problems. This problem-solving 
approach takes as its point of departure the world as it finds it and aims to assist to solve 
problems within this particular perspective of reality. Thus, the prevailing social order and 
power relationships are not questioned but taken as the given framework for action (Cox, 
1981). The second purpose of theory, on the contrary, starts with contemplating what 
perspectives on reality are available and aims to “open up the possibility of choosing a 
different valid perspective from which the problematic becomes one of creating an alternative 
world” (Cox, 1981, p. 128). This critical approach takes a step back to appreciate the 
complex functioning of the whole world, it reveals different perspectives on reality, and 
therein transcends the idea of a fixed social and political order. In other words, Critical 
Theory “reconnects (theoretical) knowledge of the everyday practice of power, and opens up 
a previously foreclosed debate about the way we ‘know’ and create reality” (George, 1993, p. 
218). 
For long the problem-solving approach has been the main paradigm that served up 
agricultural and technological solutions to feed a growing world population. However, as we 
have seen, this approach has still been unable to structurally bring down the number of people 
suffering from hunger and malnutrition, and produced an inegalitarian and faltering world 
food system. Thus, it is time to take a step back from the prevailing social and political order 
and consider alternative perspectives that could offer a viable process of change. The 
dialectic has already been introduced by defining the structure of the world food system 
through looking at its historical situation. Subsequently, we need to continue ‘by looking for 
the emergence of rival structures expressing alternative possibilities of development’ (Cox, 
1981, p. 137). For food, these ‘emerging rival structures’ can be broadly found in ideas 
surrounding the notion of empowering people to define their own food systems rather than 
rely on the whims of markets and corporations. The most prominent instance of such a 
critical alternative possibility for change is the idea of ‘food sovereignty’ (to be discussed in 
chapter 3). 
38 
 
Within the realm of critical thinking, the name ‘Critical Theory’ is perhaps a 
misnomer since it is not so much a general theory than one that presents “a method of 
analysis deriving from a nonpositivist epistemology” (Antonio, 1981, p. 332). Immanent 
critique serves as the central method of analysis in Critical Theory, entailing to attack social 
reality “from its own standpoint” as well as “from the perspective of its historical context” 
(Antonio, 1981, p. 338). More fundamentally, by summarising Horkheimer, Antonio affirms 
that immanent critique expresses “the dialectic in history which is driven by the 
contradictions between ideology and reality” (Antonio, 1981, p. 338). Revealing the dialectic 
between reality and ideology is a precarious exercise aimed at “detecting the societal 
contradictions which offer the most determinate possibilities for emancipatory social change” 
(Antonio, 1981, p. 332). As illustration of revealing such a dialectic we can look at Carr’s 
observation that the science of international politics, while it was in its infancy during the 
inter-war years (1919-1939), allowed “wishing to prevail over thinking” and focused 
“exclusively on the end to be achieved” (1946, p. 8). He argues that the eventual onset of 
WWII demonstrated the “inadequacy of pure aspiration” and forced the discipline to finally 
“embark on serious critical and analytical thought about international problems” (Carr, 1946, 
p. 9). And so the discipline of International Relations became all of a sudden exposed to the 
contradictions between ideology and reality. In this instance, however, the attack on social 
reality was not the result of immanent critique but rather caused by an external event – in the 
form of the onset of WWII. 
The global food order, regrettably, demonstrates this very dialectic. This is visible, on 
the one hand, in the international community’s grand ideology of food, envisioning 
eradication of extreme poverty and hunger, transcribed at the start of the twenty-first century 
as Millennium Development Goal 1. Yet on the other hand, this commitment undeniably 
contradicts with an unwavering reality of hunger and an unchanged vision. In 2009 the Food 
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) announced that hunger had been on the rise in the first 
decade of the twenty-first century, peaking at just over 1 billion undernourished people in 
2009 (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2009b). Thus for the global 
food system this raises an extremely timely question: can we afford to merely wish that 
human ingenuity will prevent the food order from spiralling out of control or should we 
instead seriously direct our minds to a critical methodology to find realistic alternatives? So 
far the international community seems to have favoured the former, with their endeavours to 
give rise to a situation of food security for all which is regrettably but rightfully characterised 
by Shaw as “the graveyard of aspirations” (2007, p. x). 
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Marx (1887) and Horkheimer (1947) have considered the underlying problems of a 
dialectic, arguing that it is the bourgeoisie and ruling groups who attempt to deny the 
existence of contradictions by “[portraying] a false unity of the ideal and real” (Antonio, 
1981, p. 338). This would then make the first goal of immanent critique to “[reveal] the 
contradictions of claim and context” so as to preclude the option of denial (Antonio, 1981, p. 
338). The next section from seeing to being will explore in more detail the first step of 
revealing the truth and the matter of denial. Yet, even if we succeed in exposing claim and 
context, immanent critique goes a step further by aiming to “transform legitimations into 
emancipatory weapons” (Antonio, 1981, p. 338). In other words, the ultimate objective of 
immanent critique is to transcend the stage of denial (or ignorance) by revealing the rift 
between ideal and real, this realisation ought to deterministically lead to emancipatory action 
with the intention to make “the ideal real” (Antonio, 1981, p. 338). 
Contemplating the circumstances of our contemporary food order, the ‘elites’ in the 
twenty-first century social system may indeed be rendering a fictitious version of reality. The 
affluent minority of elites is comfortably content within the confines of their consumerist 
democracies, perhaps not perfectly ideal but certainly proficient in filling their bellies and 
distracting their minds from a reality of widespread global hunger. Fortunately, the 
technological achievements of the modern age make it virtually impossible to stay away from 
daily exposure to famine, climate change, conflict, and growing resource scarcity, through the 
media’s 24/7 approach that focuses on disasters and catastrophes. The prolonged and 
recurring exposure to these harsh realities slowly begins to awaken our consciousness to the 
possibility of a food dialectic. Only bit by bit do elites appear to begin to grasp the 
contradictions and slowly wake up from their ignorance, no longer strappingly resorting to 
full-fledged denial. The ‘awakening’, however, does not appear to deterministically lead to 
emancipatory action, although there are certainly some strong calls for action (See: L. R. 
Brown, 2009b, 2011c; Cribb, 2010). Rather though, those who become aware of the food 
dialectic appear unable to take individual or concerted action, instead they get stuck in a 
powerful mode of inaction. This collective inaction on the part of the elites appears to 
emanate from the wrongful notion that the contradiction between ideology (food security) 
and reality (hunger) reflects an unamendable reality, at least not changeable for the 
individual. It can certainly be an overwhelming experience to become aware of a global food 
system with such a degree of complexity and inequality, but then again, are we positive that 
the system is truly too intricate in nature for any individual to make a meaningful change? 
Obviously, we cannot let the complexity of the subject’s dialectic stands in the way of 
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“[replacing] inaction based on the false correspondence with emancipatory praxis aimed at 
making the ideal real” (Antonio, 1981, p. 338). Although there is fundamentally “no sounder 
basis for practice than immanent critique” (Booth, 2007, p. 45), the swelling body of 
‘enlightened’ elites that realise the food system and their future food security may be in 
danger remain stuck in collective inaction. Even so much so that that once they realise that 
“emancipation is not reduced to a formal possibility” (Antonio, 1981, p. 341), they still fail to 
engage in praxis. Perhaps, their mistake lies in considering immanent critique as a substitute 
for praxis, instead of as a base for action (Antonio, 1981, p. 342). Still, this gives us no 
conclusive reason for the breakdown of the process. The next question we need to address 
therefore is how immanent critique is unsuccessful in leading to emancipatory action on food. 
Instead, the process gets stuck at collective inaction after the awakening. Conceivably, a vital 
element is missing or corrupting the equation. 
 
From seeing to being 
Seeing but not seeing is an expression analogous to knowing but not knowing. The latter was 
coined by Cohen (2001) to describe the workings of the concept of denial; a “perplexing state 
of knowing and not knowing at the same time” (p. 25). Booth conveniently repurposed 
Cohen’s concept into seeing but not seeing, depicting a mindset aware of the “morbid 
symptoms” that are proliferating all around us, even though “those most able to do something 
about them are in a state of denial” (Booth, 2007, p. 18). In the present context this notion 
stands for the near absent aptitude of the world’s collective of individuals to move from 
seeing to being. Differently formulated, there is an unforgiving reality out there – of hunger, 
climate change, population growth, water scarcity, etc... – one that is virtually impossible for 
most individuals not to observe, or at least register to a certain extent. The knowledge of this 
reality, however, does generally not translate in changed human behaviour. As it seems, the 
disconnect lies at the heart of the transformation from seeing and knowing to being by acting. 
For instance, in exploring human behaviour and the matter of sustainability, Fischer et al. 
contend that “the primary barrier ... no longer lies in a lack of knowledge about biophysical 
or social problems” but “the main challenge is to act on existing knowledge and to actively 
work toward a sustainable future” (Fischer et al., 2012).  
The paradox of seeing but not seeing is at times brazenly visible and exceptionally 
frustrating. Take the example of former U.S. President George H.W. Bush who emphasised 
in a press address during the 1992 Rio Earth Summit that “the United States fully intends to 
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be the world’s preeminent leader in protecting the global environment” (Bush, 1992). Earlier, 
at that same conference, however, President Bush had proclaimed that “the American way of 
life is not negotiable”. Paradoxically, Bush was unmistakably seeing “the warnings that we 
are headed for an ecological and environmental perfect storm” (Wheeler, 2004), yet 
concurrently displayed a strong unwillingness to connect the dots between the United States 
protecting the environment and altering the behaviour of American individuals.  
To Booth this kind of denial by state leaders is considered more serious than by 
ordinary citizens, since “with power comes responsibility” (Booth, 2007, p. 19). Admittedly, 
certain problems do require attention and action at the level of state leaders, but for the most 
“the collective actions of individuals ... lie[s] at the heart of the dilemma” (Ehrlich & 
Kennedy, 2005, p. 562). There are certainly high-level efforts worth mentioning, in particular 
the work of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the right to food, who declared that 
“our food systems are making people sick” (2012) and hence outlined five policy priorities 
that touch the heart of food systems in both the developed and developing world (United 
Nations General Assembly, 2011). But the adoption of new policies alone is hardly adequate 
to bring genuine change to human behaviour in terms of lifestyle, diet and consumption 
patterns. 
The conundrum seeing but not seeing has long been central to matters like the 
environment and sustainability (Ehrlich & Kennedy, 2005; Fischer et al., 2012), but it is no 
surprise that this expression also increasingly bears relevance to our mindset and attitude on 
the subject of food. Most of us know deep in our heart that our present patterns of 
consumption are unsustainable; that there is great inequality in global food distribution; and 
that our diets are not very nutritious, yet we fail to truly see these problems and respond with 
concrete and appropriate action. This is Hardin’s classic dilemma of the tragedy of the 
commons, in which “the individual benefits as an individual from his ability to deny the truth 
even though society as a whole, of which he is a part, suffers” (Hardin, 1968, p. 1244). The 
objective of immanent critique, however, is to reveal the contradictions in the tragedy. Yet as 
far as this concerns the food order there are presently hardly any promising signs that the 
removal of an individual’s veil of ‘food ignorance’ indeed culminates into (collective) action 
and tangible change in human behaviour and consumption patterns. Where then, in this 
process of cognition-to-action that we can call from seeing to being, is the break down?  
In proposing some bold ‘laws of hunger’ Høivik has set out to demonstrate that by 
using existing knowledge hunger can be eliminated. The bottleneck, however, he found, was 
that “[w]e know how to abolish hunger. It remains to do so.” (Høivik, 1983, p. 297). Høivik 
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herein exposes the crucial break down in the cognition-action process. Where immanent 
critique reveals the contradictions in the world, makes us understand the shortcomings and 
vulnerabilities of the present (food) order, and perhaps also offers us the knowledge to indeed 
abolish hunger, why do we get stuck in collective inaction?  
Perhaps we best start by briefly exploring the psychology of denial. Cohen (2001, p. 
23) provides four useful components: cognition (knowing), emotion (feeling), morality 
(judging), and action (behaviour). Although it seems that the problem is located at the 
action/behaviour stage, the other factors may also play a decisive role. 
Discussing immanent critique we already touched upon the cognition/knowing 
component and noted that involuntary confrontation with the harsh realities of the world is 
pretty much unavoidable these days. This process of revealing the contradictions of the world 
is rather an ongoing affair, slowly spreading and building up a critical mass. Still, the 
problem of collective inaction extends to many of the individuals who do see the 
contradictions between reality and ideology, but regardless seek refuge in denial. Emotions 
and feelings are then the next critical component that could encourage action, yet at the same 
time also foster denial. Hundreds of millions of dollars are raised by charities from 
individuals in response to (natural) disasters, like the 2011 famine in the Horn of Africa. 
Indeed, there is no escaping the advertisements depicting a reality of hunger and starvation, 
therein targeting the emotions and feeling of the audience in an attempt to evoke existential 
guilt (Coulter, Cotte, & Moore, 1999, p. 290). Of course, in turn the charitable contributions 
are an overt recognition of the reality of a famine, and certainly a test of behaviour that makes 
a difference in the world ‘out there’. This type of behaviour, however, is merely a one-off 
financial exploit; it does not structurally alter the subject’s day-to-day behaviour, lifestyle, or 
diet. Besides, it should also be noted that there are occasional reports of ‘disaster fatigue’, 
where there sheer overdose of compassion calls on the wallet seem to numb emotions and 
hence diminish generosity (United Nations News Centre, 2011). Next, there is similar 
relevance in considering morality and judgement in relation to denial. Unwillingness to 
change behaviour can be a matter of distorted morality as well as a lack of judgement about 
our individual impacts. This makes denial a particularly easy feat: “I just can’t see what is so 
wrong with my diet, consumption, lifestyle, behaviour, etc..” (Cohen, 2001, p. 23). Lastly, 
there is denial at the level of the action/behaviour component that results in inaction. In this 
case the supplied cognitive information is registered but ignored and behaviour remains 
unaltered. Cohen describes this behavioural type of inaction through denial as “It’s my 
problem”. But, at the same time, he points out that there are also “other ways of doing 
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nothing – indifference, apathy, passive bystanding” where one rather contends that “It’s not 
my problem” (Cohen, 2001, p. 23). These latter forms of indifference are not “states of 
psychic denial” but are “better explained by political beliefs, cowardice, laziness, selfishness 
and sheer amorality” (Cohen, 2001, p. 23). Thus, the problem of collective inaction could 
stem from a state of denial or from a form of indifference. Identifying whether denial or 
indifference is at the core of the collective inaction that surrounds the faltering food order is 
crucial in bringing the process, and particularly goal, of immanent critique back on track. 
To get to the heart of collective inaction we need to turn next to the process of the 
evolution of human consciousness. It is suggested that human development proceeds through 
eight general stages of which each subsequent stage transcends and includes the previous 
stages (Wilber, 2011, pp. 17-20). This perception of human value systems and psychology of 
existence was coined by Graves (1974) and further explored by Beck and Cowan in their 
theory of Spiral Dynamics (D. E. Beck & Cowan, 1996; see also: Wilber, 2011). This theory 
purports that the first six stages of human development are part of a first-tier ‘subsistence’ 
consciousness, after which a quantum jump will propel human consciousness into the second-
tier of ‘being’, where one will “vividly grasp the entire spectrum of interior development” 
(Wilber, 2011, p. 20). Within the stages of first-tier thinking there is great difficulty to fully 
appreciate the existence and worldviews of the other stages.  
The idea of a tiered consciousness could perhaps shed light on the phenomenon of 
seeing but not seeing. Progressively throughout the six stages that make up the first tier there 
is an increasing degree of awareness of the other stages, yet there is no full appreciation of 
the integral nature of human development. The first three stages are focussed on the 
existential self, making individuals indifferent to the interests and status of the ‘world out 
there’ as long as they themselves survive. In stages four to six the individual’s psyche slowly 
beings to open up to the advancement of human development and the greater scheme of 
things; however, there remains an inherent inability to see the full picture that brings about a 
feeling of disconnect and a state of denial with regard to the need to change individual 
behaviour.  
Collective inaction thus seems to emerge throughout the first-tier stages of human 
development. Initially, self-interest (i.e. existentialism, materialism) leads to indifference, but 
next, the greater awareness of a more cosmopolitan consciousness (i.e. communitarianism, 
ecological sensitivity, human potential) transcends the initial indifference yet still remains 
stuck in inaction due to a state of denial. Then, in the late stages of the first tier we reach the 
height of seeing but not seeing, right before human consciousness takes a momentous leap, 
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and notice that we are at the curb of transcending the ‘culture of contentment’. Indeed, as 
Wilber clarifies, second-tier integral consciousness “steps back and grasps the big picture” by 
“looking for the rich contexts that link and join [the] pluralistic systems ... and integrate them 
into holistic spirals and integral meshworks” (Wilber, 2011, p. 21).  
At the crossroads of the first and second tier we find that human development appears 
to culminate into a heightened state of collective inaction. In other words, there is a sense that 
change is crucial and imminent, but out of reach for the ordinary individual, and could 
possibly only emerge from the domain of world leaders and the international community – 
and in the form of technical solutions. Conceivably, the reason for this is passive mind-set is 
that without a clear integrated vision of reality the problems we face seem too overwhelming. 
Denial then becomes the de facto coping-mechanism that kicks in to “unconsciously banish 
to some inaccessible zone of the mind” a reality we are unable to entirely comprehend, nor 
feel we can alter with individual action (Cohen, 2001, p. 23). Hence, the overwhelming 
complexity of the food order makes no single individual feel confident that their individually 
changed behaviour will make a genuine difference towards altering the global state of affairs. 
The solution we are seeking is to integrate present behaviour (change) with future 
desires. However, the prospect of transforming the present food order into a genuine world 
food system can indeed be perceived as an overpowering scheme, perchance as striving for 
utopia. To assess alternative visions of the future, Nye (1987) usefully distinguishes between 
end-point and process utopias. The former posit a vision of a “better set of conditions or end 
points in the future”, while the latter can be defined as “a hypothesized benign or pacific 
trends, though the end point of the trend is uncertain” (Nye, 1987, p. 246). Booth clarifies 
that the aim of the process utopian approach is “not to become overburdened by distant ideal 
structures, but to concentrate on reformist steps to make a better world somewhat more 
likely” (Booth, 1991a, p. 324). And to emphasise real-life applicability, he asserts that at each 
crossroad “there is always one route that seems more rather than less progressive” (Booth, 
1991a, p. 324).  In terms of food, the process utopian approach is already recognised as 
valuable starting point: “the concept of utopia – that is, envisioning an alternative food 
system founded in the recognition of the qualities of food, including the moral value of the 
right to food – offers a means to begin restructuring the food system in more just and flexible 
terms” (Rosin et al., 2012, p. 17). 
The decisive question, however, is how utopian thinking can be a catalyst for action? 
Booth suggests that “utopian thinking can be used as the basis for a critical re-evaluation of 
what is believed to exist, what is believed to be ‘reality’” (Booth, 1991b, p. 535). This notion 
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is, of course, already at the heart of Critical Theory and central to its method of analysis: 
immanent critique. More interesting is the idea that utopian thinking is part of human culture 
in terms of ‘the education of desire’, which is “the desire for a better way of being and living” 
(Booth, 1991b, p. 535). This desire appears to be in sync, however, with the theme and 
consciousness of second-tier human consciousness. Hence, the value of ‘the education of 
desire’ at first-tier thinking stages is a questionable approach. Returning to the benefit of the 
process utopian approach, Booth adds that “the human collectivity is more than ever in need 
of conscious cultural development”, which is attainable through benign and reformist steps of 
the process utopian approach that are “calculated to make a better world somewhat more 
probable for future generations” (Booth, 1991b). Differently formulated, distant ideals are 
overwhelming and put a burden too heavy on the ordinary individual. Breaking down distant 
ideals into small-scale reformist steps takes away the overshadowing feeling of 
powerlessness – perhaps this is where ‘programs’ can be useful in directing towards a new 
vision. 
Finally, we should turn to discuss the reformist steps that can bring about a better 
future food system. The key-to-action therefore lies in formulating reformist steps; not in 
contemplating the structure and conditions of end point utopias. Booth’s conceptualisation of 
emancipation as “the philosophy, theory, and politics of inventing humanity” is an 
appropriate starting point for it is concerned with freeing people from the constraints “that 
stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do, compatible with the freedom of 
others” (Booth, 2007, p. 112). An emancipatory approach allows us to envision relevant 
conditions that could foster a process of change, and possibly result in an alternative world 
food system. Equally important, is the matter of adding ‘food’ to the above outlined equation. 
If, as Booth contends, ‘emancipation is security’, what are then the implications for our food 
order, and how do we approach the concept of food security? 
 
Being secure? 
We have seen that the objective of our prevailing cultural vision, human population 
expansion, is fuelled and sustained by ever-increasing food production. Without this ability to 
produce remarkable surpluses of food, population growth would not have been as immensely 
successful as it is today. And successful we are; as Reverend Sawtell (in Fauchere, 2011) 
rightfully remarks, if there is one box we can tick from the commandments it must be “Be 
fruitful and increase in number; fill the earth and subdue it” (Genesis 1:28, New International 
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Version). Even though we have undeniably succeeded here, our vision has not changed; we 
keep on reproducing. As result of the persistent perusal of this dominant cultural vision, we 
are presented with ever more and more severe ramifications at every increment of growth – 
especially since humanity is already pushing hard against numerous natural thresholds. A 
continuation of this vision relies heavily on strenuous technical efforts to keep increasing 
food production, which will put a massive amount of pressure on agricultural land and water 
resources. Recently, this has caused an explosive competition for the world’s underutilised 
and untapped land and water resources – land is the new gold, water the new oil (L. R. 
Brown, 2012). But with a vulnerable and malfunctioning food system, it is only a matter of 
time before our food problems escalate and will start affecting direct our national security. 
 To be secure, the human species obviously needs food – like any other species. But 
our aspiration to arrive at universal ‘food security’ has become confused with our quest for 
increasing food production. This makes it necessary to disentangle the diverse 
conceptualisations of ‘food security’, and more notably, reconceptualise ‘food security’ to 
take away some of the confusion surrounding the term. Counter-intuitively, only on the odd 
occasion attention is focused on comprehending the concept of ‘security’ in relation to ‘food’ 
(eg. L. R. Brown, 2012; Fullbrook, 2010). From the foregoing we have seen that there is great 
relevance for such an assessment of ‘food’ and ‘security’. The lack in discussion of this link 
is particularly evident in contemporary debates about ‘food security’, most of which mainly 
revolve around the food part of the ‘food security’ equation, and not so much – if at all – 
scrutinise the links and relation between ‘food’ and ‘security’. 
The quest for more food is already posing new immediate security concerns, but it 
also brings about existential security concerns in the long-run. Building a foundation around 
the relation between ‘food’ and ‘security’ will be essential to explore the security 
implications for the future of food, both for the prevailing cultural vision of population 
expansion as well as for alternative possible cultural visions. Therefore, the purpose of the 
next chapter is not only to explore how ‘food’ can be perceived as a matter of security, but 
also, how it has the inherent potential to become an existential security threat. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Security in a resource-constrained world 
 
Security has been a banner to be flown, a label to be applied,  
but not a concept to be used by most security studies specialists. 
(David Baldwin, 1997) 
 
 Food insecurity and conflict 
 The purpose of principles of security 
 Food power 
 Human food security 
 Framing food as security 
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There is no doubt that today’s resource-constrained world calls for effective tools to ease the 
plight of those facing insecurity and living with chronic hunger. Throughout history most 
violent conflict has primarily originated out of competition for territory and resources 
(Ullman, 1983) and to a lesser degree from disputes over religion or ideology. The prospect 
of future violent conflict over territory, to which Ullman alludes as “the conquest of peoples” 
(1983, p. 139), has become increasing unlikely. But in a world of rising demographic and 
environmental challenges, it is factors like resource competition and food scarcity that could 
spark conflict between the ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’. In particular food insecurity could 
increasingly play a major role in conflict formation; jeopardizing national and international 
security. Resource scarcity could turn food commodities into political or economic weapons, 
creating resource conflicts and exacerbating food insecurity. It is these aspects of conflict in 
relation to natural resource scarcity that Wallensteen identifies as the two problematic key 
issues (1986, p. 146).  
With an ever-growing world population, one expected to exceed 9 billion mouths to 
feed by 2050, food will become a more valuable commodity, and increasingly also become a 
strategic factor in international relations. This means, as Westing already suggested in the 
mid-1980s, “that natural resources have the potential for playing an even more important role 
as a cause of war in the future than they have in the past” (Westing, 1986b, p. 183). Food in 
particular, according to Dupont, “is destined to have greater strategic weight and import in an 
era of environmental scarcity” (Dupont, 2000, p. 57). In such an environment stressed by 
population growth and environmental degradation, Booth concurs that the challenge for the 
twenty-first century will revolve around a growing “prospect of a new era of resource wars” 
(2007, p. 14). But there is a third aspect of security in a resource-constrained world that needs 
attention. It is the unambiguous rise of the human security dimension, in which challenges 
like population growth, environmental degradation, and food (in)security feature as profound 
components of human security. 
This chapter commences therefore with the considering of the role of food insecurity 
in relation to conflict in a resource-constrained world. Recent occurrences of unrest as a 
result of concerns over food will be highlighted, such as the Global Food Price Crisis of 
2007–2008 and the Arab Spring of 2011. These instances of ‘food conflict’, however, do not 
per se frame food as a matter of security. But by leaving the empirical indications of food’s 
security character aside for a moment, there is room to consider a more theoretical 
construction of food as an object of security. This requires a brief preamble on the purpose 
and principles of security that serves as a foundation on which food can be framed as a matter 
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of security. Within this context the two most common perspectives on food as security will be 
discussed: food power in terms of national security, and the human dimension of food. These 
perspectives will set the scene for the following chapter which continues with the theme of 
‘food and security’ by exploring the definitions of ‘food security’, discussing the 
‘securitiness’ of food, and exploring alternatives visions of food as security. 
 
Food insecurity and conflict 
The security links between food and conflict are generally most visible in situations of food 
insecurity. Looking at food production and civil violence, de Soysa and Gleditsch highlight 
one of these links by noting that “the inability to meet food requirements and other basic 
needs drives people to adopt alternative survival strategies, one of which is to join rebellions 
and criminal insurgencies” (de Soysa & Gleditsch, 1999, p. 9). This reverse side of ‘food 
security’ reveals aspects of the relation between food and conflict formation and presents the 
question if a looming food insecure world should make us more promptly rethink national 
security priorities. 
Achieving a state of ‘food security’ essentially achieves two goals: it principally 
prevents human suffering, but in doing so, it also acts as a security measure. Indeed, the very 
act of preventing ‘food insecurity’ from materialising averts the eventual mobilisation of 
crowds of hungry people, with a readiness to resort to conflict and rebellion. Thus, food 
security as a preventative measure not only serves a humanitarian and moral goal, it 
inherently functions as a security measure. The former purpose is commonly accepted, 
however the latter function has difficulty gaining wide acceptance.  
The role of food in conflict formation is, however, contentious. One fundamental 
problem is an uncertainty of the origins of conflict in general – there is not much consensus 
on how conflicts emerge and escalate (Wallensteen, 1986, p. 152). For this reason ‘food’ is 
usually not considered as playing a role of significance in conflict formation, and hence does 
not attract much attention in national security debates. So exploring the role of food in 
conflict formation is far from a straight-forward task. Recent events, however, appear to give 
more credence to the significance of ‘food’ in conflict formation. In this respect the Global 
Food Price Crisis of 2007–2008 could be considered a key turning point. Food prices sky-
rocketed due to various reasons on both demand and supply side (Dupont & Thirlwell, 2009) 
and generated “serious political and social strife in more than 30 countries around the world” 
(p. 71). When food prices eased somewhat by mid 2008 – but still remained at historically 
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high levels – attention for the food-conflict nexus quickly subsided and the developed world 
rapidly shifted attention to financial concerns at home. By late 2010, however, food prices 
again hit historic highs and the FAO cautioned that once again it could prompt riots like those 
in 2008 (Reuters, 2011a). Indeed, even before the middle of 2011 the FAO’s warning turned 
out to be rather accurate. There were no ‘food riots’ like those in 2008, but the onset of 
political instability in North Africa and the Middle East was sparked by large peaks in global 
food prices. A recent study illustrates the role of high food prices in the so-called ‘Arab 
Spring’: 
 
[W]e show that food prices are the precipitating condition for social unrest and 
identify a specific global food price threshold for unrest. Even without sharp peaks in 
food prices we project that, within just a few years, the trend of prices will reach the 
threshold. This points to a danger of spreading global social disruption. (Lagi, 
Bertrand, & Bar-Yam, 2011, p. 2) 
 
Naturally, we need to be careful not to seek simple explanations for the Arab Spring 
uprisings; there are many underlying issues that are part of the equation. Still, the high food 
prices appear to have had a catalysing function. At the same time it is also important to 
highlight that uprisings, and riots generally, do not originate from chronically hungry people, 
but instead are often instigated by a poor lower-class that normally just manages to survive. 
Although the chronically hungry as well as the poor are both trapped in a system of social 
injustice, poverty, and unemployment; it is the latter that generally manages to regularly put 
food on the table. Yet, when high food prices suddenly take away their ability to just get by, 
it catalyses years of deep frustrations and anger about the structural injustices of the system – 
and its oppressor. Uprisings are often a result, which regularly escalate into riots and violent 
conflict. This is hardly surprising, as de Soysa explains, “food is an important part of the 
entitlement set of poor people and high food prices are usually associated with urban riots” 
(de Soysa, 2000, p. 29). 
Although food riots and conflict have so far mainly affected the developing world, 
Wallensteen already suggested in the 1980s that there is a “possibility of future conflict over 
access to food resources” based on the “disparity between the developed and developing 
world” (Wallensteen, 1986, p. 145). Presently, the developed world has access to inexpensive 
food in a market characterised by an excess in choice and supply (often leading to 
overconsumption); while simultaneously the developing world can hardly manage to cope 
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with the rising food prices and finds its entrenched poverty and soaring population 
considerably constricting its level of food security and consumption choices. The inequality 
is obvious: only a minority of the world population has access to an abundance of food and 
chronically over-consumes, while the majority of the world population can hardly satisfy 
basic food needs in an ever more strained market. With the disparity ever-increasing there 
will be more tensions between food secure and food insecure countries, ultimately heading 
towards a violent tipping point if there is not resolve. 
By accepting the premise that food increasingly plays a role in conflicts, this ought to 
result in a reconsideration of our national security priorities. Considering ‘food security’ as a 
security measure – in that it allows us to prevent food riots, conflict, and violence – must then 
have some effect on national security resource allocation. The benefit of spending money on 
achieving ‘food security’ is likely to benefit national security more, than spending it on the 
military. As Sarris points out, “if one contrasts military security with food security, the 
former attracts many more resources and international action. The latter, however, can be 
much more crippling for a nation as it affects its human capital in a more permanent way” 
(1989, p. 41). Sarris therefore hypothesized that the benefit of spending money on food 
security far exceeds the marginal benefit of spending it on the military, “even for developed 
countries” (Sarris, 1989, p. 41). Particularly today with mounting pressures on the states’ 
financial system, Sarris’ point rings true. Many developed countries, in particular the 
European Union, the United States and Japan, find themselves presently in a disconcerting 
and escalating financial situation. The resilience of the developed world’s economy is tested 
to the maximum. With spending tightened on all fronts, there are hardly any additional 
resources that can be allocated towards the world food situation. However, by making food a 
matter of national security, we could enable a better resource allocation to achieve ‘food 
security’ by tapping into existing national security budgets. This is a reasonable approach 
considering that ‘food security’ ultimately acts as a security measure by preventing food riots 
and conflict. Thus considering the massive challenges that threaten and may potentially 
destabilise the world food system, we need to ask if humanity is ready to face up to an 
‘inconvenient truth’ of resource scarcity and food insecurity, or if we rather collectively and 
“unconsciously banish to some inaccessible zone of the mind” the reality of an ‘imminent 
collapse’ that is “too threatening to ‘know’”? (Cohen, 2001, p. 23). 
 
 
52 
 
The purpose of principles of security 
Before we further advance the theme of food as a security issue in a resource-constrained 
world, a consideration of the purpose of engaging in a discussion on the meaning and the 
concept of food as security is in place. Rothschild (1995) proposes four reasons why it is 
important to embark on an analysis of ‘principles or definitions’ of security. Drawing upon 
Hicks, she expresses that it is pointless to analyse a concept without having a clear idea of the 
purpose for which the definition is wanted (see: Hicks, 1942, p. 175; Rothschild, 1995). 
While it is more than a definition that we are after here, the purpose of analysing and 
understanding a concept – in this case making a theoretical and functional linkage between 
‘food’ and ‘security’ – can be rationalised by summing up Rothschild’s four points. 
The first purpose of principles, definitions and concepts  is that they “provide some 
sort of guidance to the policies made by governments” (Rothschild, 1995, p. 57). The key 
point here is that while security scholars are generally the ones to describe or develop 
concepts, it is government officials who interpret and follow them. This is particularly 
relevant to ‘food’, since we will come to see in the remainder of this chapter and the ones to 
follow that the current concept of ‘food security’ is veiled in a cloak of confusion. 
Policymakers cannot be expected to create coherent policies based on imprecise concepts. 
Gibson argues here that ‘food’ is becoming one of the meaningless contemporary 
interpretations of security. But, he adds, “[this] is not entirely lost on policymakers and 
politicians. They traduce the subtleties of the concept to their own advantage” (Gibson, 
2010). The fundamental problem that Gibson describes here is that “the simplistic 
securitisation of food under the rubric of food security says very little useful for the provision 
of food” (Gibson, 2010). This patently draws out the predicament that both scholars and 
policymakers face: the conflation of the concept of ‘food security’ (the provision of food) 
with the concept of ‘food as security’ (the moral and existential rationale why we need the 
former concept). A comprehensive analysis of the required conceptual division therefore 
serves a vital purpose. 
The second purpose put forward by Rothschild is providing guidance for public 
opinion about policy. The idea here is to “suggest a way of thinking about security” 
(Rothschild, 1995, p. 58). Shaping public opinion about food and security is certainly 
purposeful; it conceives and strengthens the underlying principles and popular ideas 
necessary to support policy. But also, it provides a way to introduce an emancipatory agenda 
for food. A great example of academic research on the security dimensions of food that also 
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manifests a strong appeal for individual and immediate action is Cribb’s book The Coming 
Famine (2010). It brings home the point that theoretical principles and concepts, supported 
by robust data and advanced with journalistic flair, can appeal to a wide general readership 
and inspire an emancipatory approach to understanding ‘food’ in relation to ‘security’. In 
turn, this approach seems very much in accordance with Nye’s concept of a ‘process utopia’; 
the idea that small and targeted amendments to our own lifestyles can advance the prospect 
for a better world for future generations (Booth, 1991a; Nye, 1987). Endeavouring on an 
analysis of ‘food as security’ thus not only adds to the theoretical development of a concept, 
careful and comprehensible articulation of the discussion may also inform and shape public 
opinion – which in turn could potentially even bring about emancipation of our understanding 
and appreciation of food. 
A third purpose of clarifying concepts and principles of security serves as a way to 
contest existing policies. Rothschild illustrates this point with the sudden change in the 
security climate that came with end of the Cold War. This brought a tremendous change in 
the objective of security policies, and required a redefinition of the concept and principles of 
security. As a result old policies became contested and new policies were promoted 
(Rothschild, 1995, p. 59). Naturally, the end of the Cold War had a momentous impact on the 
security climate and unequivocally necessitated a different take on ‘security’. In one way we 
can hardly compare the major geopolitical and strategic changes to our security climate that 
resulted from the end of the Cold War with the potential security implications of our 
contemporary resources-constrained environment. In other words, at present ‘food’ does not 
challenge our security environment in a similar way, yet. Another approach is to consider the 
onset of these challenges to the security environment. Whereas no one expected the sudden 
collapse of the Cold War, similarly the threat of resource scarcity and food insecurity is 
rapidly building momentum. Therefore, we can still prevent ‘food’ from becoming a serious 
security threat by making the effort to understand the security dimensions of food and use 
these insights to promote sensible new policies that can avert a ‘coming famine’. This is 
analogous to the recent global recognition of the threat that climate change poses to the 
world, which is slowly resulting in a modified appreciation of ‘security’ and hesitant adoption 
of related policies. 
Lastly the fourth, and in Rothschild’s words the “crudest purpose ... is to influence 
directly the distribution of money and power” (1995, p. 59). Essentially this takes shaping 
public opinion to the next level where it can directly influence (or demand change in) 
government policy. A good example is the way in which climate change has been popularised 
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and elevated into the security domain, and consequently more heavily influences policy. 
Understanding the concept of climate change can be challenging, that is why Al Gore’s 
campaign and highly influential 2006 documentary An Inconvenient Truth played a key role 
in making climate change a recognised international problem. The documentary stimulated an 
increase in funding for more research on global warming and climate change, and ultimately 
brought together world leaders to discuss a holistic approach to handling the threat. A change 
in what we consider to be a ‘security’ threat can thus directly change government policy and 
expenditure. By conceptualising ‘food’ as a matter of security there is a similar potential that 
it could enable agricultural research and food policy-making to tap into the national security 
budget. This could open up significant funding streams to (re)educate people about the value 
of food as well as compelling us to focus on population management policies. Promoting the 
idea that achieving ‘food security’ serves as a security measure therefore has the realistic 
faculty of allowing real change to occur in the distribution of (government) money and 
power. 
The objective of this chapter does not revolve around a single purpose, the aim is 
rather to construct the concept of ‘food as security’ which will promote and assist each and 
all of the above mentioned purposes. To achieve the objective of ‘food security’ we need to 
perceive food as a matter of security so that it can guide policymakers, shape public opinion, 
contest old and promote new policies, and openly strive to influence the allocation of capital 
and power. Gibson, however, does not seem to appreciate the value in doing this, and argues 
that “simply ‘tagging’ food with the security label makes little difference to the reality of its 
production, supply and consumption” (2010). But uncritical statements like this are at the 
core of the confusing relationship between the practical objective of achieving ‘food security’ 
and the underlying conceptual notion of ‘food as security’. Although there are certainly 
“intellectual and political dangers in simply tacking the word ‘security’ onto an ever wider 
range of issues” (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, p. 1), Gibson fails to see how the 
conceptual power of ‘food as security’ can assist in the mobilisation of resources to achieve a 
situation of ‘food security’. In this sense Baldwin stresses that “understanding the concept of 
security is a fundamentally different kind of intellectual exercise from specifying the 
conditions under which security may be attained” (1997, p. 8). What’s more, both Wolfers 
(1952, p. 483) and Baldwin (1997, p. 17) point out that for a concept of security to be useful 
in “sound political counsel or scientific usage” the dimensions of the object of security do 
require a certain amount of specification. Although the degree of specificity depends on the 
subject under consideration, Baldwin (1997, p. 17) advises to specify at least the threats, 
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values concerned, referent objects/actors, and amount of security sought as a minimum to 
foster “meaningful scientific communication”. This means that there are roughly two tasks at 
hand: delving deeper into the meaning and understanding of ‘food as security’; and 
subsequently to identify in the next chapter which security theory that can bring ‘food’ into 
the security realm. First, the understanding of ‘food as security’ may be best demonstrated 
through the potential impact of ‘food’ in the empirical domain on matter of national and 
human security. 
 
Food power 
Building upon the notion that food is fundamental to the survival of humankind, a corollary is 
the potential to leverage ‘food power’ through controlling food supply and access. Depending 
upon the level of analysis, the actors leveraging this kind of food power can be individuals 
within a household or community, domestic or international companies, and even states can 
be poised to exercise power over food to put pressure on members of the international 
community. It is the latter situation, in which food is used as a political or economic weapon, 
which most directly demonstrates the conventional relation between food and power in the 
context of national security. The inherent strength of food power is its ability to function as 
an ‘alternative weapon’ with existential powers by threatening another country’s food 
security. The security equation is simple: “by denying access to food, life can be threatened” 
(Wallensteen, 1976, p. 277). 
During the 1970s there was a particular interest in the potential of food as a political 
or economic weapon. The then U.S. Secretary of Agriculture, Earl Butz, made great effort to 
make food power part of the American diplomatic toolbox. He contended it would be an 
eloquent way to influence world politics. At the time, however, this was far from surprising 
as the idea of food power came to pass as the obvious response to the 1973 oil embargo in 
which Arab oil producing states used ‘petropower’ as a geopolitical tool (BusinessWeek, 
1975; Paarlberg, 1978b). Hence, Butz stated in 1974 that “food is a weapon” (Butz, 1976) 
and conveyed with great confidence that ‘agripower’ would ultimately be more important 
than ‘petropower’ (BusinessWeek, 1975). While threatening starvation to achieve policy 
objectives has ardent moral implications, food has been used regularly throughout history to 
shape domestic and international affairs (Maddock, 1978). 
In response to these political statements, a number of scholars took up the task of 
examining the actual merit of ‘food power’. For starters, as a concept ‘food power’ is 
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grounded upon the idea of creating a coercive link between food resources and political 
issues with the aim of altering the target actor’s behaviour. Investigating the historical use of 
food power by the United States, Wallensteen found that he had to further define “under 
which general circumstances a given economic commodity [can] be turned into a political 
weapon” (1976, p. 277). He reasoned that four conditions of (1) scarcity; (2) supply 
concentration; (3) demand dispersion; and (4) action independence would need to exist at the 
same time “to give the structural possibility of turning an economic asset into a political 
instrument” (Wallensteen, 1976, pp. 278-279). However, even when these conditions present 
themselves in unison, there is still a political decision-making process required to ultimately 
put ‘food power’ into action. And even then, there is no certainty that when the power is 
exercised it successfully achieves the given political objective. Furthermore, Wallensteen 
defines four purposes for using economic weapons: (1) controlling general business contract 
bargaining; (2) influencing the general economic policy of the buyer; (3) influencing the 
buyer’s foreign and defense policies; and (4) instigating the subversion of a given 
government (1976, p. 280). The categories most relevant to matters of foreign policy and 
national security are evidently the latter two.  
In spite of such theoretical underpinnings, there are also convincing arguments made 
against the potential of food as a political weapon. For one, an extremely tight demand 
situation is required for food power to have the desired effect. Don Paarlberg, one of the chief 
economists during the 1970s in the U.S. Agriculture Department, doubted the promise of 
shaping international affairs through food coercion (BusinessWeek, 1975). Even more so, his 
son Robert Paarlberg elaborately argued against the idea that food power could challenge 
petropower, concluding that “whatever the changing condition of the market, food can never 
provide as much diplomatic leverage to an exporting nation as does oil” (1978b, p. 4). To 
effectively exercise resource power and influence the behaviour of a target nation one has to 
overcome three significant barriers: (1) practical or political problems at the domestic level in 
the exercising nation; (2) bringing to bear an adequate level of interruptions in the target 
nation; and (3) coercing the target nation to change certain behaviour instead of finding 
alternatives (Paarlberg, 1978a, p. 538; 1978b, p. 4). The fundamental problem for food power 
is, Paarlberg insists, that “these three conditions are seldom met simultaneously, whatever the 
state of the world food market” (1978a, p. 538). Yet even if food power could be effectively 
employed, Christensen cautions that the “political manipulation of food resources ... may 
actually exacerbate hunger and malnutrition” with “detrimental implications for global 
nutrition” (1977, p. 317). This is of particular importance since “most discussions of coercive 
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food power in fact tacitly consider it most useful in dealing with [least developed countries] 
LDCs which import grain” (Christensen, 1977, p. 302). 
To recapitulate, where Wallensteen outlines some general conditions for economic 
commodities to be used as a political or diplomatic weapon, Paarlberg points to some 
significant barriers pertaining to the effective use of resource power. There is perhaps indeed 
some rudimentary merit in Wallensteen’s observation that “economic commodities can be as 
disastrous to human life as military weapons” and that “the political use of [food] has 
potentially the most direct and inhumane effects, and thus is a weapon strongly parallel to 
military instruments” (1976, pp. 277, 279). For the most, Paarlberg’s argument does not per 
se disregard the potential of food power in his discussion of the contest between ‘agripower’ 
and ‘petropower’ which leads him to assert that “food power is inferior to oil power at each 
critical point in the process of exercising coercive resource diplomacy” (1978b, pp. 3, 17). 
Critically, however, one of the key arguments Paarlberg resorts to, is that the world food 
market is “one of abundance rather than scarcity” informing his conclusion that “the power 
which food confers is much less than meets the eye” (1978b, pp. 16, 19). More than three 
decades later, however, there appears to be consensus that we have reached the end of the era 
of cheap and abundant food (L. R. Brown, 2011b, 2012; Cribb, 2010). With the realisation 
that food, water, and land are finite resources in ever-growing demand, perhaps ‘food power’ 
ultimately confers more than meets the eye. So how does ‘food power’ hold up against the 
conditions of our contemporary world food system, especially if we take into account existing 
and emerging challenges? 
A decade into the twenty-first century the world food system is under rapidly 
mounting pressures. The major exaggerating factor – population growth – impacts not only 
on food resources but puts pressure on all economic resources. However, food – and fresh 
water likewise – has a key characteristic that distinguish it from other economic 
commodities: it is the most fundamental resource humanity requires for surviving – every 
single day. Thus amongst other demand and supply side pressures, population growth is 
particularly proving to be a key factor in turning global food security into an ever more 
challenging objective. No wonder that this has led to a growing hesitation when it comes to 
reaffirming the idea that there is sufficient food globally to feed everyone a healthy diet. Yet 
we can be certain that without increasing food production (by some 70% to 100%) there will 
be insufficient food to feed more than 9 billion people by 2050 (FAO, 2009a). For this reason 
it is becoming increasingly problematic to continue to accept the premise that we live in a 
world of abundance rather than scarcity. Surely most natural resources – including food – 
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have been up till now not considerably scarce, so for the moment there is little room to 
unleash the potential of ‘food power’. But a critical assessment or our current situation and 
the challenges we are facing can only see us conclude that scarcity instead of abundance will 
henceforth be our state of affairs, ensuring that the use of resource- and food power will 
become a more realistic scenario and threat. 
All this means that in a world with an exponentially growing appetite and increasing 
constraints on natural resources – like agricultural land, fresh water, and food – it is only a 
matter of time before precise quid pro quo conditions and strategic food policies will begin to 
shape the global food market. Arguably this system is already slowly developing, thus we 
should not question “whether food represents power”, in the words of Lester Brown, “but 
how that power will be used” (BusinessWeek, 1975). Emphasis should be on the latter, we 
should give serious thought to how food power may be used in a resource constrained world. 
Of course there is potential for conventional nation-to-nation use of ‘food power’ – which 
was the topic of discussion in the 1970s. But in a globalised world it may be more important 
to consider other actors, in vastly different situations, that could potentially leverage food in 
such a way that it will pose a threat to national or international security. 
Today, the power of food can already be illustrated with an example set in a 
contemporary context: the 2011 famine in the Horn of Africa. A conventional and widely 
accepted explanation for famines in Africa attributes these periods of hunger to its harsh 
climate with recurring and severe droughts. While droughts may traditionally indeed have 
played a key factor in causing famines, there is now growing support for the idea that 
droughts presently only spark famines and that multiple other factors create the structural 
underlying foundation to enable the occurrence of contemporary famines. In explaining the 
reasons for Ethiopia’s recurring famines, Vadala observes that “nature’s forces and climatic 
conditions like drought cannot solely be responsible for famine causation as was the 
dominant mode of thinking five decades ago” (Vadala, 2008, p. 1). Similarly, Sen has argued 
that “there has never been a famine in a functioning multiparty democracy” (1999, p. 178), 
indicating that political and economic factors may also play a significant role. Against this 
changing understanding of the sequence of events leading up to the occurrence of a famine, it 
is worthwhile to briefly assess the origins of the 2011 famine in the Horn of Africa to 
demonstrate one of the non-traditional ways ‘food power’ can be wielded. 
The 2011 famine in the Horn of Africa not only threatened the livelihoods of more 
than 10 million people, but displaced tens of thousands and had a similar death toll. But it 
was a man-made crisis, according to World Bank economist Wolfgang Fengler. Artificially 
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high food prices and civil conflict were to blame for escalating the periodically reoccurring 
droughts into a famine. In a Reuters (2011b) interview, Fengler says “This crisis is manmade. 
Droughts have occurred over and again, but you need bad policymaking for that to lead to a 
famine.” This statement indeed downplays the traditional theory which attributes famines to 
the occurrence of severe droughts. Yet it should be emphasised that this does not reject the 
significance of droughts in general, as becomes clear in Ndichu’s tremendous achievement of 
recounting the stories of the most devastating droughts in East Africa over the last 1700 
years, showing that climatic conditions do play a significant role (Ndichu, 2009). 
In such a context, Mariam (2011) explores the argument that droughts are not the 
primary cause of famines, listing ten reasons why famine persists in Ethiopia. He contends 
that the principal reason for the country’s returning famines is that Ethiopia’s leaders see 
famines as a powerful political and military weapon. Deceptively, Ethiopia’s regime has 
become rather attuned to hiding the country’s chronically returning famines, simply because 
they serve them well as tactical and strategic weapons against opponents – ranging from 
guerrilla’s and rebels to any regular organised opposition. The effect of the most recent 
famine has been even worse in Somalia; an unstable country that has been lacking effective 
governance for decades. The continuing strife between militants from the Islamic extremist 
group Al-Shabab and forces from the internationally-backed Transitional Federal 
Government enabled the already dire climatic situation in combination with high food prices 
to escalate in a fully-fledged famine. In this context the International Crisis Group (2011) 
notes that “it’s no surprise that the crisis is much less serious in Somaliland and Puntland, 
autonomous regions in northern Somalia that have been relatively stable.” The use of ‘food 
power’ is visible in Al-shababs’ aim to control food aid in a bid to win over the hearts and 
minds of locals as well as to keep the international community out of the country. 
When bad or absent policy, in combination with unfavourable climatic conditions, 
coincides with high food prices (and structural poverty), already harsh situations could easily 
escalate into fully-fledged famines. The seemingly intentional nature of famines in Ethiopia 
is a worrying example of how food can be politicised and militarised. Yet the use of ‘food 
power’ in the case of the Ethiopia is distinctly different from the theoretical framework 
outlined by Wallensteen and criticised by Paarlberg. Likewise, the situation in Somalia where 
Al-shabab attempts to use food aid to fortify itself in stronghold regions is vastly different 
from the traditional conception of ‘food power’. This is a stark reminder that in the remainder 
of the twenty-first century we can expect the potential of ‘food power’ not to be exclusively 
available to governments and see it exercised in traditional bilateral state-to-state relations. 
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But regardless which actors employ ‘food power’ and the relationship pressurised by it, the 
fundamental factor in the successful use of food as a political or military tool will remain a 
situation of resource scarcity. But with resource scarcity on the rise, the potential use of food 
power is rapidly becoming a more realistic security concern. The key factor in the link 
between food and security remains the basic human vulnerability to resource scarcity – due to 
droughts, bad policy, food power or a combination of all three.  
Ultimately, however, there is the emerging view that food power and food security 
cannot operate in concert. For genuine food security to flourish we must bring to an end any 
potential use of food as a weapon of policy or power (Raj Patel, 2009). 
 
Human food security 
The previous deliberations over ‘food power’ principally revolved around state actors 
potentially leveraging food as a means to convey power in the international arena. The focus 
of the debate is rigidly tied to the national level of analysis, a characteristic of twentieth-
century thinking about international security and relations. But today, facing a 
malfunctioning food system and profound non-traditional challenges, we ought to consider a 
more ‘humane’ approach to food security. The idea of ‘human food security’ recognises the 
importance of global and national food production and availability, but has its focus on 
transcending traditional conceptualisations of ‘food security’ by advocating for a stronger 
focus on the household and individual level. It aims to move food security forward in a way 
much alike the 1994 United Nations Development Programme report outlined human security 
as essentially requiring a move beyond the traditional security paradigm “from an exclusive 
stress on territorial security to a much greater stress on people’s security” (United Nations 
Development Programme, 1994). With respect to human food security we need to follow a 
similar rationale. This requires the recognition that national food availability is certainly a 
necessary condition for food security, but not sufficient to address matters of accessibility. 
Hence, we need to move beyond territorially defined domestic concepts of food security 
towards a more practical holistic concept – because “people can still starve even when 
enough food is available” (United Nations Development Programme, 1994, p. 27). 
Lifting people out of hunger and starvation, as well as safeguarding long-term human 
food security, requires a deeply critical and realistic approach. That said, availability and 
access to food amount to more than only a matter of security, it encroaches onto social 
justice. In this context struggles for food security at the household- and individual level 
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prevent human beings from realising their potential, and could therefore be classified as a 
matter of structural violence (Galtung, 1969; Shepherd, 2012). This means that we cannot 
study human food security exclusively from a security perspective. Indeed, we need to tackle 
the root causes of food insecurity by equally addressing human development and human 
rights. This approach follows a notion of human security propounded by Kaldor (2007). It 
envisages human security as “potentially [offering] a new approach both to security and 
development” by “incorporating minimum core aspects of both human development and 
human rights” (Kaldor, 2007, pp. 183-184). But more importantly at the household- and 
individual level of analysis is the notion that “human security is part of human development, 
but it is, if you like, at the sharp end of human development” (Kaldor, 2007, p. 184). Thus we 
are operating here on the edge of human security and human development, which is an area 
where negligence and failure in human development can have serious human security 
consequences. Conceptually this signifies the essence of embracing not only human security 
but equally including crucial elements of human development and human rights with respect 
to access to food. Hence, the human food security equation thus represents the sum of 
interdependent issues of security, development and rights on a human level of analysis. 
A ‘humane’ conceptualisation of food security is in stark contrast with many of the 
broader definitions that treat food as a matter of production, availability, or economics. While 
the next chapter will look in more detail at the cornucopia of ideas that inform ‘food 
security’, two examples are in place to here to highlight the conceptual complexity. For one, 
there is the definition by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) that describes ‘food security’ as a “concept which discourages opening the domestic 
market to foreign agricultural products on the principle that a country must be as self-
sufficient as possible for its basic dietary needs” (Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development). This definition emphasises the self-sufficiency aspect of food production 
and pertains a focus on the national and international level of analysis. Similarly, in a slightly 
different way, one can define ‘food security’ as a probabilistic equation, in the sense that “the 
degree of food security will be defined as the probability that in a given year a country will 
not be able to have enough food to satisfy some minimum domestic requirements” (Sarris, 
1989, p. 11). Again, this definition firmly expounds a national level of analysis with the state 
as object of reference and ‘food security’ portrayed more or less as an economic model rather 
than a desirable human development outcome. 
Too long analyses of food focussed predominantly on the macro-economics of food 
and its production capacity, thereby steadfastly ignoring the day-to-day food struggles of the 
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poor and chronically hungry. Even when it is has long been established that poverty is the 
major scourge in the struggle for food (Sarris, 1989, p. 38), the macro-level approach too 
often overlooks human vulnerability and the matter of access to food at the community and 
individual level. As Brandt famously remarked, “not only must the food be there; people who 
need it must be able to buy it” (Independent Commission on International Development 
Issues, 1980, p. 91). This problem has been recognised and expanded upon intensely by Sen 
(1981, 1982, 1999), who showed that even during times of high food production there can be 
famines. 
Any yet, whether food is or ought to be a matter of security remains hotly debated. 
Sure enough the future may or may not see many a conflict rooted in food insecurity or 
resource scarcity posing a national security threat, but as Ullman rightfully points out, “it will 
not require violent conflict for resource scarcities to affect the well-being – and the security – 
of nations on every rung of the development ladder” (1983, p. 140). Indeed, there seems to be 
a general sense of agreement that food falls in the category of non-traditional security threats. 
In reality, government strategies and policies seem to remain predominantly focused 
on achieving national levels of food security, and as Yoshikawa points out, improving 
national food availability and security does not automatically result in a better situation for 
those suffering from chronic hunger within the borders of the country (2007, pp. 2-3). Thus 
we should not overlook the economic, social, geographic and political reasons why people 
are food insecure or have restricted access to food. In this sense the individual human being 
ought to be the ultimate referent for food security, a notion that enforces the interrelated 
nature of human security and food security. While some definitions of food security 
recognise the individual as the ultimate point of reference, for the most there is an absence of 
a lucid separation of distinct levels of analysis. The result is that in practice food security is 
too often seen as a matter of global food production and availability instead of also including 
local accessibility and nutrition. In recognition of this deficiency, we should consider a more 
precise concept of food security that emphasises the crucial ‘humane’ nature of access to 
food. 
Thus, by defining food security as an elementary human security challenge we signify 
the importance of transcending territorially defined conceptions of food security. More 
specifically, in terms of security, food is becoming ever more widely recognised as 
mankind’s number one liability, if not security threat. For this reason food has been 
categorised by the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) as one of the seven 
main threats facing human security, according to their 1994 definition of ‘human security’ in 
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the report New Dimensions of Human Security (1994). In fact, there appears to be a strong 
emerging ‘humane’ dimension to food, much alike the advancement of a human dimension to 
security in the 1990s. The core of this dimension revolves around vulnerability and 
accessibility, which is conceptually tantamount to (1) a holistic conceptualisation of food, (2) 
with a focus on human development and the right to food, and (3) the inclusion of an ethical 
component through an emancipatory approach. Operationally this notion of ‘human food 
security’ is concerned with access at the household-individual level. With this in mind 
‘human food security’ essentially amounts to an all-encompassing ‘humane’ 
conceptualisation of security emphasising the egalitarian right to food and focusing on 
developmental mechanisms to guarantee its realisation. 
But even in this context of a more ‘humane’ conceptualisation of food security, we 
need to respect specific levels of analysis. In line with this, Dyson points out that the 
vulnerability to hunger can be defined on various levels (eg. individual, household, 
community, province, country, region, global) and depending which level of analysis one 
takes, different factors determine ‘food security’ (Dyson, 1996, p. 51). With this in mind, 
Smith, Elobeid and Jensen developed a conceptual framework for food security that offers a 
useful broad division into levels of global, national, household and individual food security 
(2000). The demarcation of ‘food security’ into these four levels of analysis provides a 
suitable framework to differentiate the human security dimension from national security 
perspectives on food. 
Within this human dimension, the critical element to determine the level of ‘security’ 
is by assessing food accessibility; which entails to more than merely assuring a sufficient 
level of food production and national availability. Hence, this requires a combined 
household-individual level of analysis in which food security conceptually connotes 
community, household and individual access to food. Analysing access to food at this 
combined ‘humane’ level can offer valuable insights into key accessibility factors. This 
approach brings food security on par with rural (and urban) livelihoods, it opens the analysis 
not only to community and household patterns, but on the individual level it can produce 
additional information on people’s personal access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food – 
recognising potential concerns over intra-household distribution, gender inequality and the 
prioritising of food acquisition. However, we should be careful not to confuse food security 
with nutritional security (Pinstrup-Andersen, 2009). 
Finally, food is a physiological need. Maslow described this in his famous hierarchy 
of needs as the most prepotent of all needs. The unsatisfied need for food poses therefore one 
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of the most fundamental threats to human security. Besides intrinsically being a physiological 
need, the external ‘accessibility’ factor carries the potential for emancipation. What this 
means is that our values and beliefs should be aligned with the previous two elements of 
human food security. As a normative component of human food security, emancipation 
stands for bringing our values and beliefs (i.e. that everyone should have access to safe and 
sufficient food) into the realm of reality. Basically, walk the talk, or for that matter, feed the 
hungry. At present there is arguably sufficient food globally available, but only part of the 
world population has access to safe and nutritious food on a daily basis. Most problems are 
rooted in matters of distribution and accessibility, hence the adage ‘food goes where money 
is’. In respect of security, Booth aptly argues that: 
 
Security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin. Emancipation, not power 
or order, produces true security. (Booth, 1991a, p. 319) 
 
‘Human food security’ is therefore a term to emphasise the importance of access to food as 
part of the concept of food security (Siegenbeek van Heukelom, 2011). The aspiration 
contained in this term is based on the idea that achieving ‘food security’ is ultimately in the 
interest of humanity as a whole. In broader terms the conceptual rational of human food 
security implies that we are leaving behind any political realist connotations of the state as 
key actor and consequent level of analysis, and are moving towards a conception of food 
security in which states are the means and humans the critical ends. The UNDP purported for 
human security the need to move “from security through armaments to security through 
sustainable human development” (1994, p. 24). Along the same line we need to move from 
food security as a measure of production, to food security as a measure of accessibility. 
 In essence the concept of human food security fundamentally endeavours to safeguard 
the ‘freedom from fear’ by realising the ‘freedom from want’. Thus, food security strategies 
should no longer be limited to traditional security approaches but equally reflect an emphasis 
on issues of human development and human rights that play a role in access to food. In a 
more general sense it is also important not to lose sight of the fact that food and water are 
mankind’s most precious source of energy and most important means of survival. Since man 
is naturally prone to engage in violent conflict in order to survive, Maslow was thus entirely 
right to note that hunger makes man extremely dangerous (1943, p. 374). This clearly 
illuminates the point that hunger is without question a threat to human security. But even 
more, if hunger and food insecurity are left unchecked, there is the ominous prospect that 
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these non-traditional security challenges may transform into de facto national security threats. 
Thus, structural solutions to food insecurity should be sought in a combination of human 
security, development and rights based approaches. In terms of security, food always had a 
strategic and coercive capacity, but the coming decades will showcase more than ever the 
impending nature of food as a matter of national and human security (Christensen, 1977). 
Yet, in the end Fullbrook may be spot on when suggesting that “food security will only 
improve when values and perceptions adjust to reflect food as security” (Fullbrook, 2010, p. 
18). 
 
Framing food as security 
The strong normative connotation of ‘food’ in relation to ‘security’ links it inexplicitly to the 
political realm, but also explains why so many people and organisations devote huge amounts 
of time and resources towards achieving ‘food security’. Unfortunately, the meaning of the 
concept ‘food security’ is problematic. As broadly discussed in the previous chapter, the term 
and concept that we refer to as ‘food security’ is rather opaque, leaving us with a number of 
widely diverse meanings (which will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter). This 
has a practical significance for considerations about which alternative measures, policies and 
investments are most appropriate to realise a situation of ‘food security’. Yet at the same time 
this invariably means that bringing the polysemous concept of ‘food security’ into the 
security paradigm necessitates an extremely thorough and comprehensive approach and 
methodology. 
Intuitively and practically the matter of ‘food’ and ‘security’ is one of both normative 
and empirical questions, but by contesting not only the term ‘food security’ but digging 
deeper into questions of what the concept of ‘food’ holds in relation to ‘security’, this chapter 
necessarily becomes one that is more abstract than empirical. Hence, to a large extent the 
following discussion will be an exercise in uncovering the semantics of the concept of ‘food’ 
in relation to ‘security. In other words, the aim is to engage in an in-depth exploration of the 
meaning of ‘food’ in relation to ‘security’ and conceptualise what ‘food’ means as a matter of 
‘security’. Critics may find the predominantly theoretical approach objectionable and argue 
for more empirical substance. But there is merit in this approach, as Baldwin asserts, that 
“without clear concepts ... scholars are apt to talk past each other, and policy-makers find it 
difficult to distinguish between alternative policies” (Baldwin, 1997, p. 6). 
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This suggested approach, however, necessitates a careful analytical method since we 
need to “avoid mixing instrumental and normative recommendations with assumptions about 
definitional and causal linkages” (Græger, 1996, p. 113). Hence we thread a fine line between 
function and concept. Finding an approach apt to the intricacies of this process is 
indispensable. We should therefore pursue a method similar to Græger’s (1996) multi-level 
approach to the environment, which requires a reframing of the concept of ‘food security’ in 
order to steer clear of functional conflicts and give more weight to the conceptual side of 
‘food’ and ‘security’. Moreover, to give this reframing wider purchase in security studies 
there is a need to break up the term ‘food security’ to emphasize and illuminate the need for 
conceptual coherence in the relation between ‘food’ and ‘security’. This creates a conceptual 
division between ‘food security’ as a practical objective and ‘food as security’ as a 
theoretical concept. The former has its focus on practical measures and policy approaches to 
achieve food security, while the latter enables the analytical conceptualisation of the 
interaction between ‘food’ and ‘security’ (see: Græger, 1996). Thus, the analysis of ‘food’ as 
a matter of ‘security’ will henceforth be referred to as the concept of ‘food as security’. 
Approaching the concept of ‘food as security’ is, however, not a simple task. In order 
to substantiate the concept it is necessary to start with a consideration of the most appropriate 
way and method to interpret the concept and determine its substance. Huysmans (1998b) 
makes a good case for distinguishing “three different ways of establishing a content of 
security” (p. 229, emphasis in original). Conventional methods consist of (1) constructing a 
definition or (2) engaging in a conceptual analysis, but in addition Huysmans (1998b) has 
introduced the notion of (3) interpreting the concept as a thick signifier. While each method 
offers a different approach to determining the meaning of security, they “do not differ 
according to the content of security they express” (Huysmans, 1998b, p. 229).  An elegant 
and helpful factor is the cumulative process of the three methods. This is noticeable in the 
growing degree of sophistication when moving from definition to conceptual analysis, then to 
thick signifier. Crucially, each approach also varies in its function, resulting in fundamentally 
different outlooks for a security agenda (Huysmans, 1998b). 
Now, where do we begin? Proposing a definition would be the conventional way to 
delineate the relation between ‘food’ and ‘security’ as a way to “[condense] meaning into a 
statement” (Huysmans, 1998b, p. 229). The function of providing a definition, however, is 
generally limited to simply identifying the topic’s particular meaning in light of the 
discussion that follows. Even more so, Huysmans suggests “that definitions operate as a rite 
of passage, a ritual of purification through which one makes the research a legitimate part of 
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a body of literature and a research community” (Huysmans, 1998b, p. 230). At the same time 
McSweeney points to the elusive nature of the term security, noting that “it denotes a quality 
of relationship which resists definition” (1999, p. 13). This chapter sets out to thoroughly and 
comprehensively formulate the content of the concept of ‘food as security’, so restricting the 
analysis to the mere formulation of a definition – if possible at all – would hardly fulfil this 
objective. However, it would be sensible to make a start by ploughing through existing ideas 
and definitions of ‘food security’ to at least create a point of reference. 
Next, a conceptual analysis seems to provide a rather good – or at least better – 
method to substantiate ‘food as security’ since this approach “is concerned with clarifying the 
meaning of concepts” (Baldwin, 1997, p. 6). The aim of this approach is to “[formulate] a 
common denominator which expresses ‘common conceptual distinctions underlying various 
conceptions of security’” (Baldwin, 1997 as cited in; Huysmans, 1998b, p. 231). What 
Huysmans means here is that the conceptual analysis utilises an analytical framework or 
textual structure, similar to Baldwin’s (1997) approach to the concept of security. Yet, 
understanding the concept of ‘food as security’ is fundamentally different from specifying the 
conditions under which ‘food’ becomes a matter of ‘security’ (Baldwin, 1997, p. 8). Both, 
however, are relevant. It is certainly possible, although risky in Baldwin’s view (1997, p. 7), 
to interlace a conceptual analysis with empirical observations – an approach famously 
undertaken by Buzan (1983) in People, States and Fear. Perhaps, a more prudent approach is 
to avoid the risk of “conflating conceptual analysis with empirical observation” (Baldwin, 
1997, p. 8). Hence, in following the “logical priority of conceptualization”, an analysis of 
‘food as security’ will require conceptual clarity, given that, “the identification of [the 
necessary conditions of security] presupposes a concept of security” (Baldwin, 1997, p. 8). 
Even though a conceptual analysis is more sophisticated than a definition, there is also 
much to gain in deepening our understanding of ‘food as security’ even more by framing 
food as a thick security signifier. The thick signifier approach, according to Huysmans, 
“pushes the conceptual analysis further ... to understand how security language implies a 
specific metaphysics of life” (1998b, p. 231). In other words, this approach aims at 
unmasking the wider dimensions that play a principal role in determining the meaning of 
‘food as security’. Most importantly, it facilitates the integration of the framework outlined in 
the previous chapter (the ‘Why Dichotomy’) into our understanding of ‘food as security’. 
Whereas the conceptual analysis creates a framework of questions that ask how ‘food’ relates 
to threats, referent objects, and values, the thick signifier goes even further by also inquiring 
“how it defines our relations to nature, to other human beings and to the self” (Huysmans, 
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1998b, p. 231). As a result, by linking our understanding of the meaning of ‘food as security’ 
to the underlying cultural vision, it gives us a deeper, ‘thicker’ and more holistic concept. But 
even more so, ‘security’ in this sense becomes self-referential (Huysmans, 1998b, p. 231), 
which has a notable analogy to the significance of ‘the utterance’ in Wæver’s formulation of 
securitisation theory (to be discussed in chapter 4). But where securitisation theory is not 
concerned with the meaning of security – at least not in the Copenhagen School’s variant – 
the thick signifier approach aims particularly at exploring the semantics of security. Here it 
seems that securitisation theory could potentially play a useful analytical role in determining 
if ‘food’ can serve as ‘security’. At the same time, it is also essential to engage in a discussion 
of the meaning of security in relation to food, as it provides a way to “considerably [develop] 
a critical understanding of (the differences in) the significance and meaning of security 
practices” (Huysmans, 1998b, p. 250). 
As pointed out, the three approaches described here are cumulative of nature, which 
means that a thick signifier approach rests upon the key elements established in the definition 
and conceptual analysis. Hence the thick signifier does not provide the ideal starting point for 
an analysis, especially now that the thick signifier approach does not constitute an external 
security agenda, rather in this approach “the meaning of security constitutes the agenda itself” 
(Huysmans, 1998b, p. 248). Thus by only resorting to the thick signifier we run the risk of 
negating the importance of the context and external agenda, as well as having the complexity 
of the approach obscure the clarity of the analytical framework. In first instance it is therefore 
sensible to commence the next chapter with formulating a context, starting with the definition 
of ‘food security’, after which a conceptual analysis of the ‘securitiness’ of food will offer a 
more sophisticated analysis to establish the rudimentary security content and agenda, and to 
be followed ultimately by a thick signifier approach to add a crucial extra layer of meaning to 
the concept. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Food as security 
 
Erst kommt das Fressen, dann kommt die Moral. 
(Bertolt Brecht, 1928) 
 
 A cornucopia of ideas 
 The securitiness of food 
 Food as a thick security signifier 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
70 
 
There is no question that food is essential for the survival of humanity. The first Director-
General of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) indeed emphasised 
food’s existential nature, by calling it the “primary necessity of life” (Boyd Orr, 1945, p. 6). 
This notion has led humankind on a quest for more and better food, one that has greatly 
shaped the world we live in and has had immense implications for our environment and 
surroundings. But the quest for food has done so much more than merely sustain life; most 
importantly it has allowed unparalleled growth. Humanity’s vision to expand its population, 
coupled with its unmatched ingeniousness ability to innovate has created a synergy that 
resulted in a greatly enhance capacity to produce food – which came roughly in three 
momentous revolutions: the advent of agriculture, industrialisation, and modern technology. 
These three eras of innovation were world changing events that firmly established humanity 
as the dominant and ruling species on Earth. Some, however, have put question marks around 
these ‘positive’ developments (Diamond, 1987; Quinn, 1992, 1996). One of the arguments 
convey the perspective that the adoption of agriculture was ‘the worst mistake in the history 
of the human race’ (Diamond, 1987). While this argument can certainly be criticised, it also 
raises the fundamental point that food – being the powerful enabler for the existence of 
humankind – can also have a grimmer side. The need for food and water are one of our great 
vulnerabilities and the lack of food can critically threaten our security, and ultimately, 
endanger our very survival. 
In the last decade the world food situation has deteriorated rapidly and food insecurity 
is now affecting more people than ever before – particularly in the developing world. In 1996 
there were some 825 million chronically undernourished people in the world, at which time 
world leaders pledged during the World Food Summit in Rome to half this number by 2015 
(FAO, 1996). Unfortunately, on the contrary, with the dawn of the new millennium it 
appeared that the number of hungry people was increasing, and worse, suddenly shot up to 
over 1 billion by 2009 (2009b). It were recent events such as the Global Food Price Crisis of 
2007–2008 and the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 that caused the massive surge in hungry 
people, and consequently instigated a growing feeling of unease with the world’s current state 
of affairs. Along these lines there is a hesitant but certainly significant rise in the number of 
people conceding that the future of food is becoming increasingly uncertain. Still, only few 
are bold enough to publicly declare that ‘food’ will be the single most imperative threat to 
global peace and stability in the twenty-first century. Words of warning have too long been 
ignored and discounted on the simple ground that continuing growth signals everything will 
be fine. 
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Yet, already more than a decade ago, former U.S. President Carter wondered why 
peace had been so elusive in the post-Cold War years. Clearly, the bipolarity of the Cold War 
had created high tensions between two ideologies, yet at the same time it had somehow 
provided some level of stability in developing regions and countries. From the early 1990s 
onwards, however, conflict and violence raged across much of the developing world. 
Devastating, in particular, countries “whose economies depend on agriculture but lack the 
means to make their farmland productive” (Carter, 1999). After reading a Peace Research 
Institute Oslo (PRIO) report published in the same year on the relation between armed 
conflict and agriculture (de Soysa & Gleditsch, 1999), Carter understood the link: “There can 
be no peace until people have enough to eat. Hungry people are not peaceful people.” (Carter, 
1999) 
Crucially, the PRIO report demonstrated that most violent conflict in the decade after 
the end of the Cold War was concentrated in the developing countries of South Asia, Central 
Africa and Latin America. The high level of agricultural dependence in these countries had 
locked them into a “vicious cycle of poverty, scarcity, and violence” (de Soysa & Gleditsch, 
1999, p. 8). The reports’ authors contended this vicious cycle could only be broken by 
focusing on good governance in order to rehabilitate the agricultural sector, enhance human 
development as to reduce poverty, and prevent environmental destruction (de Soysa & 
Gleditsch, 1999, p. 8). For that reason Carter called upon the leaders of developing nations to 
make food security a priority. 
But looking back now, more than a decade has passed and it seems that this call 
should have targeted all leaders, instead of only those in developing nations. Food security is 
– and will ever more be – a global concern, requiring a holistic approach from the entire 
international community. The idea, however, that food insecurity may someday severely 
challenge humanity’s survival – probably sooner than most anticipate – is for some people 
still difficult to come to terms with. They rely on humanity’s ingenuity to increase food 
production and availability, indefinitely – and cannot phantom the possible inadequacy of 
technological fixes to structural problems. 
Lester Brown, who has been at the forefront of studying the relation between 
agriculture, population, environment and economics, remarks that he too resisted the idea that 
a deteriorating world food situation could bring down governments or even our civilisation as 
a whole (2009a, p. 50). But adding new non-traditional challenges to the ongoing failures of 
the international community to responsibly manage the world food situation, he proclaims 
that we can no longer ignore the risk. 
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We have entered a new era in geopolitics. In the 20th century the main threat to 
international security was superpower conflict; today it is failing states. It is not the 
concentration of power but its absence that puts us at risk. ... [and] if the food 
situation continues to deteriorate, entire nations will break down at an ever 
increasing rate. (L. R. Brown, 2009a) 
 
Brown’s message to “farmers and foreign ministers alike” therefore, is to prepare themselves 
“for a new era in which world food scarcity increasingly shapes global politics” (L. R. 
Brown, 2011b). Not everyone, though, will readily accept Brown’s argument for a shift in the 
axis of geopolitics. More traditional security scholars, concerned with strategic and military 
security, may oppose the idea that the threat of superpower struggles over the balance of 
power in the world will become a lesser concern than the threat of resource-based conflict 
associated with state-failure in the developing world. But even for those holding on to the 
supremacy of the conventional geopolitical environment of superpower competition, ‘food’ 
and ‘security’ will increasingly cross their path as well. Mearsheimer, for instance, asserts 
that security competition between the United States and China is unavoidable and argues that 
the geopolitical debate will shift to China’s rise. Notably, the rise of China cannot be 
peaceful, says Mearsheimer, “because it is likely to lead to an intense security competition 
between China and the United States, with considerable potential for war” (Mearsheimer, 
2010). But the question is what exactly would drive this security contest? Presumably 
Mearsheimer could point to the classic quest for world power and hegemony. However, if 
tensions between United States and China indeed come to a climax sometime this century, it 
will most likely take the form of competition for scarce natural resources; perhaps even the 
most basic: food, water, and farmland. In fact, inter-Asian competition over resources appears 
to have already commenced with the recent clash between China and Japan over the Senkaku 
Islands in the East China Sea, which is allegedly a conflict over natural resources and fishing 
rights (Spross, 2013). Thus, we seem to be swiftly entering an era of potential resources wars 
in which “the security dilemma dynamics throw up the prospect of a Cold War spiral between 
the United States and China” (Booth, 2007, p. 15). 
Here we have two different security outlooks, seemingly worlds apart. Making sense 
of these two widely dissimilar views of security requires a better look at the fragmentation of 
the security framework, the nature of the threats and the meaning of security. The previous 
chapters have outlined some of our vulnerabilities to food and described the challenge of 
feeding a growing population in a finite world. Most attempts to address the problematic of 
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attaining a situation of ‘food security’, however, mainly focus on the politics of ‘food’ and 
the gathering of empirical evidence to inform relevant policies and measures. 
Notwithstanding the importance of developing practical food security policies, this approach 
has done little to improve our understanding of the concept of ‘food’ in relation to ‘security’. 
This chapter therefore utilises Huysmans (1998b) framework – outlined in the previous 
chapter – to make a start in conceptualising the meaning of ‘food’ as a matter of ‘security’. 
 
A cornucopia of ideas 
By now we have seen that discussing ‘food security’ presents some challenges, semantically 
as well as conceptually. It is therefore of great significance to clarify and emphasise the 
specific aspect of ‘food security’ that is at the heart of this thesis. Indeed, as Kent mindfully 
observed: 
 
When talking about food security, we should be clear about which aspect of it is under 
discussion. People may have safe food, for example, but that doesn’t necessarily mean 
they have enough food, or good food, and it doesn’t mean they will have food 
tomorrow. It is important to know what is being discussed, and also what is being 
ignored. (Kent, 2005, p. 3) 
 
As a concept, however, food security has been rendered imprecise by the ongoing evolution, 
development, multiplication, and diversification in thought and understanding of food 
(Maxwell, 1996, p. 155) – as outlined in the previous chapter. No wonder that a study in the 
early 1990s identified nearly two hundred definitions of the term (M. Smith et al., 1992). 
Fortunately, 185 nations agreed at the World Food Summit in 1996 on a definition of food 
security: 
 
food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access 
to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences 
for an active and healthy life (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations, 1996) 
 
However, even this definition cannot take away from the fact that the term food security has 
been stretched thin. In fact, some believe this has actually created a “conveniently imprecise 
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concept for classifying populations according to their vulnerability to hunger and food 
shortages” (Dyson, 1996, p. 51). The convenience of such an imprecise concept, as Dyson 
(1996) contends, springs from the various different levels of analysis which allows for a 
highly diversified and multidisciplinary approach. Somewhat alike, Maxwell also does not 
see a limitation in the broad conceptualisation and applicability of the term ‘food security’. 
He contends that “the multiple uses of the term ‘food security’ reflect the nature of the food 
problem as it is experienced by poor people themselves” and “provides many different 
perspectives on reality” (1996, p. 155). In other words, while the end goal of food security is 
reasonably clear to everyone – namely, no one should go hungry, finding the most 
appropriate pathway to reach a world devoid of hunger remains wide open to disciplinary 
interpretation and cultural vision. 
Unfortunately, this kind of conceptual imprecision also has a serious drawback. It 
runs the risk of creating yet another hollow and meaningless concept, one lacking a 
recognisable reference subject (i.e. what values of ‘food’ are under consideration?) as well as 
clarity on the level of analysis or reference object (i.e. what security perspective do we take: 
an individual, community, regional, national, or international focus?). Conceivably, food 
security has already evolved somewhat akin to the path ‘human security’ followed in the 
1990s, where it became an interdisciplinary and politicised concept, devoid of any 
unambiguous meaning. Food security appears to increasingly suffer from much of the same 
ailments. For instance, when Paris compared ‘human security’ to ‘sustainable development’ 
he noted that “everyone is for it, but few people have a clear idea of what it means” (2001, p. 
88). Technically this may not be entirely accurate for food security since we have seen that 
there is some general agreement in the international community on a definition for food 
security. But now that nearly everyone seems to agree that the goal of food security is 
intrinsically and instrumentally important (Barrett & Lentz, 2009), there has been an 
explosion of solutions – each often grounded in its own ‘enhanced’ definition of food 
security. With these many interpretations, interdisciplinary approaches, and multiple levels of 
analysis, it is commonly recognised that food security has become inherently difficult to 
define. Thus, even today the concept of food security essentially remains a ‘cornucopia of 
ideas’ (Maxwell, 1996), with no consensus on which measures are required to achieve a 
situation that resembles the definition of food security. Thus, in a similar vein to Paris, we 
could say of food security that everyone is for it, but few people have a clear idea of how to 
achieve it. In this sense the World Health Organization (2011) provides a point in case by 
identifying food security as a ‘complex sustainable development issue’. 
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From the foregoing, it can be established that the term food security connotes a wide 
variety of – sometimes implicit – meanings, which adds a layer of confusion to the concept. 
But it also implies that food security is rapidly becoming one of the trendy catchwords like 
‘sustainable development’, ‘human security’ and ‘environmental security’. Of course, we 
should welcome this on the basis that “conceptual ferment in language often reflects 
important changes in political and social norms” (Deudney, 1991, p. 23), but there is also a 
danger inherent in the popular use of these kind of terms. Each has been touted by all kinds of 
politicians, activists, and academics to advance a wide range of policies, ambitions and 
research projects. But the broad use of these terms has stripped away much of the actual 
meaning of the underlying concepts; they have become victims of their own popularity. Paris 
(2001), as we have seen, compared ‘human security’ to the faith of the term ‘sustainable 
development’. Likewise, Græger (1996) warned that if environmental security is defined too 
broadly “[it] risks the same destiny as the concept of ‘sustainable development’” (p. 113). 
Earlier even, in the 1950s, Wolfers (1952, p. 481) cautioned that ‘political formulas’ like 
national security “may not mean the same thing to different people” and “may not have any 
precise meaning at all”, which allows people to label favourable policies with “attractive and 
possibly deceptive name[s]”. 
Food security runs the same risk. Already the concept of food security has been 
massively stretched over the previous decades, leaving it with only a thin and widely spread 
layer of meaning. The reach of food in our natural and social world is extensive, it enters into 
almost every problem (Boyd Orr, 1945). Food security has therefore been used and linked to 
a wide range of topics such as, without being exhaustive: economics and trade (Aziz, 1979; 
N. Brown, Laffan, & Wight, 2008); political-economy and food regimes (Harriet Friedmann, 
1993; Harriet Friedmann & McMichael, 1989; McMichael, 2009); human development 
(Pinstrup-Andersen, 1996); geopolitics and diplomacy (L. R. Brown, 2011b; P. Collier, 2010; 
Maddock, 1978); self-sufficiency (Barling, Sharpe, & Lang, 2008); the causes of hunger 
(Barrett & Lentz, 2009; L. C. Smith et al., 2000; Thomas, 1987); climate and environment (L. 
R. Brown, 2009a; Schmidhuber & Tubiello, 2007); conflict and security (Bellemare, 2011b; 
Falcon & Naylor, 2005; Fullbrook, 2010; Lagi et al., 2011; Sarris, 1989); human rights and 
the right to food (Hadiprayitno, 2010); health and nutrition (Jaron & Galal, 2009); and, food 
definitions and policies (Pinstrup-Andersen, 2009; Sen, 1982). Nearly all commentators 
emphasise the intricacies surrounding the term food security. Few, however, manage to 
comprehensively define specific interpretations of the concept – leaving us often with yet 
another poorly defined conception of food security. 
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Naturally this leads to the question should ‘food security’ be classified as an 
‘essentially contested concept’? (Gallie, 1955). In other words, is the concept of ‘food 
security’ “so value-laden that no amount of argument or evidence can ever lead to agreement 
on a single version as the ‘correct or standard use’”? (Baldwin, 1997, p. 10) This means that 
to classify as an ‘essentially contested concept’ the concept under consideration needs to 
generate “vigorous disputes” rooted in “deep-seated philosophical disagreement” rather than 
amount merely to “policy disputes in ‘practical life’ that reflect conflicts of ‘interests, tastes 
or attitudes’.” (Baldwin, 1997, p. 11) For the concept of ‘food security’ the definition 
propounded by the FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 1996) 
can be considered authoritative and generally accepted as correct or standard use. At the same 
time ‘food security’ does not appear to be conceptually contested on grounds of deep-seated 
philosophical or ‘metaphysical’ differences (Gallie, 1955, p. 169), instead philosophical 
differences in this area have led to the creation of concepts like ‘food sovereignty’ (Boyer, 
2010; Rosset, 2003, 2006) and ‘food democracy’ (Lang, 2003). The existing disputes and 
differences surrounding the concept of ‘food security’ are mainly of a functional nature 
concerning the policies and measures required to reach the practical goal of a hunger-free 
world. Therefore ‘food security’ does not qualify as an essentially contested concept. 
However, there certainly is a de facto stretching of the meaning of ‘food security’ through the 
wide-spread and confounded use of both the term and concept. ‘Food security’ could perhaps 
be contested in functional terms, meaning that the conditions used to determine if a concept is 
essentially contested could be applicable mutatis mutandis to a ‘functionally contested 
concept’. However, this is not the place to further explore the applicability of these conditions 
since the focus of this chapter is on ‘security’ rather than on ‘food policies’, yet it emphasizes 
the importance of normative and policy-focused elements central to ‘food security’. 
The previous chapter concluded with the notion that “food security will only improve 
when values and perceptions adjust to reflect food as security” (Fullbrook, 2010, p. 18, 
emphasis added). This statement reinforces the notion that ‘food’ can – and should – be 
considered as a matter of security. Even more fundamentally, this means that to rationally 
change the world we first need to adequately interpret the world (Bhaskar, 2011, p. 29).  
When placing ‘food’ in the perspective of the mounting challenges described in the 
previous chapters, there is certainly a normative obligation and a practical sense of urgency in 
addressing the ‘securitiness’ of food. More so, as mentioned earlier, in a world of finite and 
constrained resources we need to start thinking seriously, strategically and sustainably about 
the role and availability of ‘food’ in the remainder of this century. We need to ask ourselves 
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if we should consider ‘food’ to be merely a necessity to live, or if additionally we should 
perceive it as a political priority and, perhaps even, elevate it to the realm of existential 
threats? The answer to these questions will hinge upon how we explain and understand ‘food’ 
in terms of being a challenge, a threat, and a security measure. In other words, is it practical, 
logical and theoretically sound to bring ‘food’ into the realm of security studies? Even if we 
decide that there is in principle value in securitising ‘food’, how does this happen in theory 
and practice? Essentially this means that we need to explore how certain ’public issues’ 
become matters of security. More fundamentally, how does the concept of security relate to 
‘food’? 
The purpose of this chapter is therefore to develop a comprehensive theoretical 
conceptualisation of ‘food as security’. To establish the content for this concept providing a 
mere definition is unsatisfactory, at least a conceptual analysis is required, but a thick 
signifier approach may even proof to be more suitable. Since the definition has already been 
addressed, and these methods are cumulative in nature, there is no objection to continue now 
with a conceptual analysis – and subsequently advance into a thick signifier approach. We 
need to progress from the deconstructed definition of ‘food security’ towards an inquiry into 
the securitiness of food, namely, by asking how ‘food’ presents a security issue. 
 
The securitiness of food 
For many people there is an intuitive inclination to assume that the subject ‘food security’ 
naturally has a place in the paradigm of international security studies. For one, there is the 
understandable – though perhaps somewhat naive – textual presumption that there must be 
some legitimate link between food security and security studies. But the mere semantic logic 
of resorting to the word ‘security’ contained in the term food security is too simplistic a 
justification. A more considered assumption, however, is that food security must be the 
opposite of food insecurity, and as such acts as a security mechanism to prevent the threat of 
hunger. Practically this is indeed a sensible assumption, but in theoretical terms most people 
would be surprised to learn that food security only until recently had no real place in classical 
security theory – much like many other new security challenges (Buzan & Wæver, 1997, p. 
242). Despite calls by international organisations and a handful of scholars for greater 
attention to be accorded to the security implications of food insecurity, current academic 
efforts to achieve a comprehensive understanding of food as a matter of security remain ad 
hoc and few. Still, prudence demands a rather cautious approach when commingling the 
78 
 
concept of food with the concept of security (Gibson, 2010). Gibson (2010) offers three 
reasons for concern: ‘food as security’ could misunderstand what is meant by security; it 
could lead to more political expediency than objective analysis; and by aligning food with 
security, there is an inherent connotation with risk management. Clearly, the concept of 
‘food’ as a matter of ‘security’ presents an important contemporary challenge. 
Unfortunately, the disciple of security studies offers no trouble-free and 
straightforward process of transposing and conceptualising food as a matter of security. The 
actual process of determining whether – and when – a public-issue becomes elevated into the 
realm of ‘security’ is far more intricate than one may textually assume on the basis of the 
term ‘food security’. While securitisation theory offers an elaborate method to determine 
whether food is considered a matter of security, it does not make any normative statements 
about whether food ought to be considered as security. Even so, securitisation theory 
warrants a more detailed exploration (see chapter 4) but for now we need to ask first, as 
Græger (1996) did for the environment, whether the challenges surrounding ‘food’ will 
require a revised concept of security.  
This brings us to a salient but much overlooked point in relation to the concept of 
security. In exploring the historical discourse and (re)definitions of the concept of security, 
Baldwin (1997) observes that most attempts – when closely scrutinised – hardly reframe the 
actual concept of security. Rather, most attempts appear merely to pose “empirical or 
political questions where people actually agree about the concept of security, but differ in 
their interpretation of what actual threats qualify as security threats” (Wæver, 1999, p. 339, 
note 3, emphasis in original). This matter about the concept of security that Baldwin and 
Wæver identify touches the core of the discussion on the relation between food and security. 
It necessitates the resolution of a preliminary question before we can continue: is the present 
attempt at conceptualising ‘food as security’ fundamentally aimed at modifying the 
underlying concept of security, or is the objective rather to broaden the ‘threat definition’ 
within the existing conception(s) of security? Differently formulated, does the concept of 
food as a matter of security demand a fundamentally different concept of security, or is it 
merely a case of “emphasizing different aspects of a shared concept” (Baldwin, 1997, p. 5). 
Now that the focus of this chapter is aimed at exploring the costs and benefits of placing food 
at the centre of the security debate, the discussion whether ‘food’ can or should be seen as a 
matter of security does not per se alter the concept of security, instead it is a debate about 
broadening and deepening the security agenda, and whether this is a good thing or not 
(Huysmans, 1998b). Accordingly, the present approach does not necessitate a need to 
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challenge the concept of security. However, we should remain vigilant with the use of 
‘security’ now that “[it] is a conservative notion because it is protective of the already 
existing and possessed things and values” (Patomäki, 2008, p. 18). The latter point brings 
home Brown’s urgent call to rather redefine security, stressing that “we have inherited a 
definition of security from the last century ... that is almost exclusively military in focus. ... 
But armed aggression is no longer the principal threat to our future. The overriding threats in 
this century are climate change, population growth, spreading water shortages, rising food 
prices, and politically failing states” (L. R. Brown, 2012, p. 98). Indeed, we require a 
redefinition of the meaning of security – not so much the concept, based on the contemporary 
challenges that force us to recognise that “it is no longer possible to separate food security 
and security more broadly defined” (L. R. Brown, 2012, p. 98). 
With this in mind, we need to take a closer look at the meaning of security – an area 
that is equally underdeveloped, as Huysmans (1998b) contends. This will require the present 
conceptual analysis of ‘food as security’ to be subject to specification in terms of referent 
object, values threatened, time range, and the particular kinds of threats (Baldwin, 1997). 
Altogether, this will answer whether or not this approach presents a challenge to the concept 
of security whilst concurrently conceptualising ‘food’ as a matter of security. 
To make a start with the meaning of ‘security’ we ought to take note of Wæver’s 
observation that the general discourse on the meaning of security is characterised by a 
reliance – at least for a great number of security studies scholars – on the idea of national 
security rather than the everyday word security (Wæver, 1995). For that reason there appears 
to be no generic concept of the meaning of security, but rather the only concept we actually 
have is “uncritically borrowed from the traditional view, and multiplied and extended to new 
fields” (Wæver, 1995). McSweeney seems to concur; he observes that security studies is 
dominated by one view of security, one in which “the meaning of security is ... determined by 
a prior theoretical assumption of the primacy of the state” (1999, p. 16). However, we can 
freely choose an alternative version, say in the form of a more humane sense of security that 
is a property of a relationship, therein essentially “a quality making each secure in the other” 
(McSweeney, 1999, p. 15). Thus as opposed to the classical view of security as a commodity, 
there is also security as a primal relationship, which can be illustrated with the ‘mythical 
image’ of Mother and Child (McSweeney, 1999, p. 14). Even so, the former view of security 
has long dominated the security discipline, and is still regularly presented “not as an option, a 
choice, but as the only one which is valid and relevant”. But as we will come to see, both are 
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not mutually exclusive, since “the subject who wants to be secure also needs to be defended” 
(McSweeney, 1999, p. 16). 
 This presents us with one of the fundamental elements in security studies – crucial to 
defining the meaning of security; the referent object for security. Upon whom has the concept 
of ‘food as security’ bearing? Whereas McSweeney (1999) describes this as “the subject who 
wants to be secure”, Baldwin (1997) simply asks “security for whom?” This question pertains 
not only to the referent object, but likewise the level of analysis. Which actor(s) are central to 
conceptualising food as a matter of security? Intuitively, the individual level of analysis is a 
sensible starting point as it presents a causal link between food and security that is easily 
understood: man must eat to survive. Similarly, when put in the negative sense, the 
relationship between hunger and conflict is as intuitive. Interestingly, however, once the level 
of analysis gets broader – from the individual to the community, national, and international 
level, recognition of the relationship between food and survival diminishes, or for that same 
matter between hunger and conflict. Admittedly though, rising food prices, intensifying 
resource scarcity, and environmental degradation are all increasingly contributing to a 
refocused threat assessment. The challenge of meeting the global need for food is now 
recognised as “one of the most important challenges of this century” (United Nations 
Environment Programme, 2012, p. 81). Thus, in pursuance of ‘food security’ we need to 
accept that this contemporary challenge is as much about sustainable development as it is 
about security and survival. In other words, the idea of ‘food as security’ supports, and even 
promotes, the quest for global food security, but it does so by emphasising the ‘securitiness’ 
of food. The raison d’être for this approach is captured best in Fullbrook’s assertion that 
“putting food first will strengthen the security in food security” (Fullbrook, 2010, p. 7, 
emphasis added). Hence, it is worth repeating that “food security will only improve when 
values and perceptions adjust to reflect food as security” (Fullbrook, 2010, p. 18). Naturally 
this raises the question how ‘food’ compares to other values and needs, and what that means 
in relation to ‘security’? 
 To conceptualise food as a matter of security propounds the notion that achieving 
‘food security’ on a global scale will in effect function as a principle of security by reducing 
human suffering and preventing food-related conflict and violence. Falcon and Naylor 
conclude, therefore, that “perhaps the most direct ways to security and democracy, as to love, 
may be via the stomach” (Falcon & Naylor, 2005, p. 1125). Hence, food is the imperative 
prerequisite for the satisfaction of other needs, as well as for the enjoyment of a majority of 
values. So safeguarding ‘food security’ is at the core of protecting humanity’s foremost 
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needs: survival. From this existential perspective ‘food’ naturally overrides numerous needs 
and values, notwithstanding the costs incurred. But, in such a context, what does ‘putting 
food first’ mean? If it stands for increasing food production to continue to feed our vision of 
growth, it may ultimately not ‘strengthen the security in food security’ – perhaps only in the 
short run, but certainly not in the long run. However, if we can overcome the paradigm of 
‘growth’ and focus on sustainable food production, enhancing distribution networks, and 
improving access to food, then putting food first indeed strengthens security.  
Another element to consider is the time range for which security is sought (Wolfers, 
1952, p. 486, note 6). In the case of ‘food as security’ this is an important factor. At present, 
food is high on many actors’ priority list and perceived as an immediate and future security 
challenge. But it has only been over the last decade that food begun to re-enter people’s 
minds as a genuine political and moral priority. Only if an immediate or looming situation of 
food insecurity poses a threat to national security, food becomes suddenly elevated into the 
security realm. 
Hence, we may construe that food as security does not require a modification at the 
conceptual level of security. But if that is the case, would allowing ‘food’ into the security 
paradigm then imply a widening of the security agenda? Not necessarily, food as a matter of 
security does not widen the security agenda by following a sectoral expansion. The concept 
of food as security does not entail a separate security sector like national-, human-, and 
environmental security. A separate sector approach often aims at broadening the security 
agenda horizontally, but the concept of food as security presents an inherent threat that 
reaches all across existing sectors. Food as security deepens the security agenda vertically by 
highlighting and emphasising the existential type of threat that food poses against national 
security, human security, and environmental security. Most importantly is then the question 
how food could threaten security in its widest sense, and conversely how food could function 
as a security measure. 
Nowadays there is not much concern over food in the function of an ‘offensive’ 
security measure – namely as we have seen the potential of ‘food power’ to exert pressure on 
(international) actors. The type of threat emanating from this offensive security measure had 
a brief period of popularity during and in the aftermath of the food crisis in the 1970s. We 
have outlined the discussion on the potential prospect for ‘food power’ – as opposed to ‘petro 
power’ – and how food commodities in general to be used as a political or diplomatic weapon 
(see generally: BusinessWeek, 1975; Christensen, 1977; Maddock, 1978; Paarlberg, 1978a, 
1978b; Tarrant, 1981; Wallensteen, 1976). Presently, however, more ‘defensive’ security 
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approaches (eg. concerning the threat of food insecurity) appear to be the primary modus 
operandi in discussing ‘food’ and ‘security’. Nonetheless, certain circumstances, such as a 
resource crisis or climate collapse, may still at some point in the future ‘unlock’ the potential 
of food as offensive security (See generally: L. R. Brown, 2011b). 
 Food as a matter of defensive security focuses in its broadest conceptualisation on the 
threats that emerge from situations of food insecurity. At the level of national security we 
have most recently seen during the Global Food Price Crisis of 2007–2008 how high food 
prices can lead to food riots, violence, and even regime change. Similarly, human security 
threats are also omnipresent; from hunger and famine to nutrition deficiency and increased 
disease vulnerability. One problem is that at present most of the developed world has food 
available in excess; it is relatively cheap and presents unbelievable amounts of choice, with 
the consequence that food intake patterns are more related to lifestyle than to survival. Butler 
describes this as “disproportionately well-fed, well-off and influential individuals on the one 
hand and nature, ecosystems and food production on the other” (2009, p. 577). Does this 
make ‘food’ a zero-sum concept of security, namely, does more food for one actor means less 
for another? In a world of plenty, ‘food’ would not suggest any zero-sum outcomes, however, 
considering that reality presents us with a world of finite resources and a growing demand for 
more food, there is certainly a zero-sum aspect to ‘food’. Unfortunately, already there is 
evidence of the zero-sum nature of the ‘food game’. There is at present sufficient food in the 
world to provide every individual with a nutritious diet, so why do we see almost 1 billion 
people go hungry and the integral destruction of the environment to produce ever more food? 
It appears that this is due to the zero-sum nature of food in combination with a marginal 
values approach. This means that the value of food will vary from actor to another and from 
context to another. A certain minimum amount of food is required to sustain life, but as 
Baldwin (1997, p. 19) strikingly illustrates, “the value of a glass of water is [not] the same for 
a person stranded in a desert and a person drowning in a lake”.  
Thus, even in contemporary societies of plenty, we should never forget that no-one 
will ever be exempt from the potential threat of food insecurity since “all inhabitants of the 
earth [are] consumers” (D. J. Shaw, 2007, p. 3). Already touched upon in the previous 
chapter, the problem was described as the notion of ‘seeing but not seeing’; firmly rooted in a 
cultural vision of growth. To explore wider and deeper the factors pertaining to the concept of 
‘food as security’, it requires us to move into a thick signifier approach. 
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Food as a thick security signifier 
For the thick signifier approach Huysmans suggests to take ‘security’ as the signifier to 
change social relations into security relations. Specifically, the aim of this approach is that it 
“tries to understand how security language implies a specific metaphysics of life” by 
“[positioning] people in their relations to themselves, to nature and to other human beings 
within a particular discursive, symbolic order” which resembles “an ensemble of rules that is 
immanent of a security practice and that defines the practice in its specificity” (Huysmans, 
1998b, pp. 231-232). With this in mind Huysmans (1998b) proposes two questions: “How 
does a security story order social relations?” and “What are the implications of politicizing an 
issue as a security problem?” (Huysmans, 1998b, p. 232). In addition it should be noted that it 
is the ‘metaphysics of life’ as well as the ‘discursive, symbolic order’ which Huysmans 
speaks of that represent what we have so far referred to as a ‘cultural vision’ (see: Quinn, 
1992, 1996, 1997). 
More precisely, Kinnvall (2006) details that the thick signifier approach actually 
implies the deconstruction of at least three interrelated processes. First, one needs to begin at 
the foundation, deconstructing “the larger stories or narratives in which security dimensions 
are embedded ... to study the extent to which such narratives affect people’s sense of 
security” (Kinnvall, 2006, p. 27). Fundamentally this means we need to identify the narrative 
that embodies humanity’s existential relation between food and security. In the previous 
chapter we already made a start by deconstructing two perspectives that help us understand 
how a dysfunctional world food system greatly affects humanity’s security in a multifaceted 
manner, and on a global scale. We found that a specific ‘cultural vision’ determines how 
humanity believes it ought to live and interact with its environment, which accordingly 
underpins people’s sense of security. This indicates that using the thick signifier approach 
negates the need to formulate a security agenda a priori, the mere requirement is to render 
problematic what is mostly taken for granted, namely that cultural vision determines social 
order – which inevitably generates a security agenda (Huysmans, 1998b). This makes the 
objective here to explore the meaning of ‘food as security’ by looking at how this cultural 
vision – as a specific metaphysics of life – articulates a particular relation between humanity 
as a species and food as its object for survival, which informs our ‘humane’ sense of security. 
Secondly, following from the above, we need to explore “how these processes 
manifest themselves locally as discursive, institutional and cultural practices that define 
people’s perceptions and thus their different senses of security” (Kinnvall, 2006, p. 27). The 
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discursive formation of ‘food as security’ can be interpreted to mean different things in 
different contexts – much alike the multitude of definitions of ‘food security’. In other words, 
we need to identify the forms in which cultural vision manifests itself and how this generates 
the security agenda. 
As a third point Kinnvall suggests the necessity to probe into the psychological 
dimension, by analysing “the extent to which individuals become preoccupied with the search 
for one secure identity, the securitization of subjectivity, in response to how these individuals 
are discursively, institutionally and culturally positioned.” (Kinnvall, 2006, p. 27). Within 
this psychological dimension we ought to pursue two interrelated elements of the individual’s 
perception of ‘security’ in order to understand its relation to ‘food’. We need to reveal the 
origin of the search for one’s security by looking at the stages of human development, in 
conjunction with an assessment of the security discourse – what makes ‘security’? 
Accordingly, at first this requires an incisive and far-reaching theory of human development, 
one that has the ability to place individual experiences in the context of the entire history of 
human psychological development (Roemischer, 2002). Spiral Dynamics offers such a theory 
by integrating worldviews, beliefs, values, and identities into a dynamic spiral-shaped model 
of human consciousness (D. E. Beck & Cowan, 1996; Roemischer, 2002; Wilber, 2011). 
Once there is an understanding of the historical context that informed humanity’s relationship 
with food, next we can utilise securitisation theory and emancipatory realism to reveal the 
subjective interpretations of ‘food’ as a matter of ‘security’. 
What follows is first the articulation of the formation of ‘food as security’ through 
deconstructing the dominant cultural vision of growth. Subsequently, this will be contrasted 
by the construction of an alternative cultural vision of harmony. Each vision has its own 
narrative, manifestations, and psychological dimension. In effect, these distinctly different 
‘visions of food’ highlight the issues McMichael identified as the ‘foundational divide’ 
between agro-industrial and agro-ecological practices (McMichael, 2009). 
Inherent to this approach is the notion that our choices of ‘security’ and ‘food 
systems’ are not predefined by ‘what humanity is’; one particular cultural vision does not 
equate humanity. In other words, there are potentially thousands of alternative cultural 
visions – ways for humanity to live; so one single, dominant cultural vision should not be 
perceived as deterministic of what humanity is (Quinn, 1996). We need to realise that “we are 
not ‘locked in’ to the existing system” (Campbell, 2012, p. 47). Referring to the concept of 
‘food regimes’, Campbell (2012) points out omnipresent conditions that can lead to major 
transformations, which have twice already radically altered the structure of the world food 
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system. Not to forget, too, that “in both cases, food security concerns in the wealthy nations 
drove that change” (Campbell, 2012, p. 47). 
 
A vision of growth 
To begin, we need to reiterate the contemporary dominant cultural vision under which nearly 
the entire human species operates. This vision came about as the result of a relatively new 
lifestyle that humankind adopted 10,000 years ago: totalitarian agriculture. This particular 
form of agriculture is aimed at maximising food production by claiming the exclusive right to 
food. Throughout this process competing species have been intentionally wiped out, while 
others have been displaced through the clearing of all and any land that is suitable for 
agriculture. Humanity proved to be immensely successful at practicing this form of 
agriculture, and before long it brought about an unprecedented lifestyle – of food surpluses 
and unlimited growth – that rapidly took dominion of the world.  
This new way of life gave rise to the narrative that ‘man was made to rule the world’, 
presenting a stark departure from the narrative that ‘man is just one of many in a world of 
natural hierarchies, systems, and forms’. The erroneous belief in the rightfulness of the new 
narrative was fuelled by the success of totalitarian agriculture, indeed as Diamond (1987) 
sensibly remarks, ‘might makes right’. Soon this lifestyle turned into a cultural vision of 
growth, a vision that was firmly rooted on the principle of unlimited food production and 
propounded an extraordinary expansion in human population size – namely, growth without 
limit. Thus, in summary, the adoption of totalitarian agriculture inspired a new lifestyle of 
food surpluses and population expansion, a lifestyle that subsequently transformed into a 
new-found cultural vision of unlimited growth. However, in the process this lifestyle and 
vision also produced a whole new set of challenges (Wells, 2010). 
Manifestations of this vision are ubiquitous, whenever more land is needed to increase 
food production to feed a growing population, more land is conquered from other cultures, 
species, and nature. Classic historical examples include the A.D. 700 Viking explosion 
(Diamond, 2005, p. 181) and European colonialism between 1500-1900. But modern 
manifestations should certainly not be discounted, and of particular concern is the 
contemporary emergence of so-called ‘neo-colonial’ practices in the form of the recent global 
land grab for food security and biofuel production (Kugelman & Levenstein, 2009), and to a 
lesser degree a variety of other contemporary practices of land grabbing – such as ‘green 
grabbing’ (Fairhead, Leach, & Scoones, 2012). Both these historical and modern 
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manifestations brought about a multiplicity of security challenges; ranging from threats to 
national security in terms of inter-state conflict and war; to human security challenges with 
respect to physical safety, the rule of law, and human rights; but also environmental security 
challenges when considering the wellbeing of the natural world, the Earth. Even more 
fundamental is the security challenge at the existential level – namely the survival of 
humanity amongst all other species and the longevity of the Earth. Presently this cultural 
vision of growth poses serious challenges across the whole security realm, but the existential 
security outlook is especially gloomy. The flowing river of this particular cultural vision is 
rapidly and violently rushing towards its final destination: a global civilisational collapse. 
Perhaps, one may find the notion of a ‘global civilisational collapse’ overly dramatic, 
alarmingly emotive, or deceptively unrealistic. But the historical record of this cultural vision 
provides a plethora of societal collapses that reinforce the perilous direction of this vision. 
For instance, Diamond (2005) masterfully explores in Collapse: How Societies Choose to 
Fail or Succeed how since the adoption of agriculture 10,000 years ago, unsustainable 
farming practices and overexploitation of natural resources have brought down numerous 
historic and modern societies. As such, documented are the rise (around A.D. 900) and fall 
(approximately between 1400 – 1700) of Easter Island, which he asserts is “the clearest 
example of a society that destroyed itself by overexploiting its own resources” (Diamond, 
2005, p. 118). Similarly, one of the reasons for the Maya collapse turns out to be population 
growth outstripping available resources (Diamond, 2005, p. 176). Most strikingly, perhaps, 
was the sudden collapse of the Anasazi between 1150 and 1200, which was according to 
Diamond ultimately determined by one fundamental mistake: “people living in fragile and 
difficult environments, adopting solutions that were brilliantly successful and understandable 
‘in the short run,’ but that failed or else created fatal problems in the long run” (Diamond, 
2005, p. 155). The bottom-line appears to be extremely level-headed: unlimited societal 
growth is unsustainable in a finite environment. A variety of societies had to learn this lesson 
the hard way, by means of partial or full collapse. Yet, Brown (2011c) notes that there are 
always many warning signs, there is simply no way civilisational collapse presents itself 
entirely unforeseen. In fact,  the historical record has shown that “economic and social 
collapse was almost always preceded by a period of environmental decline” (L. R. Brown, 
2011c, p. 9). Even so, at this day and age, our global civilisation continues to pursue the same 
risky vision of unlimited growth. And for all the problems and challenges we encounter, our 
solutions are mostly the same short-sighted quick-fixes like the many societies before us 
used, those that faced merciless collapse. 
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To impede the flow towards civilisational collapse the cultural vision of growth relies 
heavily upon the problem-solving approach. This approach recognises the existence of 
security challenges, but operates under the assumption that solutions must be technical in 
nature. As Hardin explains,  “a technical solution may be defined as one that requires a 
change only in the techniques of the natural sciences, demanding little or nothing in the way 
of change in human values or ideas of morality” (Hardin, 1968, p. 1243). But some problems 
do not have a technical solution, or require a modification of vision, too. Borlaug, the father 
of the Green Revolution, observed that this is inherently a problem for ‘food as security’: 
“[Man] is using his powers for increasing the rate and amount of food production. But he is 
not yet using adequately his potential for decreasing the rate of human reproduction” 
(Borlaug, 1970). Hardin, two years earlier, had already pointed to this problem , maintaining 
that “no technical solution can rescue us from the misery of overpopulation” (Hardin, 1968, 
p. 1248). Unfortunately, it remains unclear whether Borlaug believed the solution to 
overpopulation would be exclusively technical in nature, or if it indeed would require a 
change in cultural vision. Yet, the wider context of his 1970 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance 
speech prominently features the role of ‘science, invention, and technology’, which 
inconclusively seems to point to a reliance on the problem-solving approach. 
It is important, however, to return to the modern manifestations of this cultural vision 
that impact on our perception and sense of security. The most visible, contemporary and 
distinct manifestation is without doubt the phenomenon of land grabs. It can hardly be more 
relevant, since this manifestation is directly based upon the vision of increasing food 
production to feed the hungry and, above all, to feed a growing population. For this reason, 
the phenomenon of land grabbing warrants a detailed investigation, one which will be 
theoretically outlined in chapter 5 and empirically explored in chapters 6, 7 and 8. 
At last we turn to the psychological dimension, which provides the ultimate ground 
zero for the cultural vision. Manifestations and security perceptions are shaped around human 
consciousness and developmental progress. But before we look at ‘what makes security’, it is 
sensible to first deconstruct the psychological dimension of ‘food as security’. As proposed 
earlier, Spiral Dynamics will be helpful as a theory of humankind’s evolution of worldviews 
over the last 100,000 years. Additionally, Spiral Dynamics follows a line of reasoning that 
similarly perceives human nature (i.e. cultural vision) not as predetermined. At the same 
time, the principles of Spiral Dynamics are not limited to the individual level of analysis, they 
also equally apply to communities, organisations, and even entire societies (D. E. Beck & 
Cowan, 1996, p. 30). 
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Since [Spiral Dynamics] describes human nature in a universal sense rather than 
through personality types or racial, gender, and ethnic traits, the model provides a 
common language for grappling with both local and global problems. It offers a 
unifying framework that makes genuinely holistic thinking and actions possible. (D. E. 
Beck & Cowan, 1996, p. 30) 
 
The framework that Beck and Cowan (1996) have created, after the work of Claire Graves, is 
a so-called vMEME system (values-attracting meta-meme) – transposed into plain words by 
Wilber as “basic stage[s] of development that can be expressed in any activity” (Wilber, 
2011, p. 17). As a system it consists of eight spiralling and interweaving stages, each of 
which “reflects a world view, a valuing system, a level of psychological existence, a belief 
structure, an organizing principle, [and] a way of thinking or a mode of adjustment” (D. E. 
Beck & Cowan, 1996, p. 4). The most interesting stage they describe, with respect to our 
understanding of the psychological dimensions of ‘food as security’ as part of the cultural 
vision of growth, is the RED ‘impulsive/egocentric’ vMEME that got underway 10,000 years 
ago – not surprisingly at the same time humanity began the practice of totalitarian agriculture 
and adopted with it the cultural vision of growth. The values of this stage of development are 
characterised as ‘exploitation’ and ‘power’ (Graves, 1974, p. 80), while its practice is 
predictably rooted in ‘conquering’, ‘out-foxing’, and ‘dominating’ (Roemischer, 2002, p. 
109). The narrative in this stage of development is given as “enforce power over self, others, 
and nature through exploitive independence” (D. E. Beck & Cowan, 1996, p. 41). At first 
glance, this stage actually seems to deliver a sense of security in that it enabled humanity to 
break free from the chains and domination of nature. But by producing unprecedented food 
surpluses and unmatched conquests over other cultures and species, the vision of growth 
firmly took root. Before long, the vision of growth became extremely successful, perhaps 
because there still was space for humanity to grow and the limited confines of the Earth and 
its finite resources did not yet prohibit growth in any meaningful way. Spiralling upwards, 
and building on this foundation, we enter the next ORANGE ‘achievist/strategic’ vMEME 
that essentially represents another, modern, iteration of the vision of growth. Value 
characteristics here are ‘scientism’ and ‘materialism’ (Graves, 1974, p. 80), while its practice 
focuses on ‘problem-solving’ and ‘technical-solutions’ which drives the narrative of 
“possibility thinking [that is] focused on making things better for self” (D. E. Beck & Cowan, 
1996, p. 41). In other words, the leitmotif is achieving the ‘good life’ and material abundance, 
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by manipulating and exploiting the Earth’s resources. Security is narrow and individualistic, 
informed by one’s own ability to provide.  
 The upshot of the Spiral Dynamics approach is that is provides a psychological angle 
into the mindset of humanity. In this way it assists in bestowing ‘food’ and ‘security’ a place 
in the cultural vision of growth. But in this framework, the question that follows is ‘what 
makes security’ for an individual, community, or society? In exploring the meaning of ‘food 
as security’, following Huysmans (1998b), the specific mediation of food and survival 
implies a mixture of two interdependent forms of security. The mediation of vision and action 
pertains to the realm of ontological security, and the mediation of growth and food pertains to 
daily security concerns. For instance, when a society moves from a cultural vision of 
subsistence livelihood to a vision of exponential growth, its relation to food will become a 
key signifier to its security agenda. Instead of minimally sustaining life, food production now 
becomes central to the vision of expansion. When such a momentous shift takes place in a 
vacuum it would be of no real significance, but as expected, context is extremely relevant. 
As Spiral Dynamics implies, and Huysmans explicates, “security practices articulate a 
particular kind of order – ... they arrange social relations in a particular way” (Huysmans, 
1998b, p. 245). The psychological dimension thus positions ‘food’ as a security practice of 
the self, whereas the ‘self’ can refer to the individual, family, community, tribe, or nation. 
What this points to, is that ‘food security’ – which under totalitarian agriculture amounts to 
maximum food production – not only secures one’s survival, but above all, secures one’s 
identity embedded in cultural vision. This also suggests that ‘security’ is not an external and 
objective reality, but from the outset a sense of ‘security’ is formed in the psychological 
domain and only subsequently enacted into an external security reality/agenda. This idea 
comes close to the notion that “security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something 
more real; the utterance itself is the act” (Wæver, 1995, p. 55). However, Balzacq criticises 
the use of language theory in the conceptualisation of security as a speech act by noting that 
“security cannot be wholly self-referential” even when “a speech act may be intuitively 
strong, [...] it is theoretically restrictive and methodologically unfruitful“(2010, p. 59). But if 
security is to be seen as an internal condition reflecting on an external reality, then “in a thick 
signifier approach ‘security’ becomes self-referential” (Huysmans, 1998b, p. 232). 
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A vision of harmony 
The previous chapter proposed that perhaps a cultural vision of ‘harmony’ could serve as an 
alternative to the dominant vision of ‘growth’. This alternative vision draws upon the 
narratives from old, pre-totalitarian agriculture societies and their cultures. However, this 
vision does not propose ‘a return to the basics’ by going back to hunting and gathering, rather 
it aims at reviving some elemental beliefs about humanity’s relation vis-à-vis the world at 
large. A continuation of human psychological development stands central, with the objective 
to change the direction of humankind’s vision from growth to (ecological) harmony. The 
vision of harmony gives up on the narrative of dominion and conquest, by acknowledging 
that “life is a kaleidoscope of natural hierarchies, systems, and forms” (Roemischer, 2002, p. 
108). The alternative narrative follows the notion that the world is a natural system, a place of 
diversity, in which humanity is one part of the greater whole. ‘Harmony’ is here the leitmotif 
of existence and ought to direct humanity’s progress with the aim to “express self so that all 
others, all beings, can continue to exist” (Graves, 1974, p. 84). Accordingly, in pursuance of 
an alternative vision we are required to conceive ‘food as security’ as a strategy that 
constitutes and mediates an existential balance between human development (in 
psychological terms) and its relation with nature, the environment, and – of course – food. 
Manifestations of alternative visions generally emerge from a critical approach, since 
problem-solving typically refrains from opening doors to genuine long-term alternatives. To 
be fair, though, technical solutions certainly play a crucial role in overcoming immediate 
food security concerns. However, in the long-run we need to recognise that some human 
problems fall into a class of ‘no technical solution problems’ (Hardin, 1968). 
As manifest to the vision of growth, food has been turned into an ever-increasing 
production process to guarantee human population expansion. Yet, once growth loses its 
prerogative, we enter a space of profound possibilities for transformation. In this space we 
can seriously question and reconsider the present strong push to increase food production – 
some 50-70% by 2050. Perhaps so, we should in all earnest consider the suggestion from 
Farb (1978) and Quinn (1992, 1996) that an increase in food production always results in an 
increase in human population size. This is of particular relevance since population growth is 
tightly intertwined with a variety of looming food and security concerns – as outlined in 
previous chapters. Moreover, in this space of reflection, we should cast doubt on the idea that 
an increase in global food production will improve food security for the world’s hungry. 
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At the most basic level, a critical alternative for the conventional growth-inspired 
quest for ‘food security’ ought to be conceived around the notion of a harmonious 
relationship between the human species and the wider ecological environment. More 
precisely, where ‘food security’ is surrounded by notions of growth and problem-solving, 
alternatives ought to promote sustainability and a long-term harmonious outlook. In the latter 
realm we find up-and-coming critical alternative visions, including the concepts of ‘food 
democracy’ (Lang, 2004; Shiva, 2000), ’land sovereignty’ (S. Borras & J. Franco, 2010), and 
most notably ‘food sovereignty’ (Desmarais, 2002; Raj Patel, 2009; Via Campesina, 1996; 
Windfuhr & Jonsén, 2005; Wittman, 2011). Most promising is the notion of food 
sovereignty, which has already gained wide international recognition as it represents a rapidly 
developing critical alternative to the prevailing notion of ‘food security’ (Wittman, 2011).  
But food sovereignty is neither an established paradigm nor a clear-cut concept; Wittman 
hence opts to perceive it as an ‘emergent science’ that offers “a potential new framework 
emerging from diverse set of contemporary grassroots production practices and political 
approaches” (Wittman, 2011, p. 88). In other words, there is a paradigmatic difference 
between food security and food sovereignty: 
 
The difference between food security and food sovereignty may seem like mere 
semantics, but in the hyper-globalized world wherein transnational companies may 
privately own significant portions of arable land in countries facing food insecurity, it 
is not just a matter of word play. (Cochrane, 2011) 
 
Indeed, food sovereignty is by some considered as a serious ‘counter-proposal’ to the 
mainstream neo-liberal macroeconomic policy framework and agro-industrial development 
paradigm associated with achieving food security (McMichael, 2005; Windfuhr & Jonsén, 
2005). Others though, rather than necessarily speaking of a counter-proposal, assert that food 
sovereignty is a logical precondition for achieving genuine food security (Raj Patel, 2009; 
Via Campesina, 1996). The principal question, however, is what exactly amounts to ‘food 
sovereignty’? As Patel rightfully observes, the term is hard to define; but in essence food 
sovereignty “is a call for peoples’ rights to shape and craft food policy” (Raj Patel, 2009, p. 
663).  
Hence, the outline for food sovereignty emerges when we “couple the venerable idea 
of food security with the fundamental right of farmers to land, water, seeds and other means 
of production, as well as the rights of rural communities to decide what and how to produce” 
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(Perfecto, Vandermeer, & Wright 2009, p. 9). Still, the only widely agreed upon notion is 
“that food sovereignty isn’t what we have at the moment” (Raj Patel, 2009, p. 663). With this 
in mind Windfuhr & Jonsén’s suggest that food sovereignty could be broadly considered as 
“an umbrella term for particular approaches to tackling the problems of hunger and 
malnutrition, as well as promoting rural development, environmental integrity and sustainable 
livelihoods” (Windfuhr & Jonsén, 2005, p. xiii).  
The key principles laid down by La Vía Campesina in its original declaration on food 
sovereignty are more to the point: 
 
Food is a basic human right.  
 
Food sovereignty is the right of each nation to maintain and develop its own capacity 
to produce its basic foods respecting cultural and productive diversity.  
 
Long-term food security depends on those who produce food and care for the natural 
environment. As the stewards of food producing resources we hold the following 
principles as the necessary foundation for achieving food security. 
 
Food sovereignty entails the sustainable care and use of natural resources especially 
land, water and seeds. 
 
Food is first and foremost a source of nutrition and only secondarily an item of trade. 
 
Food sovereignty is undermined by multilateral institutions and by speculative 
capital. 
 
Everyone has the right to be free from violence. Food must not be used as a weapon. 
 
Peasants and small farmers must have direct input into formulating agricultural 
policies at all levels. (Via Campesina, 1996) 
 
This particular expression of food sovereignty captures the essence of what McMichael 
referred to as the ‘foundational divide’ (see chapter 1) between environmentally catastrophic 
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agro-industrialisation (ie. the reckless man; a vision of growth) and alternative, 
agroecological practices (ie. the critical visionary; a vision of harmony). 
What moreover stands out in particular is the focus on ‘rights’ in the food sovereignty 
framework. Paul Nicholson, one of the founding members of La Vía Campesina, emphasises 
the importance of this very point: “At La Via Campesina, we understand that the struggle 
around food is tied to the whole question of rights and will be one of the most important 
concepts for organizations and social movements around the world” (Holt-Giménez, 2012, p. 
33).  
With this in mind, the specific rights-based approach to food championed by the 
United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food would appear a much welcomed 
socio-legal reinforcement by the international community to the ‘question of rights’ for the 
food sovereignty framework. However, there is unfortunately a significant disparity between 
the rights-based approach to food pursued by the UN’s Right to Food and the version adhered 
to by the food sovereignty movement. The UN’s Right to Food approach is criticised for 
merely affirming the individual’s right to food (Wittman, 2011), which “does not directly 
address the right of communities to produce food and retain command and control over local 
food systems” (Mazhar, Buckles, Satheesh, & Akhter, 2007, p. 65) – the latter being central 
to the rights-based approach embedded in the food sovereignty discourse. Similarly, some 
caution that conflating the objective of achieving the human right to food with wider reforms 
of the food system can easily confuse means, ends, and complementary goals (Anderson, 
2008). As such, a rights-based approach in the food sovereignty framework should – 
according to Wittman (2011) – focus on producing progressive outcomes as a ‘means’ rather 
than an ‘end’. Notably, such an understanding of a rights-based approach as a means rather 
than an end is consistent with the previous notion of the ‘process-utopian’ approach (see 
chapter 1). 
At any rate, food sovereignty offers a distinctly different framework to discuss rights-
based approaches to food. The food sovereignty paradigm revolves around critical visions of 
alternative food systems, as opposed to the international legal framework that operates within 
the existing policy arena with the aim to improve the existing food system (compare ‘critical 
visionaries’ with ‘problem-solvers’ in Table 1, chapter 1). With these concerns in mind – and 
in the context of finding a critical security alternative to food security – it is neither 
particularly useful nor necessary to further explore the details of the UN-based Right to Food 
approach. 
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That said, on a more general level some maintain there is certainly a role for the UN-
based Right to Food approach within the food sovereignty framework. The notion is that the 
UN Right to Food approach does not have to revolve around the enforceability or violations 
of the international legal framework around the right to food, but that the ‘mass re-
politicization of food politics’ can simply be produced “by using the language of rights to 
summon an active politics over a social domain” (Rajeev Patel, Balakrishnan, & Narayan, 
2007, p. 91). Interestingly, this type of discourse starts to move towards the ensuing 
discussion in the following chapter on emancipation. 
By now it has become apparent that food sovereignty differs from food security at the 
most fundamental level: it does not take the current food systems and food models for 
granted. This difference, discussed in chapter 1, is between technical problem-solving (taking 
the world as we find it and setting out to improve or modify some of its problematic 
conditions) and critical thinking (dreaming of alternative realities and asking ‘why not?’). 
This crucial divergence of food sovereignty from food security is aptly phrased by Handy; 
“[food sovereignty] envisions fundamental changes in the basis of modern society” (Jim 
Handy quoted in Wittman, Desmarais, & Wiebe, 2010, p. 4). Similarly, by allowing the 
powers-that-be – the global political elite – to conceptualise our food models (ie. food 
security, the right to food, freedom from hunger) the existing social, political and economic 
structures that gave rise in the first place to the malfunctioning food systems are not called 
into question (Fairbairn, 2010). To counterbalance, Fairbairn (2010) highlights how food 
sovereignty stands out from these other food concepts by being coined and conceptualised in 
first instance by a social movement of peasants and small-scale farmers. It was this grassroots 
social movement that identified a transformative bottom-up approach to link ‘food’ to 
‘security’. This link between ‘food’ and ‘security’ is observed by Rosset: “food sovereignty 
says that feeding a nation’s people is an issue of national security – of sovereignty” (Rosset, 
2003, p. 1). However, it is interesting that in reviewing the literature on ‘food sovereignty’ 
Wittman observes that “much of the most recent literature takes a world-historical and food-
regime approach to understanding the theoretical potential of the food sovereignty concept 
for agri-food studies and its practical implications for addressing food and environmental 
crises” (Wittman, 2011, p. 88). This seems to point, perhaps somewhat implicitly, but 
nonetheless, to an absence of critical security studies perspectives on food sovereignty. In 
pursuance of formulating ‘food as security’, we will return to this observation in the final 
chapter. 
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Continuing now with the psychological dimension, we find that this area is without 
doubt positioned as the decisive ground for change in transforming a vision of growth into a 
vision of harmony. Notably, this requires a revolutionary shift in consciousness, which, in the 
theory of Spiral Dynamics, occurs between vMEME 6 and vMEME 7 when the so-called 
‘first-tier thinking’ takes a momentous leap into ‘second-tier thinking’ (Graves, 1974; Wilber, 
2011). When this leap into second-tier thinking takes place, it brings about a shift in human 
consciousness from the singularity of the first six ‘subsistence’ levels that make up the first 
tier, into two levels of ‘being’ allows one to can “vividly grasp the entire spectrum of interior 
development” (Wilber, 2011, p. 20). More concretely, Beck and Cowan describe the first tier 
of human development as “the culmination of our primate nature” (D. E. Beck & Cowan, 
1996, p. 274), which is aimed at establishing individual survival and dignity (Graves, 1974, p. 
73). However, as Wilber (2011) observes, first-tier thinking struggles to fully appreciate the 
existence of the other stages (i.e. vMEMEs). By moving into the second-tier of ‘being’ one 
“steps back and grasps the big picture” (Wilber, 2011, p. 21). Humanity stands here at “the 
threshold of being human”, which Graves sees as “the line between animalism and 
humanism” (Graves, 1974, p. 75). In other words, with the jump into the second tier 
humankind goes beyond subsistence, away from the turbulence of the “animalistic needs” of 
the first tier (Graves, 1974).  
With this in mind, it is clear that reaching second-tier thinking is a prerequisite for the 
transformation of cultural vision. The leap into the second-tier, however, is no effortless feat, 
since external conditions and circumstances such as poverty, inequality, and deprivation often 
slow down the development of human consciousness (Graves, 1974). However, once we 
succeed to find our way into the second-tier, “we will no longer be living in a world of 
unbridled self-expression and self-indulgence, or in a world of reverence for the individual, 
but in one whose rule is: Express self, but only so that all life can continue” (Graves, 1974, p. 
81). 
It is exactly this expression of second-tier thinking that could give rise to a new, 
alternative cultural vision. Even so, Graves hastens to add that specific features of second-tier 
thinking cannot be predicted; nonetheless he manages to describe some features remarkably 
well. Graves begins with the notion that the root of ‘being’ leans heavily on learning no to 
upset nature, but to live in balance with nature – and avoid setting off on “another self-
aggrandizing binge” (Graves, 1974, p. 75). This resonates deeply with the notion that 
humanity should regroup and position itself as just one of many species in a world of 
exorbitant natural diversity. Graves continues even more strongly along this line, “the 
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purpose [of second-tier thinking] will be to bring the earth back to equilibrium so that life 
upon it can survive, and this involves learning to act within the limits inherent in the balance 
of life” (Graves, 1974, p. 81). In such a harmonious world Graves carefully raises the 
possibility that it may become necessary for “vital human concerns [such] as food and 
procreation [to fall] under strict regulation” (Graves, 1974, p. 81). Perhaps to some this may 
seem a radical statement, or at least not commonplace, still the necessity of “abandoning the 
commons in breeding” is not a novel notion (Hardin, 1968, p. 1248). Hardin compellingly 
argued that “freedom to breed will bring ruin to all” (Hardin, 1968, p. 1248). Perchance, the 
revolutionary nature of these propositions might be perceived less extreme with the dawning 
of second-tier thinking. For instance, the mindset that Graves suggest for this level of ‘being’ 
is that “man enjoys a good meal or good company when it is there, but does not miss it when 
it is not” (Graves, 1974, p. 81). This could only result from a conscious shift from our 
‘growth’ mindset that spells ‘more is better’ towards a more harmonious perception of the 
world inspiring a state of mind based on ‘enough is simply enough’. Ultimately, therefore, 
the transformation of the vision of growth into a vision of harmony starts with the 
development of human consciousness, but ought to culminate into “a ‘new movement’ in the 
symphony of human history” (Graves, 1974, p. 81). 
 This indeed shows that “interpreting security as a thick signifier brings us to an 
understanding of how the category ‘security’ articulates a particular way of organizing forms 
of life” (Huysmans, 1998b, p. 231). These ‘forms of life’ are best interpreted as what we so-
far have identified as ‘cultural vision’. Still, in conceptualising food as a matter of security 
we have now come to at a point where two overarching realms require further exploration: 
security theory and the empirical reality of food as security. We need to explore how security 
theory might be considered in relation to the notion of ‘food as security’. For one, Rieker 
(2000) already identified that the Copenhagen School’s securitisation theory moves in the 
direction of Huysmans work on security as a thick signifier. But, as we will come to see, it is 
essential not to overlook the importance of praxis. As Büger (2008) observes, it is action that 
defines the meaning of security, not overarching linguistic or theoretical aspects – which will 
be identified as a severe limitation of securitisation theory. In other words, “security becomes 
meaningful, becomes an object, by being used in action and by mediating action” (Büger, 
2008, p. 11).  
What’s more, it will become clear that securitisation theory has a number of 
limitations that prevent a comprehensive understanding of ‘food as security’ – especially the 
lack of a normative framework proves to be a crucial limitation. The limitations of 
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securitisation theory, however, shine some light on the potential of critical security theory. 
This warrants a look into the critical security approach of emancipatory realism to see if it 
could offer a more appropriate way of defining the content for the concept of food as 
security. Hence, chapter 4 will start out with exploring the applicability and relevance of 
securitisation theory, but identify its limitations in terms of ‘emancipatory intent’. Critical 
Security Studies, in particular the Welsh School, will be drawn upon subsequently to explore 
the potential of emancipatory realism in relation to conceptualising food as a matter of 
security. Later, in Part II we will put all in the context of the empirical reality of food as 
security. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Securitisation and emancipation 
 
Before security can be improved globally, the truth of the world must be revealed, 
systematically and accessibly – if with contention. 
(Ken Booth, 2007) 
 
 Securitising food 
 An existential threat? 
 The limitations of securitisation theory 
 Wider securitisation studies 
 Appending a normative framework 
 Towards ‘emancipatory realism’ 
 Consolidating Critical Security Studies 
 Consequentialist security 
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By now we have reflected upon the significance of security in relation to food by discussing 
its principles and the purpose of framing issues as a matter of security. However, the present 
topic of food not only requires us to decide whether or not we ought to approach the ‘problem 
of food’ in security terms or not, there is also the question of how food can be framed as a 
matter of security. This chapter will therefore consider two theoretical approaches that each, 
in a different way, can frame the securitiness of food in a particular way. 
 To begin, the clean logic of securitisation theory will be utilised to determine whether 
food is ‘securitised’ or not. Yet, some inherent limitations of the theory – in particular the 
absence of a normative framework – will guide the discussion towards another critical 
security approach rooted in idea of ‘emancipatory realism’. At last, we will consider how 
both approaches may actually have a complementary potential to frame food as a matter of 
security in a so-called ‘consequentialist theory of security’. 
 
Securitising food 
Buzan (2010) contends that we can approach the concept of security from two angles. On the 
one hand we can analyse the content of security, which is made up by the traditional 
‘objective threat analysis’. This amounts to deciding what is to be designated as a threat and 
who is threatened. On the other hand we can ask questions about the construction of security, 
this is what Buzan calls the ‘social side’ of security; “who speaks it, who listens to it”, and 
how is an issue constructed and accepted as a threat (Buzan, 2010). 
The debate about broadening the security agenda, from military threats towards 
environmental and societal, and from the state as referent object to the individual, played out 
to a large degree in the 1990s. Whereas this has led to a fair amount of consensus that 
security should not be restricted to military threats and the defense of the state, this 
broadening did not exhaustively define the limits of ‘security’. It is for this reason that 
Wæver and Buzan (Buzan et al., 1998; Wæver, 1995) suggested the need for some kind of 
‘formula’ to identify what amounts to a security threat since they deem “the very security 
quality [to be] always socially constructed: issues are not security issues by themselves, but 
defined as such as a result of political processes” (Buzan & Wæver, 1997, p. 243, note 6). 
Securitisation theory was their answer. 
Within contemporary security studies, securitisation theory has by now become a 
widely accepted method to determine how and when ‘public issues’ enter the security realm 
(i.e. when they become securitised). The theory originates from the Copenhagen School of 
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security studies where Ole Wæver (1995) coined it and subsequently presented it to a wider 
audience in collaboration with Barry Buzan and Jaap de Wilde (1998). Since its introduction, 
securitisation theory has been welcomed, criticised, expanded upon and misunderstood by 
security analysts, academics, and policymakers. Still it has gradually become a central 
element of security studies and even part of a wider body of theory generally referred to as 
‘securitisation studies’ (Taureck, 2006b, p. 59; Wæver, 2000, p. 253). 
Securitisation theory employs a set of critical tools to target public issues that balance 
around the nexus of International Relations and International Security. With the operation of 
these tools securitisation theory aims to probe into the ontological nature of ‘security’ to 
investigate how we determine “what counts as a security problem” and why “certain 
challenges become security issues while others do not” (Balzacq, 2011a, p. xiii). The 
underlying principle of the theory is to maintain the utility of the term ‘security’ by creating 
an analytical framework that gives a security analyst a set of performative rules to determine 
when an public issue evolves into a matter of (national) security (McGuire, 2011). 
The need for such a framework became especially urgent during the early and mid-
1990s when the discipline of security studies rapidly begun to open up to wider conceptions 
of ‘security’. A focus on the environment and the emergence of ‘human security’ expanded 
the content and context of the security agenda. This challenged the traditional core of 
strategic and military-political issues in security studies, even more, the broadening of the 
discipline also risked to turn the term ‘security’ into a meaningless concept. Thus, by 
widening the security agenda to include new threats – or at least anything other than military 
threats – one was required to (re)consider the concept of security. 
This brings us to the key questions that Wæver (1995) tried to tackle with 
securitisation theory: “what really makes something a security problem” and “what then is 
security” (Wæver, 1995, pp. 54-55). Here he introduces language theory, and especially the 
speech act, as the elementary tool in securitisation theory to determine what ‘security’ is and 
what it is not. The raison d’être of securitisation theory is therefore that “security is not of 
interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act” (Wæver, 
1995, emphasis in original). In this the performativity of language is central, which is 
inspired by the work of Austin and Searle (see: Balzacq, 2011b, p. 22) showing that 
“utterances are able to ‘perform’ an activity that can transform the way the world currently 
is” (Balzacq, 2011b, p. 23). Meaning thus, that securitisation is a social construct resting on 
the premise that “the meaning of ‘security’ is what it does” (Wæver, 2004, p. 56); it is not 
about what actors think  it is about what they think aloud (Wæver in Taureck, 2006a, p. 7).  
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This means to Wæver that security is self-referential, in the sense that it relies on 
discourse to move an issue into the security realm and “not necessarily because a real 
existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat” (Buzan et al., 
1998, p. 24). Securitising an issue is therefore one step up from politicising a matter, going 
above and beyond normal politics is “exactly the reason for doing the security move” 
(Wæver, 2000, p. 251). 
In practical terms securitisation theory deems all public issues to be somewhere in the 
range of being nonpoliticised, politicised or securitised. Depending upon circumstances and 
the (textual) presentation of the subject, any issue can move from being nonpoliticised 
through politicised into securitised – and vice versa, which would  be the process of 
desecuritisation (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 23-24). For something to be designated as an 
international security issue the Copenhagen School provides three criteria: (1) the issue is 
presented as an existential threat, that (2) requires and justifies emergency measures beyond 
normal political limitations, which (3) will effect interunit relations by breaking free of rules 
(Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 24-26). Yet, for an issue to become securitised the actual adoption of 
an emergency measure is not strictly necessary. As long as the discourse about “existential 
threat, point of no return, and necessity” obtains an adequate amount of support to possibly 
enable the adoption of emergency measures that will cross the threshold of normal politics, 
there is a case of securitisation (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 25). 
This approach outlines securitisation theory, and its conditions, as originally coined 
by the Copenhagen school. There are, however, distinct ‘readings’ of what securitisation 
theory can and should do, that have led to three ‘variants’ which will be discussed later 
(Balzacq, 2010; McGuire, 2011; Patomäki, 2008; Stritzel, 2007). For now, the Copenhagen 
School’s approach with its three criteria will be employed to illustrate how this ‘reading’ of 
securitisation determines how ‘food’ moves into the security realm. 
 
An existential threat? 
Dupont and Thirwell (2009) observe three – mainly economic – grounds for pessimism in 
contemplating the future of food. They observe that there is “the real possibility that 
structural shifts in demand and supply are beginning to fundamentally change the food 
calculus, presaging an extended period of higher prices, sporadic food shortages and 
heightened  anxieties about food security” (Dupont & Thirlwell, 2009, p. 92). As such, they 
do not frame high food prices as an existential threat, but they do note that the upward trend 
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of food prices likely will have “major consequences for future food security and the world 
economy” (Dupont & Thirlwell, 2009, p. 93). There seems to be some hesitance to apply the 
‘security label’ to food, however, the implications are clear: high food prices will play a 
significant role in determining whether ‘food’ can be seen as a matter of security. 
Brown (2009a) makes a stronger case by arguing that “the biggest threat to global 
stability is the potential for food crises in poor countries to cause government collapse” (L. R. 
Brown, 2009a, p. 50). Even more, he explicitly refers to the existential nature of food 
shortages by exclaiming that “[they] could bring down not only individual governments but 
also our global civilization” (L. R. Brown, 2009a, p. 50). Brown (2011b) then concludes that 
food scarcity increasingly shapes international relations, giving rise to dangerous dynamics in 
geopolitics. 
Furthermore, Carrington (2011a) writes in environment blog of The Guardian about a 
study on the rise of food prices making him wonder if food prices are approaching a violent 
tipping point and possibly before long remain permanently above the level which sparks 
conflicts. This particular study by Lagi, Bertrand and Bar-Yam (2011) links high food prices 
to political instability and social unrest in North Africa and the Middle East over the course 
of 2011. They conclude that “high global food prices are a precipitating condition for social 
unrest ... [and] food riots occur above a threshold of the FAO price index” (Lagi et al., 2011, 
p. 4). Although there clearly is a correlation of high food prices with global social unrest, it 
fails to make a strong case for a causal relationship. More importantly, Lagi et al. do render 
their findings in a broader discourse of looming food insecurity: “the current problem 
transcends the specific national political crises to represent a global concern about vulnerable 
populations and social order” (Lagi et al., 2011, p. 6). 
In another blog, Carrington (2011b) reports that the Maplecroft Food Security Risk 
Index 2011 demonstrates “the sickening, symbiotic relationship between hunger and conflict” 
prompting his headline that “food is the ultimate security need”. However, we need to be 
cautious with interpreting the Food Security Risk Index 2011. Bellemare (2011a) points out 
that the index and associated map “shows a correlation, but correlation does not imply 
causation. As such, the map demonstrates nothing except for the fact that there is a 
potentially statistically significant correlation between hunger and conflict.” Bellemare’s 
(2011b) own research, however, further investigates the correlation between food prices and 
political unrest and presents a more convincing case that there is indeed a causal relationship 
between high food prices and social unrest. However, he cautions “rising food prices do not 
inevitably cause political unrest ... [but] can have a causal impact on political unrest in certain 
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cases” (Bellemare, 2011b, p. 7). Even more, as a surprising conclusion we find that rising 
food price levels are empirically proven as the reason for food riots, and not food price 
volatility as is often assumed (Bellemare, 2011b, p. 29). Central to the question at hand if 
food insecurity amounts to an existential threat, the paper features a sharp theoretical example 
based on the premise of rising food prices: 
 
Take two households who are net consumers of food and who differ only in their 
respective levels of income. If food is a normal good (that is, if the demand for food is 
increasing in income), the impact of a price change on welfare will be felt 
comparatively more by the poorer of those two households, who devotes a higher 
share of its budget to food consumption. In developing countries, poor households 
often allocate more than 50 percent of their budget to food purchases – a proportion 
that increases directly as a result of increases in food price increases. For a large 
enough increase in the price of food, the welfare loss incurred by the poor may 
threaten their very subsistence, which in turn may push them toward desperate 
measures. (Bellemare, 2011b, p. 2) 
 
In a comparative paper Arezki and Brückner (2011) similarly demonstrate that “food price 
increases put at stake the socio-economic and political stability of the world’s poorest 
countries”. In 2011, U.S. Senator McGovern also argued in the United States House of 
Representatives that a lack of food security contributes to political instability: 
 
Food was a primary reason people first took to the streets in Tunisia. Food and 
poverty were right at the top of the list in the squares of Egypt right next to the call 
for political freedom. (McGovern, 2011) 
 
McGovern clearly articulates why food security is a matter of national security and calls upon 
President Obama to stand up – and the media to wake up – to act upon the fact that “it really 
is a matter of life and death” (McGovern, 2011). Clearly, McGovern does not shy away from 
labelling ‘food security’ as an existential threat. 
Altogether, this presents a snapshot of some recent discourses in which ‘food’ is 
slowly heading into the direction of the security paradigm. While there is some mention and 
recognition that a lack of food can present an existential threat, it is a view that is neither 
widespread nor accepted (yet) by a majority of policymaker and politicians as an issue that 
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requires emergency measures. Framing food as a matter of security therefore still falls short 
of the explicit contention that the existential nature of this matter necessitates the 
consideration of emergency measures. Some commentators certainly suggest (far-reaching) 
policy changes (Bellemare, 2011b; McGovern, 2011), yet most presently refrain from explicit 
calls for the adoption of emergency measures to break free of regular political limitations to 
address the future of food.  
Now, does this mean that food is not securitised? Strictly speaking, if follow the 
securitisation theory criteria of the Copenhagen School, this appears to be correct. But while 
‘food’ may technically not be securitised at the global level, this does not foreclose the 
possibility of a securitisation of food on different sub-levels, neither does it reject the broader 
notion of ‘food as a matter of security’. As outlined in chapters 2 and 3 it is important to take 
in consideration the level of analysis and actors involved – which is equally significant in the 
process of securitisation. This means that we may need to pause and reflect upon “for whom 
security becomes a consideration in relation to whom” (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 18). Whereas 
food may presently not be securitised at the global level, it is certainly possible that food is 
securitised by certain regional or domestic actors in different policy and empirical settings. 
 
The limitations of securitisation theory 
Even though the Copenhagen School’s criteria to determine whether a successful instance of 
the securitisation of food on a global scale cannot be fulfilled, this hardly presents the end of 
conceptualising ‘food as security’. We have seen that there are several levels of analysis and 
various kinds of actors that play a role in determining if ‘food’ is securitised in a specific 
situation. While ‘food’ may not be securitised at a global level of analysis, perhaps this would 
change if we shift to a different level or method of analysis. We could look at the developed 
and developing world, or at specific regions and countries. We can, for instance, restrict the 
securitisation analysis to the country level. For instance, we could use the social unrest and 
toppling of regimes in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011 as an example. 
‘Food’ certainly played a role in the violent conflicts and regimes changes that 
occurred during the Arab Spring in 2011 – although the full extent of the role of the food riots 
is not entirely clear (Fraser & Rimas, 2011). Most interestingly, however, is the fact that it 
were not the ‘usual suspects’ that securitised food. Rather than state-representatives it was the 
public that en mass decided the time had come to assert the existential nature of food. High 
food prices at the time seem to have catalysed existing structural grievances about food and 
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other issues. Fraser and Rimas (2011) argue that the psychology behind food riots seems to 
indicate that “food riots are ultimately caused more by the perception of profiteering and less 
by the actual prices on the shelves” (Fraser & Rimas, 2011). Still, regardless of the 
underlying psychology, it is widely believed that serious qualms about food access, price, 
quality and quantity are closely linked to sparking the Arab Spring uprisings. 
The information from this example can be applied to the criteria of securitisation 
theory. In this case the population can be seen as the relevant actor that used a speech act (i.e. 
demonstrations) to declare that food insecurity posed an existential threat to them. This was 
followed by ‘public emergency measures’ (i.e. protest and riots) that broke the normal 
political rules (i.e. violent conflict and the toppling of regimes). Even though this is not by far 
the best example of securitisation, and requires some flexibility and interpretation of the 
criteria, it does show that securitisation theory can be applied to multiple levels and rely on 
various actors. Even so, securitisation theory still does not appear to be the most suitable 
approach to comprehensively conceptualise ‘food as security’, yet it does give us a point of 
departure. 
Indeed, in this context securitisation theory offers a fairly limited approach that is not 
without problems. Booth contends that “the general approach advocated by the Copenhagen 
school runs in parallel with several themes central to critical thinking about security” (2007, 
p. 164) but adds that securitisation studies rests on a “confused conceptualisation of security” 
and as such is a way of thinking that is “seriously flawed” (Booth, 2007, pp. 163-164). To 
specify the flaws securitisation theory there are four problems worth discussing in relation to 
the present conceptualisation of ‘food as security’. 
In the first place, there is the quintessential matter of ‘what security is’. Securitisation 
theory takes a very specific, minimal and indirect approach to the meaning of security – 
which is precisely what Booth perceives as confusing and flawed. Wæver simply puts it this 
way: “the meaning of ‘security’ is what it does” (Wæver, 2004, p. 56). Clarifying this rather 
contracted statement, Taureck points out that “in using securitisation theory, the analyst must 
not focus on what security is, but rather what it does – because what security does is 
tantamount to the meaning of security” (2006a, p. 15 emphasis added). Differently 
formulated, this means that “there is nothing outside the text” (Derrida in Taureck, 2006a, p. 
7); hence the meaning of security is determined through the textual performance of saying out 
aloud ‘this is security’. This leaves us with a very constricted approach to the meaning of 
security. Considering this in terms of the concept of ‘food as security’ means that if security 
is the utterance itself this leaves no room for arguing that food is by its very nature an 
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existential matter to our security (i.e. survival), regardless of our discourse of it. Yet, 
fundamentally, the human biological system depends by its very nature on food and water to 
survive, hence the existential nature of food cannot be merely dependent on security 
discourse – this is something more real than the utterance itself (cf. Wæver, 1995). 
This uncovers the second limitation: the strong, practically absolute, reliance on the 
speech act. Wæver (1995) is certainly right that in broadening our understanding of security 
(threats) we need to be careful not to make ‘security’ a term for “everything that is politically 
good or desirable”. Only with good arguments and sound reasoning we can allow ‘food’ into 
the security realm. So the logic of securitisation theory may appear at first a refreshingly 
clean and analytical solution. Yet, taking a closer look unveils how technical particularities 
and utter reliance on the speech act transforms securitisation into “static theory” (Booth, 
2007, p. 167). The inherent problem with static theory is that we put off any action until all 
the relevant boxes are ticked and we can utter ‘this is security’. But in reality, actual events 
surmount discourse. We cannot hide forever in ignorance while events unfold and the only 
recourse to action is our ability, or often simply willingness, to call events by their real 
names. There is a grave danger in excessive dependence on the power of discourse and 
ticking the boxes on a list of criteria. Meanwhile, the actual event to which the unspoken 
utterance refers can unfold in real-time in a world outside of our perception: the actual 
domain. In a moment of reflection one may ask ‘when do we act upon genocide, famine or 
security?’ The unfortunate answer is often ‘too late’; we seem to only act upon events when 
their true name has been revealed. Even when signs have long been in place and could hardly 
have been missed it is often a matter of waiting for a powerful actor to say the ‘word’ before 
the wheels of the international community are put in motion. This makes ‘saying the word’ an 
extremely dangerous and political affair. The utterance has often great consequence, it 
requires us to act when we call out its name. For instance, when we speak of ‘genocide’ it 
creates a requirement to act, when we utter the word ‘famine’ we are morally obliged to act. 
Conversely, when we refrain from specific discourse (i.e. calling it by its real name) there 
seems to be no (legal) obligation to engage in action – except morally, but then again, there is 
no normative element to securitisation theory. When we desisted in 1994 to call the 
widespread violence in Rwanda ‘genocide’, the situation simply remained an internal violent 
conflict without legitimate ground for intervention. Similarly, drought and hunger spread 
around East Africa in 2011, but it was only after a famine had officially been declared that 
the international community truly resorted to action. A recent report by Oxfam and Save the 
Children (2012) looks into this ‘dangerous delay’. It asserts that “[the] crisis unfolded despite 
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having been predicted” (p. 3), there were accurate indications that a crisis was coming from 
as early as August 2010. Yet, only when the situation reached the point of crisis, had been 
declared a ‘famine’, and started to get significant media and public attention, the international 
community felt compelled to engage in a large scale humanitarian relief effort. It is an 
unfortunate example of the powerful relationship between the speech act (i.e. speaking the 
word ‘famine’) and the ability/willingness of decision makers to act. As the report points out, 
“decision makers are often not comfortable with uncertainty and forecasts” (p. 4). In order to 
utter the word ‘famine’ they require hard data, yet that often only comes when situations 
reach a point of crisis, in other words, when it is too late. 
Another way to approach this problem is from a Critical Realist perspective. Whereas 
Wæver contends that security is self-referential, there is a strong argument in Patomäki’s 
observation that “security statements are usually related to external realities; their rhetorical 
success is not only dependent on the meanings, fears and hopes they can evoke but also on 
their capacity to interpret real external situations and circumstances in a cultural meaningful 
way” (Patomäki, 2008, p. 11). This means that in securitisation theory, the heavy reliance on 
the speech act restrains the concept of ‘security’ to our perceptions and experiences in the 
empirical domain. They are subjective interpretations of the causal powers expressed by 
generative mechanisms of the real and the external realities that unfold in the domain of the 
actual (Burnett, 2007). These powers and events are processed and interpreted to become part 
of our reality (i.e. the empirical domain). Even though securitisation theory seems to 
acknowledge that there is an actual domain ‘out there’; still its reliance on the self-referential 
nature of the speech act prevents ‘security’ from being anything but a subjective perception 
that constructs the social reality of the empirical domain. In other words, if a real external 
reality gives rise to a situation, which without doubt could be classified as a matter of 
‘security’, securitisation theory only acknowledges this instance as a matter of security upon a 
successful securitising move.  
Clearly we run into ontological problems here if we adhere to the Critical Realist 
stratification of reality. Booth also recognises this problem by observing that securitisation 
studies revolves around “a discourse-centric approach [which] misses chunks of reality, and 
is based on the fallacy that threats do not exist outside discourse” (Booth, 2007, p. 165). 
These missing ‘chunks of reality’ are what Patomäki refers to as ‘external realities’ and what 
Critical Realists describe as the causal powers and events of the real and actual domain. 
Now what does this restricted stratification of reality mean to the threat of ‘food 
insecurity’? Consider the scenario that rising food prices could potentially, at some point in 
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the future, in some part of the world, result in violent conflict. Hence, we could then say that 
‘food insecurity’ is a certain mechanism with a tendency that could potentially be realised 
(i.e. causing violent conflict). In first instance we can imagine a situation in which the threat 
of ‘food insecurity’ is not yet a realised tendency (i.e. high food prices have not led to violent 
conflict). But due to fears of the consequences of a realisation of this tendency, an actor could 
decide to securitise ‘food’ through the use of discourse and the speech act. If that happens, we 
have an unrealised yet securitised tendency. However, in still another instance, we may have 
a vastly different situation. Say, the threat of ‘food insecurity’ has become realised (i.e. high 
food prices are causing violent conflict), yet no actor is compelled to turn the discourse to 
‘security’. This would give us a realised but ‘unsecuritised’ tendency. Therefore Booth’s 
point is that with the discourse-centric approach of securitisation theory, even realised 
tendencies (i.e. threats) could potentially not be considered as ‘security’ simply because no 
actor uttered the word ‘security’. 
As a result of the exclusive reliance on discourse, the meaning of ‘security’ becomes 
restricted to the empirical domain; which points to securitisation theory’s third limitation: its 
applicability to real-life situations. As Stritzel (2007, p. 362) notes, the basic idea of 
securitisation as laid down by the Copenhagen School “is too limited to ... guide the study of 
‘real-world’ securitizations”. Events that occur in the world outside of our perception (i.e. in 
the actual) determine our interpretation and perception of ‘security’ in the empirical domain. 
Thus if we take securitisation theory’s claim that security is nothing but socially constructed 
(Taureck, 2006a, p. 55), then it can only reside in the empirical and has no place in the actual 
– let alone the idea of ‘security’ as a mechanism in the domain of the real. This seems to be 
tantamount to the underlying reliance of securitisation theory on constructivism. Critical 
Realists may agree that to a certain extent that ‘security’ is a construct of the mind, and an 
individual interpretation of the actual. Yet there are also objective threats in the actual, as 
well as mechanisms and structures in the real, that intrinsically possess a capacity or tendency 
that mounts to ‘security’ as a commodity or a ‘secure’ relationship.  
Fourthly, perhaps the most serious limitation of securitisation theory is the absence of 
a normative conceptualisation of securitisation within the analytical framework of 
securitisation theory. The objective of securitisation theory is to be practical and analytical, 
and thus intentionally not designed to be concerned with matters of a normative nature. It 
therefore only provides an answer to the question ‘what is security’ and does not venture into 
answering ‘what should be security’. It thus only provides a practical analytical tool designed 
to determine whether a certain state-of-affairs has changed; namely has a public matter been 
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elevated above ordinary politics (i.e. securitised). Following this process of securitisation 
enables a security analyst to determine whether at a certain moment in time ‘food’ was lifted 
into the security realm. This process of determination is not political, namely the security 
analyst is not meant to intentionally argue that ‘food’ should be a matter of security. 
However, as we have seen, every instance of defining a matter as ‘securitised’ is in itself a 
security discourse – hence the so-called ‘normative dilemma’ in securitisation theory.  
It is neither the place, nor very useful, to criticise securitisation theory at length on 
this restriction, especially since the omission of morality and ethics from the theory has been 
deliberate and by design. Taureck (2006b) discusses in detail some of the moral and ethical 
criticism “[coming] from other critical security theories” and argues that “such criticism 
fundamentally misconceives the analytical goal of securitization theory, which is namely to 
offer a tool for practical security analysis” (p. 53). Even so, she points out that Wæver (2000, 
p. 253) “by way of reconciling securitization theory with its critics” (Taureck, 2006b, p. 53) 
eventually introduced the wider domain of ‘securitisation studies’ – in which there is room 
for morality and being political – as a normative supplement to the analysis of securitisation 
theory. This might be a direction worth pursuing since a normative approach to ‘food as 
security’ is crucial.  
The threat of conflict emanating from food insecurity may presently be an 
unexercised power; however, based on Critical Realist ontology, the world could become at 
any given time many things which currently it is not. In other words, the mechanism of ‘food 
insecurity’ possesses a tendency with causal powers that operates in the domain of the real. 
One of the causal powers of the ‘food insecurity mechanism’ is to generate conflict; once this 
power is exercised the tendency moves into the domain of the actual and has genuine security 
ramifications. Yet, if we adhere to securitisation theory’s logic, the realisation of the tendency 
only becomes a matter of ‘security’ once a relevant actor made a successful securitisation 
move. Ultimately securitisation theory comes short here, now that the threat of ‘food 
insecurity’ and its causal powers exist regardless of any security discourse. Even when we do 
not speak of ‘food’ in terms of security – or conceptualise ‘food as security’ for that matter –
still there remains the capacity of causal mechanisms with unexercised powers to produce a 
situation of ‘food insecurity’ and generate potential national or human security ramifications. 
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Wider securitisation studies 
The Copenhagen School’s version of securitisation theory (see: Buzan et al., 1998; Wæver, 
1995) has received a “seemingly never-ending stream of criticism” observes Taureck 
(2006b). The introduction of a broader dimension of ‘securitisation studies’ might ease the 
methodological limitations of securitisation theory somewhat by allowing the embedding of 
normative elements (Taureck, 2006b, p. 60). It opens up a “realm wherein the securitization 
theorist is freed from the ties of securitization theory” (Taureck, 2006b, p. 59) enabling one to 
have “a special interest in strategies that pre-empt or forestall securitization rather than those 
that solve already declared security problems” (Wæver, 2000, p. 254). However, this does not 
resolve all the previously mentioned limitations. For that reason some of the critics endeavour 
to improve securitisation theory, resulting in numerous variants on the original theory 
(McGuire, 2011). Each of these variants exhibits its own specific attributes aiming at 
providing an improved analysis and better account of what amounts to a matter of ‘security’. 
While they share some common assumptions, there are a number of significant theoretical 
and practical differences. 
Balzacq contends securitisation theory in its original version can best be described as 
a ‘philosophical approach’ to securitisation (Balzacq, 2010, p. 60). Alternatively, he proposes 
a sociological variant based on the concept of a “pragmatic act of security” (Guild, Carrera, 
& Balzacq, 2008, p. 2). Hence, this approach is therefore sometimes referred to as ‘pragmatic 
securitisation’ (McGuire, 2011, p. 9). This variant comes forth from Balzacq’s (2010) 
strenuous efforts to develop the constructivist nature of securitisation theory by dismissing 
the speech act (as a inconsistent “post-structuralist link”) and endeavouring to achieve 
coherence through a pragmatic approach (based on a sociological model of securitisation) 
that “[blends] discourse analysis and process tracing” (Balzacq, 2010, p. 57). This pragmatic 
model “aspires to determine the strategic and tactical uses of language to attain a certain aim, 
while looking at the consequences of ‘saying security’” (Guild et al., 2008, p. 2). Balzacq  
therefore describes the pragmatic act of securitisation as “interested in ascertaining both the 
constitutive and causal effects of discourse – text and action – upon context, and vice versa” 
(Balzacq, 2010, p. 25). This means that the sociological model calls into question the 
narrowness of the philosophical variant of securitisation (McGuire, 2011, p. 10). As a 
pragmatic solution to the restricting utility of the individual speech act, the entire realm of 
persuasive argumentation and reasoning is considered as the strategic process of 
securitisation (Balzacq, 2010, p. 17). In other words, the argument that constitutes a 
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securitising move is more than merely a speech act; there is also a context that interacts with 
the individual speech act(s) that is relevant to the analysis. Hence the speech act is merely 
part of a wider process of argument and reasoning that constitutes securitisation (McGuire, 
2011, p. 8). This resonates with the Critical Realist view of the dual character of the world 
where “there is the opportunity for individuals to impact on society whilst recognising the 
impact society does have on individuals” (Burnett, 2007, p. 3). Unfortunately, however, the 
notion of ‘fundamental change’ at the heart of Critical Security Studies’ emancipatory 
approach – which is vital to conceptualising ‘food as security’ – is not one of the aims of the 
constructivist position and therefore also not part of the sociological variant of securitisation 
theory (Balzacq, 2010). 
Even though securitisation theory – and its more flexible ‘studies’ variants – fall 
within the wider realm of critical approaches to security, two principal limitations continue to 
push our inquiry into ‘food as a matter of security’ in the direction of expanding our 
theoretical horizon. The first limitation is the previously discussed lack of a normative 
component; now that securitisation theory merely aims to be ‘a tool for the security analyst’ 
not a method that can ‘inspire fundamental change’. Secondly, securitisation theory turns out 
to be ultimately more theoretic (or perhaps formulaic) than realistic. As Patomäki describes 
this limitation – seen in both the philosophical and pragmatic variant, he notes that the theory 
“retains an aspect of linguistic super-idealism: there is no explication or assessment of the 
reality of the alleged threats” (Patomäki, 2008, p. 10). With these two limitations in mind, 
Booth rightfully observes that to some degree “securitisation studies, like mainstream 
strategic studies, remains somewhat stuck in Cold War mindsets” (Booth, 2007, p. 165). 
Notwithstanding these limitations, securitisation theory certainly gives us  a practical 
– but certainly limited – theory that enables security analysts to determine what is security 
and what is not. But looking at food as a matter of security rouses the notion that there 
perhaps is more to the concept of security. Indeed, in Theory of World Security Booth 
outlines three reasons for a critical theory of security: “to respond to empirical curiosity, to 
pursue moral politics, and to rise to the challenges of the times” (Booth, 2007, p. 89). 
Securitisation theory, unfortunately, only seems to engage with the first. But even at that 
point Stritzel makes the case that “the current state of securitization theory is theoretically 
vague and it does not provide clear guidance for empirical studies” (Stritzel, 2007, p. 368). In 
conceptualising ‘food as security’ securitisation theory (and its wider ‘studies’) fails to 
provide us with a strong analytical tool to ‘rise to the challenges of the times’. The absence of 
a normative framework in securitisation theory thus marks a considerable drawback in 
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formulating ‘food as security’ as a theoretical approach that underlies the practical objective 
of achieving ‘food security’. Even where the wider realm of securitisation studies allows for 
more flexibility to ‘pursue moral politics’, it leaves us with a vague and inadequate 
foundation to comprehensively approach ‘food as security’. 
In the end, it appears that there must be more to ‘security’ than merely the 
performativity of language (in the form of discourse analysis and/or process tracing). Indeed, 
now that ‘security’ is more than merely language, a thorough conceptualisation ought to 
touch the heart of the ordinary insecurities that determine lives (Booth, 2007). This alone 
merits an exploration of a different critical framework of security to investigate if it can 
provide a complementary approach to deal with the (un)realised normative security 
tendencies of food. 
 
Appending a normative framework 
Within the wider realm of critical security studies there is a multiplicity of critical approaches 
based on the common assumption that we can uncover the fundamental features of the world 
with the objective to “identify and interpret those features for the purposes of animating their 
change” (Mutimer, 2010, p. 45). As mentioned, most would classify securitisation theory as 
one of these critical approaches, however, it must be noted that Critical Theory has no role in 
securitisation theory, as evidenced by the lack of a normative framework – which is one of 
the key features of Critical Theory. But, as already cursorily remarked, the need for a 
normative framework is most comprehensively addressed in the critical approaches to 
security studies in the work of Ken Booth and Richard Wyn Jones, known as the Welsh 
School or Aberystwyth School, sometimes simply referred to as the capitalised ‘Critical 
Security Studies’ and occasionally also specifically labelled as ‘emancipatory realism’. 
Henceforth the capitalised ‘Critical Security Studies’ (CSS) will refer to the work of Booth 
and Wyn Jones, and therein to be distinguished from lowercase ‘critical security studies’ as 
the more general and wider realm of critical approaches to security. To specifically refer to 
Booth’s work, the term ‘emancipatory realism’ will be utilised. But a general caveat is in 
place; CSS and emancipatory realism do not give us “a theory of security as such”, rather it 
presents “a body of knowledge about security in world politics” (Booth, 2007, p. 29). 
Critical Security Studies appends a normative framework to the study of security, 
which is best demonstrated by contrasting the problem-solving approach with the critical 
approach. The approach of the international community towards achieving ‘food security’ 
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falls by and large in the category of ‘problem-solving theory’ (Cox, 1981, p. 128). Solutions 
proposed to feed the expanding world population centre around technological advancements 
of agricultural systems that deliver higher yielding crops, more efficient water use, and 
diminished needs for fertiliser and pesticides. The vast majority of these ‘food security 
solutions’ take the existing social order and power relationships for granted, in other words, 
the status quo is their point of departure. While there is certainly a need for strategic action to 
solve some of the world’s food security problems, the problem-solving approach does not ask 
critical questions. This means that such an approach does not address, let alone 
fundamentally change, the unequal food distribution and access to food that are 
characteristics of the present world food system. Problem-solving approaches are therefore 
often not aimed at, nor successful in, challenging the ideology of the prevailing order.  
The alternative is a critical approach that enables us to make a normative choice to 
change the existing order. This approach broadly takes “a ‘critical’ stance towards traditional 
ideas about knowledge and society” (Booth, 2007, p. 40) and “contains an element of 
utopianism in the sense that it can represent a coherent picture of an alternative order” which, 
however, remains restricted to realistic alternative scenarios since it rejects “improbable 
alternatives just as it rejects the permanency of the existing order” (Cox, 1981, p. 130). 
In security studies this critical approach is visible in a number of post-modern 
approaches that are generally referred to as ‘critical security studies’. These critical 
approaches to security have their roots in the normative sociological ideas of the Frankfurt 
School – widely known as Critical Theory – that explores the “possibilities for social 
transformation in a world that favours the powerful and supports the status quo” 
(Nuruzzaman, 2006, p. 293). At its core, Critical Theory is concerned with questioning the 
origins of existing institutions, social complex and power relations and wonders “how and 
whether they might be in the process of changing” (Cox, 1981, p. 129). This method is 
distinct from problem-solving theory in that it favours a larger perspective of the world to 
understand the continuing process of historical change that necessitates continual adjustments 
of its concepts and objects (Cox, 1981, p. 129). Ultimately, its aim is to transcend the 
practices and perspective of the existing order and present realistic alternatives that are 
“feasible transformations of the existing world” as opposed to solving sub-complex problems 
that sustain the existing order (Cox, 1981, p. 130). Thus fundamentally, Critical Theory dares 
to take the step that Marx (1978) suggested: from interpreting the world, to changing it. 
Applying Critical Theory to the security paradigm places the individual human being 
at the centre stage as ultimate reference object for a wider conception of security that can 
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only be reached through emancipation of individuals, groups and communities. Whereas the 
central problematic of security studies has traditionally been concerned with the causes of 
war and conditions of peace, from a critical point of view the “causes, conditions and 
consequences are not so easily separable” (Krause, 1998, p. 311). Hence, a critical approach 
to security studies rejects the political realist version of security that accords states with a pre-
given ontological status as the referents of security (Nuruzzaman, 2006, pp. 293-294). 
Fundamentally, this constitutes the idea that the universal emancipation of human beings has 
the potential to change global power structures. Which, in turn, as Nuruzzaman points out, 
“naturally leads the critical theorist to question the link between power and knowledge” 
(2006, p. 296). 
To conclude, a normative framework can present a string of interacting concepts 
allowing us to transform world politics through the use of security. Not surprising therefore, 
we find the concept of emancipation at the heart of CSS. It envisages a fundamental 
transformation of systems, an approach that transcends short-term management of the rights 
and potentialities of the contemporary generation by emphasising the equal rights for future 
generations. 
 
Towards ‘emancipatory realism’ 
The concept of ‘emancipation’ has come a long way; it has undergone several changes over 
time, but never became associated with a fixed meaning (Nederveen Pieterse, 1992, p. 8). An 
appropriate way to describe the meaning of emancipation in relation to security is to think of 
it in first instance as the broad notion of self-liberation of the non-privileged. It is a mindset 
that encourages critique and reflection on our lives and the world at large. Booth sees it as a 
way in which “we can contemplate the future of the human story – convinced that ‘we do not 
have to live like this’” (1999, p. 43).  
Over the last two decades Booth has put tremendous effort in conceptualising 
emancipation as security by continuously sharpening its definition and meaning. Booth’s first 
famous equation of emancipation with security was in his 1991 article Security in anarchy: 
utopian realism in theory and practice: 
 
Emancipation should be given precedence in security thinking over the traditional 
realist themes of power and order. ... Emancipation means freeing people from those 
constraints  that stop them carrying out what freely they would choose to do, of which 
115 
 
war, poverty,  oppression and poor education are a few. Security and emancipation 
are in fact two sides of the same coin. It is emancipation, not power and order, in 
both theory and practice, that leads to stable security. (Booth, 1991b, p. 539) 
 
Here he presents the relationship between emancipation and security as a straightforward 
matter: one equates to the other, since they are two sides of the same coin. But by making 
emancipation the equivalent of security, Aradau cautions that consequently we “can no 
longer envisage social transformation outside the logic of security” (Aradau, 2004, p. 397). 
More fundamentally even, further scrutinising the relationship between emancipation and 
security, she argues that “their circular definition deprives the former of its truly 
transformative potential” (Aradau, 2004, p. 390). Aradau would certainly be right if we relate 
emancipation to the traditional concept of security in its narrow and static form, but once we 
perceive security as a wide range of constraints (including traditional threats) that curb and 
oppress a multitude of reference objects, then in fact the value of emancipatory 
transformative potential becomes evident. In other words, if security is restricted to high-level 
political discourse and military-strategic threats its equation with emancipation would indeed 
diminish the practical relevance and real life impact of the emancipatory approach. But once 
we also perceive security as a practice of resistance to confront the ordinary insecurities that 
determine lives, it provides us a ‘process utopian’ framework “to actualise both nearer-term 
and longer-term emancipatory goals through strategic and tactical political action based on 
immanent critique” (Booth, 2007, p. 112). The problem that Aradau indirectly highlights is 
probably best characterised as approaching security from the ‘either-or’ perspective. This 
means that we can see security either as the traditional practice of narrowly defined threats to 
the state or as a modern broader conception of security delineated by the constraints on 
human freedom. But, perhaps, it makes more sense to approach security from a ‘both-and’ 
point of view. McSweeney values the latter; he says there are “two ways of practising, or 
‘doing’, security”, one is the traditional perception of the external threat to the state, whereas 
the other addresses the problems that arise from “the normal conditions which generate the 
human need for security” (1999, p. 176, emphasis in original). Most importantly, as he 
continues, “military defense is only one aspect of a security policy responsive to the everyday 
needs of the individuals who are its subject” (McSweeney, 1999, p. 176). Practising security 
in a contemporary and broader conception does therefore not exclude the essentially military-
strategic orientation of the traditional approach. Hence, we need both the traditional practice 
of narrowly defined threats to the state and a contemporary and broader conception of 
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security delineated by the constraints on human freedom. In more recent work Booth 
recognises the value of a ‘both-and’ approach as he notes that military/strategic security “is 
indeed an important part of the landscape ... but it is only one part of the complex of world 
insecurity” (2007, p. 96). Later we will see how this ‘both-and’ approach turns out to be the 
most suitable way to conceptualise ‘food as security’. 
The emphasis of the Welsh School is on the practical relevance of emancipation. For 
Wyn Jones this is found in reflecting upon the meaning of emancipation “in terms of actual 
institutions and relationships” (1999, p. 76). Booth is initially more abstract when he says that 
“emancipation, empirically, is security” (1991a, p. 323) but gradually outlines the practical 
nature of an approach he calls ‘emancipatory realism’ (Booth, 2007).  
 
A security theory deriving from Critical Theory conceives security as a process of 
emancipation. Emancipation, in turn, has no objective or timeless meaning; different 
peoples in different cultural surroundings and socio-political contexts will attach 
different meanings to the idea. Emancipation is concerned with freeing people, as 
individuals and groups, from the social, physical, economic, political and other 
constraints that stop them from carrying out what they would freely choose to do. 
(Bilgin et al., 1998, p. 153) 
 
By the end of the twentieth century these ideas about emancipation resulted in Booth’s 
emerging view that emancipation had become more than “only [a] struggle against 
oppression but also, more coherently, [a] struggle for new visions of society” (1999, p. 40, 
emphasis in original). Emancipation thus had slowly developed from a rather ‘negative’ 
formulation (i.e. struggling against) to a more ‘positive’ version with an emphasis on 
“creating new structures and power relationships that promise to enhance human 
potentialities” (Booth, 1999, p. 40, emphasis added). The foundation for this was laid down 
in 1991 when Booth explored the concept of ‘emancipation’ in Security and Emancipation 
which was aimed at making the concept more practical and applicable to ‘everyday life’ by 
outlining the idea of a reciprocity of rights: 
 
Integral to emancipation is the idea of the reciprocity of rights. The implication of this 
is the belief that ‘I am not truly free until everyone is free’. This is a principle 
everyone can implement in everyday life, and it has implications for international 
relations. Since ‘my freedom depends on your freedom’, the process of emancipation 
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implies the further breaking down of the barriers we perpetuate between foreign and 
domestic policy. (Booth, 1991a, p. 322) 
 
With this principle of a reciprocity of rights, Booth clearly advances his claim that “security 
and emancipation are broader concepts than peace and war as traditionally conceived” (1995, 
p. 344). As an emancipatory principle it is certainly an interesting proposition to “break down 
the barriers between ‘us’ and ‘them’” (Booth, 1991a, p. 324). But in terms of breaking down 
barriers to achieve ‘freedom’ it may remain somewhat hazy for ordinary citizens to perceive 
how one actually implements this notion of emancipation in everyday life. Even though one 
may appreciate the emancipatory function of a reciprocity of rights, the absence of a specific 
and targeted implementation diminishes some of its practical relevance. Hence, specification 
is required; what are these constraints that block our paths to ‘freedom’? While there are 
numerous obstacles out there that need to be addressed and overcome, in this case the 
freedom from food insecurity lends itself as a fitting specification. If we genuinely want to 
improve the world food system we need to break down the barriers between foreign and 
domestic food production, security and access. In other words, we need to embrace the idea 
that ‘my food security depends on your food security’ (Siegenbeek van Heukelom, 2011).  
This approach supports the formulation of a vision of an ideal world food situation by 
proposing the required underlying mindset and philosophical attitude of a ‘food utopia’. But 
reaching such an ‘end-point utopia’ may seem impossible from our current world outlook. 
How can we ever reach a situation in which every single human being has access to sufficient 
and nutritious food when all we hear are sombre forecasts that “by 2030, the world will need 
at least 50 per cent more food, 45 per cent more energy and 30 per cent more water” (United 
Nations Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Global Sustainability, 2012). To remedy our 
innate inability to perceive practical everyday measures to reach such an food-utopia, Booth 
argues to distinguish ‘end-point utopias’ from the more tenable ‘process utopias’ that allow 
us “not to become overburdened by distant ideal structures” (Booth, 1991a, p. 324) by 
concentrating on “benign and reformist steps calculated to make a better world somewhat 
more probably for future generations” (Booth, 1991b, p. 536). This aligns well with Falk’s 
(1980) contraction of the utopian dichotomy of present behaviour and future hopes. The 
realisation of the future is nothing more than “the eventual culmination of the present”, thus 
integrating present with the future gives us a better prospect of achieving our desired destiny 
(Booth, 2007, p. 63). 
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Perhaps this means that our ‘process utopian’ endeavours should be seen as 
contributions towards creating a eutopia (literally ‘a good place’) instead of aspiring to reach 
a utopia (literally ‘no place’). The key difference in building eutopias and utopias is that to 
attain the required cooperation the former uses freedom and the latter coercion (Hager, 2003, 
p. 47). So if we set out to build eutopias, with what Booth refers to as the ‘process utopian 
approach’, this means we need to emphasise voluntary action, emancipation and freedom. 
Once people voluntarily free themselves from the constraints that hold them back, “it opens 
the way for ordinary people to realize extraordinary accomplishments that serve both their 
own interests and the interests of others” (Hager, 2003, p. 47). As such, Hager notes that 
eutopias are based on “voluntary actions that yield mutual advantage” and accordingly 
produces abundances, while utopias cannot but flounder in destitution (Hager, 2003, p. 47). 
A reciprocity of rights and a process utopian approach are part of what Booth 
describes as ‘utopian realism’, a concept he has fully integrated with the idea of emancipation 
and renamed to ‘emancipatory realism’. 
 
Utopian realism as I am using it here is more an attitude of mind than a ‘theory’ with 
powers of explanation and prediction. But it is based upon both normative (‘utopian’) 
and empirical (‘realistic’) theories. (Booth, 1991b, p. 534) 
 
Emancipatory realism is therefore “a theory as well as an attitude of mind, with a systematic 
set of ideas about being, knowing, and doing” (Booth, 2007, p. 91). But central remains the 
concept of emancipation, which “shapes strategies and tactics of resistance, offers a theory of 
progress for society, and gives politics of hope for common humanity” (Booth, 2005b, p. 
181).  
 
Consolidating Critical Security Studies 
Critical Security Studies [...] follows the post-positivist turn in viewing theory as 
constitutive of reality. Accordingly, the distinction between theory and practice 
dissolves: theory is itself regarded as a form of practice, and practice is seen as 
always being informed, whether consciously or not, by theory. To recognise the 
dialectical relationship between theory and practice is to become aware that 
theorising is an inherently political activity. (Bilgin et al., 1998, p. 153) 
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Neufeld (2004), however, has highlighted two problems that arguably kept the unofficial 
precursor to Critical Security Studies – the World Order Models Project (WOMP) in the 
1960s and 1970s – from successfully framing a widely accepted emancipatory agenda. The 
potential pitfalls came from by utopianism and elitism, which could similarly undermine the 
emancipatory ends envisioned by Critical Security Studies (Neufeld, 2004, pp. 109-110). 
The first vulnerability lies in the notion of what Neufeld calls ‘abstract utopianism’, 
which in the case of the WOMP meant that it “stripped its theorizing of its critical content” 
by failing to constrain its ‘alternative world futures’ to feasible transformations of the 
existing world (Cox, 1981, p. 130; Neufeld, 2004, p. 110). As we have seen earlier, Critical 
Theory certainly endorses utopianism as a guide to picture a coherent alternative order, but 
crucially this normative choice should be constrained by a comprehension of historical 
processes (Cox, 1981, p. 130). The failure to realise that “theory is always for someone and 
for some purpose” (Cox, 1981, p. 128) resulted for the WOMP indeed in abstract utopianism, 
an utopianism that neglected to take account of “‘the dynamic forces of historical change’ ... 
[and] the ‘laws of motion’ of contemporary global society” (Neufeld, 2004, p. 110). 
The second vulnerability lies in the use of an elitist pedagogical style in equipping 
ordinary citizens with emancipatory theoretical and practical tools to liberate themselves. The 
danger of this elitism was found in the WOMP’s prevailing assumption that “the masses [are] 
... too ignorant ‘to understand the present in which they live and the future that would be most 
desirable’” (Harry Targ in Neufeld, 2004, p. 111). Rather on the contrary, the educative 
conception should originate from a pedagogy and practice that is critical, dialogical, and most 
importantly sees the oppressed as “self-reflecting and knowledgeable beings whose self-
definitions and understandings must form the starting point – though clearly not the endpoint 
– of the learning process” (Neufeld, 2004, p. 111). 
Together, both vulnerabilities lead Neufeld to Marx’s claim that “man must prove the 
truth, that is, the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking in practice” (Marx, 
1978, p. 144). This forms the foundation for Neufeld’s conclusion that Critical Security 
Studies can steer clear of the pitfalls of utopianism and elitism by ensuring that its intellectual 
work is grounded and connected to “the real lived experiences and struggles of real people” 
(Neufeld, 2004, p. 111). Liberating humanity from the shackles of (human) security threats 
(eg. poverty, food insecurity, poor health, oppression, etc…) is indeed Booth’s starting notion 
for emancipatory politics (Booth, 2007). In fact, he purports that “emancipation is the 
philosophy, theory, and politics of inventing humanity” (Booth, 2007, p. 112). The 
emancipatory potential is in this way philosophically anchored to the view that “there is no 
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ultimate truth in the social world, only a pragmatic truth, created intersubjectively” (Booth, 
1999, p. 43, emphasis added). 
Some critics, however, observe a difficulty in relating the social world and the politics 
of inventing humanity to the theory and philosophy of emancipation. Dannreuther, for 
instance, takes concern with empirically relying upon the concept of emancipation, 
contending it has a “tendency towards a certain vagueness and lack of clear definition of what 
an ‘emancipated’ world would look like” (Dannreuther, 2007, p. 51). There appears to be 
some merit in this concern as Booth cannot give us a practical description of emancipation, 
for he contends that “it is simply not possible to say what emancipation looks like, apart from 
its meaning to particular people at particular times” (Booth, 1997, p. 110). Even so, Booth 
does lucidly outline an emancipatory three-folded framework, which ought to provide: “a 
philosophical anchorage for knowledge, a theory of progress for society, and a practice of 
resistance against oppression” (Booth, 2007, p. 112). In fact, while the exact definition of 
emancipation may remain elusive, it is the critical framework and inspired ideas of Booth that 
“open alternative strategies for thinking, and doing something, about the insecurity of 
hunger” (Shepherd, 2012, p. 204). 
In another way, Booth’s rationale for a critical theory of security is actually helpful in 
chipping away at emancipation’s nebulous character. With three unambiguous reasons to 
frame the need for critical thinking about security (Booth, 2007), it turns out there is a more 
practical reading of the emancipatory approach. The first reason given is to respond to 
empirical curiosity. The curiosity of the present study is two-folded: 1) can we bring food 
into the security paradigm; and 2) what are the implications of foreign agricultural 
investments for food and security. For the former, emancipation translates into enabling 
serious and critical thought about the future of food, and accordingly inspire appropriate 
behaviour (changes). The later implies that emancipation engages with the (human) security 
of real people in real places (Booth, 2007). 
Pursuing moral politics conveys Booth’s second reason, for which he has made the 
point that emancipation ought to be superior to the quest for power and order, since the latter 
creates potentially unstable situations given its always at somebody else’s expense (Booth, 
1991a). Thus, he continues, “true (stable) security can only be achieved by people and groups 
if they do not deprive others of it” (Booth, 1991a, p. 319). This perspective on security is 
indeed driven by a set of value commitments and treating the concept as ‘political’ instead of 
‘analytical’ and therein very much oppositional to more traditional views on security as 
‘apolitical’ and ‘value free’ (Krause, 1998). 
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Attesting to be the most interesting reason is the notion that critical thinking about 
security can help us rise to the challenges of the times. Wyn Jones aptly phrases this by 
saying that “proponents of critical security studies can not only interpret the world but also 
play a role in changing it” (Wyn Jones, 1999, p. 167). Indeed, as we have seen in the previous 
chapters, a critical and emancipatory security approach can provide a more suitable 
understanding and pathway to address the emerging and future challenges of the world food 
system. And yet, some might raise the objection that there is much uncertainty about many of 
the emerging and future challenges of our times, and we better focus upon conventional 
security risks. However, in equating ‘uncertainty’ with ‘risk’ we come to see that the former 
challenges are more profound in the sense that “there is no scientific basis on which to form 
any calculable probability whatever. We simply do not know” (Keynes, 1937, p. 214). Even 
so, there are degrees of uncertainty that allow us to anticipate and adjust ourselves to future 
realities, but above all, it enables us to “try to shape worlds that are yet to come” (Patomäki, 
2008, p. 17). This notion touches upon the heart of emancipation; namely, shaping alternative 
realities. It may not be exactly clear how, or in what form, but the transformative potential is 
unambiguously present within. 
 
Consequentialist security 
To further the development of the most suitable theoretical position and philosophical 
approach to bring ‘food’ into the security paradigm, one final step awaits. Now that we have 
seen the many ways to understand ‘security’ (cf. Buzan & Wæver, 1997, pp. 249-250), the 
following conceptualisation of ‘food as security’ is to be appreciated as one of several 
possible avenues to theoretically build merit in conceiving ‘food’ as an existential component 
of ‘security’. After all, the objective is to bring about a better understanding and response to 
contemporary and future security threats that involve ‘food’. Yet, whichever approach toward 
security we choose, our understanding will always rest upon a certain “specific ontological 
commitment” (Balzacq, 2010, p. 57). 
Given that the approach outlined above is not without ontological problems, some 
precursory comments on philosophical and normative grounds are of utter importance in 
dealing with the concept of ‘food as security’. The central question is how to conceive a 
security paradigm that utilises the incisive logic of securitisation theory yet embraces the 
decisive normative power exhibited by emancipatory realism without running into 
methodological inconsistency and ontological incompatibility? 
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Evidently, an imperative distinction between securitisation theory and emancipatory 
realism emanates from their objectives. Securitisation theory sets out to offer a practical 
analytical tool to determine occurrences of securitisation and desecuritisation, and should 
therefore not be confused with “a political statement on the part of the analyst” (Taureck, 
2006b, p. 55). Conversely, emancipatory realism endeavours to conceive security as political 
theory by understanding it in relation to emancipation (Booth, 2007, p. 169). In other words, 
securitisation theory intentionally lacks a normative agenda while emancipatory realism 
endows a strong normative approach in terms of its emancipatory impetus. 
To recap, securitisation theory’s intentional absence of a normative framework means 
that it only offers a practical tool to the security analyst to uncover the political choice of 
securitisation/desecuritisation. Consequently, securitisation theory is by default devoid of any 
transformational potential – perhaps except for the security analyst’s normative dilemma that 
speaking and writing security is in itself an execution of the speech act (Huysmans, 2002, p. 
43; Taureck, 2006b, p. 57; Wæver, 1999, p. 338). To determine, then, whether ‘food’ is a 
matter of ‘security’ we can turn to securitisation theory to make use of this practical 
‘formula’ to answer the “positivist question: what does security do?” (Taureck, 2006b, p. 58). 
This gives us a logical toolset to analyse whether or not a political choice (the speech act) has 
made ‘food’ a matter of security. Yet, this does not help us much in answering the normative 
question “what should security do?” (Taureck, 2006b, p. 58, emphasis added). Accordingly, 
the question becomes: are there ethical and moral grounds on which we ought to perceive 
‘food’ as a matter of ‘security’? From a critical security perspective there are certainly 
convincing normative reasons to approach ‘food’ as a security issue. For instance, to achieve 
‘food security’ – or even ‘human food security’ – an emancipatory approach can ”[bring] our 
values and beliefs (i.e. that everyone should have access to safe and sufficient food) into the 
realm of reality” (Siegenbeek van Heukelom, 2011, p. 14). This notion originates from the 
idea that “security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin. Emancipation, not power 
or order, produces true security” (Booth, 1991a, p. 319). This further suggests, therefore, that 
a comprehensive conceptualisation of ‘food as security’ cannot succeed without addressing 
both questions. 
Thereby, however, we cannot avoid running into some ontological, epistemological 
and methodological tensions between securitisation theory and emancipatory realism. With 
the consequence that especially the ‘normative gap’ needs to be bridged by blending ontology 
and epistemology. But vigilance is imperative to avoid “the detrimental effects of an 
inconsistent mixture” (Balzacq, 2010, p. 7). 
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By relying on the philosophical framework informed by Critical Realism (as outlined 
in the Introduction) we may overcome many of the foreseeable tensions, incompatibilities 
and inconsistent mixtures of ontology, epistemology and methodology. In other words, the 
aim is to use the insights of Critical Realism as a mediator to reveal the complementarity of 
securitisation theory (i.e. by using the broader form of securitisation studies) with the 
normative and transformational power of emancipatory realism. This endeavours upon the 
creation of a synthesis that supports the concept of ‘food as security’ with a strong theoretical 
foundation whilst benefiting from a powerful normative approach. Some may argue though, 
that these theories appear irreconcilable, yet the argument furthered here is that both 
approaches are fundamentally and necessarily not incommensurable (see McGuire, 2011, p. 
11; but cf., Taureck, 2006b, p. 54). 
Actually, considering a complementarity of securitisation theory with emancipatory 
realism is not too farfetched. Booth, for instance, has envisaged Critical Security Studies to 
turn security issues into political questions, or in his words, “to politicise security, not 
securitise politics” (Booth, 2007, p. 31). In fact, this turns out to be exactly what Wæver 
describes as the process of ‘desecuritisation’ (Buzan et al., 1998; Wæver, 1995, 1999), bar 
the lack of a normative impetus. Desecuritisation is therefore, as Huysmans (Huysmans, 
1998a) puts it, the unmaking of securitisation. But Aradau crucially adds that desecuritisation 
essentially “has to be tackled first politically and not analytically” (Aradau, 2004, p. 388). 
Fundamentally, this tentatively points to the notion that there is hardly real incongruity 
between Wæver’s securitisation theory and Booth’s emancipatory realism, only normative 
incommensurability. 
And yet, Booth unwaveringly contends that “securitisation and desecuritisation are 
interesting but flawed ideas” and subsequently promotes emancipatory realism as offering a 
more viable alternative that can “advance the cause of a more progressive security studies” 
(Booth, 2007, p. 169). More specifically, “desecuritisation can disempower” by “[turning] a 
victim’s extraordinary situation in to a power-holder’s ordinary politics” (Booth, 2007, p. 
168). Wæver on the other hand is more reconciliatory, suggesting even that “the two 
[approaches] might be complementary” (2003, p. 23). Fortunately, Floyd (2007) took 
Wæver’s suggestion as both legitimisation and encouragement to further explore the 
compatibility of both approaches in a combined strategy. She contends there are three 
advantages in a combination of both schools: (1) it offers a stronger and more cohesive 
alternative to mainstream (i.e. traditional) security; (2) policymakers benefit in their adoption 
of ideas from a more united academy; and (3) it enables a more expansive critical approach 
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for the security analyst by “allowing for normative – but denying infinite – conceptualisations 
of security” (Floyd, 2007, p. 336). Floyd refers to this emerging potential for both approaches 
to take on complementary roles as “a consequentialist evaluation of security” (Floyd, 2007). 
Looking at this broad way of framing the advantages, it touches upon an interesting 
remark by Booth. Save his critique on the specifics of securitisation theory, Booth does admit 
that “the general approach advocated by the Copenhagen school runs in parallel with several 
themes central to critical thinking about security” (Booth, 2007, p. 164). Moreover, we have 
seen that within the wider realm critical thinking about security, both securitisation theory 
and emancipatory realism conceive of ‘security as practice’ – namely, the former as practice 
through discourse, the latter as practice through emancipation. Considering the function of 
emancipation in security, Wyn Jones hints similarly toward the complementarity of both 
approaches by asserting that “concept of emancipation is a necessary element of any form of 
analysis that attempts to problematize and criticize the status quo” (Wyn Jones, 2005, p. 216). 
Booth, together with Bilgin & Wyn Jones (1998), in an earlier more general argument 
about the future of security studies remarked that any potential problems for the development 
of the discipline will derive from a continuation of conceiving and practising security in 
competitive terms. Remarkably – and somewhat contrary to Booth’s previous statement – this 
seem to pre-empt Floyd’s consolidation by simply observing that “when security is conceived 
in collaborative terms, the ‘securitization’ of non-military issues would constitute the first 
step towards their solution” (Bilgin et al., 1998, pp. 148-149). However, there is even greater 
relevance in their statement as they begin to demonstrate the importance of entrenched 
thinking about security interdependence with the example of water scarcity in the Middle 
East. Non-traditional challenges, such as food insecurity, water scarcity and resource 
depletion, they argue, can only be addressed effectively by ceasing to chase the ‘zero-sum’ 
mindset of competition and confrontation (Bilgin et al., 1998). 
 Unfortunately, competition and confrontation over these kinds of precious resources 
is likely to increase throughout the remainder of this century. With this in mind, an 
alternative vision (see chapter 1) and the above outlined security approach that 
comprehensively addresses the realities of food, water and land seem long overdue. The next 
step, however, constitutes a move from theory to reality. For this reason, the ensuing chapter 
will explore the phenomenon of ‘land grabbing’ and consider the security realities and 
implications of this contemporary practice. Aiming, therein, to create an empirical exposition 
of how emancipation and an alternative vision can change the course of food and security.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
A ‘global land grab’ 
 
A new geopolitics of food has emerged—a world in which the global competition for 
land and water is intensifying and each country is fending for itself. 
(L. R. Brown, 2012) 
 
 The end of cheap food 
 A great global land grab 
 Investing in whose future? 
 Alternative pathways for development 
 Land as a matter of security 
 Underestimated security concerns? 
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The scope of this chapter covers the phenomenon of foreign agricultural investments, but 
focuses specifically on the contemporary interest in large-scale land acquisitions for 
agricultural production. It outlines how the Global Food Price Crisis of 2007–2008 stimulated 
wide spread investment in cheap agricultural land throughout much of the developing world, 
therein catalysing a broader set of underlying factors like globalisation, land liberalisation 
and food security concerns into a ‘global land grab’. Central is the fundamental debate about 
the nature of this global land grab: should investment be welcomed as a much-needed 
opportunity for development, knowledge transfer and agricultural modernisation or does it 
rather present a ‘neo-colonial’ move by wealthy foreign powers and corporate interests to lay 
claim to the land, food, and resources of the Global South? 
To understand the extent of the security implications of the global rush for land, this 
chapter looks in more detail at the emergence, form, extent, and ramifications of the so-called 
‘global land grab’. As noted by the Executive Director of the FAO, José Graziano da Silva, 
“land acquisitions are a reality. We can’t wish them away, but we have to find a proper way 
of limiting them. It appears to be like the wild west and we need a sheriff and law in place.” 
(Tran, 2012). On this basis, the discussion moves on to determine which alternative 
paradigm(s) could offer feasible and realistic pathways for development from the perspective 
of food as a matter of security. Then, at the end of the chapter, we pivot even more to the 
security aspects of foreign agricultural investment, and consider the implications for national 
security and human security. 
 
The end of cheap food 
The Global Food Price Crisis of 2007–2008 pushed many people in the developing world into 
food insecurity, giving us a glimpse of an imminent future rife with hunger and struggles for 
food. The unprecedented increase of food prices saw the cost of basic foodstuff commodities 
rapidly sky-rocket, within a short period of time, making food financially inaccessible for 
hundreds of thousands of families around the world. No wonder that riots soon ensued, 
people killed, and governments toppled (see chapters 1 and 2). 
At the height of the crisis the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) believed that 
more than a billion people were food insecure. In late 2008 prices eased somewhat allowing 
the highly affected middle class in the developing world to regain financial access to food. 
However, around the same time the Global Financial Crisis took centre stage, affecting the 
food security of the lower-classes in the developed world. By mid-2010 food prices once 
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more steadily climbed and the FAO warned of new record heights. Then again, a severe food 
price shock hit in early 2011 with the FAO food price index peaking at a record 238 points in 
February (Wise & Murphy, 2012, p. 5). 
These grim developments awakened a growing public awareness that we may have 
reached the end of an era of unprecedented cheap food. For many countries, both in the 
developing and developed world, this means that safeguarding future food supplies now tops 
the list of national priorities. In lieu of these recent developments there is a growing 
comprehension of the significance of food for social stability and national security, 
something China already grasped in the mid-1990s (L. R. Brown, 1995). Indeed, the former 
Director-General of the FAO, Jacques Diouf, emphasised in 2011 that food insecurity will 
not only see the world’s poor famish, but equally has the potential to “generate political 
instability in countries and threaten world peace and security” (Kubota, 2011). 
Amidst the global turmoil caused by soaring food prices in 2007–2008 a number of 
large net-food importing countries in the Gulf region and Asia realised that the food riots 
witnessed in more than 30 developing countries offered a bleak prospect for their own future 
stability and security prospects. Quietly, but in rapid progression, these states begun to shift 
away from trade dependence on the global food market towards new strategies focused on 
(partial) self-sufficiency. Yet to realise this strategy to safeguard their future food provision 
additional food production capacity became a vital condition – either at home or overseas. 
The need for additional capacity was the start sign for a surge in commercial pressure on land 
in poor developing countries through an unprecedented rise in land deals. By mid 2009 large-
scale land acquisitions had suddenly mushroomed all over Africa, South-East Asia and Latin 
America. This contemporary rush for land did not remain limited to state interests. Even in 
greater numbers a diverse range of international corporations, private investors and financial 
funds joined what became publically known as the ‘global land grab’. Some even believe that 
the land rush is part of a much more elaborate scheme aimed at controlling land and labour in 
the Global South (Huggins, 2011, p. 2). Others, however, emphasise that the investment on 
the contrary “is by no means limited to a ‘North-South’ pattern” (United Nations, 2012, p. 
42). 
 
A great global land grab 
Ahead of exploring the particularities of large-scale land acquisitions, a clarification of the 
henceforth used terminology and concepts is in place. As described, the increasing 
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commercial pressure on land has generated the contemporary global rush for agricultural 
land. German et al. correctly point out that the present surge in agricultural investments 
“conjures up images of foreign governments or corporate interests operating single-handedly 
to secure large tracts of farmland to hedge against insecurities of food, fuel and fiber in their 
countries of origin” (German, Schoneveld, & Mwangi, 2011, p. 3). As a result this 
phenomenon is now generally labelled with the catch-all term ‘global land grab’ (S. M. 
Borras & J. Franco, 2010). Broadly speaking this so-called ‘global land grab’ points to a 
surge in mass purchasing and leasing of cross-border agricultural land by transnational 
companies, sometimes initiated with the support of foreign governments and/or facilitated by 
the host-country’s state agencies (Scoones, 2009; Zoomers, 2010). While large-scale land 
acquisitions are not a new phenomenon (Smaller & Mann, 2009; United Nations, 2012, p. 
40), the present scale and magnitude at which these land deals are presently burgeoning is 
unprecedented. What’s more, these land deals are also vastly different in terms of the drivers 
and players involved. No longer do they merely involve a strategy of comparative advantage 
but increasingly represent an existential notion of food and energy security – which in turn 
inevitably entices private investors to become involved (Smaller & Mann, 2009; World 
Economic Forum, 2012, p. 70). 
Looking at the drivers of this contemporary interest in agricultural land we find by 
and large three interconnected processes: globalisation, the liberalisation of land markets, and 
a worldwide boom in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) (Zoomers, 2010, p. 430). More 
specifically, Zoomers identifies seven relatively new instances of commercial pressures on 
land that seem to drive the contemporary global land grab (Zoomers, 2010). It is quite well-
known that investments in food production and biofuel production are increasing the pressure 
on land, but so too is nature conservation – now commonly referred as ‘green grabbing’ 
(Fairhead et al., 2012, p. 238; Pearce, 2012; Vidal, 2008). To a lesser extent but in a similar 
way, urban expansion, tourism, retirement migration, and remittance investments are also a 
mounting pressure on land. Even so, concerns over future food and energy security, or 
anticipated profits related to these concerns, are certainly behind the two most prominent 
types of investments: food and biofuel production (United Nations, 2012, p. 42), making 
these kind of large-scale land acquisitions the predominant type of investment (Cotula et al., 
2009; Hallam, 2009). But it is important to keep in mind that the interest in acquiring cheap 
land in low-income countries is not always exclusively for agricultural purposes (Ansoms, 
Forthcoming 2012, p. 2). Indeed, above and beyond the present interest in Africa’s farmland, 
the ‘commercialisation of space’ (Ansoms, Forthcoming 2012) has been well underway since 
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the emergence of a resource boom in Sub-Saharan Africa at the dawn of the twenty-first 
century (Donnelly & Ford, 2008). It is therefore sensible to remember that “trends in large-
scale land acquisitions for agricultural investments must be placed in the broader context of 
expanding economic relations between Africa and the rest of the world” (Cotula et al., 2009, 
p. 25). 
The term ‘global land grab’ is thus a powerful way to describe the stark rise in 
demand for cheap agricultural land, but it harbours a somewhat negative, derogative 
connotation. A ‘land grab’ is generally depicted as a land acquisition that causes 
displacement, dispossession and disenfranchisement (Cochrane, 2011). In activist parlance it 
serves as effective terminology, but in common use it “obscures vast differences in the 
legality, structure and outcomes of commercial land deals and deflects attention from the 
roles of domestic elites and governments as partners, intermediaries and beneficiaries” (Hall, 
2011a). Occasionally it is also noted that perhaps the essence of these modern ‘land grabs’ is 
not only rooted in acquiring land but equally in the long-term objective of obtaining water 
rights (Smaller & Mann, 2009, p. 5). Even so, the ubiquitous use of the term ‘global land 
grab’ paints a rather ominous picture of the swelling interest and investment in the 
agricultural sector of developing countries. Perhaps there may indeed be good reason in some 
cases to opt for using the terminology ‘land grab’, but for many cases the label is applied 
merely as a result of assumptions rather than facts. For this reason the term ‘foreign 
agricultural investment’ could offer a more neutral alternative, especially for complicated 
investment deals or brand new ventures that still lack an adequate level of scrutiny. Hence, in 
the remainder of this chapter and the ones to follow it is sensible to opt for the use of the 
more neutral term ‘foreign agricultural investment’ or ‘land deal’ to describe large-scale land 
acquisitions in general, except when the particular instance is evidently unfair, unbalanced or 
zero-sum in nature, only then, a resort to the use of the term ‘land grab’ seems fair. 
Despite the uncertain consequences of the global rush for land, perhaps a 
contemplative consideration may be that it garners support for a renewed impetus to scale up 
research and development in the agricultural sector. For now, however, the ‘global land grab’ 
seems mostly rooted in immediate concerns over food security, and for many private sector 
speculators it is all about profit. On the whole, we could tentatively suggest that the overall 
increase in foreign agricultural investments appears to entail to a crucially needed financial 
and technological injection to ensure that agricultural development can reinforce our global 
food security so that we can feed over 9 billion people globally by 2050 (United Nations 
Population Division, 2011, p. 2). To break it down, with a world population growth of 1.2 per 
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cent a year, already by 2015 there will be 400 million additional mouths to feed, and by 2020 
some 800 million (L. R. Brown, 2011a). 
With demand for food increasing significantly worldwide – even more sharply in 
developing countries – emerging super economies like India and China exert a massive 
pressure on food, water, and land. The contemporary pattern of large-scale land acquisitions 
in low-income countries is therefore unlikely to disappear in the near future (Huggins, 2011; 
Smaller & Mann, 2009). Population growth, climate change, and the finite nature of natural 
resources will assure that food prices stay at record heights – which makes a compelling case 
for foreign agricultural investment. With this worrisome outlook the prospect of a food 
insecure future brings home even more strongly the message more that the era of cheap food 
has irrevocably come to an end and therein makes “land grabbing ... an integral part of a 
global power struggle for food security” (L. R. Brown, 2011c, p. 71). The race for the world’s 
farmland is, however, not solely driven by direct concerns over safeguarding future food 
security. The continuing trend of high food prices has enthused private investors to pursue 
foreign agricultural land to lock in tangible ‘real assets’ with high profit margins that offer 
diversification to their uncertain portfolios (Litovsky & Villalpando, 2012). The interest of 
private sector actors presents a novel development now that “historically, the investment 
community has not been interested in the food and agricultural sector” (Blumenthal, 2009). 
But with new unexperienced investors entering the agricultural sector “only … the smart 
investor who is willing to do his homework diligently [may] stay well-clear of the many 
pitfalls” that surround the great potential and exciting opportunities of African agriculture 
(Horton, 2012, p. 93). 
 Altogether this means that land is now “the nexus that holds all trade-offs together” 
(Litovsky & Villalpando, 2012, p. 16). Reflecting challenges such as balancing population 
growth, ecological conservation, energy needs, food production, water availability and human 
prosperity. But at the same time these challenges have rekindled interest in the development 
of agricultural land on a global scale, a sector that had been crippled by a decades-long lack 
of investment – one of the causes of rising food prices (Hallam, 2009, p. 37). The 
contemporary wave of foreign agricultural investment in the developing world’s farmland is 
therefore generally not contested in principle, but the nature of these large-scale investments 
– purportedly often indeed in the form of  land grabs – is without doubt controversial (United 
Nations, 2012). Does this mean that the surge in agricultural investments ought to be seen in 
principle as a welcome development, but with the land rush as its unfortunate and inevitable 
configuration? Borras and Franco do not think so: “we contend that land-grabbing is not 
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inevitable, that it can be prevented, and that concerted efforts should be undertaken to stop it” 
(Borras Jr. & Franco, 2010, p. 521). They have serious reservation about accepting that a 
virtue can be made out of the global land grab, and doubt if formulating investment 
guidelines in an international ‘code of conduct’ or ‘principles for responsible large-scale land 
acquisitions’ would result in genuine pro-poor development. Most importantly, they hit a 
critical note by putting forward the notion that efforts to make large-scale land acquisitions 
‘win-win’ investments “explicitly or implicitly assumes that there is no fundamental problem 
with existing industrial food and energy production and consumption patterns tightly 
controlled by TNC’s [transnational corporations]” (Borras Jr. & Franco, 2010, p. 515). We 
will return to this point later when we shift the paradigm from the habitual problem-solving 
approach to the fundamentals of critical theory. 
First now, it is important to consider who ultimately benefits from foreign agricultural 
investments, a question that presently remains largely unclear. Opinions on the desirability of 
the massive surge in land acquisitions are divided, with pros and cons of land deals heavily 
debated. There are investors that regularly tout the ‘win-win’ character of foreign agricultural 
investment, but also human rights organisations and NGOs that conversely stress the risks of 
marginalisation, corruption, degradation, instability, and local food insecurity. 
Unfortunately, recent investigations show that the reality of large-scale land acquisitions is 
generally not very rosy (Pearce, 2012). What’s more, according to a growing body of 
scholarly reports, most instances of foreign agricultural investment are indeed unfair, 
unbalanced and unsustainable, with the consequence that they are a leading source of local 
conflict and (human) food insecurity (see papers presented at the International Conference on 
Global Land Grabbing, 2011; 2012). Indeed, Oxfam reports that “two-thirds of agricultural 
land deals by foreign investors are in countries with a serious hunger problem” (Geary, 2012, 
p. 2). It is precisely for these reasons that foreign investors frequently hear accusations of 
‘neo-colonial’ practices and face allegations that their operations displace communities and 
deepen poverty and food insecurity – claims sometimes difficult to substantiate. 
 
Investing in whose future? 
The debate over the implications and potential benefits of the contemporary wave of foreign 
agricultural investment is presently sharply divided. The only consensus seems to be that 
Africa is by far the most highly targeted region, followed by South-East Asia, and to a lesser 
degree Latin America. In Africa, though, we find that particularly Sub-Saharan countries with 
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weak land tenure and great governance challenges are facing the brunt of the investment 
wave (Litovsky & Villalpando, 2012, p. 10). Disparity in wealth and land ownership is far 
from new for many Sub-Saharan African countries (Cochrane, 2011), the ramifications of the 
present rush for land could nonetheless be severe as the wave of investment is in all 
probability “much stronger and more extensive than ... generally highlighted” (Zoomers, 
2010, p. 442). 
To better understand the impact of foreign agricultural investments we need to look 
closer at the investors behind the land rush. We need to discover their real objectives and 
consider in whose future they are really investing. Thus to get some preliminary idea of who 
actually benefits from foreign direct investment in the agricultural sector of developing 
countries, the starting point has to be scrutinising the investors. In 2008, upon the exposure of 
the contemporary rush for land, the discourse surrounding the phenomenon of ‘land grabs’ 
centred around the new players that had entered the field: cash-rich state-owned and private 
investors from Arab and Asian countries (Smaller & Mann, 2009). Gradually it became 
apparent, however, that traditional European and American investors were just as entrenched. 
Moreover, a number of developing countries also showed a sudden surge in domestic 
investments (S. M. Borras & J. Franco, 2010). So it is important to emphasise that not only 
governments of resource-poor cash-rich countries are interested in securing access to land in 
resource-rich cash-poor countries. Still, this scenario is certainly not an unfamiliar practice, 
but it has been over-simplified and blown out of proportion by the media (Hall, 2011a). As a 
result the steadfast discourse of ‘neo-colonial land grabs’ by wealthy nations to safeguard 
their own food security still disproportionally casts a shadow over the reality of large-scale 
land acquisitions. 
In reality it turns out that most of the deals are private sector investments (Hall, 
2011a). The financial downturn in 2008 turned out to be a key reason for the private sector to 
join the land rush; it forced numerous corporations, funds and multinationals to seek 
alternative ways to deliver financial returns. With high food prices not projected to ease, 
investing in land suddenly seemed a profitable venture. But also the soaring demand for 
biofuels – with lucrative subsidies and mandatory inclusion in fuels in some countries – 
encouraged the private sector to seek cheap farmland for biofuel production. Rumour even 
had it that some investors were merely after large-scale land leases for the worthwhile 
subsidies, and had no intention of actually growing any crops or producing any biofuel.  
In the process of these land acquisitions we should also not ignore the role of host-
country governments in “facilitating, and in some cases encouraging, the sale of arable land 
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and displacement of peoples” (Cochrane, 2011). In fact, several resource-rich cash-poor 
countries are actively seeking foreign agricultural investment and offer land at low rates 
under favourable conditions. Hoping that a foreign capital injection will fast-track their 
economy. Both Ethiopia and Pakistan are well known for staging road shows to attract 
foreign investors. But in addition to promoting their land, it turns out that governments of 
host-countries also regularly act as facilitator or broker in negotiating large-scale land 
acquisitions with foreign investors. But as Huggins (2011) points out, there is a potential 
conflict of interest between the state’s role as land deal broker and its responsibility to 
regulate land acquisition policies. Even more interesting, Litovsky and Villalpando contend 
that the majority of land acquisitions in Sub-Saharan Africa in reality are “carried out by 
actors within those countries” (Litovsky & Villalpando, 2012, p. 12). Indeed, the domestic 
appropriation of land is for some countries equally problematic. This issue is of great 
historical importance to the case of Kenya, which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
In short, the contemporary wave of foreign agricultural investments is driven by three 
main groups of actors: private sector investors and speculators, cash-rich resource-poor 
countries, and domestic influencers in hosting-countries. This leaves us with the critically 
important question ‘what do these investments aim to achieve’ (Spieldoch & Murphy, 2009). 
But complicating the answer is the fact that most land deals appear to vary considerably in 
their end goals and often are too opaque to really get to the core of the investment rationale 
and genuine objectives (Litovsky & Villalpando, 2012, p. 10). Hence there still exists great 
uncertainty over what these investments set out to achieve and who will actually benefit from 
them, which is exactly what makes the present wave of land investments so controversial. 
Predictably this has so far produced conflicting views and “two major competing narratives 
that prevail in discussions about foreign acquisitions of agricultural land” (World Economic 
Forum, 2012, p. 75). The first narrative is that of ‘mutual beneficial investment’ or the so-
called ‘win-win scenario’ promoted by supporters of foreign agricultural investment. The 
second contradictory narrative is driven by critical commentators and draws upon a discourse 
of ‘neo-colonial land grabbing’ and depicts the land deals as a ‘zero-sum scenario’. With only 
scarce information available about most land deals it is difficult to assess and group land 
deals into either one of these competing discourses. In fact, as we will come to see in the 
Kenyan case study in the following chapters, land deals hardly ever conform entirely to one 
of these competing views. Instead, for many cases the playing field is not polarised to either 
extremity, highlighting that land deals generally bring both positive and negative impacts 
with them. 
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In view of these diverse potential impacts, many communities often find themselves 
divided upon the arrival of an investor. Some (hope to) find new opportunities, while others 
are (afraid to become) further marginalised (United Nations, 2012). The different stances and 
perceptions are to a certain extent linked to social class, ideological and religious viewpoints, 
as well as political standpoints (S. M. Borras & J. Franco, 2010). It is therefore instrumental 
and of the highest priority to shape foreign agricultural investments (both public and private) 
in such a way that the economic and agricultural sectors of developing countries can grow 
and mature in a sustainable way without imposing inappropriate economic, political and 
cultural systems upon a country and its people. But Cochrane asserts that at the International 
Conference on Global Land Grabbing in 2011, “not one positive outcome could be found for 
local communities; such as, food security, employment and environmental sustainability” 
(Cochrane, 2011). Perhaps the reason for this is that the type of farming often pursued by 
foreign investors is industrial-size plantations that reflect economies of scale, which, 
however, “have much less powerful poverty-reducing impacts than if access to land and 
water were improved for the local farming communities” (De Schutter, 2011). 
 
Alternative pathways for development 
The present-day paradox of the utilisation of agricultural land demonstrates how a finite 
resource – one that is critical to food production, water management, and energy generation – 
has become victim of widespread degradation by a misguided paradigm of unbound 
extraction and mismanagement. The renewed attention for the agricultural sector, and 
farmland in particular, is a confirmation that agricultural land is no longer the 
underappreciated sister of metropolitan and urban land. Strictly speaking, however, the wave 
of foreign agricultural investment seems to remain rooted in the same old short-term 
problem-solving paradigm. Foreign agricultural investment provides a whole range of 
investors with solutions to any number of problems: safeguarding future food security, 
improving energy security, hedging against volatile investments, ensuring high profit 
margins. But this kind of approach to investment in agricultural land is best typified as an 
instance of problem-solving theory, which as Cox explains, “takes the world as it finds it, 
with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are 
organised, as the given framework for action” (1981, p. 128). Yet by taking the prevailing 
social order and power relationships as a given framework for action, investors take “a 
dangerously and naïvely ahistorical view toward investment in African farming” (Horton, 
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2012, p. 86). Makunike (2009) beautifully captures the naive ethos that informs much of the 
global land grab in what he describes as the ‘market-based utilitarian’ or ‘reductivist’ 
approach: 
 
What’s the problem? They are not using it and are not equipped to use it, or capable 
of using it, maximally in any meaningful commercial way. So if we take the land, give 
them at least some token compensation, and then develop the land and provide them 
jobs and downstream opportunities, then surely that is a net gain for the natives that 
they should warmly welcome. So what is the problem? Why all the fuss? (Makunike, 
2009, p. 87) 
 
The problem, of course, should not necessarily be sought in these kind of economic or 
utilitarian considerations, but instead has its roots in African cultural, ancestral, religious, and 
sentimental ties to the land (Makunike, 2009). Crucially, however, these kind of traditional 
ties to land do not inescapably signify that it is irretrievably off-limit to economic and 
commercial development (Makunike, 2009). However, to gain the cooperation and support of 
the local community and avoid enmity, Makunike (2009) submits to the use of a simple and 
clear-cut formulae: show respect for those attached to the land. Doing so goes a long way 
towards securing the long-term viability of investments, especially since communities are 
hardly ever respected by foreigners, bureaucrats, or politicians – except by the latter during 
election time, as Makunike (2009) rightfully points out. 
Now the key problem underlying the reductivist approach is that “many investors 
today only view the prospects of farming in Africa in narrow, shallow, and ahistorical ways. 
Such limited perspectives ignore the complex, messy realities that must be understood for 
investors’ ventures to be successful” and to avoid conflict (Makunike, 2009, p. 89). The point 
Makunike stresses is exactly what Cox outlines as one of the basic premises of Critical 
Theory, namely, the need for “an awareness that action is never absolutely free but takes 
place within a framework for action which constitutes its problematic” (Cox, 1981, p. 135). 
This framework, as Cox continues, 
 
has the form of an historical structure, a particular combination of thought patterns, 
material conditions, and human institutions which has a certain coherence among its 
elements. These structures do not determine people’s actions in any mechanical sense 
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but constitute the context of habits, pressures, expectations and constraints within 
which action takes place (Cox, 1981, p. 135). 
 
In such a context, Makunike’s observations vis-à-vis the problematic of foreign agricultural 
investment in Africa shows that the framework for action is not so much constrained by 
material capabilities (i.e. capital and technology are often brought in by the investor) or by 
perpetuating influence of institutions (i.e. institutional influence is mostly absent or corrupt). 
Rather, the problematic in the framework for action is the ‘narrow, shallow, and ahistorical’ 
thought patterns of the investor and their disregard for the complex, messy realities of the 
environment in which they plan to operate. Cox defines these thought patterns as “collective 
images of social order held by different groups of people” and points out that these differing 
views can constitute several (rival) collective images, with the potential to clash  (Cox, 1981, 
p. 136). Such clashes, however, provide “evidence for the potential of alternative paths of 
development” (Cox, 1981, p. 136). Evidently, the clash of collective images brought about by 
foreign agricultural investment has its manifestation in two differing views upon agriculture 
and land use: “one is traditional and pre-colonial, while the other is newer and Western-
oriented” (Horton, 2012, p. 88). But Makunike contends that a mutually beneficial path of 
development is certainly possible as long as the investor is “willing to do his homework 
diligently” and embraces lateral partnerships with out-of-the-box thinking. 
As a matter of fact, following this kind of advice could probably improve the current 
investment climate, enhance relationships, and prevent conflict by equipping investors with a 
historical and cultural sensitive framework for action. However, from a critical perspective, 
this approach as such does not fundamentally question the underlying social order and 
political-economic power relationships that gave rise to the arguably inevitable ‘global land 
grab’. For this reason Borras and Franco (2010) set out to take the additional step of 
describing the reality of the global rush for land from a critical point of view. They identify 
two theoretical points of departure. First there is the current economic climate and political-
institutional context, which aims to find a pragmatic solution to make large-scale land 
acquisitions ‘win-win scenarios’ by proposing voluntary ‘codes of conduct’ or ‘principles of 
responsible investment’. But, as they point out, this type of “response to the global land grab 
veers away from questioning the fundamental roots of land-grabbing, i.e., the existing 
industrial pattern of food and energy production and consumption controlled by TNCs, while 
engaged in the problematic notion of win-win scenarios” (Borras Jr. & Franco, 2010, p. 521). 
By questioning the roots of land grabbing, Borras and Franco indeed take a step back and 
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critically approach the underlying social order and political power relationships. In doing so, 
they offer us an indisputable shift from the simple, direct response of problem-solving theory 
to the appraisal of the very framework of action as directed by critical theory (Cox, 1981, p. 
129). This means that assuming that the phenomenon of foreign agricultural investment (i.e. 
land grabs) has been an inevitable development “a priori dismisses the possibility of other 
development pathway options and ignores the clamor of those who believe that other 
pathways are possible – and better – and are either working toward or attempting to actualize 
them” (Borras Jr. & Franco, 2010, p. 515). Thus, the ‘code of conduct’ for large-scale land 
acquisitions that the international community has formulated seems to be merely a tactical 
guide to address some of the concerns and problems surrounding the contemporary land rush, 
yet it sustains the existing order (Cox, 1981, p. 130). Secondly then, it is conceivable to 
pursue an alternative vision and therein “[allow] for a normative choice in favour of a social 
and political order different from the prevailing order, but [limited by a] range of choice to 
alternative orders which are feasible transformations of the existing world” (Cox, 1981, p. 
130). Indeed, Borras and Franco contend that there is more than one controlled path of 
development and accordingly they reject the ‘inevitability thesis’ which is part and parcel of 
the large-scale land acquisition paradigm by arguing that its proposed ‘code of conduct’ is 
merely a ‘dangerous diversion’ to “[divert] attention away from the real issues at hand with 
respect to land” (S. M. Borras & J. Franco, 2010, p. 12). They propose that meaningful 
change is possible; there is choice, agency, and capacity to struggle for a feasible alternative. 
Hence, at least one realistic alternative path of development is encapsulated in the vision of 
‘food sovereignty’, which attempts to actualise an alternative food order as discussed in 
chapter 3 (Borras Jr. & Franco, 2010, p. 515, note 25). But even more so, Borras and Franco 
also coin the concept of ‘land sovereignty’ to highlight that “without people’s full control 
over land, the construction of food sovereignty as an alternative food system and 
development model will be without any solid foundation” (S. M. Borras & J. Franco, 2010, p. 
36). Wisely, however, they remain realistic in pointing out that “rejecting a bad idea is one 
thing; asserting that ‘another world is possible’ is another; and making alternatives happen 
under real world conditions, constraints and circumstances is still quite another” (S. M. 
Borras & J. Franco, 2010, p. 12). 
 Hall (2011b) concurs with Borras and Franco’s differentiation between two 
alternative paradigms, noting that it is a useful way to “[define] the terms of the debate” over 
land grabs (Hall, 2011b, p. 2). It essentially highlights that the debate should not remain 
entrenched in questions over “the processes through which land uses are transformed and 
139 
 
land rights transferred” but ought to go deeper by fundamentally addressing “the direction of 
agrarian change” (Hall, 2011b, p. 2). We have seen so far that presently the direction of 
agrarian change is predominantly geared towards the problem-solving approach, of which 
foreign agricultural investment is by and large a prime example. Hence an alternative 
pathway for agrarian change could therefore be based on food sovereignty and land 
sovereignty (S. M. Borras & J. Franco, 2010; Hall, 2011b), in which the importance of rural 
development, poverty reduction and environmental management could be guided by the 
concept of ‘sustainable rural livelihoods’ (Scoones, 1998). Scoones describes the concept of 
‘sustainable livelihoods’ as follows: 
 
A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (including both material and social 
resources) and activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable 
when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks, maintain or enhance its 
capabilities and assets, while not undermining the natural resource base. (Scoones, 
1998, p. 5) 
 
He admits, though, that the ‘rural’ typification is somewhat artificial since most livelihoods 
are intertwined reflections of urban and rural environments (Scoones, 1998). More 
importantly, however, that the framework provided by Scoones demonstrates how this 
concept can provide a useful way forward in terms of policy planning, institutional processes, 
and organisational structures that can create sustainable livelihood outcomes. The concept is 
a “composite of many ideas and interests”, it is a balancing act in which the terms are always 
subject to negotiation (Scoones, 1998). 
While such a framework is an useful starting point, Scoones stresses that “defining 
what a sustainable livelihood is in a particular context is always open to debate” (Scoones, 
1998, p. 14).  Perhaps, though, the most important message Scoones draws out is that this 
framework should be “combined with the integrative analysis derived from participatory field 
level analysis” (Scoones, 1998, p. 15). Only together with an in depth fieldwork analysis that 
highlights key issues, questions and contradictions, we may be able to identify common goals 
and suggest areas for action (Scoones, 1998). 
To conclude, there is no question that Litovsky and Villalpando are correct when they 
observe that “how land is used, by whom, and with what benefits is therefore likely to be a 
substantial factor in much of the profits, geopolitics and, possibly, the revolutions of the 21st 
century.” (Litovsky & Villalpando, 2012, p. 16). Thus, how we approach the subject of land 
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is one of the most fundamental matters with regard to food and security, which warrants a 
closer look at the ‘global land grab’ phenomenon from a security perspective by considering 
the implications for national and human security. 
 
Land as a matter of security 
The phenomenon of foreign agricultural investments appears to be a prime example of one of 
the many new security challenges the world has to face in the twenty-first century. Whether 
land deals are part of a food security strategy, meant to safeguard long-term energy security 
or simply serve as profitable investments, the common denominator is the potential threat to 
international security. That being said, it is important that we interpret ‘international security’ 
as both involving traditional security concerns (i.e. national security threats) and issues of a 
non-traditional nature (i.e. environmental and human security). More specifically, land deals 
can be severely destructive to the environment, but also hold a dangerous potential to 
destabilise security within and between states, thereby directly threatening the ‘freedom from 
fear’ and ‘freedom from want’. While the inherent nature of the contemporary wave of land 
deals by and large appears to emanate from non-traditional security challenges, on the impact 
side of this phenomenon there can be serious military/strategic and human security 
implications. 
In chapter 3 it was noted that national security traditionally has long been 
conceptualised as merely comprising military and strategic threats, thus concerning mostly 
matters of defence, state interest and territory (Paris, 2001). Only on the fringes of this 
traditional conception of ‘national security’ there has been the hesitant notion in the 1970s 
that food may perhaps also poses some potential as a national security resource for exerting 
leverage over food insecure countries, as discussed in chapter 2 (Christensen, 1977; 
Paarlberg, 1978b). But, in a very similar vein the contemporary rush for land could carry an 
inherent capacity to directly threaten the territorial integrity of states, and in the worst case – 
once food and agricultural land become extremely scarce – perhaps even activate military 
defence mechanisms. 
One of the most tangible threats from the most recent wave of land deals stems from 
its extraterritorial nature. Notwithstanding the many land deals that never survive the initial 
negotiation and start-up phase, the ones that do see the light of day have raised major 
concerns over the status of the leased land. What happens when political situations alter, 
when the availability of resources suddenly change, or when local people rise up to reclaim 
141 
 
‘their land’? More specifically, what is the predicament when a new food crisis shocks the 
world; will hosting countries and their populations declare land deals void in order to support 
their own (food) interests? Will they simply recapture agricultural plots, appropriate the food 
reserves and stock of the investor, and close the border to prevent any food leaving the 
country? And, in such a hypothetical case, how might investors react? Perhaps the most food 
insecure states may consider resorting to military measures to ‘defend’ their contractual right 
to the use of foreign farmland. As for private investors, those well-resourced could equally 
request (military) support from their constituent governments, or possibly resort to privatised 
‘security solutions’. Perhaps a parallel can be drawn here to the 1950s Anglo-Iranian oil crisis 
in which Iran nationalised the nation’s oil reserves, ultimately leading to a U.S.-sponsored 
coup d’état overthrowing the Mossadegh government (see generally: Bamberg, 2000; Heiss, 
1997). 
Notwithstanding the seriousness of these possible threats, their likelihood to 
materialise into military confrontation or territorial intervention seems at present still 
relatively small. However, as Homer-Dixon (1991, 1994) and more recently Cribb (2010) and 
Brown (2011b, 2012) rightfully pointed out, the finite nature of many natural resources 
combined with a soaring increase in demand will sooner or later inevitably lead to tension 
and conflict. For now, however, without discarding the grave nature of these security 
challenges, we will focus on a more eminent threat emanating from the day-to-day 
consequences of foreign agricultural investment in the form of large-scale land acquisitions. 
Namely, what are the human security implications of land deals? To what degree is the 
security of ordinary people at risk when foreign investors are snatching up vast amounts of 
agricultural land? Questions of this kind spring from the realm of non-traditional security 
threats, and are generally considered to be human security challenges. As we have seen, the 
concept of human security emphasises the welfare of individuals by focussing on threats to 
the security of ordinary people, and is arguably believed to have the capacity to take pre-
eminence over military security and the right of sovereignty. It is this ‘humane’ area of 
security where emancipatory realism, and Booth’s (2007) eclectic Theory of World Security, 
attains great relevance. 
Much of the international debate surrounding ‘land grabs’ has tried to expose its 
human implications by emphasising the wide-range of risk and threats faced by local 
populations and communities of targeted developing countries. As way of response, the 
international community – driven by the United Nations, World Bank and a number of states 
– has focused predominantly in the last few years on conducting high-level problem-solving 
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dialogues aimed at culminating in practical and policy relevant solutions to mitigate most of 
the human security consequences. But with the conclusion in 2012 of the ‘Voluntary 
Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the 
context of National Food Security’ (FAO, 2012) many non-governmental organisations, 
advocacy groups and civil society organisations still assert that these policy solutions will not 
fundamentally change the security situation of affected populations – nor address the 
underlying problems that drive the land rush. Hence, the problematic nature of large-scale 
land acquisitions lies in the very ambiguous nature of their human security implications. 
In this respect there are essentially two broad types of security challenges we should 
distinguish: natural resource constraints and reactive strategies. The first category contains 
the growing number of non-traditional security concerns over food, water, energy and the 
environment. Natural resource constraints emanate and accelerate through factors such as 
population growth, urbanisation, shifting diets, climate change and unsustainable lifestyles. In 
the second category we find the responses and solutions to the global challenges we face in 
our resource-constrained world. These policies and reactive strategies, created to address and 
deal with the consequences of living in a resource-constrained world, unfortunately seem to 
bring about a whole range of different (human) security challenges. Mitigating or eliminating 
human security concerns from these ‘reactive strategies’ requires responses to be based on 
holistic, sustainable and ‘humane’ ways of thinking. It requires a modern, critical approach to 
security. 
For land deals this entails to the use of an inclusive security approach that facilitates 
the transformation of ‘land grabs’ into sustainable development and livelihood outcomes. A 
great number of land deals are already proclaimed to be mutual beneficial deals. But many of 
these claims turn out to be hardly mutually beneficial, or at least not genuinely address 
aspects of ensuring an appropriate degree of human security for the locally affected people. 
Concerns have been eased little with the release of the Voluntary Guidelines, for which the 
major issue still seems to be the great ambiguity over the extent and precise ways in which 
land grabs impact on the human security of local communities. Unfortunately there remains 
to be an absence of widely available information detailing the precise ramifications of land 
deals. In fact, many of the early reports from 2008-2010 filed unsubstantiated claims of 
human rights violations, or merely outlined the potential impacts of land deals.  
Even more problematic are the widely differing and sometimes confusing definitions 
of ‘human security’. It is herein that we uncover two areas that need further attention. First, 
we need to define ‘human security’ in relation to the non-traditional challenge posed by land 
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deals. More specifically, can we accurately classify large-scale land acquisitions as security 
threats, or are we instead dealing with a ‘securitisation’ of the phenomenon? Furthermore, do 
our deliberations on the potential impacts of land grabs reflect the actual and culturally 
perceived consequences? What follows from this is the imperative need to empirically 
investigate what actually amounts to real (or culturally perceived) implications of land deals. 
We cannot generalise about causal effects without first understanding in-depth how people 
are affected by these land acquisitions. First, however, we need to further explore how the 
security concerns surrounding land deals reflect human vulnerability and global security in 
the long-term. Looking at the bigger picture of the world’s security environment it poses the 
question if we perhaps underestimate the security concerns of land deals. 
 
Underestimated security concerns? 
As it turns out, the global land rush is inextricably linked to human vulnerability. It brings up 
many questions: what defines “ownership”, how to divide vital natural resources, who has the 
right to tenure and farm land, and what are the rights of small-holder farmers as opposed to 
that of the large agricultural corporations? In a world of increasing resource scarcity it 
moreover raises many questions about morality and the use of power. For one, the 
dependence on foreign powers for food commodities – particularly in this case through land 
leases – is what Christensen describes as a ‘classic concern’ that is applicable to “any 
essential or strategic resource” (Christensen, 1977, p. 290). 
Parties interested in strategic natural resources are today no longer reigning solely 
from the traditional realm of nation-states – just as the rapidly mounting interest in natural 
resources creates profound new risks for nations, communities, and investors alike. In fact, 
more than ever before, actors residing on all possible levels of analysis – ranging from 
individual, household, and community to national, regional, and international – attach much 
greater importance to the value of land, and therein demonstrate an emerging awareness of 
the potential risks and challenges at the heart of obtaining or retaining land. Indeed, strategic 
natural resources such as land, food, and water truly accentuate the notion that a new security 
agenda for the twenty-first century is quickly emerging. 
In considering this new security agenda, Litovsky and Villalpando (2012) caution that 
land use and land acquisitions are expected to have a progressively greater impact on the 
international security environment. Their caveat stands not alone; Brown forcefully adds that 
the contemporary phenomenon of land grabs “represents a new stage in the emerging 
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geopolitics of food scarcity” (L. R. Brown, 2012, p. 83). Similarly, the emerging challenge of 
large-scale land acquisitions to the future of our environment is considered to be likely much 
greater “than conventional wisdom suggests” (World Wide Fund For Nature, 2010, p. 81). 
This type of discourse surrounding foreign agricultural investments is portraying the 
phenomenon increasingly as a security concern. The surge in foreign agricultural investments 
has indeed brought about a whole range of new implications for national, human and 
environmental security. However, the relatively novel character of land acquisitions has 
hitherto left its security implications largely underestimated, downplayed, or simply ignored. 
So in pursuance of drawing attention to the new geopolitics of land, there is a need to 
carefully consider the security concerns emanating from the present ‘global land grab’. We 
already discussed in chapter 2 how the matters of resource scarcity and food relate to conflict. 
Hence, now it makes sense to subsequently highlight a number of national and human 
security implications stemming from the contemporary wave of land acquisitions. 
The unforeseen – or perhaps underestimated – consequences of land deals can be 
devastating. Not only can they cause immediate human insecurity but also potentially 
destabilise long term geopolitical balances and national security. With the growing number of 
land acquisitions in Africa, the Asia-Pacific and South-America the ‘global land grab’ 
phenomenon is undeniably shaping up to become a serious security challenge. What’s more, 
in the context of natural resource scarcity and conflict, food and land are intrinsically linked. 
Brown therefore fittingly declares that ”Food is the new oil. Land is the new gold.” (L. R. 
Brown, 2012, p. 10). Now that the security implications for food – such as food power and 
human food security – have been outlined in chapter 2, it is sensible to focus here on the 
national and human security implications of land acquisitions. 
Within the contemporary discourse on foreign agricultural investments most 
commentators and critics promptly identify and highlight the human security implications of 
land acquisitions. This is hardly surprising because the immediate (human) security threats 
posed by ‘land grabs’ – such as displacement, suffering the loss of livelihoods, imposition of 
cultural/economic/religious systems, etc.. – are often strikingly tangible and plainly visible 
(see generally: Pearce, 2012; Spieldoch & Murphy, 2012). At the same time the hostility of 
local people towards investors has equally not gone unnoticed, with a sense of enmity being 
the rule rather than exception (L. R. Brown, 2011c, p. 67). 
But there is a direct link between the immediate human security concerns and the 
implications for national security and geopolitics. For one, the sheer magnitude of large-scale 
land acquisitions “prompts all too vividly visions of a dystopian future in which millions of 
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the hungry are excluded from the land of their forefathers by barbed wire fences and security 
guards as food is exported to feed the rich world” (Bunting, 2011).But as we have seen 
earlier, land accounts to many people in the developing world for more than just an economic 
asset. Restricting access to economic resources can certainly endanger livelihoods and often 
will produce human insecurity and community-investor conflict. However, taking away the 
very land that defines a community’s identity through its traditional, cultural and religious 
links to the land heavily compounds the already perilous nature of land acquisitions in the 
developing world. This explains why the traditional custodians of ‘idle’ or ‘waste’ land – 
often indigenous peoples – frequently refrain from giving up their land without a fight, and 
regularly end up in entrenched conflicts that occasionally cross the violence-threshold and 
can drag on for years. Indeed, Sarris concurs that there is a clear danger in the imposition of 
foreign values, and that impressing an external system of production “that goes against a 
country’s own perceived preferences is bound to create conflict” (Sarris, 1989, p. 33). The 
related security consequences are as obvious as copious: threats, riots, sabotage, violence, 
coups, power struggles, regional spill-over, and political conflict. 
In recent years the United States military has begun to classify climate change as a 
‘threat amplifier’ of national security (Litovsky & Villalpando, 2012). Looking at the 
challenges posed by food and land it increasingly appears they must be heading in a similar 
direction. It seems that states actively involved in the ‘global land grab’ are dissatisfied with 
their degree – or perhaps future prospect – of food security. Wolfers already outlined the 
underlying equation in simple terms: nations with acquisitive goals are “dissatisfied with the 
degree of security which they enjoy under the status quo and are out to enhance it” (Wolfers, 
1952, p. 484, note 3). But as we have seen the acquisition of foreign land for off-shore 
farming is not only a national security strategy to safeguard and enhance domestic food 
security, it also functions as a financial mechanism aimed at lucrative returns.  
What’s more, a closer look at the sudden global rush for land shows characteristics of 
the dichotomy between short-term problem-solving and long-term critical alternatives. To put 
this in a security context, we may follow Baldwin’s remark that “the most rational policies 
for security in the long run may differ greatly from those for security in the short run” 
(Baldwin, 1997, p. 17). The variety in foreign investors and investment objectives 
necessitates that we consider the dichotomy of the two most relevant ‘security policies’.  
First, the wave of large-scale land acquisitions was initially believed to be driven and 
attributable to cash-rich resource-poor foreign state-actors that were after fertile farmlands on 
foreign soils to safeguard their own medium- to long-term food security. Ensuring that people 
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have access to adequate and nutritious food can be marked as a prime responsibility of the 
state. Indeed, theoretically at least, this approach subsumes consideration of social stability 
and traditional security, and highlights the primary responsibility of the state to ensure and 
maintain a healthy, productive and contended population. Hence, this type of ‘rational 
security policy’ aims to guarantee medium- to long-term domestic (food) security, which in 
many cases is notwithstanding the immediate and short-term security consequences of these 
land acquisitions in the host countries. More nuanced, unequal or unfair land acquisitions one 
way or another agitate or upset local communities, and left unresolved, they often cause not 
merely short-term conflict but compound medium- to long-term security consequences in the 
host state. In other words, investment in foreign farmland is assumed by foreign powers as a 
safeguard for their long-term food security, but when these deals take the form of land grabs 
a common consequence is the occurrence of small-scale conflicts that easily escalate and 
before long can suddenly spell the end of the land deal. Similarly, Cochrane duly wonders 
what the security implications are of giving the food supplies of one region to another, “even 
in the case where the local population faces chronic food insecurity?” (Cochrane, 2011). At 
the least it will be no surprise that in the event of a serious food crisis host states may indeed 
invoke a national security exception to render land leases null and void any rights to export 
food (Smaller & Mann, 2009). 
The second type of ‘security policy’ comes with private sector investments in 
farmland with the objective of significant short- to medium term returns, which is entirely 
different in nature and much more common than land grabs for state food security. The 
problem here is that investors frequently hardly display any interest in engaging with local 
communities, hoping their investments will return profits before any conflict escalates into 
violence. Many examples of this type of investment strategy can be found in Pearce’s recent 
compelling chronicle of land grabs across the world (Pearce, 2012). Indeed, Pearce’s 
inquisitive unravelling of many instances of foreign agricultural investment demonstrates that 
corporate short-term revenue interests can have disastrous long-term consequences for the 
security of local peoples and the environment. Conflict over natural resources, such as land, 
food, and water, has historically long been the rule rather than it is now the exception. Yet, 
heading into an uncertain future in a resource-constrained environment we should reminds 
ourselves that “warfare—a prominent human activity—is one of the means by which access 
to [natural] resources is achieved” (Westing, 1986a, p. 3). 
 In both cases serious danger looms in the improper treatment, involvement or 
engagement of local peoples that live on, or are connected to, land leased to a (foreign) 
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investor. This is particularly relevant in situations where populations live in already volatile 
and environmentally or demographically stressed regions. As Litovsky and Villalpando 
observe, under these circumstances “land investments may amplify the risk of conflict, 
especially in those cases where communities are relocated to already heavy populated or 
resource-stressed regions” (Litovsky & Villalpando, 2012, p. 29). 
Ultimately we will have to face the veracity of our present predicament; it is an 
untenable position to buy “the relative security of the inhabitants of the North ... at the price 
of chronic insecurity for the vast majority of the world population” (Wyn Jones, 1999). 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
Foreign agricultural investment in Kenya 
 
Our greatest asset in Kenya is our land.  
This is the heritage we received from our forefathers. 
In land lies our survival and salvation. 
(Jomo Kenyatta, 1968) 
 
 Foreign agricultural investment in Africa 
 A brief history of land and food in Kenya 
 The Yala Swamp: conservation, conversion, or community-resource? 
 A history of opportunistic development 
 An agent of change: Dominion Farms 
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In the previous chapter we have seen a duality in land as a critical paradigm. Land is not only 
critical in safeguarding future food security, at the same time the contemporary phenomenon 
of land grabs necessitates a critical approach to land tenure, land rights and sustainable 
agricultural practices. To empirically flesh out the implications of large-scale land 
acquisitions in the name of food security, Kenya is introduced in this chapter for the purpose 
of a case study on the impact of foreign agricultural investment. The country’s history of a 
dynamic and voracious appetite by colonial, domestic and international powers for land is 
highlighted, as well as contemporary challenges such as unprecedented population growth 
and the probable impact of a changing climate. We will see that land amounts to a crucial 
factor in securing the livelihoods of the rural poor in Kenya, but above all, that in light of 
these challenges the significance and value of land will only increase over the coming 
decades (Derman, Odgaard, & Sjaastad, 2007). 
Nowadays, the private sector recognises land as a powerful investment opportunity, 
and African governments welcome with opens arms foreign direct investment in agriculture – 
betting on the new technology, capital and knowledge it brings to reinvigorate their 
struggling agricultural sectors. But improvident behaviour is unfortunately too often 
synonymous with the contemporary interest in affordable African farmland. This chapter 
therefore tries to break down the intricacies of a case of well-intended foreign agricultural 
investment in a qualitative and contextualised study of the reclamation and conversion of the 
Yala Swamp in Kenya into a food production scheme that sets out to boost Kenyan food 
security and contribute to taking a million rural poor across Africa out of poverty. 
 
Foreign agricultural investment in Africa 
The rekindled interest in agricultural land for both food and biofuel production that emerged 
in the wake of the 2008 Global Food Price Crisis had far ranging consequences for land in 
Africa. While parts of Asia and South-America were certainly not spared by investors, it was 
the years of agricultural neglect, weak land rights protection, and absence of investment that 
drove two-thirds of demand for land to the African continent (Deininger, 2011). With the 
global land grab disproportionately concentrated in Africa, there was suddenly great interest 
in qualitative impact studies on consequences of this significant stream of foreign agricultural 
investment into African land leases. There was in particular a general lack of empirical data 
about the magnitude and impact of the ‘land grab’ phenomenon, which naturally gave rise to 
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“widespread speculation” and “preconceived notions rather than information on what is 
happening on the ground” (Deininger, 2011). 
The first qualitative studies are now being published. Ansoms (Forthcoming 2012), 
for instance, observed that it is rare to come across a thorough analysis of the costs and 
benefits of large-scale land acquisitions, making it indeed difficult to appreciate the 
magnitude and impact of the ‘global land grab’. For this reason, she paves the way by taking 
up the challenge to come to a much more detailed analysis of agricultural investment. Her 
study presents a thorough assessment of two Rwandan land deals based upon a detailed and 
contextually-sensitive analysis that reflects productivity, job creation, and income distribution 
as well as “opportunities and threats to the socioeconomic circumstances and livelihoods, the 
agency, and the cultural identities of different local interest groups” (Ansoms, Forthcoming 
2012, pp. 4-5). Crucial to this type of deep analysis is the dimension of time (short, medium, 
and long-term) and dimension of space (local, regional, national, supranational) (Ansoms, 
Forthcoming 2012, p. 5). 
This type of qualitative study is increasingly recognised as crucial in understanding 
the nature of land deals, as well as the actual impacts land grabs can have. At the start of the 
present study in 2009, the majority of new investments in potential African farmland was 
hardly in its first stage of development. In fact, around the time most of the land deals had 
only been closed on paper with little information disclosed about the nature of the deal. 
Worse, contracts and related documents were generally of a strictly confidential nature. 
Accordingly, the first reports that emerged introduced the international community to a new 
era of land grabbing by utilising quantitative data to highlight the staggering number of new 
land deals – although some studies also speculated on the potential impact of these land deals 
(Cotula et al., 2009; GRAIN, 2008; Kugelman & Levenstein, 2009). For all that, actual 
empirical and qualitative data on the impact of ‘land grabs’ was hardly available at the time – 
and even now remains in short supply. 
In such a context, the African continent that was bestowed with the majority of land deals 
offered many opportunities for interesting qualitative case studies. Unfortunately, due to the 
emergent nature of most land deals – with relative little to no empirical information available 
– the greater part of land leases appeared to be unsuitable for in-depth qualitative study. To 
identify the most promising land lease in the context of the present study, several potentially 
suitable land deals were shortlisted and assessed on basis of the following characteristics: 
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- Foreign agricultural investment aimed at producing food (security); 
- Active and ongoing on-the-ground development and/or food production; 
- Presence of controversy and/or conflict surrounding the land deal; 
- Accessibility to investor, community and government; 
- Availability of contracts and relevant documents; 
- Scale of the land deal; 
- Country context and land history. 
 
Upon close scrutiny of the shortlisted projects, it turned out that the land deal most suitable 
for a qualitative study on the effect of foreign agricultural investment in relation to food 
security and conflict was a land deal closed by an American investor in the Yala Swamp in 
Kenya. This particular project required large-scale reclamation of a swamp in order to 
convert it into agricultural land, which made it the largest reclamation project in Kenya 
(Riedmiller, 1994). Importantly, this instance of foreign agricultural investment had the 
explicit objective to produce food to improve Kenya’s food security. Development and 
operations had already commenced in 2004, which meant that by 2011 there would be 
significant on-the-ground progress – and the company claimed to have its rice available to the 
public at numerous commercial outlets.  
Initial scoping also turned up that the activities and reclamation by this foreign 
investor in the Yala Swamp was surrounded by controversy, heightened tension, and bursts of 
conflict with the local community. Even so, all parties involved and affected by the project 
promptly responded positively to initial research enquiries and were keen to support the 
present study by enabling access to relevant sites, organisations and people. 
Preliminary research yielded numerous media, activist, environmental and scientific 
reports and papers pertaining to the unique environmental status of the wetland, while others 
outlined how matters such as reclamation and food production could impact on the livelihood 
of local communities. Even more so, some of these reports – mostly newspaper articles 
addressing community impacts – seemed to show a certain amount of speculation and were 
suspect to a degree of bias. Soon it became clear that no comprehensive socio-economic 
impact study had been undertaken for this foreign agricultural investment project, similarly 
the impact on the regional and national level of food security also had not been studied. This 
is in particular noteworthy now that this land deal amounts to the lease of 17,050 hectares, 
which, when converted to rice paddies, could certainly make a significant impact on the 
country’s food security. Notably, the project already delivers measurable results in its mission 
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to boosts Kenya’s food security. Yet, the land deal remained entrenched in controversy with 
its various stakeholders pursuing widely different agendas. For the purpose of this study the 
land deal in Kenya’s Yala Swamp presented itself as a highly interesting and suitable case 
study to explore the role of foreign agricultural investment in relation to national- and 
individual food security, to address the question of ‘food as a matter of security’, and explore 
the different cultural visions on food and security.  
 
A brief history of land and food in Kenya 
As the market for cheap farmland suddenly gained traction in the wake of the 2008 Global 
Food Price Crisis, it was remarkable that foreign investors pursuing vast plots of land in 
Africa did not flock en masse to Kenya. Perhaps Kenya’s rich history of struggles over land 
and its relatively developed agricultural sector – at least for African standards –prompted 
potential investors to try their luck first in other African countries where land was cheaper 
and weak governance surely made acquisition considerably less complicated. 
Notwithstanding the comparatively low interest in Kenyan land, a comparatively small 
number of investors nonetheless expressed interest in acquiring land in the East African 
country. Especially its coastal Tana River Delta attracted attention. These deals, however, 
were predominantly aimed at biofuel production, and hardly any had passed from negotiation 
phase into actual commencement of on-the-ground operations by 2011. Without doubt the 
most mysterious of them all was a rumour that surfaced in December 2008 about the 
President of Kenya, Mwai Kibabki, secretly closing a land deal with Qatar’s emir, Sheikh 
Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, for the lease of 40,000 hectares of land in the Tana River Delta 
to grow food to help feed Qatar’s 800,000 strong populace (Rice, 2008). But since the deal 
first made headlines in 2008 it slowly faded away from the spotlight as no more details were 
made available. By early 2011 the story seemed all but an unconfirmed rumour, appearing to 
be yet another unrealised land deal. Perchance it may even have only ever existed as a 
rumour, like numerous other land deals that ever remain unimplemented (Deininger, 2011). 
In strong contradiction to the moderate foreign interest in Kenya’s land during the 
contemporary ‘global land grab’, it should be noted that if there is one country in Africa 
where land grabbing has long been common practice, it must be Kenya. After all, as Klopp 
suggests, “Kenya was founded by successive acts of land grabbing, and hence, land grabbing 
is as old as Kenya itself, if not older” (Klopp, 2000, p. 15). Indeed, Kenya has without doubt 
a rich and dynamic history of struggles over land, which makes it of the essence to 
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understand the role of land as it “clarifies its persisting symbolic importance as a locus of 
resistance to the form of rule in Kenya” (Klopp, 2000, p. 15). Moreover, with a track record 
of decades of socio-political scuffles over land – and in the wake of severe ethnic and 
political violence in early 2008 – it is not surprising that foreign investors rather sought deals 
in less volatile countries with weaker land-governance; thus targeting amongst other 
countries like Ethiopia, Sudan, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Mozambique. 
As for Kenya, the unfair use, unequal allocation, and deep-rooted culture of land 
grabbing has too often driven public opinion, mobilised demonstrations, and escalated into 
violence and rebellion. Most strikingly, perhaps, is the fact that the founding of the Republic 
of Kenya was ushered in by the famous rebellion of the Mau Mau over massive seizures of 
Kikuyu land (Klopp, 2000). After independence in 1963, its first President Jomo Kenyatta 
declared that Kenya’s greatest asset is its land, in which lies its salvation and survival. But 
land has always been a highly contentious issue in Kenya, characterised by the unprecedented 
shifts in land allocation during times of colonialism. Similarly, if not worse, the trend of land 
grabbing has continued into the post-colonial era, and presently it still fuels many a dispute 
and conflict. 
Before the days of imperialism, Kenya already had a rich and long history of 
migration patterns. Palaeontologists now generally agree that humankind’s origin can be 
traced back to East Africa (Leakey, 1994), but our historic ancestors from this region have 
been submerged by centuries of mostly intra-African migration (Azevedo, 1993). This means 
that Kenya’s diverse ethnic groups have been no strangers to taking over land and settling 
upon new pastures. For long, however, natural barriers prevented direct conflict between 
communities over land and resources, and low population density ensure plenty of land and 
space for all groups to peacefully coexist. But this wealth of untouched ‘virgin’ land would 
soon be discovered by the imperial powers. 
During the colonial era in Kenya the British administration indeed recognised the 
wealth of fertile land and swiftly began to ‘alienate’ land for Europeans at nominal prices (C. 
Leys, 1975). Denying the traditional owners of the land their established African land rights 
was  perceived at the time as a sensible undertaking (Rutten, 1998), since “the country was 
half empty of people” with “more land than the Africans of Kenya could use” (N. Leys, 1924, 
p. 177). Hence, Europeans settlers did not foresee any problems with the alienation of ‘terra 
nullius’ (vacant land) now that “there really was room for colonisation” (N. Leys, 1924, p. 
177; Wakhungu, Huggins, & Nyukuri, 2008). By 1934 the 30,000 settlers (0.25% of the 
population) controlled a third of the arable land (World Resources Institute and Landesa, 
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2011) but as a result many Kikuyu farmers as well as Maasai and Kalenjin herders had been 
expelled from their land – mostly from the best farm lands available in the lush, rolling 
highlands of the Rift Valley (Azevedo, 1993; Klopp, 2000). With it the first instance of 
foreign land grabbing in Kenya became a fact. 
Upon independence many expected President Kenyatta to expel the European farming 
community and cause the usual African post-independence chaos (Azevedo, 1993). But far 
from bringing the country to the brink of economic collapse, Kenyatta swiftly took strong 
action to build a stable and prosperous country. In a grand effort to build the nation, his 1964 
‘back to the land’ speech resolutely called upon his fellow Kenyans not to “cry for more 
land” but first develop efficiently and effectively their existing plots (Kenyatta, 1968, pp. 
232-234). While Kenyatta was outspoken about land consolidation, land rights and the 
registration of titles, he promptly reassured the white settlers – who occupied at least half of 
the best farming land – that “any future land reform would be governed by the principle of 
‘willing buyer, willing seller’” (Azevedo, 1993, p. 54). Hence the constitution of the newly 
found republic gave citizens the right to purchase land anywhere in Kenya, a policy that 
would long serve the country well – at least those with some capital, but not so much for the 
poor and landless (Wakhungu et al., 2008). However, as Rutten (1997) points out, in reality 
Kenyatta failed to implement any real corrections in the post-colonial period to return the 
country’s alienated good pastures to its original occupants. 
That said, by 1977 most of the ‘white highlands’ had swiftly been purchased back by 
wealthy Kenyans; mostly through dubious deals with elites or favourable political 
connections. Corruption and bribery became go-to schemes for the well-connected in order to 
acquire large-scale landholdings. Worse even, during the 1990s under Kenyatta’s 
predecessor, President Daniel arap Moi, the country became spellbound by a domestic ‘land-
grabbing mania’ in which irregular and illegal allocation of public land became a widespread 
practice in which the powerful ruling elite put all systems at work to get rich, rather than 
govern (Southall, 2005; The Economist, 2004). Conservative estimates belief that between 
1962 and 2002 at least 200,000 illegal titles had been created (Duvail, Médard, Hamerlynck, 
& Nyingi, 2012; Manji, 2012; Republic of Kenya, 2004b). As a result Kenya has become one 
of the most unequal societies in Africa (Swedish Interantional Development Cooperation 
Agency, 2004). 
But with a new government installed under President Mwai Kibabki in December 
2002, it did not take long for a commission to be appointed in June 2003 to investigate the 
illegal allocation of public lands by the outgoing administration (Manji, 2012). President 
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Kibaki had already noted in his opening speech to parliament in February 2003 that under his 
predecessor “land [had become] the most critical tool of political patronage” (Kibaki, 2003). 
Hence the new government therefore adamantly announced that it was “to energetically deal 
with past mismanagement of our land resources” (Kibaki, 2003). The resulting ‘Commission 
of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land’, chaired by lawyer Paul 
Ndung’u, presented its final report in 2004 to President Kibaki, which “revealed shocking 
trends of illegal and irregular public land allocations, implicating prominent individuals, 
companies, foreign delegations, religious groups, and public entities that had benefited from 
large-scale land graft” (O’Brien, 2011, p. vii).  
Often referred to as the ‘Ndung’u Report’, the Commission’s findings were praised by 
many for its thorough nature and impressive scope, but naturally also received criticism from 
Kenyans afraid to lose land (AfriCOG, 2009). The key recommendation offered in the report 
was that all titles illegally obtained had to be revoked and the applicable land to be 
repossessed (Republic of Kenya, 2004b). Unfortunately the Africa Centre for Open 
Governance (AfriCOG) rightfully noted in 2009 that “political support for the Ndung’u 
Report [had] been worryingly low” and that there had only been “half-hearted attempts” to 
implement and enforce the recommendations (AfriCOG, 2009, p. 9). Alas, implementing the 
Commission’s findings is a mission impossible, but as Southall (2005) remarks, for the most 
part Kibaki’s campaign promise to fight corruption and graft has turned out to have been 
more rhetorical than real (see: Wrong, 2009). 
Even so, President Kibaki has delivered on one of his campaign promises; enacting a 
new constitution which includes significant land reforms. Under the new constitution that 
was promulgated on 27 August 2010, a National Land Commission has been established with 
the power to repossess illegally acquired and occupied public land. It also mainstreams 
gender by allowing women to own and inherit land, while at the same time preventing 
foreigners from owning land – only permitting foreigners to land leases with a maximum of 
99 years. Only time will tell if these constitutional land reforms will quell the domestic land 
grabbing, but Kenyans generally agree that it all depends on the country’s leadership – and 
they have not much hope that things will change after the upcoming election in March 2013. 
Presently under the regime of President Kibaki it appears that the practice of ‘eating 
as much as you can whilst at the table’ has remained more or less and integral part of Kenyan 
politics – but less visible due to a prevailing anti-corruption rhetoric (see: Wrong, 2009). As 
part of the political dogma ‘it’s our turn to eat’ the practice of domestic land grabbing has 
become a controversial but regular practice in Kenya (see: Klopp, 2000; also see: Wrong, 
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2009). Unsurprisingly, Southall therefore epitomises Kenya as “a kleptocracy characterised 
by a drive for primitive accumulation by those who controlled the post-colonial state, 
alongside the failure of an African business class to promote industrialisation and 
development” (Southall, 2005, p. 150). 
To outsiders, however, it long seemed that Kenya performed expediently as one of the 
most politically stable and economically progressive countries in East Africa. But, as some 
commentators note, the country remains prone to economic, political and climatic shocks as 
well as conflict over land and natural resources (Asaka, 2012; Hickey, Pelletier, Brownhill, 
Kamau, & Maina, 2012). Indeed, as previously outlined, Kenya has always been fraught with 
land conflict, flaring occasionally up into harsh bouts of violence. Tribal clashes left 
thousands dead in 1992, a surge of similar violence spread around the country in 1997, and 
the post-election violence in 2008 caused more than 1200 deaths. Most recently land and 
grazing rights have been at the centre of deadly clashes in the Tana River Delta which so far 
has cost more than a hundred lives in 2012 alone (Asaka, 2012; BBC, 2012). Less reported 
upon, but equally violent is the daily fight over grazing lands in the Turkana region in the 
north of Kenya at the border with Ethiopia (Abramson, 2010). At the root of these clashes 
one often finds disagreements over land ownership or tenure, which is not surprising in a 
country that has three – sometimes conflicting – systems of land tenure. With parts of the 
system carried over from colonial times, contemporary Kenya is left with a fragmented land 
system based on “private/individual/modern, communal/customary and 
public/state/trust/government” tenure (Odote, Ochieng, & Makoloo, 2008, p. 13). 
Moreover, Abramson (2010) and Asaka (2012) highlight climate change as a 
fundamental cause underlying the recurring violence in Kenya. Yet, another source of land 
conflict should most certainly not be overlooked: the country’s massive population growth. 
Kenya’s population has grown from a mere 8.3 million people in 1961 to almost 40 million in 
2009 – an increase of 372 percent. However, over the same period there had only been an 
increase of 55 percent in the available arable land and permanent crops – notably from 3.9 
million hectares in 1961 to 6 million hectares in 2009 (FAOSTAT, 2012). Thus, population 
has grown six times faster than the expansion of arable land in Kenya. This imbalance 
noticeably has put significantly more pressure on land, a problem Rutten already identified in 
the late 1990s (Rutten, 1997).  
By the onset of the 1990s the weight of the burgeoning population was slowly taking 
on dangerous proportions, especially when “populist politicians incited desperate youth to 
invade farms on ethnic grounds” (Nairobi Chronicle, 2008). A soaring population boom with 
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the ensuing intensifying pressure on land seems only to fuel Kenya’s historical ‘curse of 
negative ethnicity’ and explicably frames the contemporary inter-ethnic violence over land 
and natural resources. Indeed, many belief that the country’s inveterate ethnic violence 
“stem[s] in large measure from unresolved and politically aggravated land grievances” 
(World Resources Institute and Landesa, 2011). For one, Wa Wamwere already cautioned in 
2003 that the country was getting dangerously close to a repeat of Rwanda’s fate, namely, 
moving towards genocide (see: Diamond, 2005, pp. 311-328; Wa Wamwere, 2003). 
Admittedly, the 2008 post-election violence and recent escalating clashes in the Tana River 
Delta only seem to reinforce this grim scenario. Worse even, although the new constitution 
has reformed the country’s land laws, Kenyans seem to fear that the constitution’s 
ambiguities and unpolished new laws could potentially only increase tensions in the lead up 
to the 2013 election. 
This brief overview leaves no doubt that land disputes have been a long standing issue 
in Kenya (Kalande, 2008, p. 2). To paraphrase Klopp (2000), it brings home the point that for 
most Kenyans the grabbing of land is symbolically equivalent to grabbing independence 
itself. In such a context the value of land in Kenya simply cannot be overestimated. While 
historical claims and ties to the land are still sore issues, new challenges like climate change 
and rapid population growth only compound the problem of increased landlessness under 
Kenyans. No wonder that the Conflict Sensitivity Consortium describes land in Kenya as “a 
highly contentious issue [which] continues to be a mainstay of local level violence” (Conflict 
Sensitivity Consortium, 2010, p. 7). Likewise, Kalande typifies the contemporary land 
situation as extremely volatile, noting that “the issue of land is often treated with fervent 
sentimentality and sensitivity and in many ways, considered explosive” (Kalande, 2008, p. 2). 
Still, following Manji (2012), it is extremely important to emphasize the need to 
understand the contemporary ‘global land grab’ in the context of these domestic 
manifestations of land privatisation. Manji asserts that the ‘global land grab’ debate comes 
“at the expense of understanding the role of in-country, local land grabbing, leading to 
simplistic analyses of Africa’s land problems” (Manji, 2012, p. 471). There is, however, no 
conclusive evidence that the contemporary phenomenon of foreign land grabs indeed 
overshadows Kenya’s domestic land-grabbing problems. Perchance on the contrary it may 
bring to the attention of a wider global audience the problematic of land grabbing – whether 
of a domestic or foreign nature. Of course, simplistic analyses must be avoided, yet the reality 
for Kenya is that while it struggles with implementing the findings of the Ndung’u Report the 
government better pay sufficient attention to foreign interest, especially now that additional 
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pressures and the degradation of already scarce fertile lands must be avoided. Still, foreign 
agricultural investment could potentially offer a vast array of benefits to modernise and 
develop the agricultural sector in Kenya; which is still the backbone of the country’s 
economy. Hence, the Government of Kenya recognises that agriculture “is inevitably the key 
to food security and poverty reduction” since it remains to be “the means of livelihood for 
most of the rural population” (Republic of Kenya, 2010a, p. xiii). 
At the heart of the founding of the nation of Kenya there was always a prevailing 
cultural vision of growth. First President of Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta, urged his fellow Kenyans 
in a 1968 televised speech to go back to the land since “whatever our plans for the future, 
they must spring from a resolve to put our land to maximum production” (Kenyatta, 1968, p. 
233). And still the Government of Kenya chases the vision of “a food-secure and prosperous 
nation” which it presently aims to achieve by focussing on innovative, commercially oriented 
and modern agriculture (Republic of Kenya, 2010a, pp. xiii, 28). But, as Hickey et al. (2012) 
point out, Kenya has persistently been in the ranks of one of the twenty most food-insecure 
countries on Earth. Surprising, perhaps, for a country fraught with challenges of food 
insecurity, poverty, and an underperforming agricultural sector, one finds evidence of 
economic (micro-)activity all throughout the country. Wherever one goes, Kenyans are hard-
working to make their niche business succeed. It shows that Kenyatta was right when he 
asserted that “[Kenyans] do not believe in loitering and laziness” (Kenyatta, 1968, p. 234). 
But even though agriculture is by far the largest sector of employment in Kenya, there 
has always been a struggle to produce sufficient food given that 84 per cent of the land is arid 
or semi-arid (Republic of Kenya, 2010a) and thus Kenya is known for its perennial challenge 
of food insecurity. In drawing out some of the root causes of food insecurity in East Africa, 
Hansen (2011) has identified the distressing neglect of the agricultural sector in Sub-Saharan 
Africa since the early 1990s. Declining investment and lack of development over the last two 
decades appear to have been driven by ideology and policy. Since independence in 1963, 
Kenya has seen a diverse range of food and agricultural policies; moving from the first 
decades of full government controls to liberalising markets in the 1980s (Nyangito & Okello, 
1998). But agricultural development has stagnated and trapped rural communities in cycles of 
poverty, only to be compounded by challenges like climate change and population growth. It 
is therefore not surprising that Hansen (2011) urges for the reversal of lamentable 
development and investment policies. 
The need for better policies is recognised by the Government of Kenya, which has put 
significant attention into formulating a National Food and Nutrition Security Strategy 
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(Republic of Kenya, 2011) as well as creating an Agricultural Sector Development Strategy 
(Republic of Kenya, 2010a), all part-and-parcel of the country’s Vision 2030. One of the 
aims of the Vision 2030 is to reform the agricultural sector so that “outdated laws that limit 
competition are in force half a century after independence” will be replaced with “laws that 
foster agricultural competitiveness and regulate the sector for the benefit of both domestic 
and foreign investors” (Republic of Kenya, 2007, p. 53). There is certainly a need for better 
investment policies, as Donnelly and Ford point out, “for all the conflict resolution, 
democratisation and economic improvement that has taken place in SSA this decade, it 
remains an inhospitable place to do business” (Donnelly & Ford, 2008, p. viii). Many 
investors certainly think twice before entering Africa, which seems to imply that those who 
do invest in Africa must be either naive good-doers or self-styled wild men – see for the latter 
Pearce’s (2012, p. 49) description of Philippe Heilberg. Indeed, Heilberg is one of the 
‘capitalists of chaos’, favouring inhospitable environments because it generally holds 
unrecognised value (Funk, 2010). Heilberg’s tactic is simple: “You have to go to the guns: 
this is Africa”, he says, “the whole place is like one big mafia – and I’m like a mafia head. 
That’s the way it works” (Blas & Wallis, 2010; Funk, 2010). Cowboy entrepreneurs like 
Heilberg are not common, yet it remains fact that doing business in Africa comes with 
enormous challenges – as we will see in the following case study of the Yala Swamp. 
 
The Yala Swamp: conservation, conversion, or community-resource? 
In West-Kenya, just North-West of Kisumu, the Yala River has for ages ended downstream 
in a wide flood plain that that is now known as the Yala Swamp (Map 1). This swampy area 
is situated snugly along the North-Eastern shore of Lake Victoria and internationally 
renowned as one of Kenya’s most important freshwater wetlands and biodiversity hotspots. 
The swamp is classified by Harper and Mavuti as a typical ‘valley swamp’ which is “very 
susceptible to draining by man” and notably “many have been converted to agriculture in the 
last four decades” (Harper & Mavuti, 1996, p. 222). In its entirety the Yala Swamp covers an 
area of 17,500 hectares (R. Abila, Rasowo, & Manyala, 2006; Odote et al., 2008) and is 
bound by the Hwiro and Nzoia rivers to the north and Yala river to the south (Aloo, 2003; 
Riedmiller, 1994) with the Equator roughly coinciding with the southern boundary of the 
wetland. Located within the confines of the Yala swamp wetland are three peripheral lakes: 
Lake Sare, Lake Namboyo and Lake Kanyaboli. Altogether the wetland provides a unique 
habitat for a mixed vegetation of reed grasses and papyrus, but it also harbours a number of 
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Map 1: The Yala Swamp, Nyanza Province, Kenya.
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endangered species (Photo 1). 
Besides serving as an important ecosystem for various species of plants and animals, 
the Yala Swamp also provides several local communities with the natural resources to secure 
their livelihoods. Furthermore, the swamp has since long been valued for its extraordinary 
potential to be developed for agricultural production – a type of land use that could 
significantly boost Kenya’s food security. Biodiversity conservation, community-based 
resource management, and agro-industrial exploitation thus present three widely diverse and 
conflicting types of land use (R. Abila, 2002; R. Abila et al., 2006). Integrating these 
opposing interests forms a significant challenge to the management of the wetland, therein 
demonstrating the increasing complexity of reconciling land claims (Zoomers, 2010, p. 441).  
Harmonising the land claims in a system of multiple land-uses poses a difficult 
challenge. The ultimate question for the Yala Swamp, one that Abila (2002) identified, is 
which type of land use will yield maximum benefits. Perhaps more importantly, though, 
benefits for whom? Abila (2002) resolutely concludes his study on the utilisation and 
economic valuation of the Yala Swamp wetland with recommending conservation over 
conversion. Yet others cautiously note that sufficient investment and proper management 
could enable sustainable conversion and development of parts of the wetland, which would 
create an economically viable and differentiated utilisation of the Yala Swamp (Mavuti, 
1989). 
The latter view of a differentiated utilisation, which favours partial conversion of the 
swamp, has historically gained more traction than conservation. The first investigations 
already carried out in the early 1950s into the viability of reclamation had a strong preference 
for conversion. Since the late 1980s, however, a growing environmental awareness 
increasingly emphasised the need for conservation of the Yala Swamp wetland. These two 
forces of conversion and conservation both gained momentum over the last decade, with the 
result that both reclamation and conservation are currently ongoing. Conversion of the 
swamp is presently undertaken by a foreign investor who is reclaiming the 40% of the Yala 
Swamp that is earmarked for agro-industrial development. Conservation efforts culminated in 
2010 into the very first gazettement of a National Reserve in and around Lake Kanyaboli by 
the Kenya Wildlife Service (National Council for Law Reporting, 2010). Together, these two 
relatively new land claims impact significantly on the traditional land use of the Yala Swamp 
as a community-resource. It is not surprising therefore that without any further insights into 
the situation in the Yala Swamp, these land deals are commonly referred to as a neo-
colonialist agro-industrial land grab and an unambiguous instance of green-grabbing.
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 However, as we have seen in the previous chapter, the phenomenon of ‘land 
grabbing’ is not as black and white as some stakeholders like to portray it. The intermediate 
shades of gray are made up of matters such as food security/sovereignty, land 
access/sovereignty, human rights, and socio-economic development. But even more 
fundamentally, these ‘shades of gray’ are actually coloured by what we have called ‘cultural 
vision’. This means that cultural vision determines the shape and colour of the intermediate 
shades, in other words, whether we pursue food security or food sovereignty. Yet, the 
colouring function of cultural vision often gives rise to a clash of visions, now that different 
cultural visions have different agendas and pursue different pathways of development. With 
this in mind, the following analysis of the foreign agricultural investment in the Yala Swamp 
will demonstrate the remarkable role and visibility of the clash of visions in the protracted 
conflict in the Yala Swamp. 
 
Photo 1: The original, papyrus filled, ecosystem of the Yala Swamp (Author, 2011). 
 
A history of opportunistic development 
The reclamation of the Yala Swamp for conversion into agricultural land is not a particularly 
novel development. According to a report by the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) and Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) there has been discussion of 
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reclamation of the Yala Swamp since the early years of the twentieth century (UNDP/FAO, 
1971). Even so, it took until the early 1950s for the colonial Government of Kenya to express 
serious interest in the opportunities for agricultural cultivation of the wetland as part of the 
integrated development of the region’s 200,000 acres of tsetse-cleared land (UNDP/FAO, 
1971, pp. iii, 6). An initial attempt at reclamation of the swamp was successfully forestalled 
by environmental conservationists who managed to prevent conversion of the swamp by 
resolutely pointing to the unique environmental value of the swamp (Community Initiative 
Action Group-Kenya, 2011; Kenya Land Alliance, 2006). All the same, the Department of 
Public Works of the Kenya Government still commissioned in 1954 a ‘Water Resources 
Survey’ to the British engineering consultancy Sir Alexander Gibb & Partners with the task 
to assess “the potentialities of irrigation development and swamp reclamation within the 
Kenya Nile Basin” (Sir Alexander Gibb & Partners, 1956, p. iii). The resulting survey report 
describes several individual reclamation and irrigation schemes, therein strongly favouring 
the potential offered by the Kano Plain, yet noting that “the Yala Swamp also offers 
favourable prospects for development by means of reclamation” (Sir Alexander Gibb & 
Partners, 1956, p. iii). In the assessment of the developmental potential of the Yala Swamp, 
Gibb & Partners put the total size of the Yala Swamp at 53,000 acres (21,500 hectares), 
which would allow for an estimated 24,000 acres (9,000 hectares) to be reclaimable for 
cultivation, of which 15,000 acres (6,000 hectares) could be irrigated (Sir Alexander Gibb & 
Partners, 1956, pp. 112-113). Notably, the reclaimable area is less than half of the total 
swamp, which was not surprising given that much of excluded swamp grounds were below 
the water level of Lake Victoria (Sir Alexander Gibb & Partners, 1956, p. 111). Riedmiller’s 
reaction to this was that sometimes “economics may act in support of ecology” (Riedmiller, 
1994, p. 338), referring to the technical difficulty of drainage which would require pumping 
and the construction of polders. 
According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, 
one of the recommendations put forward in this survey was to further examine “the feasibility 
of reclaiming and irrigating the almost uninhabited Yala swamp” (FAO, 1970, p. 1). Indeed, Gibb 
& Partners recommended a small pilot scheme of about 50 acres before any large-scale 
reclamation should be undertaken (Sir Alexander Gibb & Partners, 1956, p. 116). However, 
nowhere do they explicitly mention that the Yala Swamp was ‘almost uninhabited’ at the time of 
their survey. There is a brief statement noting that “with the exception of the Mara River and the 
Yala Swamp, all schemes were in locations inhabited by members of the Luo tribe with its 
various sub-divisions” (Sir Alexander Gibb & Partners, 1956, p. 3). While this could imply that 
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the Yala Swamp may be ‘almost uninhabited’ it could also imply that the swamp is inhabited by 
members of another tribe – most likely the neighbouring Luhya. It is therefore interesting that the 
FAO attributes to Gibb & Partners the view that in the 1950s the swamp was ‘almost 
uninhabited’.  
In November 1963, approximately a month before Kenya became independent on the 
12th December, the government took the recommendations from the Gibb & Partners survey 
to heart and requested assistance from the United Nations Special Fund (which later merged 
with the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance in 1966 to become the United 
Nations Development Programme) in carrying out pre-investment surveys and pilot 
irrigations schemes to study the potential of reclaiming the Yala Swamp (FAO, 1970). 
 Once this request to the United Nations was approved in June 1964, preparations were 
made by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), in its role as United Nations 
executing agency for the project, so that on 23 April 1965 the Government of Kenya and the 
UN Special Fund signed a Plan of Operation (FAO, 1970). The key objective of the Plan was 
“to ascertain the suitability of the Yala swamp for large scale irrigated agriculture” (FAO, 
1970). However, soon after the feasibility study became operational in May 1965, the 
physical conditions of the swamp necessitated a revision of the work programme. By May 
1966 the joint UNDP/FAO operation of the project had revised the work programme and 
established the following activities to be carried out (FAO, 1970, pp. 1-2): 
 
- Drainage of part of the swamp; 
- Diversion of the Yala River through a canal on the southern end of the swamp; 
- Establishment of a 500 acre pilot irrigation scheme on the reclaimed land; 
- Conduct a survey for a protection dyke on the western edge of the swamp; 
- Conduct a survey for a feeder canal from the Yala river to Lake Kanyaboli; 
- Study the economic feasibility for land reclamation and irrigation in the Yala Swamp. 
 
Implementation of the Amended Plan of Operation commenced swiftly by mid-1966, but 
before long, work was falling far behind schedule due to several factors: “unseasonal and 
heavy rains, unrealistic initial estimates of the rate of earth moving, inadequate equipment 
and delays in its delivery, managerial, staffing and administrative problems” (FAO, 1970, p. 
2). In 1968 a second revision of the work programme was undertaken, with the result that the 
500 acre pilot scheme that was planned on reclaimed land within the swamp was moved to an 
area on high ground just north of the swamp, the Nzoia Pumped Irrigation Scheme 
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(UNDP/FAO, 1971) – which became better known as the pilot Bunyala Rice Irrigation 
Scheme. Moreover, the economic studies to the overall feasibility of the project were 
cancelled, but the rest of the work programme remained unaltered.  
Between 1965 and 1970 the Yala River was successfully channelled for some 7.25 km 
along the southern boundary of the swamp and Lake Kanyaboli was separated from the 
swamp with the construction of a dyke (FAO, 1970; ILACO, 1975). By 1970 the reclamation 
project had produced 2,300 hectares of reclaimed swamp land which soon became cultivated 
by people from nearby villages (ILACO, 1975; OSIENALA, 1998). The final report with the 
project results in 1970 outlined how the whole swamp could be reclaimed with a phased 
approach: Phase I (5,000 to 7,500 gross acres) could be reclaimed by the construction of the 
diversion canal for the Yala River; Phase II (15,000 gross acres) would necessitate extending 
the Yala River diversion canal through to Lake Saru; and Phase III (17,500 gross acres) 
would require the construction of protection dykes and empoldering. This study therefore 
concluded that it would be feasible to reclaim some 40,000 acres (~16,000 hectares) (FAO, 
1970). The five year project was finalised in 1970 and the joint UNDP/FAO final report 
recommended regular inspection and maintenance of the canals and dykes to ensure safety, as 
well as proposing topographical and soils surveys and small-scale pilot schemes as immediate 
follow-up action (UNDP/FAO, 1971, pp. 7-8). Besides these technical considerations for 
further reclamation, somewhat obscurely featured on the report’s last page was a brief call for 
“a need for sociological studies within the area ... to assess the effect of a major development 
of this nature on the surrounding population” (UNDP/FAO, 1971, p. 53). 
To take the project forward, the Kenya Government requested assistance from the 
Department of International Technical Assistance of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Netherlands to carry out the proposed technical follow-up actions so that the reclamation of 
the Yala Swamp could continue, though no mention was made of any sociological impact 
studies. The new ‘Yala Swamp Investigation Project’ was carried out by Dutch consultancy 
company ILACO over the course of 1973 and 1974, and consisted of a technical investigation 
into further reclamation and another ‘pre-feasibility’ study which indeed was comprised of “a 
topographic and a soil survey, hydrological studies as well as an evaluation of cropping 
potentials under rain fed conditions and irrigation” (ILACO, 1975, p. 1). Similar to the 
UNDP/FAO project, this study also suggested a phased reclamation. This meant that Area I 
would comprise of the already reclaimed land by the UNDP/FAO project of about 2,300 
hectares, in Area II some 9,200 hectares could be reclaimed through extended canalisation 
and gravity, and Area III could be empoldered to create some 3,500 hectares of agricultural 
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land (ILACO, 1975). These reclamation prospects are roughly the same as the first 
UNDP/FAO calculations; ILACO’s projections are for a total of 15,000 hectares (~37,000 
acres) which is close enough to the earlier assessment of about 40,000 acres. 
Besides the technical issues pertaining to the reclamation of the swamp, the report 
proposed four alternatives for agricultural development on the reclaimed land. Perhaps most 
interesting, is that the report assumes that local ‘settlers’ will farm the reclaimed land. 
 
For agricultural development cropping patterns had to be devised allowing settlers to 
earn an income of K.Sh. 3,000 in year 1 of this project on a holding which he can 
manage with his family. (ILACO, 1975, p. 2) 
 
From this report it seems that the initial development plans for the Yala Swamp were aimed 
at cultivation of the reclaimed land by local small-scale farmers. Along those lines the 
cultivation alternatives discussed in the report ranged from ‘rainfed traditional farming’ to 
‘irrigated sugar-cane growing’, whereas the latter would give the highest rate of return but 
also would require more experience in the field of agricultural practices and management 
skills (ILACO, 1975, p. 5). 
The ‘settlers’ in the ILACO report likely refer to the local residents of the wider 
swamp area. This report notes, in stark contradiction to the earlier views of the FAO in 1970 
of an ‘almost uninhabited’ swamp, that “the areas north and east of the Swamp are densely 
populated, whereas markedly less people live in the areas sought of it” and that “the larger islands 
in the Swamp are even more densely populated than the area north of it” (ILACO, 1975, p. 7). 
Later in the report, however, it is noted that “the present population of the Swamp area is very 
small and restricted to some islanders. Once reclaimed, the Swamp could accommodate 
thousands of people” (ILACO, 1975, p. 37). Thus it appears there is neither record nor certainty 
of the historical population density of the swamp and its islands. Even so, local residents in 2011 
contended during interviews that their forefathers indeed had lived in the swamp for many 
generations. 
By the early 1980s the Kenya Government had now accumulated a range of technical 
reports with extensive recommendations for the reclamation of the Yala Swamp. What’s 
more, some practical construction work had already been carried out by the UNDP/FAO 
during the late 1960s that offered prospects for further development. While the conversion of 
the Yala Swamp was never seen as an isolated project, there now was an increasing emphasis 
on making the reclamation of the swamp part of a broader programme with an integrated 
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development character. Accordingly the Kenya Government commissioned the Integrated 
Development Project (IDP) to a consortium of the Dutch companies HVA International and 
ILACO, with the following objective: 
 
to prepare an outline for an overall integrated plan for the development of 
agriculture, animal husbandry, fishing and forestry for the area resulting in a higher 
economic output, based on alternative development strategies, which shall take into 
account as well the existing resources and the increased potential of resources as a 
result of the reclamation of the Yala Swamp. (HVA International & ILACO, 1982, p. 
2) 
 
The IDP thus aimed at increasing rural production and productivity, creating employment 
opportunities, and improving the quality of life through improved education, healthcare and 
infrastructure (HVA International & ILACO, 1982, p. 19). The project’s coverage therefore 
extended to an area of around 222,000 hectares, which included the development of the 
17,500 hectares of the Yala Swamp. Nonetheless, the conversion of  the Yala Swamp still 
amounted to the largest land reclamation project in Kenya (Riedmiller, 1994, p. 336). 
During roughly the same period, the Kenya Government had also contracted F.C. De 
Weger International, Infra Consult and Kitololo in 1979 to prepare “final designs and tender 
documents for the engineering works of [the] Yala Swamp reclamation” (Community 
Initiative Action Group-Kenya, 2011, p. 8). Even more, the in 1979 established Lake Basin 
Development Authority (LBDA) was now getting involved in the management of the 
development and its implementation, and commenced during the 1980s with cultivation of 
the 2,300 acres reclaimed by the UNDP/FAO in Area I.  
Around the same time, the Kenya Government acting through the LBDA had put in a 
request with the Government of Japan to conduct a study to create an Integrated Regional 
Development Master Plan for the Lake Basin Development Area, which the latter carried out 
through its Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) in the years 1986-87 (Japan 
International Cooperation Agency, 1987b). The first book of its seven volume report outlines 
the spatial development potential of the Lake Basin area. Interestingly, the Master Plan 
groups the Yala Swamp and its nearby settlements into Zone 4, which is accorded a low 
priority for development, except for the provision of basic needs (Japan International 
Cooperation Agency, 1987b, pp. 10-11). Most likely the Yala Swamp was for the most part 
left out of the Master Plan since the LDBA was at that time already operating the Yala 
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Swamp Agricultural Development Project – based on the previously conducted studies. In 
fact, since the JICA Master Plan aimed to establish new economic activities in the ‘Western 
frontier’ area (pertaining to the districts of Busia and Siaya), the report remarks that the 
existing Yala Swamp Agricultural Development Project conforms well to its development 
scheme (Japan International Cooperation Agency, 1987a, pp. 4-22, 24-23). 
While JICA was working on development plans for wider region, by the mid-1980s 
all the preparatory technical investigations and planning assessments for the reclamation, 
development and cultivation of the Yala Swamp had now been carried out. The 
implementation of the Yala Swamp Agricultural Development Project by the LBDA was 
underway, however, the project lacked appropriate funding (Community Initiative Action 
Group-Kenya, 2011). Additional assistance was therefore sought so that the reclamation 
plans made over the previous decades could indeed be realised.  
Up to this point in time, (financial) assistance for the conversion project had mainly 
been sought through international development and aid channels. Yet, as HVA and ILACO 
had already suggested in 1982, “it cannot be sufficiently emphasized that to realize the 
objectives of the IDP the government development expenditures must be supplemented by 
private investments” (HVA International & ILACO, 1982, p. 25). In other words, without 
significant private investment the reclamation of the Yala Swamp would most likely not 
succeed. 
Private investors, however, did not show serious interest in supporting or taking over 
the development of the Yala Swamp during the 1990s. Meanwhile, the LBDA oversaw for 
several years the small-scale cultivation of some of the earlier reclaimed grounds, only until 
these grounds became inundated when a dyke broke due to absence of maintenance. The 
limited production managed by the LBDA had marginal financial benefits, which allegedly 
only flowed into the pockets of LDBA officials.  
By the late 1990s it was clear that only a major commitment with significant 
investment could genuinely bring the still unrealised reclamation project to fruition. Finally, 
at the dawn of a new a new millennium, a new player entered the scene and it seemed that the 
decades-long reclamation project was about to get a major new impetus. 
 
An agent of change: Dominion Farms 
Calvin Burgess, an American who made his fortune in constructing prisons and federal 
buildings across the United States, came in 1999 to Kenya – at the behest of God. During his 
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first trip on Christmas Day that year he set out to see ‘the real Africa’, eschewing tourist 
destinations like the Masai Mara and the Coastal regions of Kenya (Burgess, 2009). Instead, 
he visited the impoverished areas of Western Kenya, something Burgess remembers vividly. 
 
Box 1: ‘Dominion Farms: an agent of change’ 
A poorly maintained murram road connects the rural communities 
around the Yala Swamp to the nearest urban centre of Siaya. But 
urban is hardly the word, the town of Siaya is merely a 
conglomeration of basic concrete buildings with the occasional hub 
of business activity. Near the centre of the town boda-boda drivers 
diligently await clientele, and show a keen interest in taking the 
occasional mzungu to Dominion Farms’ headquarters on the edge 
of the swamp. After a rather long, dusty and bumpy ride, 
expectations of the corporate headquarters of the American investor 
have unintentionally skyrocketed. The main gate of the company 
compound is, however, rather unimpressive, which also goes for the 
office buildings. This strikingly changes after a short stroll further 
down the murram road, all the way up to the edge of the swamp. 
Here one bears witness to a remarkable agricultural feat; fenced-off 
and laser-levelled rice paddies standing out starkly with the 
papyrus filled swamp. Deeper in the remaining parts of the swamp 
the papyrus is near impenetrable and only occasionally gives way to 
small-scale shambas. It is hard to take in the significance of this 
now discordant wetland area, which today has become difficult to 
characterise with its high-tech modern agriculture operation, small-
scale traditional subsistence farming, and unique diversity of flora 
and fauna. No wonder that many speak of the battle of the Yala 
Swamp: conversion, conservation or community-resource? 
 
As President of the Dominion Group of Companies based in the United States, Calvin 
Burgess soon expressed interest in making significant long-term investments in Kenya’s 
agricultural sector. With his fortune already made, Burgess’ reason to come to Africa was not 
inspired by a vision of high profit margins on undervalued African land or significant 
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financial gains from large-scale food production – as many commentators subsequently have 
suggested. Rather though, as Burgess writes, “there was always a greater purpose deep down 
in me” and thus he exclaims “I was born to do something significant” (Burgess, 2009; 
personal communication, 12 March 2011). Being a proud Christian, he proclaims God has 
given him the financial freedom and spiritual guidance to ‘grow rice and save souls’. Against 
this backdrop Burgess is convinced that God had given him a special mission in Kenya 
(personal communication, 12 March 2011; Pearce, 2012, p. 48). And a mission it is, as Calvin 
observed the situation in the Yala Swamp during several of his initial visits to the region: 
 
By the time Dominion came into the picture, the situation at the Yala Swamp had 
deteriorated to dangerous levels. The primitive dikes were eroded and broken by 
heavy rains, the dike across Lake Kanyaboli had completely washed away and the 
feeder canal to Kanyaboli had been completely silted in. Roads around the swamp 
were impassable, the improvements at the compound were in a deplorable shape with 
bats overtaking the buildings; there was no running water, no electricity; grass had 
grown to the rooftops and snakes were a menace to the local community. Locals who 
had worked for LBDA had not been paid and there was general despair within the 
community. Poverty was rampant with high crime levels and prostitution was a 
principal source of survival for many families. (Burgess, 2007) 
 
It must be noted that Burgess was initially advised to take over the stalled Ahero Irrigation 
Rice Scheme in the Kano Plain south-east of Kisumu, near Ahero. Why exactly this particular 
scheme in the Kano Plain was earmarked for Burgess’ investment remains unclear, but 
perhaps the underlying rationale was the Gibb & Partners survey from 1956 which identified 
this area as “far the more important both in regard to size and productive capacity” compared 
to the Yala Swamp (Sir Alexander Gibb & Partners, 1956, p. 2). Throughout the year 2000 
Burgess tentatively explored the opportunities at the Kano Plain, yet concluded within the 
first six months that the area was already ‘occupied’ and for that reason the project did not go 
very far (personal communication, 6 December 2012). Consequently, Dominion’s first 
tentative venture into Kenya’s agricultural sector became a false start now that the Kano Plain 
turned out to be unviable for Burgess’ intended investment – and, according to rumours, the 
site was also deeply entrenched in corruption. Firmly committed to “never succumb to 
corruption no matter what the cost may be” (Burgess, 2009), Burgess was now some valuable 
lessons wiser and keen to move on. Not deferred by this initial setback, his Kenyan point man 
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Reverend Ken Nyagudi soon identified the flailing Yala Swamp reclamation project as a 
more viable endeavour, and started negotiations with the LBDA on Burgess’ behalf. This 
project was indeed viable for Burgess’ envisioned project, but Burgess soon came to learn 
that corruption simply reigns supreme in Kenya (Burgess, 2009). 
 
Photo 2: A murram road through the Yala Swamp (Author, 2011). 
Around the same time, at the dawn of the new millennium, the Kenya Government was in the 
middle of assessing the achievements and constraints it had encountered in the 
implementation of its National Development Plan (NDP) 1997-2001 to formulate its NDP for 
the years ahead, 2002-2008. These nation-wide development plans support foreign 
investment and agricultural development in an undefined sense, but explicitly encourage 
private sector initiatives to revitalise the agricultural sector. More attuned to the specific 
situation and opportunities to attract investment for the reclamation and conversion of the 
Yala Swamp is the District Development Plan (DDP) of the areas covering the wetland. 
Presently two districts share coverage of the swampland, Siaya and Bondo. However, the 
Siaya DDP covered the entire area during the period 1997-2001 since Bondo only became a 
separate district in 1998. In the Siaya DDP 2002-2008 the Ministry of Finance and Planning 
noted that the poverty rate in this district was up from 41% in 1994 to 58% in 2002, with 
‘food poverty’ affecting 56% of the district’s population (Republic of Kenya, 2002b, p. 21). 
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The report clearly signals that the food situation in the district had become a serious 
challenge: 
 
Siaya district is still a food deficit district with an ability to meet food requirements 
for only 4 months per year. This can be attributed to the continued use of local seeds, 
low use of modern farm inputs, poor crop husbandry practices and erratic rainfall 
conditions. The food deficit is met by importation from neighbouring districts like 
Vihiga, Kakamega and Nandi. The district’s main cash crops of sugarcane, cotton 
and coffee performed poorly during the plan period [1997-2001] mainly due to poor 
management and marketing problems. (Republic of Kenya, 2002b, p. 15) 
 
In such a context of poverty and food insecurity it comes not as a surprise that the Kenya 
Government and Siaya District Council eagerly welcomed the investment plans of Dominion 
Farms. In fact, the hopes were that the Yala Swamp project would bring about rural 
development through increasing agricultural production and curbing rural-urban migration 
(Asunah, 2005, p. 3). However, the Siaya DDP stated that for any proposed investment “care 
will need to be taken to guard against any possible environmental fall-outs” (Republic of 
Kenya, 2002b, p. 18). 
Thus, with the Yala Swamp identified as project site for Burges’ investment in 
Kenya’s agricultural sector, his U.S. based Dominion Group of Companies worked together 
with the Lake Basin Development Authority to table a project proposal for the ‘Development 
of a Rice Irrigation Scheme at Yala Swamp’ in November 2002 (The Dominion Group of 
Companies & Lake Basin Development Authority, 2002). The project proposal gives us an 
insight into the intentions for the agricultural development in the Yala Swamp, listing five 
objectives:  
 
1. Develop a profitable business and model for the region; 
2. Reduction of poverty in the region through provision of employment; 
3. Increase crop production for domestic consumption and for export; 
4. Provide sustainable livelihoods for rural households; and 
5. Improve socio-economic infrastructure in the region.  
(The Dominion Group of Companies & Lake Basin Development Authority, 2002) 
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These objectives are all interconnected; Burgess explains that building a viable and profitable 
‘strong nucleus company’ opens new doors to “transfer technology to the community through 
education, investment, market place availability, and strong leadership”, which ultimately 
will “change and repair the desperate lives of the people of Africa” (Burgess, 2009). With 
this mindset Burgess’ vision for the farm is to take a million people across the African 
continent out of poverty (Burgess, personal communication, 10 March 2011, 27 February 
2013). But how realistic is this vision? Can the reclamation and development of the Yala 
Swamp by Dominion Farms truthfully change the lives of thousands of people in one of 
Kenya’s poorest regions? Many ponder this question over, as does Meister (2012), who 
wonders if Burgess is a religious nutcase, a joker, or perhaps, if miracles are possible in 
Africa? 
In any case, with these objectives in mind Burgess and the LBDA collaborated on 
crafting a project proposal for Dominion Farms’ rice irrigation scheme in the Yala Swamp. 
The plan was completed just a month before the Kenya general elections in December 2002, 
but perhaps sensibly, the initiation of official procedures and paperwork for the land lease 
was postponed until after the elections. With a new government installed in early 2003, the 
now locally incorporated Dominion Farms Limited (Dominion Farms) decided to go ahead 
with the project by signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on 19 May 2003 with 
the Lake Basin Development Authority (LBDA) for investment and development of the Yala 
Swamp (MoU, 2003a). 
The MoU explicates that the Yala Swamp is under the jurisdiction of the LBDA 
which is a governmental development authority whose aim it is “to sustainably exploit and 
develop the immense natural resources in the region in collaboration with other development 
agencies and investors to create wealth and employment and alleviate poverty” (MoU, 
2003a). The MoU stipulates that Dominion Farms will lease allocated land from the Siaya 
and Bondo County Councils. For this reason, the next day a similar Memorandum of 
Understanding was signed with both County Councils (MoU, 2003b) which details that the 
lease to Dominion Farms concerns an area of 17,050 acres (6,900 hectares) in the Yala 
Swamp, for a period of 25 years with the option to renew for 20 more years. This means that 
Dominion Farms can only reclaim and convert 40% of the Yala Swamp, which is even less 
than the earliest estimation by Gibb & Partners of a possible reclaimable area of 24,000 acres 
– which amounted to 45% of the total swamp. Furthermore, the swamp is to be reclaimed, 
developed and cultivated in three phases and subject to the terms and conditions outlined 
under section xviii of the MoU. The actual contract for the lease of the land, however, was 
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signed only a year later on 25 May 2004 and limited the land lease to an initial area of 3,700 
hectares which had already been gazetted for this purpose in 1970 (Republic of Kenya, 
2004a). It is unclear when exactly the additional 3,200 hectares were leased to Dominion 
Farms, Burgess simply refers to the MoU and agreement with the County Councils, yet the 
lease contract remains elusive. 
The somewhat opaque nature of the investment of Dominion Farms in the Yala 
Swamp invoked calls from a number of NGOs, CSOs and environmentalists for closer 
scrutiny of the MoU, lease contract and Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). An 
analysis of the MoU by the Institute of Law and Environmental Governance (ILEG) in June 
2008 lists numerous concerns: the County Councils signed the MoU without proper public 
consultation; questions are raise if the leased land is Trust Land or if ancestral rights should 
have been acknowledged; insufficient provisions for displaced squatters; uncompetitive 
leasing rates; the EIA requirement provides insufficient environmental safeguards and should 
be supplemented by regular Environmental Audits; insufficient and imprecise social- and 
infrastructural obligations for Dominion Farms; no clauses dealing with: water- and soil 
pollution, water usage rights, community fishing rights, spread of malaria, dispute resolution, 
local employment, corporate social responsibility, right of re-entry, and supervision. It is 
remarkable, however, that ILEG decided to analyse the MoU instead of the land lease 
contract which had long been in place by 2008 and had effectively voided the MoU. The 
lease contract actually deals with several of the deficiencies brought up in the ILEG analysis 
and would have been the proper document for analysis of the legal and contractual 
underpinnings of Dominion Farms’ land lease. 
One of the conditions listed in the MoU and lease contract was the need for an EIA to 
be carried out, which is a regular procedure required prior to the conclusion of investment 
agreements (Farb, 1978). In accordance with this requirement Dominion Farms 
commissioned an EIA for the ‘Rehabilitation and Development of a Rice Irrigation Scheme 
for Commercial Purposes’ at the Yala Swamp, which was subsequently approved by the 
National Environment Management Authority (NEMA) on 31 August 2004 (Kenya Wetlands 
Forum, 2006; NEMA, 2004). It appears that the LBDA conducted this EIA sometime in 2003 
or 2004, but soon tentative concerns surfaced pertaining to the comprehensiveness of the 
assessment and the impartiality of the LBDA as executing body. 
Even so, with a lease contract signed, an EIA license granted, and several water and 
construction permits in place, Dominion Farms swiftly commenced the development of the 
rice irrigation scheme at the Yala Swamp in 2004. Before rice could be planted, however, a 
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great deal of construction and rehabilitation of the initial area was required, including the 
rehabilitation of dykes, the construction of an incomplete weir, the levelling of land, the 
building of diversion and feeder canals, maintenance and construction of infrastructure such 
as access roads, storage facilities, drying facilities, warehouses, staff houses and the 
construction of an airstrip (Burgess, 2007). Soon though, in the same year, large-scale rain-
fed maize production was started whilst irrigation infrastructure was built, which by 2006 
became the main mode of production. 
Incidentally, it soon became apparent that Dominion Farms was far more ambitious in 
its development of the swamp than just rehabilitating the flailing rice irrigation scheme, 
which was evidenced by its simultaneous experimentation with numerous different crops and 
its launch of an aquaculture project to breed tilapia. The approved EIA, however, only 
concerned large-scale rice production in the Yala Swamp and had not assessed any of the 
other projects. Hence, the NEMA subsequently requested Dominion Farms to commission a 
new EIA that had to incorporate all existing and proposed projects. By September 2005 a 
team of independent experts and consultants submitted on behalf of Dominion Farms an EIA 
for the ‘Proposed Multipurpose Dam, Aquaculture and Agro Industrial Development 
Projects’ (Asunah, 2005). 
 Not long thereafter, in December 2005, ActionAid Kenya facilitated a forum in 
Kisumu to discuss, assess and comment on the EIA submitted months earlier to the NEMA. 
The Forum aimed “to ensure that the EIA report got a fair and objective assessment”, 
however, none of the expert consultants and authors of the EIA were present nor were any 
representatives of Dominion Farms. From the 58 participants in the Forum about half were 
community members living in and around the Yala Swamp area, while the remaining 
participants included academics, government officials, media, and NGO representatives. 
Perhaps predictably, the report raised some 95 matters and questions about Dominion’s 
projects, which led the Forum to the ultimate conclusion that the EIA is “inadequate (in 
coverage and detail), inaccurate, and inconsistent” and that does “not meet the required 
standards and therefore should be rejected by [the] NEMA” (Community Initiative Action 
Group-Kenya, 2005b). 
A brief note prepared by CIAG-K guided the discussion and assessment of the EIA 
report during the forum. This guiding document makes note of that fact that the lead expert of 
the EIA, Francis Asunah, was at the time of the EIA employed by the LBDA (Community 
Initiative Action Group-Kenya, 2005a). While this indeed is the case, the document lacks to 
explicitly add that Asunah nonetheless had been officially registered and listed as 
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independent ‘licensed expert’ by the NEMA for Environmental Impact Assessment and 
Audit. Even so, there is merit in considering the assignment of Asunah as lead expert on the 
EIA for Dominion Farms – whilst being employed at the LBDA – as a severe conflict of 
interest. Not in the least since the LBDA facilitated the land leasing process and co-authored 
the initial project proposal for the investment in the Yala Swamp by Dominion Farms. For 
this reason numerous NGOs, CBOs and environmentalists have disputed the credibility of the 
EIA completed under the authorship of Asunah, arguing that even though an EIA has been 
carried out, it was not an independent EIA (Ogwe, 2009b). 
 As a result the Ujamaa Center – a dynamic community centre devoted to mobilising 
Kenyan citizens to regain ownership of local natural resources – received funding from the 
Ford Foundation in 2006 to commission an independent EIA on Dominion Farms operations 
in the Yala Swamp (Okemwa & Ochieng', 2006). Besides the question of impartially, one of 
the other main critiques offered in the ActionAid Forum and in community workshops 
undertaken by Ujamaa, was the fact that Dominion Farms’ 2005 EIA report submitted by 
Asunah to the NEMA “had lumped all ... activities as one project; therefore, each project had 
been treated very superficially” (Okemwa & Ochieng', 2006). More so, Okemwa contends 
that each of Dominion Farms’ projects requires an individual EIA since all the proposed 
projects fall into the Second Schedule of the Environmental Management Coordination Act 
(Okemwa & Ochieng', 2006, p. 13). One would thus expect the emphasis of the Ujamaa EIA to 
be on its independent nature, but above all, that it would address each project of Dominion 
Farms in a separate EIA. Indeed, the independent character of the Ujamaa EIA is emphasised, 
but surprisingly, however, after noting the need for separate EIAs Okemwa continues without 
any further explanation to do exactly the same as Asunah: write one report that covers all of 
Dominion Farms’ activities and projects. 
The critical reception of the MoU and EIA have only been one of the many critiques 
on Dominion Farms, and while the controversy around these documents is certainly not 
unimportant, they present a legal and procedural framework to safeguard environmental and 
social sound practises by the investor. Instead, the real controversy in the Yala Swamp seems 
to have its roots in deeper and darker domestic divides that slowly begun to fuel a rising 
tension around the investment project of Dominion Farms, in which the EIA became 
unknowingly a politicised tool. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
A protracted conflict in the Yala Swamp 
 
If knowledge can create problems, 
it is not through ignorance that we can solve them. 
(Isaac Asimov) 
 
 Rising tension 
 A protracted conflict 
 Community concerns: a sense of injustice 
 Environmental awareness 
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The previous chapter outlined the significance of land in Kenya and introduced the foreign 
investment project in the Yala Swamp. Both on the national and case-study level it was 
demonstrated from a historical, cultural and economic perspective that land is of immense 
value to the population of this East African country. At the same time it became clear that 
interest of foreign investors and entrepreneurs in the fertile lands of Kenya is hardly a new 
phenomenon. What is new, however, as witnessed in the case of the Yala Swamp, is the 
seemingly genuine intentions of a foreign investor to bring within reach of local Kenyans 
sound business practice and agricultural technology. But aside from good intentions, the 
approach taken in this particular case is rather described by many as culturally and socially 
‘insensitive’ and leaving much to be desired for whose affected and involved. 
 This chapter therefore details how a potentially positive agent of change 
unintentionally ended up causing numerous human security challenges. It is an unfortunate 
account of how cultural misunderstanding, feeble communication, and staunch attachment to 
‘one right way to live’ caused tension to rise in the Yala Swamp and induced an intricate and 
protracted conflict. 
 
Rising tension 
In late November 2003, when Dominion Farms was in the midst of importing much of its 
high-tech equipment and well underway with initial infrastructural developments, 
Dominion’s head of operations in Kenya, Bob Greene, was served a cease-and-desist notice 
from the Ministries of Regional Development, Water Resources and Natural Resources 
(Oywa, 2003; personal communication, 12 March 2011). The letter stated that: 
 
We have noted with concern that the project is about to be implemented without 
adequate consultation and authorisation by the line ministries. We, therefore, direct 
that all physical activities being carried out by the Dominion Farms Limited on the 
Yala farm be halted forthwith and that all Government equipment and houses 
purportedly taken over the company be surrendered forthwith (Oywa, 2003) 
 
The company’s permit for the development of the wetland was suddenly revoked and staff 
and equipment had to be withdrawn immediately (Mwaura et al., 2003). The reason for the 
sudden withdrawal of Ministerial consent remains somewhat speculative. Yet, the account by 
Ochieng’ appears to offer an reasonable explanation (Ogwe, 2009a). He contends that the 
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three Ministries were not satisfied with the scope and comprehensiveness of the initial EIA 
submitted by Dominion Farms to the NEMA. They considered the EIA to be lacking in terms 
of full scientific certainty that the development project of Dominion Farms would not cause 
serious or irreversible environmental damage. Thus, based on the precautionary principle – 
which states that for actions with suspected risk causing harm to the public or environment a 
cautionary approach needs to be taken – the Ministries temporarily revoked the permit to 
ensure a more thorough impact study could be completed before any licenses were issued for 
the large-scale development in the Yala Swamp. Hence, being cautious, the Ministries put the 
burden of proof – to show that the reclamation and development of the swamp would not 
have unpredictable, uncertain, and unquantifiable but possibly catastrophic risks for the 
environment – upon Dominion Farms. 
However, a report for the Daily Nation contends that the three Ministers had acted 
after the new managing director of the Lake Basin Development Authority, Bartholomew 
Wanyama, had sought government support to secure amendments to unfavourable terms in 
the Memorandum of Understanding signed with Dominion Farms by the LBDA’s former 
managing director George Ochieng. Wanyama apparently commented that “we support the 
project but we shall lose immensely if the project starts without a review of the 
memorandum” (Oywa, 2003). 
In any case, when Greene received the cease-and-desists letter he immediately 
telephoned Burgess in the United States to discuss the situation. Calvin’s solution was simple 
and rational: “show the letter to the workers, explain the situation and send them home” 
(personal communication, 12 March 2011). Early next morning Bob Greene broke the news 
to the employees that Dominion Farms was ordered to bring their operations to a standstill. 
The workers responded with outrage and within hours several demonstrations and protests 
erupted against the Ministries’ decision. The protests took place in urban areas of Kisumu, 
Bondo and Siaya, but allegedly lacked much involvement from the real stakeholders – the 
workers and rural locals that would be directly affected by the faith of the development 
project (Mwaura et al., 2003, p. 2). According to Burgess “the city [Kisumu] shut down, 
businesses had closed and people were burning photos of the Ministers involved in front of 
TV cameras. People told the Council that ‘you are stopping the only investment there is in 
our community!’” (personal communication, 12 March 2011). 
The outcry for investment played an important role in the demonstrations, which 
should be interpreted in the perspective of the socio-political post-independence history of 
Nyanza province. Historically, Nyanza province is characterised by widespread 
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underdevelopment and feelings of relative deprivation held by its mainly Luo inhabitants. 
Ochieng’ further explicates how this type of entrenched ‘negative ethnicity’ fuelled the 
protests: 
 
The ineffectual reformist politicians from the [Nyanza] region read ulterior motives in 
these calls [for more a thorough impact study] and protested with the usual rider that 
this was a plot by a section of ruling [Kikuyu] elites to deny Nyanza [and the Luo] 
development as had always been the case. (Ogwe, 2009a) 
 
There is sporadic evidence that this is indeed a view held by some of Dominion Farms’ 
supporters. For instance, from a number of publicly available online discussions and email 
conversations we can get an insight in the ‘negative ethnicity’ argument. In one discussion 
between Chris Owalla from the Community Initiative Action Group Kenya and Odhiambo T 
Oketch, Chairman of the Yimbo Development Network, the latter explicitly touches upon 
deep feelings of relative deprivation and the underdevelopment of Nyanza province:  
 
All the rest, are just lies peddled to malign Dominion Farm, and moreso [sic], meant 
to consign our people to continued poverty, as other regions benefit from other 
multinational developers.  
  
Why are we not hearing the Kikuyu complain about the activity of that multinational 
at Thika, the one that does Pinaeple [sic] production in mass? I have forgotten the 
name. Why is it only our people who get incited to make noise about something that is 
surely changing the face of Nyanza and Western? 
  
It is time we became objective, and looked at development from a wider prism, not 
from the pieces of silver paid to consign our people to eternal poverty. (Oketch, 2007) 
 
In a spin-off from the above discussion, Oketch also seems to justify the loose ends left by 
the initial EIA for Dominion Farms: 
 
As  Luos, time has come for us also to fight for what is good for our people. We must 
not unnecessarily put obstacles in the way, issues that tend to frustrate rather than to 
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build. We must all engage in issues that build. If something is 98% good, why blow 
yourself hoarse for the negative, which is only 2%? (Oketch, 2007) 
 
It becomes apparent, as we have seen earlier in the history of land and development in 
Nyanza, that the Luo generally feels deprived of investment and development of their 
‘homeland’ – and hold the Kikuyu responsible. One this matter Leys makes an interesting 
note, he contends that the most striking characteristic of Kenyan negative ethnicity (what he 
refers to as ‘tribalism’) is its “almost whole a consciousness of being either Kikuyu or not 
Kikuyu” (C. Leys, 1975, p. 203). This is indeed very evident in the Luo relationship with the 
Kikuyu. For the Luo the roots of this difficult relationship with the Kikuyu must be sought in 
their former leader and first Vice-President of Kenya Jaramogi Oginga Odinga’s fallout with 
his Kikuyu friend and first President of Kenya Jomo Kenyatta. After independence in 1963, 
ideological friction between Odinga and Kenyatta soon drove the two apart, and by 1969 
Odinga was arrested after one of Kenyatta’s political rallies in Kisumu resulted in public 
uproar and deaths. From then on, during the reign of Kenyatta till his death in 1978 and later 
also under the Kalenjin regime of Daniel arap Moi and subsequently the return to Kikuyu rule 
under Mwai Kibaki, the Luo in Nyanza province felt they were systematically denied 
investment and development opportunities. For all that, some commentators even believe that 
the ongoing curse of negative ethnicity in Kenya is heading toward genocide (Wa Wamwere, 
2003). Perhaps, Wa Wamwere has a sensible point here, after all the post-election violence in 
2007 was indeed largely along ethnic lines. 
With this in mind we return to the tension surrounding Dominion Farms in the Yala 
Swamp. On grounds of pure anticipatory measures of pre-damage control, the repeal of the 
permit for Dominion Farms may seem a reasonable step in ensuring sustainable and 
controlled development of the wetland. However, in the light of the perceived historical 
injustices, the protestor’s accusations and charges against Kibaki’s (Kikuyu) Ministries for 
once again denying Nyanza development, heavily colour the debate and politicize the official 
procedures. 
While all the unrest unfolded, Burgess had returned to the Farm, and before long he 
was invited to discuss the situation with many senior people in Nairobi, including the 
President. Burgess asserts that all made their apologies, except for one Minister, who said it 
was simply a matter of ‘miscommunication’ (personal communication, 12 March 2011). 
Finally, after days of widespread demonstrations, the protestors were informed by the 
Ministry of Planning and National Development that the investment project by Dominion 
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Farms would go ahead as planned (Mwaura et al., 2003, p. 2). It seemed that the protests paid 
off, but perhaps the close relationship between Calvin Burgess and Prime Minister Raila 
Odinga that had developed from the early days of the investment, also played to its 
advantage. And so Burgess’ mission continued to make the farm succeed; convinced to make 
it of the most prosperous regions in Kenya, he assures the local people that “first shall be last, 
and last shall be first” (personal communication, 12 March 2011). 
 
A protracted conflict 
Over the years Dominion Farms has immensely invested in the development of the Yala 
Swamp. Calvin Burgess asserts that he has invested more than US$40 million in the project 
since its inception in 2003 (Sunday, 2011). The cost of the reclamation is, however, not 
merely financial. Burgess has been arrested, detained, protested, extorted, threatened, 
attacked, and slandered (Burgess, 2009, 2011; J. Ochieng, 2011a). But, some believe, that the 
real cost for the reclamation of the swamp is rather borne by the local community, who have 
been displaced, lost livelihoods and homes, called ‘backwards’, and feels misled and 
betrayed. 
Initially, however, there was a sincere sense of optimism and excitement throughout 
the local community. During the initial period of negotiations and construction – 
approximately the years 2003 and 2004 – the local residents of the swamp area mostly 
seemed to welcome the arrival of a foreign investor and generally showed support for the 
development project (FIAN, 2010, p. 22). The reason for this favourable attitude must have 
resulted from the high expectations created by the investor, County Councils, chiefs and 
village elders, religious leaders, and politicians – all made numerous (and sometimes 
outrageous) promises and were eager to forecast that the project would alleviate poverty on a 
massive scale by creating employment, producing food, bringing technology and knowledge, 
and building infrastructure and social amenities. As a result, the locals gave the investor the 
benefit of the doubt, hoping that with the arrival of Dominion Farms there would be 
employment for themselves and their relatives, and that a world of abundance with no more 
hardships was just around the corner (Janak, 2011; Mwaura et al., 2003). 
While Nyanza’s urban community eagerly rallied in 2004 to keep Dominion Farms in 
operation, the following years revealed that establishing a respectable working relationship 
with the rural community proved to be a painstaking uphill battle. Early on, Dominion made 
some blatant mistakes in handling community affairs; it failed to properly manage local 
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expectations and passed by its chance for timely engagement and consultancy with the local 
community – although some chiefs and village elders were occasionally informed of the 
development plans. Hence, since the early days of the arrival of the investor there has been a 
gradually building tension between the communities surrounding the project site and the 
investor, which over time generated mounting protests, occasional threats, and flares of 
conflict. Even today the relationship between Dominion Farms and the local community still 
suffers from a fragile and unstable foundation, but it seems that to some degree the flares of 
conflict have mostly been instigated, fuelled and initiated by third parties. 
Managing director for Dominion Farms, Chris Abir, is aware of third-party-meddling 
in their relationship with the local community and identified three groups which he suspects 
to be behind what he calls ‘negative publicity campaigns’: 1) local opportunists who initially 
swarmed around Calvin Burgess throughout the first years, but failed to obtain what they 
hoped for (eg. money, land, status, power); 2) local politicians that pleaded with Calvin to 
(financially) support their campaigns, but to no avail; and 3) local people that were once 
employed at Dominion Farms but at some point were laid off, not because they did a poor job 
but simply because they were no longer needed (Abir, 2011). But, as Abir cursorily remarks, 
Dominion Farms is not fazed by their opposition and negative publicity. Calvin Burgess later 
expresses a similar stance. He claims to be no longer concerned by the endless string of 
negative media reports on Dominion’s operations, remarking that ultimately people will come 
to see that Dominion Farms is a bright little spot in a world of darkness (Burgess, 2009). But 
adding cynically, “in Kenya no good deed goes unpunished” (personal communication, 10 
March 2011). 
In response to a question about the role of environmentalists, Abir hastens to add that 
the situation is actually even more complex. Besides these proximate influencers, there is also 
a more distant array of actors that similarly have their own reasons to engage with the local 
community to interfere with the investment of Dominion Farms in the Yala Swamp (Diagram 
1). The distant influencers fall roughly into five groups: 1) environmentalists who are 
concerned about preserving the swamp and its biodiversity; 2) Community Based 
Organisations (CBOs) that act on behalf of the community or the environment; 3) Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) that offer financial, logistical or technical assistance to 
the local community, to environmentalists or to CBOs; 4) national or provincial politicians 
who take a stance to further an election campaign, seek voter approval, or anticipate political 
credit (or simply want to establish local credibility as politician); and 5) the bureaucracy at 
large, which includes local, regional or national departments, all with their own agendas. 
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These groups, however, do not per se represent a cabal of anti-investment activists. 
The agendas of most of the proximate and distant influencers are tightly guarded and difficult 
to penetrate, but there seems to be a shared modus operandi focussing on common concerns 
that broadly fall into two categories: community concerns and environmental awareness. 
 
 
Figure 1: Proximate and distant influencers of the protracted conflict in the Yala Swamp. 
 
Community concerns: a sense of injustice 
We have seen that land surveys and reclamation studies pertaining to the development of the 
Yala Swamp date back to the early 1950s. So do early apprehensions about the impact of the 
proposed reclamation and development. These concerns, however, originated from an 
environmental perspective and failed to consider socio-economic impacts. Accordingly, as 
Kareri points out, up till the early 1990s there had been “no contribution from social scientists 
and no fruitful recommendations ... on how best to incorporate land users into the 
management and conservation of wetlands” (Kareri, 1992, p. 99). In other words, the 
community living in and around the wetland was mostly ignored or simply discounted as 
being of no relevance to development projects in the swamp. Indeed, for long the wetland 
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was considered to be sparsely inhabited, and on some accounts even considered to be 
uninhabited and nothing more than useless swamp land (Okondo, 1989). Still, in one of the 
FAO reports that outlined what health services would have to be established for the to-be-
reclaimed swamp, a prospective 40,000 new settlers were identified as potential new 
inhabitants for the reclaimed wetland, in addition to the cursorily mentioned presence of an 
existing location population (FAO, 1970). 
By the late 1980s Mavuti observed that some families were living on high ground and 
islands on the northern-most side of the swamp as well as southern regions of the swamp, and 
that only one or two human settlements were found at the central and western side of the 
swamp (Mavuti, 1989, p. 12). There is no doubt that these communities in the proximity of 
the swamp made use of the natural resources found in the wetland, yet it seems that small-
scale farming in the Yala Swamp only became viable when part of the swamp was reclaimed 
(Photo 3). Billgren notes that “since much of the wetland had been drained during these 
[early] attempts to use it for large-scale agriculture, it became accessible to local communities 
who used it to grow subsistence crops” (Billgren, 2008, p. 33). 
 
Photo 3: Small-scale farming on partly reclaimed land in the Yala Swamp (Author, 2011). 
 
Throughout the 1990s a general understanding had developed that wetlands are not only 
important for biodiversity, but that they also have great socio-economic value for the 
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surrounding local communities (R. Abila, 2002). However, in addition to its socio-economic 
value, Kareri also stresses that “the historical associations between people and wetlands 
should be taken into account in development planning” (Kareri, 1992, p. 99). This amounts to 
the cultural, religious and ancestral importance of the environment which forms the 
foundation for many communities’ identity. 
By way of these traditional ties to the swamp, many local families relied on the 
wetland for water, building materials, fish, and subsistence crops by the time Dominion 
Farms entered the scene (Schuyt, 2005). The wetland was therefore certainly not ‘idle swamp 
land’, but the utilisation of natural resources by the local community was perhaps perceived 
as a clear-cut underutilisation of the potential for large-scale agricultural production and thus 
effectively considered as of no (economic) value. Hence, the most common complaint of the 
local communities is that Dominion Farms has displaced several families as well as taken 
away the livelihoods of numerous residents by grabbing their land without adequate 
compensation (Ogwe, 2009b). If this proves to be true, this foreign investment project may 
begin to look like the classic ‘land grab’ in which “people living on the land are neglected, 
uninformed about secret deals, and at best minimally compensated with nowhere to go” 
(Zarembka, 2010). To these claims Burgess responds casually, noting that the first 300 acres 
of reclaimed land was given to the local people and by now has been expanded to over 900 
acres (see Map 1) – which is more dry land to farm on for the community than was available 
before Dominion entered the area (Burgess, personal communication, 27 February 2013). 
 
A land grab? 
Over time it becomes increasingly difficult to trace back the exact procedures followed in the 
conclusion of the land deal and indentify all the individuals involved in the initial stages of 
the negotiation and acquisition of land. Nonetheless, at the time of research in March 2011 
there were multiple stories, all with a different perspectives depending on who one speaks 
with. These accounts, in conjunction with the MoU and official contract and supplemented 
with numerous newspaper articles, give us some insights into how the transfer of land-use 
from the Siaya and Bondo County Councils to Dominion Farms came about. Some versions 
claim that the negotiation process for the land lease was entrenched in bribery and corruption. 
Bar newspaper articles and hearsay, there is hardly any evidence to substantiate these 
accusations (Agina, 2003; 2003). Alas, it is mainly circumstantial evidence and rumours that 
are used to corroborate the accusations of corruption. 
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Granted, Burgess does not shy away from the fact that after negotiating the MoU and 
lease contract an amount of US$120,000 was transferred from Dominion Farms to the LBDA 
(personal communication, 12 March 2011). According to Calvin, Dominion Farms was under 
the impression that the LBDA acted as the main governmental authority to which taxes and 
lease fees had to be made payable. Their understanding was that the LBDA would then 
calculate the correct sums to redistribute to the Siaya and Bondo County Councils, which in 
turn would ensure that the community would receive their fair share of the lease payments. 
Perhaps the investor was too trusting, or simply naive, but the entire sum of money had soon 
simply disappeared. According to Burgess, the real problem was that “the LBDA money was 
diverted by the Attorney” (personal communication, 6 December 2012). Eventually it turned 
out that the lease fees instead were to be transferred directly to the County Councils. Some 
believe that this particular money-transfer to the LBDA was in reality a bribe, meant to 
ensure that Dominion Farms would be able to sign a favourable lease contract. Yet, after 
speaking to Burgess and noting his staunch anti-corruption policy, these accusations are hard 
to believe. Burgess adds that Dominion requested the police investigate the diversion of 
funds, yet it never came to any arrests (Burgess, personal communication, 27 February 2013). 
 
Box 2: ‘Dominion Farms: a corruption-free zone’ 
In 2003 we imported 22 containers with equipment, shipped over 
from the United States. When the containers reached Mombasa they 
got stuck in the port because the authorities wanted some bribes to 
release it. Of course we did not pay any money to release them, so I 
was told we would be charged for storage. But I told them we were 
not going to pay any of it, and would just wait for them to release it. 
After three months there was an upcoming visit of President Kibaki 
to President Bush in the States. I used this opportunity to inform 
then Ambassador John Carsson of our problems, which he relayed 
back to Washington. Straight after Kibaki was back in Kenya the 
containers got released. (Burgess personal communication, 12 
March 2011) 
 
Even so, Odote et al. (2008) provide an interesting assessment of the land situation in the 
Yala Swamp by looking at the implications of property rights in the management of wetlands 
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in Kenya. The crucial matter they highlight is that there was a regime of multiple tenure in 
the Yala Swamp before the arrival of the foreign investor. In other words, portions of land 
were owned by local communities, some by the LBDA, and others areas by the County 
Council. Admittedly, for an outsider it must have been difficult to identify the relevant parties 
for lease negotiations, especially since the ‘insider’ parties already demonstrated great 
difficulty to identify relevant property and tenure rights. Odote et al. suggest that the 
government should have exercised its power of dominium eminens to acquire all the 
necessary land for public purposes and then lease the 17,050 acres in its entirety to Dominion 
Farms. However, as it turned out, “instead it left issues of tenure to be addressed through 
private arrangements by the company” (Odote et al., 2008, p. 19). 
Furthermore, another pertinent complaint of local residents is that they were never 
consulted by the investor in the negotiation process of the land lease. As the community 
rightly points out, the swamp is classified as ‘community trust land’, so essentially it is their 
commonly owned land. Practically, however, the land is held in trust by the relevant County 
Council which has authority to act on behalf of the community. By way of this structure – as 
representation of the community – the County Council is indeed the proper entity to approach 
to negotiate a land deal. At the same time this means, though, that it is the responsibility of 
the County Council to ensure that consultations with the local communities and residents are 
initiated to get their approval to lease the land to third parties. Farb observes that this is not 
uncommon, “title if often vested in the government, or in local chiefs or other community 
structures. Actual users may have no clear rights” (Farb, 1978, p. 15). Indeed, most of the 
Yala Swamp’s residents had hardly any say in what happened to their community land. Due 
to this system there seems to be a feeling that Dominion Farms has cheated them out of their 
land by engaging the County Council and not consulting with the actual residents. Burgess, 
on the other hand, claims that even before the County Councils were involved “many, many 
public local meetings were held with all involved but the final decision was up to the 
councils” (Burgess, personal communication, 27 February 2013). 
Regardless of the foreign investor following proper procedure, it seems that a stronger 
effort to engage the community in the negotiation process could have saved the company a 
lot of trouble and perhaps even prevented the land deal from being classified by many as 
‘land grab’. The ultimate question in this matter is whether community resentment over the 
‘loss’ of parts of the swamp should indeed be directed at the foreign investor or instead target 
the local County Council for the deficiencies in informing, consulting and engaging the 
community in the decision-making process. 
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The problems and anger over the alleged ‘land grab’ are not only of a procedural 
nature, however. There are allegations that Dominion Farms intentionally used its weir to 
flood land in 2007, with the aim to drive off residents that were unwilling to take 
compensation and move off the land. Burgess claims, however, that it was rather massive 
amounts of rain in 2007 that broke a dyke and flooded part of Dominion’s land. The rain and 
flooding made life extremely difficult for the locals which ran into serious food shortages, 
hence “Dominion then gave away 100,000 kilos of rice to the locals, something locals easily 
forget” (personal communication, 12 March 2011). Even so, only a limited number of people 
had to actually move their houses, since Dominion’s project is the reclamation of mostly 
uninhabitable swamp grounds. The necessary relocations were at the edge of the reclamation 
area where Dominion Farms was planning to build a weir with water reservoir. The affected 
families were compensated with Sh45,000 an acre, but three families resisted and declined to 
move (Ochola, 2006). Burgess explains that Dominion paid the compensation for all the 
families to the Government, but is unsure how they handled the situation. All he knows is that 
in some cases the families are still on the land (personal communication, 6 December 2012). 
In the end, with most families moved but some remaining on the land, the struggle has 
become part of the prevailing narrative that Dominion’s land lease is founded upon 
widespread, forced displacement with minimal compensation. 
Other points of anguish over land access amongst the local residents pertain to the 
fencing around most of Dominion’s land that restricts the locals from using water from the 
canals and forecloses access to a road passing through the heart of Dominion’s farm. With 
respect to the former point of discontent, one of the more senior residents living near the 
swamp in Ratuoro village explained how their access to the canals and dykes had changed 
with the arrival of Dominion Farms (Figure 2 and Photo 4). Most crucially is the placement 
of the fence that surrounds the land leased by the investor. Prior to the arrival of Dominion 
Farms there was already a fence, but the fence was erected on the inner dyke of the swamp 
land. This situation allowed locals access to the canal. When Burgess arrived, however, he 
decided to move the fence to the other side of the canal on the edge of the road, foreclosing 
community access to the canal. However, Burgess disagrees, according to him there was no 
fence and no water in the canal when Dominion arrived; the fence only became necessary to 
keep cattle out of the rice fields (Burgess, personal communication, 27 February 2013). 
190 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Fence placement on the dykes in the Yala Swamp. 
 
 
Photo 4: Dyke, murram road, fence, canal, and reclaimed land in the Yala Swamp (Author, 2011). 
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Burgess claims that the locals and their livestock damaged the canals and dykes so access had 
to be restricted. But at the same time, as told by a former employee of Dominion, when 
Burgess first saw the local men, women and children bathing naked in the canal from which 
they also collect drinking water, he apparently decided that they should have proper sanitary 
facilities and be assured of a quality freshwater supply. Hence, as part of their Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) Dominion provided eight boreholes with water pumps, 
constructed washrooms, and ensured that livestock had access to water in a canal outlet. 
Ogwe contends, however, that “residents have to travel longer distances in search of water 
owing to the fencing off of key access points to water points by Dominion. Despite the fact 
that Dominion has sunk a number of boreholes, not all residents gain from these” (Ogwe, 
2009b). Pearce (2012) found a resident complaining that the pumps ‘only deliver dirty canal 
water’, which is interesting since the water comes from boreholes and other locals claim to 
prefer ‘dirty’ canal water. Some other residents questioned during their use of these amenities 
expressed, however, that they are content with these alternative water facilities. But activists 
discount the water pumps and Dominion’s CSR program as ‘opportunistic corporate 
goodwill’ firmly grounded in cultural insensitivity (personal communication, 1 April 2011). 
Upon enquiry into Dominions CSR program, Burgess responds: 
 
The whole farm is responsible to help provide a stable food source for the area, to 
provide jobs to many, and to help in any other way possible. We have constructed 
classrooms, clinics, built roads, drilled water wells, and so much more. No profits 
have come to any of the shareholders, so I suppose the whole operation so far has 
been for the benefits of others. (personal communication, 6 December 2012). 
 
But the lack of a transparent and comprehensive CSR plan, and the question if Dominion 
Farms has one at all, is indeed a concern. It appears that the listed facilities provided to the 
community – but also the water pumps, playground, outdoor cinema, and football field – are 
not part of a comprehensive plan, but do resemble spur-of-the-moment acts of goodwill. 
The other point of community disgruntlement is over the alleged ‘privatisation’ of the 
Bondo-Siaya road which passes straight through Dominion’s land (Ogwe, 2009a). Burgess 
contends that this road has always been private since it was constructed by Dominion Farms. 
The community, however, disputes Dominion’s construction of the road, they assert instead 
that there was a road long before Dominion arrived but that the investor merely rehabilitated 
and widened the existing road. What’s more, initially this road was open to the public, and 
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local residents were allowed to make use of the road. However, when all of the land adjacent 
to the road came under production Dominion Farms decided it was no longer safe to keep the 
road open to the public now huge tractors and heavy equipment frequent the road on a daily 
basis. Burgess says it is no wonder that the locals want the road left open to them, when they 
had access to the temporary road the adjacent maize fields were nearly stripped bare as 
people went through the farm (Burgess, personal communication, 27 February 2013). Still, it 
remains unclear what the official designation of this road is – public or private property. Yet, 
it is understandable that the local community is disappointed, and perhaps even disgruntled, 
that they can no longer make use of this road. It should be noted, however, that the restricted 
access to this road does not principally foreclose movements between Bondo and Siaya. The 
original perimeter road that meanders around the edge of the farm has been improved by 
Dominion Farms and connects both towns. Incidentally, many local residents did express 
their gratitude for another dyke and road built by Dominion which passes through Lake 
Kanyaboli and more effectively connects the communities on both sides of the lake. 
 
Cultural concerns 
Besides the foregoing procedural and practical concerns regarding the lease of the land by 
Dominion Farms, many local residents still find it difficult to understand why in the first 
place ‘their land’ is now in the hands of a foreign company. For one, their tradition, culture 
and identify has always been intrinsically part of the land they live on and make their 
livelihoods off. Even more so, many local residents find it extremely difficult to grasp why 
their own County Council decided to forego any traditional linkages to the land and allow a 
foreign investor to develop their community land. Still, there seems to be a general 
understanding in the community that the potential of investment and development in one of 
Kenya’s poorest regions can create a better life for future generations. At the same time, 
however, many locals are inclined to belief that the project could indeed boost food security, 
employment opportunities and infrastructural development, yet they believe that the country 
as a whole will reap the benefits and not themselves as individual community members. 
Accordingly, these locals express feelings of a ‘lose-lose’ situation, in which they not only 
have to accept that they lost access to the land that inspired their tradition, kindled their 
culture, and produced their identity, but they also do not expect to receive any economic 
benefit in return for the development of ‘their land’. Hence, the tension surrounding this land 
deal should thus not merely be assessed from an economic/livelihoods perspective – which 
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too easily, and too often, happens. There is a strong need to also acknowledge the cultural 
concerns and objections raised in lieu of Dominion Farm’s development project. 
The most visible and perhaps best example of cultural insensitivity is the placement of 
a large cross on top of a hill in the middle of Dominion’s land (Photo 5). When asked, 
Burgess explains that the prevailing belief of the locals in witchcraft made him erect the 
striking white cross in an area that witch doctors used to gather strength and power (personal 
communication, 12 March 2011). Others contend, however, that rather than Burgess’ claim of 
nightly exorcisms on the hill (Meister, 2012), this used to be one of the community’s most 
sacred and spiritual places (personal communication, 1 April 2011), where once animist 
rituals were performed (Pearce, 2012). Alas, traditional religion and animist beliefs had to 
make place, now that Burgess had brought with him his own god (Meister, 2012). 
 
Photo 5: A white cross on top of a hill in the middle of Dominion Farms’ land (Author, 2011). 
 
One night, Burgess brought the pastor from Siaya to the hill to perform a Christian ritual to 
end the witchcraft. The next day the locals were apparently surprised to see them still alive. 
To reinforce the end of pagan rituals and mysticism, and show the locals they no longer had 
to fear this particular hill, Burgess erected a large white Christian cross on top of it. Even so, 
Burgess claims “the rumour that we threatened people with crucifixion is nonsense” (personal 
communication, 12 March 2011). 
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Another cultural concern occasionally heard, is that the development of the swamp 
forces many people to adopt different lifestyles and therein puts an end to traditional ways of 
living. Evidently, this amounts exactly to one of Quinn’s concerns that the prevailing 
‘cultural vision’ of humanity in most parts of the world steadily absorbs any other cultural 
visions of ways of living (Quinn, 1992, 1997). For instance, the previously mentioned water 
pumps and washrooms provided by Dominion Farms as the more hygienic and privacy 
respecting alternative to drinking and bathing in the canals, is considered by some as forcing 
a certain lifestyle upon the local community (personal communication, 1 April 2011). 
Similarly, the community’s way of living is allegedly perceived by Burgess as ‘backward’ 
and ‘nineteenth century’. Activists claim that in a meeting convened by Burgess, he was 
highly surprised that most of the invited local activists and scientists understood his technical 
descriptions of the farm operations (personal communication, 1 April 2011). 
There is certainly more to be said about cultural insensitivity and clashes, which will 
be discussed in the following sections. For now, it is important to note that even though there 
are serious cultural concerns, they need to be balanced against the widespread poverty, 
recurring food insecurity, and high levels of HIV & AIDS that reign supreme in Nyanza 
province. 
 
Managing expectations 
A persistent complaint from the community is that the mzungu (i.e. the foreign investor) has 
not delivered on any of the promises made. In asking them about these promises, there 
appears to be a wide range of pledges dating back to the early days of the negotiation process. 
Some local residents speak of promised free bags of rice every week or month for every 
family. Others claim they were promised employment; the construction of houses, schools, 
and medical centres; reclaimed land to farm on; and in general ‘a better life’ (personal 
communication, 8 March 2011). Upon further inquiry, most locals are uncertain who exactly 
made these promises. Some hesitantly claim it was Burgess himself who made a promise to 
them, but then sometimes later admit to have never met him. On the whole one gets the 
impression that people are fairly unsure who actually made these unrealised promises, but 
most eventually opt to name one of the many former managers at Dominion Farms, while 
others may suggest a local church leader, a county councillor, or even a politician.  
 It turned out to be a hopeless quest to uncover what exactly had been promised by 
whom to whom. There is no doubt, though, that a plethora of pledges and promises have been 
195 
 
made to the local people, and as it seems, many were made on behalf of the foreign investor 
without his knowledge. Dominion Farms has had difficulty managing the expectations of the 
local community, and at times had to reap the community’s wrath as some turned against the 
development project because the alleged promise of ‘a better life’ did not soon enough 
materialise. Taking into consideration the local context and history of the swamp, the distrust 
on the side of the local community is not surprising. But, perhaps, Burgess should have 
known better and ought to have more carefully approached and managed the expectations of 
the local communities. Especially since an engraved stone on his desk prominently exclaims 
the maxim “under promise – over deliver”. 
Presently Burgess believes that most of the problems are gone, stating that “the 
community is very friendly and I walk and talk to them over and over” (Burgess, personal 
communication, 27 February 2013). Still, Burgess does not shy away from admitting that the 
first years were very difficult. But also positively proclaims that he never promised anyone 
free rice. Regardless, Dominion did once indeed hand out free rice in 2008, when food 
insecurity was rampant after the locals had poor harvests in 2007 and the country became 
paralysed by post-election violence (personal communication, 12 March 2011). In fact, 
Hilliker accurately puts Burgess’ commitment to the local people in perspective:  
 
While Calvin Burgess wants earnestly to help the people of Kenya, he has no interest 
in handouts. “We won’t just give you things,” he told the locals. (Hilliker, 2009) 
 
Burgess’ interest seems to be in delivering development through employment and 
entrepreneurship. For this reason Dominion Farms encourages local people to purchase rice 
in bulk at their onsite wholesale shop, to resell the rice in their respective communities, and to 
make a profit and build a small business. One of the company’s Kenyan warehouse managers 
in Kisumu certainly shared this attitude. Only weeks on the job she had already managed to 
get women off the streets of Kisumu by offering them to buy small packs of broken rice for 
45 Shilling, which they would resell for 60 Shilling. Even more, when these women are 
unable to make the small initial investment, she occasionally loans them her own money on 
the condition that they leave their identity card with her (personal communication, 15 March 
2011). 
Fundamentally, it seems that the local residents expected to enter a utopia, while the 
foreign investor set out to create a eutopia. As Hager notes, eutopias are based on “voluntary 
actions that yield mutual advantage” and accordingly produces abundances, while utopias 
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cannot but flounder in destitution (Hager, 2003, p. 47). Some, however, like a reporter for 
Kenya’s Daily Nation newspaper, interpret this approach quite differently, and believe 
Dominion Farms embodies the archetype of a “multinational impoverishing local people in 
the name of development” (Flanders, 2007).  
Still, it is all the same to Burgess, who remains optimistic and impatient. His next plan 
to do good revolves around providing filtered water to the community at lost cost as well as 
generating hydro-electric power with the weir that Dominion Farms reconstructed in the Yala 
River diversion canal (personal communication, 10 March 2011). Both plans appear to be 
viable, with the potential for hydro-electric power generation already recognised as feasible 
in the UNDP/FAO (1971) project. Community activists see these plans, however, as another 
scheme to exploit the local people. They never had to pay for water, but now the investor is 
forcing them by fencing off the canals and providing water pumps at incorrect locations that 
only give ‘dirty water’. And, as is often raised, how can the locals pay for rice, water and 
electricity if their land is taken away and no employment is available? In Owalla‘s (2010) 
words, “the half-million or so local residents weren’t rich but they were self-sufficient. Now 
they’re forced to live on the handouts.” 
 
 
Photo 6: Local women working in the rice fields (Author, 2011). 
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Employment is indeed another bone of contention. The development plans for the Yala 
Swamp were anticipated to bring wide scale employment with hundreds, if not thousands, of 
jobs. Early on there was much optimism when more than 1500 workers were hired for 
manual labour to clear land, but soon Dominion changed course and brought in modern 
equipment to do the job (Pearce, 2012). The workforce was scaled down to about 180 full-
time employees, some 40 security personnel, and about 400 seasonal positions for unskilled 
labour on casual or part-time basis (personal communication, 6 December 2012). Some 
Community Based Organisations (CBOs) and local residents criticise the employment 
opportunities at Dominion Farms, arguing that these kind of unskilled jobs, such as weeding 
rice paddies and scaring away birds, are degrading for the local people. Yet, upon questioning 
local women working in the rice fields there appears to be an overall positive response to 
their employment and the opportunity it gives them to generate their own incomes (Photo 6).  
What’s more, the community steadfastly believes that skilled, full-time positions are 
only available to other ethnics groups (i.e. Kikuyu, Kalenjin, etc...) and offered only to 
friends of the investor, such as well-connected businessmen and politicians. A persistent 
perception, however untrue, as Burgess assures in February 2013 that only two Kikuyu are 
employed and all others, as well as all managers, are locals (Burgess, personal 
communication, 27 February 2013). Skilled positions are available to everyone, including the 
local communities, but are merit and skill based. Unfortunately for the local residents this 
means that some positions require specific technical expertise, expertise that sometimes has 
to be brought in from other parts of the country. Even though it seems that most people do 
understand this, they remain adamant that the investor had promised to hire at least 80% of 
the employees from the local community, another broken promise (personal communication, 
8 March 2011). 
 
Injustice and escalating conflict 
In hindsight, the community contends that the approach Dominion Farms took confused and 
misled them. The project and its benefits did not live up to their initial expectations. Janak 
(2011), for instance, beliefs that Burgess was merely dangling a carrot in front of the local 
community and their leaders by presenting the ‘sleepy and conservative Yala Swamp 
community’ with a mixture of economic and spiritual transformations that would change their 
lives and end poverty. Alas, for many these prospects never materialised. 
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Instead, over the years a lingering sense of mistrust and disappointment slowly 
elevated the tension level. As we have seen, in the beginning the lease of swamp to a foreign 
investor was received half-heartedly by the community. Soon, though, by early 2006, public 
opinion turned against Dominion Farms when they required a number of families to make 
place for a water reservoir. The land for the water reservoir was officially set aside by the 
Kenya government 25 years earlier to help assure irrigation water for projects in the then still 
to be reclaimed Yala Swamp. The land had been idle though, and in the meanwhile families 
had settled on it. The relocation request became a catalyst for trouble, now that the 
communities began to receive strong support in their struggle for justice from two 
organisations: ActionAid, a non-governmental organisation working in Kenya to end poverty 
and injustice, and the Kenya Land Alliance (KLA).  
The staunch opposition of both organisations to Dominion Farms’ plans allegedly 
amounted to destructive activism that incited locals to sabotage the company’s operations 
(Ochola, 2006; personal communication, 12 March 2011). Burgess suspects that ActionAid’s 
opposition in reality had to do with the success of the farm. “In essence”, he says, “NGOs are 
the lords of poverty, and if there is no more poverty there is no more work for them” 
(personal communication, 12 March 2011). 
 Fortunately for Burgess, a group of politicians soon came to the rescue. The current 
Prime-Minister, Raila Odinga, was at the time Member of Parliament (MP) for Kisumu and 
led a group of ten MPs in May 2006 to publicly defended the project, stating that it had to be 
welcomed as a “major gateway to prosperity for the people of the region” (The Nation, 
2006). The group of politicians also warned against biased media reporting, and cautioned 
ActionAid to keep off the project by assuring everyone that the local community was 
comfortable with Dominion Farms’ activities (The Nation, 2006). This type of political 
involvement is always by its very nature ambiguous, but at least it ensured that for the 
remainder of 2006 the situation in the swamp was relatively subdued. It was only in August 
that tensions briefly peaked when there was a scuffle with local youth who demanded jobs 
and raided the company’s headquarters (Onyango, 2006). However, soon the relative 
peaceful climate that the politicians had imposed returned, lasting till the end of the following 
year. 
 By December 2007 the local residents were up in arms again, this time protesting over 
aerial spraying by the company which they claimed was killing livestock and damaging crops 
(Olwenya, 2007). Burgess contends, however, that while they do spray herbicides and 
fertiliser, they never spray fields in the proximity of working labourers. He also asserts that 
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no one ever sprayed DDT around the swamp to combat malaria, a claim often propounded by 
the local community. Casually Burgess remarks, though, that it certainly would have helped 
as DDT has been very successfully applied in South Africa (personal communication, 6 
December 2012). Admittedly, there is some more infrequent spraying that takes place, but not 
by Dominion Farms – although their runway and equipment is sometimes utilised. The 
United Nations occasionally shows up to spray queleatox at night to control the pest of 
Quelea birds (personal communication, 10 March 2011). Still, Calvin discounts the claims 
that people could have died or fallen seriously ill from the crop or queleatox spraying. 
 The conflict with the community further intensified over the months to follow, finally 
exploding in April 2008 when reportedly hundreds of residents armed with whistles and 
twigs stormed Dominion’s premises. They demanded a revision of the MoU between the 
company and the two local authorities, claiming the existing agreement only allowed the 
County Council to rake in millions of shillings whilst the community did not see any 
remuneration for the lease of their land (Oywa, 2008). While riot police dispersed the 
protestors, Burgess was already on his way from the United States. When asked about the 
incident, Burgess responds with some surprise, declaring that “nobody has ever stormed our 
premises, let alone with whistles and twigs” (Burgess, personal communication, 27 February 
2013). Prior to the massive community demonstration, Dominion had in fact received several 
requests for cash to support political campaigns in return for ‘protection and influence of 
favourable decisions’ (Oywa, 2008). One of the letters addressed to Burgess outlined the 
necessity to ensure pro-Dominion councillors to be elected, while another email speaks of 
marshalling unrivalled support for the company: 
 
Calvin, 
  
I have recieved [sic] very interesting responses to my defense of Dominion Group, one 
from a very unlikely quota. 
  
Now, I want you to invest $12,000 on me, so that I can finish this job once and for all. 
  
I want to marshal for you the kind of support you have never seen, from my friends, 
the media and even from the people on the ground. 
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The people fighting Dominion have been paid by known agents, and we can expose 
them for what they are. 
  
You must get your peace of mind to enable you think big for Dominion, devoid of 
these detractions. 
  
Look at the options, and reach me on [omitted].  
 
Blackmail and corruption, as Burgess notes, are serious offences and he will never be 
intimidated. But by now Calvin’s patience was beginning to run out, so he upped the ante by 
threatening to close down the whole Kenya operation and relocate to another country, saying 
“he was fed up by intimidation and extortion by politicians and residents” (Olwenya, 2008). 
Within days the threat was reinforced with the company suspending all investment and laid 
off some hundred workers on grounds that nearly all operations had been stopped for the next 
three month pending investigations into the extortion and blackmail attempts by community 
leaders and residents (Olwenya & Ayodo, 2008). 
 In reaction, a group of 20 Nyanza Church Leaders publically released a statement 
addressed to the Provincial Commissioner condemning ‘this circus of corruption’ and 
demanding the culprits brought to justice (Ngede, 2008). Meanwhile Burgess was assured by 
Bondo and Siaya Council Council officials that the perpetrators would be dealt with. From 
2008 onwards tensions between the company and community remained a lingering reality in 
the Yala Swamp. By early 2011 there was another fall out over the alleged failure of 
Dominion Farms to honour its Corporate Social Responsibility (J. Ochieng, 2011b). But 
things really came to a head in August that year, when news headlines ran “Dominion Farms 
Chief Fears for His Life” (J. Ochieng, 2011a).  
Slowly but steadily, Dominion had been expanding its farm by gradually reclaiming 
more land over the years – all within the limits of their land lease. Out of the 17,050 leased 
acres the company had only managed to reclaim about 3,500 acres by mid 2011. But when 
they started reclaiming a new phase of the farm, they found hundreds of villagers still 
farming the land. The government – acting through the County Councils as the company’s 
landlord – had already given the residents “three months to harvest their crops and stop 
cultivating the land but they continued to plant after the deadline” (J. Ochieng, 2011a). 
Burgess remarks that over the years the local community had been allowed to grow crops on 
the land, but they always knew that at some point the land would be reclaimed and they 
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would have to leave (Burgess, 2011). Evidently the locals had not moved to the 900 acres set 
aside for them by the company, instead, on the morning that the tractors broke first ground on 
the land a group of 20 machete yielding villagers incited by a local politician suddenly 
attacked Burgess jeep. After a close escape, Burgess and farm manager Chris Abir 
immediately asked for police assistance. Only with great difficulty the riot police finally 
dispersed the villagers. Later, after a phone call with Prime Minster Odinga and the U.S. 
Embassy, Burgess was sent 25 heavily armed police officers the next day. 
Since mid-2011 there have been no more outright clashes with the community. 
Burgess contributes the relatively stable situation to the court decree that confirmed 
Dominion’s right to the land, and also ordered everyone else to leave the leased land 
(personal communication, 6 December 2012). Today Dominion provides 900 acres of land 
for free use by the community, as opposed to the 300 acres provided for in the lease contract 
(personal communication, 6 December 2012). Calvin Burgess is now confident that after 
almost a decade of troubles Dominion Farms is finally at peace with its neighbours, and they 
with them. Perhaps, though, some of the tension and conflict between the foreign investor 
and community remains unresolved and silently lingers on. This can only attest to the great 
difficulty in finding a balance between conserving community tradition, culture and identity 
on the one hand, and alleviating poverty, eradicating food insecurity and providing 
development on the other. The complexity of the situation only increases when the 
environmental agenda is added to the mix, making the balance of interests ever more 
intricate. 
 
Environmental awareness 
Environmentalists, for the most, are adamantly against development in the Yala Swamp, 
emphasising the irreplaceable habitat that the wetland provides to a wide range of species. In 
particular, they promulgate Mavuti’s classification of Lake Kanyaboli as a unique ‘living 
museum’ of fishery resources that once populated Lake Victoria – namely before the 
introduction of non-native species in the 1950s (R. O. Abila & Othina, 2006; Mavuti, 1989, 
1992). Interestingly, it appears that Mavuti himself is not in principle against development in 
the Yala Swamp, although he certainly notes that “any change in landuse is a potential 
environmental disruption. The impacts of swamp reclamation and development are usually 
very unpredictable and may result in more negative than positive effects” (Mavuti, 1989, p. 
14).  
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It must be noted, though, as Riedmiller crucially observes, that the environment is a relatively 
new factor to be considered in development projects. Hence, when the first reclamation plans 
for the swamp were designed in the 1960s “awareness of environmental issues had not yet 
developed” (Riedmiller, 1994, p. 336). 
 
The swamp was simply seen as an underutilized resource of vast fertile lands, covered 
by water and lying idle, which could be drained and developed for agricultural 
settlements. Therefore the draining of Phase I area in the swamp a decade ago went 
ahead without any major concern for its environmental impact. (Riedmiller, 1994, p. 
336) 
 
But it took a long time for environmental awareness to fully mature. As noted, by 1989 
Mavuti was not too concerned with the idea of development. Worse though, that year a local 
politician also prominently proclaimed that “the Yala Swamp is useless” (Okondo, 1989). 
 
As an economic unit, the swamp is useless; it is a danger to the economy and it takes 
away land. It is a breeding ground for mosquitoes, vermin and snails. The swamp 
should be drained to improve the ecology of the area. (Peter Okondo in Amisi, 2006a) 
 
Even so, during the 1980s and 1990s environmental awareness rapidly developed, with the 
result that at present scientists and environmentalists have come to widely agree that “the 
reclamation of swamps can cause considerable environmental damage” (Riedmiller, 1994, p. 
336). Harper and Mavuti, for instance, observed that since the early 1990s, in particular since 
the 1992 Conference on Environment and Development, “attitudes to natural ecosystems 
have changed, moving towards the concept of sustainable development rather than merely 
economic development” (Harper & Mavuti, 1996, p. 218).  
Today, it is therefore no longer disputed that the Yala Swamp, and in particular Lake 
Kanyaboli (Photo 2), present important ecological hot spots of biodiversity in Kenya. This 
explains the serious concerns of environmentalists over the impact of converting (part of) the 
swamp into agricultural land. Even though Dominion Farms’ conversion of the wetland into 
agricultural land will leave some 60% of the Yala Swamp untouched, the reclamation project 
is watched with great apprehension by environmentalists fearing the ultimate aim of the 
company is to secure additional land rights and convert the entire swamp. Indeed, a full 
reclamation of the swamp would be disastrous for the wildlife and biodiversity of the Yala 
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wetland. It appears however, from various discussions, documents and the current lease 
contracts, that there is no willingness on the side of the investor to develop more than the 
currently allocated hectares. In fact, Burgess openly admits that the government initially 
requested a full reclamation of the Yala Swamp. Based on environmental concerns, however, 
Burgess declined to do so and still underlines that Dominion Farms will not expand beyond 
their current land lease agreements (Burgess, personal communication, 27 February 2013). 
With a minimal risk of Dominion Farms converting even more of the Yala Swamp, there 
certainly remain other outstanding environmental concerns. 
Besides the general question whether or not a wetland ought to be converted for 
agricultural production, the main environmental concern pertaining to the reclamation of 
swamps is water management. 
 
Photo 7: Lake Kanyaboli in the Yala Swamp (Author, 2011). 
 
Water quality and management 
Originally the Yala River was a free flowing body of water discharging into the Yala 
Swamp’s south-east corner. Some of its water found its ways into the swamp’s three lakes 
(Sare, Namboyo and Kanyaboli) while the rest slowly filtered through the swamp to 
ultimately reach Lake Victoria. Reclaiming part of the wetland and redirecting the flow of the 
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Yala River evidently requires a water management plan to ensure that the lakes continue to 
be replenished as well as minimize any potential negative impacts on the remaining swamp 
land. 
Burgess’ approach to reclaiming the swamp was simple: “first you have to stop the 
water from filling it up and secondly you have to drain what is already in” (Sunday, 2011). 
But the plan to redirect the Yala River along the southern edge of the swamp raised concerns 
that Lake Kanyaboli would no longer be replenished and that water from the surrounding 
lakes would be used for irrigation. Aloo, for example, asserts that “agricultural farms 
extracting waters from these lakes should not be allowed, as this will affect the levels of 
water with its adverse effects on the entire ecosystem, especially the fish fauna” (Aloo, 2003, 
p. 917).  
Yet, Dominion’s solution was straightforward, they rehabilitated and extended a dyke 
to relocate the Yala River for its last 12km, and as Burgess plainly remarks, “[then] we split it 
and sent part of it into Lake Kanyaboli and part of it to Lake Namboyo” (Sunday, 2011).  
Prior to the arrival of Dominion Farms there already was a small canal leading from 
the partly redirected river to Lake Kanyaboli. Yet due to its narrow size and poor 
maintenance it had been dry for years, with no water reaching the lake. Under the 1993 
UNDP funded Lake Kanyaboli Rehabilitation and Conservation Programme the rehabilitation 
of the feeder canal had already been an objective, which unfortunately never came to fruition 
(OSIENALA, 1998). Dominion Farms basically took the rehabilitation plans and finished the 
construction of a half-built weir, as well as rehabilitated the canals and dykes for the purpose 
of irrigating the rice paddies, and opened up and expanded the Lake Kanyaboli feeder canal. 
Interestingly, at the time of research in 2011, there was quite some confusion among 
activists, environmentalist and scientists about the role and impact of Dominion Farms on the 
management and quality of the water in the Yala Swamp and Lake Kanyaboli. Major 
concerns were raised over the supply of fresh water from the Yala River to Lake Kanyaboli 
through the feeder canal. Many were under the impression that Dominion Farms extracted too 
much water from the feeder canals for irrigation, leaving little fresh water to replenish the 
lakes. Indeed, most alleged that this had already resulted in a serious drop in Lake 
Kanyaboli’s water level and massive increase in salinity of the lake. 
One of the senior scientists at the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) was among those 
convinced that with the arrival of Dominion Farms the condition of Lake Kanyaboli had 
deteriorated badly. Surprisingly, however, the KWS scientist was unable to substantiate these 
205 
 
claims with relevant data and reports. What’s more, it was publicly known that Dominion 
Farms is required to produce periodic water quality analysis reports in cooperation with an 
official from the Water Resources Management Authority. In fact, these reports show on the 
contrary that the water quality and water levels in the lake have seen significant 
improvements over the last decade. The KWS scientist, however, hesitantly expressed the 
concern that these analyses done by Dominion Farms together with the Water Resources 
Management Authority were believed to be ‘compromised’. Admittedly, KWS noted that 
perchance the data from an independent researcher from the University of Nairobi, Alice 
Arrumm, who spent vast amounts of time researching the lake area from 2002 to 2006, would 
be the most accurate and independent data available. Arrumm’s reports show, however, that 
since Dominion Farms built a weir and opened up new larger feeder canals, the water quality 
and water level in Lake Kanyaboli has improved significantly (personal communication, 30 
March 2011). The data on the water quality (i.e. conductivity) collected by Arrumm shows a 
reversal from the high levels of salinity that Mavuti detected in 1989. 
Evidently, the feeder canal constructed to supply Lake Kanyaboli with fresh water 
from the Yala River during the earliest reclamation of the swamp in the 1970s,  had in reality 
allowed little to no water to reach Lake Kanyaboli due blockages and a lack of maintenance 
(Mavuti, 1989, 1992). Hence, Mavuti observed in 1992 that: 
 
The physico-chemical properties of Lake Kanyaboli water, compared with other lakes 
within the swamp, have changed drastically (Mavuti, 1989); the salinity has more 
than doubled in less than 15 years. Since the diversion of the Yala River and the 
construction of the protection dyke; the salinity of the lake has gradually increased 
due to lack of water replenishment from the river. Had the feeder canal been 
maintained in functional condition, perhaps this increase in salinity would not have 
occurred. (Mavuti, 1992, p. 31) 
 
Reports indeed confirm a total absence of maintenance to the feeder canal, which by the 
1990s had been heavily damaged by livestock (Aloo, 2003; Riedmiller, 1994). With now only 
little water reaching Lake Kanyaboli, the water quality and level had indeed decreased over 
the years. 
It should be noted that water quality is generally assessed by determining the salinity 
level. The method used to determine salinity is the conductivity of water, which is a measure 
of electrical current that flows through a solution to determine the amount of salt present in 
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water. To understand salinity readings it is helpful to know that seawater has a conductivity 
of approximately 5,000 μS cm-1 , tap water measures around 110 μS cm-1, and distilled water 
is near 0 μS cm-1. For freshwater ecosystems, such as wetlands, there is general acceptance 
that there is “little ecological stress when subjected to salinities up to 1,000 mg L-1 [~1,600 
μS cm-1]” (Nielsen, Brock, Rees, & Baldwin, 2003, p. 661). Over the years several 
researchers and scientists have taken conductivity measurements in Lake Kanyaboli (Table 
2). 
Year Conductivity Source 
1981 630 μS cm-¹ Okemwa (1981) 
1989 950 μS cm-¹ Mavuti (1989) 
1994 600 μS cm-¹ National Museum field report (1994) 
1998 349 μS cm-¹ Maithya (1998) 
2002 255 μS cm-¹ Odhiambo (2002) 
2002 277 μS cm-¹ Lake Victoria Environmental Management Project (2002) 
2002 150-300 μS cm-¹ Arrumm (personal communication, 2012) 
2003 150-300 μS cm-¹ Arrumm (personal communication, 2012) 
2004 150-300 μS cm-¹ Arrumm (personal communication, 2012) 
2004 202 μS cm-¹ Romulus Abila (personal communication, 2012) 
2005 150-300 μS cm-¹ Arrumm (personal communication, 2012) 
2006 150-300 μS cm-¹ Arrumm (personal communication, 2012) 
2008 360-725 μS cm-¹ Ochieng, E., Lalah, J., & Wandiga, S. (2008) 
Table 2: Water conductivity in Lake Kanyaboli. 
 
The data indeed confirms that the conductivity of water in Lake Kanyaboli was high in the 
1980s and early 1990s. But, interestingly, by the early 2000s the conductivity had already 
dropped significantly, even before Dominion Farms entered the scene and rehabilitated the 
feeder canal. After rehabilitation and expansion of the feeder canal, the water quality 
remained within range of 150-300 μS as reported by Arrumm. Still, by 2008 readings from 
several parts of the lake show higher values, again. This raises the question if the higher 
conductivity readings are a result of less water entering Lake Kanyaboli, or perhaps other 
factors. Similarly, should theses higher values be attributed to Dominion Farms’ project? 
In another 2008 study, scientists determined the concentration and distribution of 
heavy metals in Lake Kanyaboli and reported that “compared with WHO standards and other 
freshwaters worldwide, this lake was found to be unpolluted, with all metals, except Mn, 
being detected at concentrations lower than the highest desirable levels and maximum 
permissible levels” (E. Ochieng et al., 2008). Based on these measurements of trace metal 
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concentrations, they noted that the water in Lake Kanyaboli “satisfies the recommended 
standards both for drinking water purposes and aquatic (fish) life” (E. Ochieng et al., 2008). 
But the matter of water management and quality is part of wider concerns over 
wetland conservation and management. Throughout the years there has been hardly any 
serious discussion over the prospective roles for the foreign investor and community in the 
environmental conservation and biodiversity management of the Yala Swamp. 
 
Wetlands management and conservation 
Since the late 1980s scientists and environmentalists have increasingly stressed the need to 
preserve the unique ecological character of the Yala Swamp. Kenya has been part of the 
Ramsar Convention on wetlands since 1990, but the Yala Swamp has not yet been designated 
as a wetland of international importance under the convention. The unique nature of Lake 
Kanyaboli, however, did recently spur the Kenya Wildlife Service to gazette the lake and 
surrounding parts of the Yala Swamp as the ‘Lake Kanyaboli National Reserve’ (Republic of 
Kenya, 2010b). Aloo already asserted in 2003 that it was imperative to design proper 
management and conservation measures “to protect the fishery of Lake Kanyaboli from any 
future environmental catastrophe” (Aloo, 2003, p. 912). In reality, however, the 
establishment of the reserve appears only to add to the troubles of the local community. To 
them it is merely an instance of green grabbing; described in chapter 5 as the appropriation of 
land and resources for environmental ends (Fairhead et al., 2012, p. 238; see also: Vidal, 
2008). 
The Reserve patently demonstrates the onset of a key conservation effort of the 
biodiversity in and around Lake Kanyaboli. Earlier though, in the mid-1990s, the Lake 
Kanyaboli Rehabilitation and Conservation Programme had already been a first endeavour to 
relieve pressure from the fragile lake ecosystem by involving local communities in alternative 
income generating activities (OSIENALA, 1998, p. 1). Previously, there had already been 
growing awareness that local communities were overexploiting the natural resources of the 
lake by hunting endangered wildlife and overfishing Lake Kanyaboli (OSIENALA, 1998). At 
the time, however, no action was taken. Communities feared for losing access to their only 
source of livelihood and had protested fervently against the plans (OSIENALA, 1998, p. v).  
With the recent gazettement and involvement of the KWS, Pearce (2012) rightfully 
observes that it adds another powerful player to the battle for the Yala Swamp. And, indeed, 
the gazettement of the reserve in 2010 immediately led to serious disagreements between the 
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communities, the Siaya County Council, and the KWS over the management of the reserve. 
The local KWS office in Kisumu reports that locals are divided over the benefits that the 
reserve will bring them and afraid they will lose even more land. The KWS subsequently 
initiated community workshops to ‘sensitise’ and educate local residents about the actual 
situation (personal communication, 21 March 2011). But it has come under heavy criticism 
now that its workshops and community involvement efforts came after the fact, instead of 
taking place before the gazettement became official. Even so, there is still no management 
plan in place for the Lake Kanyaboli National Reserve and the KWS admits that there are a 
lot of management issues to deal with (personal communication, 11 September 2012). 
For some local residents, though, it is hard to distinguish between Dominion Farms’ 
reclamation project and the KWS’ national reserve; in both cases they lost access to ‘their 
land’. While this is a regrettable situation, it does show that the conflict over food, water and 
land in the Yala Swamp is not inherently tied to the involvement of a foreign entity; tactless 
domestic decisions seem to cause similar anxiety under local communities – and exacerbate 
only existing tension. 
Still, one of the local residents – and activist with Friends of Yala Swamp 
Biodiveristy – remarked that governmental conservation is certainly a step forward, but only 
a first step. Adding, “in terms of conservation Dominion is very important. It will get 
development and attention to the area. Dominion should stay on their 1/3 of the swamp and 
the other 2/3 should be reserve” (personal communication, 14 March 2011). 
Even though there is certainly an important role for KWS and Dominion Farms in the 
management of the remaining wetland, the burden of protecting the unique nature of the 
swamp and its lakes depends equally on the sustainable practices and environmentally 
conscious behaviour of the local communities. Aloo therefore contends that “[local] people 
need to be sensitised on the importance of these lakes, not only to them as a source of their 
livelihood but also for conservation of biological diversity” (Aloo, 2003, p. 917). But Aloo 
stresses to also take into account the socio-economic activities of local residents in the 
conversion and conservation plans. 
By now most of the institutions and individuals involved in the protracted conflict 
have began to realise that a differentiated utilisation of the Yala Swamp is no longer in 
question, but has simply become a fact. Even so, their concerns often remain valid, and most 
parties are still unrelentingly committed to achieving the necessary objectives to realise their 
particular vision for the future of the wetland. At this fundamental level of competing cultural 
visions pertaining to the prospective future of the Yala Swamp we find a structural clash. The 
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following chapter will therefore address these deeper, underlying problems of the conflict and 
accordingly draw out the particulars of this clash of visions. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
 
A clash of visions 
 
 
We believe that we can make this one of the most prosperous regions in Kenya. 
(Calvin Burgess, 2011) 
 
 
 Food security 
 
 Structural problems 
 
 A clash of visions 
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The previous two chapters introduced us to the bitter sweet investment tale of a staunch 
Christian who, unlike most evangelicals that make their way to Africa, does not belief in the 
modus operandi of handouts and traditional aid but rather strong-mindedly beliefs to take a 
million Africans out of poverty by introducing them to good and realistic business practice. 
The in-depth exploration of this case of well-intended foreign agricultural investment shows 
that the food production project in the Yala Swamp has been fraught with conflict from the 
start, and has left many locals disillusioned. At the same time, however, it cannot be denied 
that food availability has improved on the whole in the project’s area and the influx of foreign 
investment has kicked off wider development in the region. 
 From a macro-level perspective, the agricultural development of the Yala Swamp is a 
clear example of the impact of globalisation. New technologies, modern agricultural practice, 
and foreign investment are now within reach of communities in Kenya that long have 
suffered from developmental neglect, particularly from their own government. Even so, 
instead of reaping benefits from access to a nigh endless source of foreign capital directed at 
developing Kenya’s poorest region, many of the local communities feel that they are 
suffering from the injustices of corporate globalisation and have no tangible gains to show for 
the financial impetus to the area. Nevertheless, the investor steadfastly believes his 
investment contributes to taking a million Africans out of poverty and can make this region in 
Kenya one of the most prosperous in the country. The locals, however, wonder what 
‘prosperous’ will mean for them.  
Once again, this presents a stand-off between two visions. In one corner there is 
globalisation with its characteristically corporate capitalist large-scale expansion, and in the 
other the alternative notion that ‘another world is possible’ where people and the planet 
matter more than corporate profits. Two visions, worlds apart. This is notably well-illustrated 
with the contrast between the World Economic Forum and World Social Forum taking place 
each year. Each forum has its own notion on how to manage the growing concerns over food, 
land, water and resources. But both widely differ in their approach to handle the ‘Great 
Reckoning’ that the world faces in the first half of the twenty-first century; a general crisis 
that is rooted in new security threats such as population growth, climate change, 
environmental destruction, cultural clashes, growing rich-poor disparity and many other 
‘multidimensional predicaments of globalisation’ (Booth, 2007, pp. 1-2). 
 This chapter will slowly rise up from the particularities of food and security in the 
Yala Swamp, elevating the discussion to the structural problems at the core of the investor-
community conflict, and ultimately towards a more holistic assessment of the clashing 
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visions that instigate much of the tensions that has put the investor at odds with the local 
community. 
 
Food security 
By now it is no longer in question that the foreign investment in the Yala Swamp is fraught 
with a range of ambiguous problems and entrenched in a protracted, albeit presently subdued, 
conflict. At this stage it is wise to remind ourselves of the fundamental objective of the 
investment project: to boost Kenya’s food security – with the eventuality of lifting thousands 
of Kenyans out of poverty. So the main objective of significantly increasing food security in 
Kenya is what we turn to now. Accordingly, the key question we need to ask is whether 
Burgess has so far been successful in his mission to feed Kenya. Are his lush rice fields and 
innovative aquaculture in fact contributing to a reduction of hunger in Kenya? Similarly, 
what are the results of the foreign agricultural investment project in improving food security 
around the Yala Swamp? To answer these questions we must first establish the relevant food 
security context in Kenya to place Dominion Farms’ objectives as well as its food output into 
a country perspective.  
Against the backdrop of a series of food shortages that had plagued the country since 
its independence in 1963, the Kenya Government decided in the early 1980s that a serious 
effort had to be made towards achieving national food security (Olindo, 1992). Among many 
of the new policies enacted, one was aimed at “[encouraging] landowners, with river 
frontage, to make every effort to reclaim all the wetlands and swamps that may be adjacent to 
their land” (Olindo, 1992, p. 174). By the year 2007 the Kenya Government once again 
committed to developing a wholly new comprehensive national food and nutrition policy, at 
which time the Agricultural Sector Coordination Unit Programme Officer admitted that 
“despite the existence of food and nutrition policies since 1981, the situation has not 
improved [in Kenya]” (East African Standard, 2007). 
 In 2011 there were 10 million people suffering from chronic food insecurity and poor 
nutrition, while food assistance was required for between 2 and 4 million Kenyans (Republic 
of Kenya, 2011). The Global Hunger Index (GHI) confirms that Kenya has not made 
significant progress over the last decades in making its population more food secure. In fact, 
Kenya is the only East African country that has not made significant progress in the last 
decade – except for somewhat similar unimpressive results in Burundi and Mauritius (IFPRI, 
2012). But even earlier, since 1990, Kenya has steadily hovered around a GHI of 
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approximately 20, which is on the margin between ‘serious’ and ‘alarming’ food insecurity.  
Presently in 2012 Kenya’s GHI has slightly dropped to 19.3, but the proportion of 
undernourished in the country still steadily remains at 33 percent – only showing a brief dip 
to 32 percent in the period 1995-97 (IFPRI, 2012). 
These food insecurity figures superimpose a lifeless statistical landscape on Kenya’s 
dynamic national map. In other words, the above assessment of food security in Kenya – in 
its common interpretation as the availability and access to food – is an amalgamation of 
country-wide data and therein void of the individual realities of hunger and malnutrition. 
When we speak of Dominion Farms’ food production project with the laudable aim to 
significantly boost Kenya’s food security, it is generally assumed that the company’s 
performance should be assessed against a national framework. By using this type of 
assessment at the country level, Dominion Farm’s contribution to Kenya’s food security falls 
within the framework of a national level of analysis. NGOs and CSOs rightfully stress, 
however, that it is equally important to take stock of the impacts on local food security in 
Nyanza province and in particular amongst the communities living in the areas surrounding 
the swamp. Community Action for Nature Conservation (CANCO) asserts that the 
conversion of the Yala Swamp into farmland may boost national food security, but at the 
same time fails to enhance local human food security in the project area. Worse even, 
CANCO Director Hadley Becha cautions that in reality Dominion Farms may degrade local 
food security: 
 
You need purchasing power to buy the rice Dominion Farms produces, but where do 
the locals get purchasing power without a job? Formerly they could grow their own 
food, but now they can’t buy Dominion’s rice, so in effect the local food security is 
worse off. (Becha, personal communication, 1 April 2011) 
 
But CANCO is not against development, assures Becha. Even so, development in the Yala 
Swamp should equally focus on enhancing sustainable livelihoods instead of making the 
locals spectators of development. Becha’s colleague Patrick Muraguri says “if you are serious 
about increasing food security, you should educate and upgrade the local farmers” (personal 
communication, 1 April 2011). Their take on the development of the Yala Swamp is that 
there appears to be a trade-off between national economy and local livelihoods. 
There is also the occasional speculation that Dominion Farms may be telling tall tales 
about their commitment to improve Kenya’s food security. In reality, as some speculate, 
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Dominion Farms has only one objective: making profit. This line of reasoning propounds a 
fear that if Dominion’s ‘Prime Harvest’ rice would be more profitable when sold abroad, 
Burgess will not hesitate to forego the Kenyan domestic market for better returns elsewhere.   
At first sight it appears that most of these concerns are based upon unsubstantiated 
accounts that a large part of Dominion Farms’ rice is already directly exported to more 
profitable markets. Over the years many stories about the alleged export of rice have 
surfaced, some even wildly claiming the rice is produced to feed prisoners of the United 
States in Iraq. Still there has been no conclusive evidence that rice indeed has been exported 
outside of Kenya by Dominion Farms. Burgess steadfastly asserts that Dominion Farms has 
never exported rice, but sensibly notes that what happens to the rice after wholesale on 
Kenya’s domestic market is out of their control. Indeed, on at least one occasion some Prime 
Harvest rice has reportedly surfaced on a market in South Sudan. Still, most of the wild 
stories have a pertinacious character, but at the same time remain largely unverified. What 
can be verified, however, is the wide availability of Dominion Farms’ rice in Kenya. Most 
major supermarkets carry the Prime Harvest brand, and small kiosks all over Nyanza 
province have this highly regarded rice in stock.  
CANCO employs an interesting line of reasoning to support its claim that Dominion 
Farms is exporting most of the rice produced in the Yala Swamp. They reason that Dominion 
Farms production capacity can produce so much rice that it would simply floods the Kenyan 
market, so to make a profit most of the rice must be exported. The particular flaw here is a 
factual one, Dominion Farms may have a land-lease for 17,050 acres but only 7,000 acres 
were under production by the end of 2012, producing three tonnes of rice per acres per crop, 
with two crops per year. Burgess is confident, however, that by the end of 2013 the entire 
area will be reclaimed, “as now the land is drying out well and is much easier to clear off the 
papyrus” (personal communication, 6 December 2012). It is difficult to believe that 
somewhere down the line Dominion Farms would indeed produce more rice than the Kenyan 
market can absorb. There is a potential output of roughly 50,000 tonnes of rice per year once 
all swamp land is reclaimed and converted, but Burgess notes “many fields will also produce 
soy, sorghum, and maize but the possibility of producing all 17,050 acres in rice exists for a 
couple crops per year” (personal communication, 6 December 2012). Even at full production 
Burgess intends to remain with the current model of operation that provides domestically for 
the Kenyan market (personal communication, 6 December 2012). 
 Whereas Burgess maintains that no rice has been exported, it has certainly been an 
initial consideration. In the company’s first project proposal dating back to 2002 the idea of 
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exporting rice was an integral part of the plan: “high quality rice will be milled at the Lake 
Basin Kibos Rice Mill for local consumption and the export market” notes the report (The 
Dominion Group of Companies & Lake Basin Development Authority, 2002, p. 1). The 
proposal further lists as one of its five objectives: “increase crop production for domestic 
consumption and for export” (The Dominion Group of Companies & Lake Basin 
Development Authority, 2002, p. 7). In addition, the EIA (2005) lists five main objectives for 
the project in the Yala Swamp, including the following two: 
 
Increasing food production for both the local and export market, 
Increasing foreign exchange earnings through export. (Asunah, 2005, p. 3) 
 
But the worries over any potential export of Kenyan rice produced by Dominion Farms is 
perhaps unfounded, as it was recently announced that Burgess almost effortlessly launched 
another, substantially larger, rice operation in Nigeria. By the end of 2012 Burgess stated that 
the new project had the full backing of the Nigerian Government and that shipping of 
“massive amounts of equipment and machinery” was in progress. Moreover, construction has 
commenced and several Nigerians have been recruited as department heads, with another 50 
Nigerians selected and taken to Kenya for 6 months of training (personal communication, 6 
December 2012). 
Meanwhile in Kenya, the central Government seems very pleased with the progress 
Dominion Farms is making. Indeed, it knows all too well that many of its domestically 
managed rice schemes have only produced meagre results over the years, with some 
eventually even collapsing altogether (i.e. in Ahereo, West Kano, Tana River Delta). At the 
moment, the Kenya Government recognises and highly values private sector investment in 
increasing agricultural productivity in Kenya (Republic of Kenya, 2011). Hence, business and 
bureaucracy alike welcome the financial and technological capital of Dominion Farms that 
can make the rice project in the Yala swamp a national success story in boosting the 
country’s food security (Oywa, 2003). But also regionally there appears to be a growing 
recognition that poor technology is major cause of food insecurity in East Africa (Madoshi, 
2012). 
Indeed, the Global Harvest Initiative reported in 2012 that in Sub-Saharan Africa “the 
average annual growth in food demand is projected to be 2.83 percent per year from 2000 to 
2030, primarily due to population increase” (Global Harvest Initiative, 2012, p. 2). But at the 
same time the region’s total factor of agricultural productivity growth is projected to be 0.5 
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percent, thus leaving a significant ‘food demand gap’ (Global Harvest Initiative, 2012). The 
Global Agricultural Productivity report (2012) recommended appropriate and adaptable new 
technologies as the best way forward for smallholder farmers to close this gap, however, as 
Zarembka noted in relation to the Yala Swamp “rice is a capital intensive crop to develop and 
it is clear that all the savings of all the people in the region would not be sufficient to develop 
even a modest, shareholding rice cooperative” (Zarembka, 2010). Zarembka certainly touches 
upon one of the key problems, the lack of adequate capital and financing.  
 
The problem then is not “superstitious and traditional” people as Burgess claims, ... 
With proper inputs and developments, Africa can clearly feed itself and sell its 
surpluses to such agriculturally marginal places as the Middle East. (Zarembka, 
2010) 
 
Structural problems 
After detailing the various concerns of the local community and discussing some of the 
environmental apprehensions, we can now move into a deeper critical analysis of the 
intricacies surrounding the development project. As we will see, most of the current and past 
conflicts over Dominion Farms’ development of the Yala Swamp can be traced back to five 
structural problems: the absence of transparent policies and procedures, deficient 
communication, cultural misunderstanding and social insensitivity, political involvement, and 
historical socio-ethnic divides. 
Initially, in the early days of the investment, expectations of economic, agricultural, 
and infrastructural benefits became widespread in the local communities. But as we have 
seen, mismanagement of community expectations and dubious political involvement created 
unrealistically high hopes, which ultimately resulted in tension and conflict when the 
expected benefits did not materialise. 
 
The absence of transparent policies and contracts 
In a study on land deals in Africa, Cotulo (2011) specifically explores a range of legal 
documents that enable or contractually facilitate land leases. Now that little was known of the 
exact terms of many land deals, Cotulo’s specific interest was in answering the question 
‘what is in the contracts?’ (Cotula, 2011, p. 5). As suspected by many commentators, the 
study found that: 
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Negotiations usually happen behind closed doors. Only rarely do local landholders 
have a say in those negotiations. Few contracts are publicly available. Yet, together 
with applicable national and international law, contracts define the terms of an 
investment project, and the way risks, costs and benefits are distributed. (Cotula, 
2011, p. 5) 
 
The common veil of secrecy surrounding the negotiation of land deals – as well as the usually 
confidential nature of its terms, obligations and benefits – unquestionable throws up the first 
structural problem in mitigating tensions over large-scale land leases. If the negotiated terms 
and procedures as well as relevant policies are not transparent to the general public – let alone 
accessible; speculation and rumour will soon become rife. Indeed, what can be expected from 
affected parties that are not directly and transparently informed about anticipated 
development projects, and have no recourse to publicly available documentation about the 
projects that will significantly affect their lives? Similarly, the confidential nature of these 
contracts makes it problematic for outsiders to verify whether projects in the first place 
confirm with environmental guidelines, national policies and international regulations. But it 
also throws up the challenge of ascertaining that projects have proper management and 
(social) responsibility plans in place, as well as remain to operate within the terms of 
reference and contractual obligations. 
 Gathering the relevant documents pertaining to the land lease of Dominion Farms was 
not an easy feat. While Burgess certainly facilitated access to the Farms’ headquarters, staff 
and several personal progress reports, Dominion’s business plan and contractual documents 
about the exact terms of reference for the project remained elusive. The business plan turned 
out to be an ‘internal document’ and thus not publically available. Later, however, one 
activist shared somewhat hushly a copy of the business plan he had obtained by some means.  
Inspecting the company’s contracts turned out easier said than done whilst visiting 
Dominion Farms. The contracts were supposed to be at the Farm, but unfortunately turned 
out not to be readily available. In a subsequent email requesting additional information and 
copies of the contracts, assurance was again made that all contracts are readily available at 
the company’s headquarters in Kenya. Still, it was merely by coincidence that during an 
interview with one of the CBOs in Kisumu copies of the two Memorandums of 
Understanding for the project suddenly turned up. Looking at these documents, the first MoU 
with the LBDA refrains from explicitly setting out its confidential nature, yet the MoU with 
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the Siaya and Bondo County Council clearly posits that “[the] document and all related 
documents shall be confidential” (MoU, 2003b). The subsequent land lease (Republic of 
Kenya, 2004a) also abstains from explicitly coining the confidential nature of the deal, yet for 
what it’s worth the preceding MoU had already declared all related documents as 
confidential. It should be noted, though, that the land lease contract concluded in 2004 only 
covers about half of the currently leased land allocation. Hence, an additional contract has 
subsequently been closed for the remaining land allocation and also extending the lease 
period to 45 years, unfortunately no copies are publically available. 
Requesting documents from government authorities proved to be even more daunting, 
generally requiring the researcher to submit official requests and complete many forms. It 
suffices to note, that these hurdles effectively close off (easy) access to the general public. 
Hence, it should be noted that only with great persistence and a level-headed approach some 
of the contracts and its terms and conditions can be obtained. This leaves us to conclude that 
average local residents will most likely not be able to affirm for themselves what exactly is in 
the contract(s). It must be noted, though, that Burgess maintains “[that] hundreds of copies of 
the MoU were given out to the public by Dominion” (Burgess, personal communication, 27 
February 2013). Even so, the opaque nature and inaccessibility of the land deal’s terms can 
build tensions and cause severe dismay, as evidenced by the previously described explosion 
of community anger in April 2008. Apart from the question whether or not most protestors 
ever had a chance to see the actual MoU they so fiercely protested against, they still claimed 
the existing agreement was unfair and they were left out in the terms and benefits described 
in the MoU. 
 With no access to the documents outlining the responsibilities and obligations of 
Dominion Farms, it is understandably difficult for third parties to assess whether the 
company genuinely and structurally endeavours to bring benefit to the local community or if 
it merely shows some goodwill whenever the situation becomes tense. The leaked copy of 
Dominion’s internal business plan – which was developed together with the LBDA – does 
not explicitly address Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) nor specifically outline how the 
community will benefit from the project. Admittedly, the business plan succinctly lists a 
number of ‘benefits to the LBDA, Government of Kenya and the People of Kenya’ which 
include in particular: 
 
- Provision of employment opportunities, improved standards of living and alleviation 
of poverty; 
219 
 
- The development of an education centre, community centre, healthcare facility, clean 
water and washing facilities for the staff living within the project; 
(The Dominion Group of Companies & Lake Basin Development Authority, 2002) 
 
But, as CANCO contends, without specification (with details such as management, timeline, 
costs, etc...) these proposed community benefits are merely acts of goodwill instead of well-
defined elements of a proper CSR policy. CANCO observed that presently the 
implementation of the above listed benefits depends upon the goodwill and mood of the farm 
manager, but a well-defined CSR policy ought to be adhered to regardless of who the farm 
manager is at any given time (personal communication, 1 April 2011). 
There is no question that decent contracts, transparent procedures, and proper CSR 
policies are important tools to aid land deals in making a positive impact on the community 
and environment. But as we have come to see in the Yala Swamp, even without some of 
these mechanisms land deals can offer a number of community benefits – albeit somewhat 
limited and opportunistic in nature. At the same time strong and effective legal frameworks 
are required to hold investors accountable and ensure obligations are fulfilled (Cotula, 2011, 
p. 10).  
A striking example of Dominion Farms’ goodwill is the promise to build an education 
centre (aka. Youth Centre, Kenya Youth Camp or Dominion Vocational Training Center). 
The purpose of this Youth Centre will be to train the youth of Kenya in modern agricultural 
practices. Initially the construction of the training centre was funded by the Eagle Sky 
Foundation of Oklahoma City, which according to their online mission-statement is a 
specialist in building “a unique retreat environment where everyone is challenged to grow in 
their faith and relationship with Jesus Christ”. However, during the first phase of the 
construction the Foundation elected to rather concentrate on its existing projects in the United 
States. Dominion Farms subsequently committed to pay for the necessary costs to complete 
construction and made plans to begin operating the education centre. However, by early 2011 
the project had been put on hold. Burgess explained that the company’s priority was to first 
reclaim the swamp, grow rice, and start generating income – which in turn would finance the 
completion of the centre. Nonetheless, discussions are ongoing with another Christian 
volunteer organisation, Youth With A Mission, to run the centre. There is certainly no lack of 
intention and goodwill to bring benefits to the community, however as CANCO observed, 
these occasional spurs of goodwill can hardly be called a CSR policy. 
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Deficient communication and engagement 
In the absence of transparent information about the development plans and day-to-day 
operation of Dominion Farms, it should not come as a surprise that rumours and dubious 
stories about ‘the development project of an American investor in the Yala Swamp’ have 
spread far and wide. It is therefore not rare to encounter implausible and sometimes 
astonishing stories about Dominion Farms in Kenyan newspapers. These dubious media 
reports focus in general on the undesirable and damaging consequences of the development 
of the Yala Swamp, but hardly ever substantiate their claims with factual evidence. 
Newspapers are unfortunately considered by many Kenyans as a relatively genuine source of 
information. Amisi (2006b) therefore contends that “the trouble [with Dominion] is purely a 
matter of public relations gone sour”, though it should have become apparent by now that the 
situation is certainly more complex than merely mismanagement of public relations. 
Nonetheless, the lack of structural communications about the company’s operation and 
planning, and equally the stream of uninformed reports about ‘neo-colonialism’ in the Yala 
Swamp, has created an environment of mutual distrust and suspicion. With this in mind, 
Pearce is spot on when he says “a lot of nonsense has been talked about the swamp since 
Burgess arrived” (Pearce, 2012, p. 50). 
It is distressing to observe that a fundamental level of communication between the 
investor, communities, government and third parties (NGOs, CBOs, media) today remains a 
key weakness in the appreciation and understanding of this agricultural development project. 
On all sides of the conflict it seems that parties are not interested, motivated or willing to 
engage in proper dialogue on the issues at hand. Either they tried once before and failed to 
achieve the desired result or plainly take it for granted that the other side is not interested or 
unwilling to engage. Oywa (2008), for instance, maintains that “Mr Burges does not want to 
meet local leaders to address the teething issues”. Burgess on the other hand asserts that his 
management team met regularly with the local leaders and all qualms have been discussed; 
instead he deems the misgivings and false allegations to be the work of ‘faceless’ activists 
that aim to rally the locals against the company. By the end of 2012 Burgess believes that 
most of the ‘faceless’ activists have disappeared, with only one county councilman 
occasionally causing problems – although he too has recently not been seen any more since 
facing court over an incitement indictment that occurred in 2011 (personal communication, 6 
December 2012). 
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There is certainly no denying that local residents rely quite heavily on information 
provided by CBOs, NGOs and environmental organisations that work in the region. For many 
locals the information fed to them by these activists makes up all they know about the foreign 
investor’s operations. All the worse, most activists and their organisations do not directly 
communicate with Dominion Farms, and thus are short on firsthand factual information and 
rely regularly on hearsay. Compounding the situation further is the fact that the investor 
seems to have given up on actively providing third parties with factual information on their 
operations now that the press about Dominion Farms remains so negative. More so, Burgess 
expressed no longer to be concerned with the ongoing stream of negative press. He remarks 
that NGOs have little idea of what is actually going on here, “[their] opposition to our work 
comes and goes, but we’re still here” (personal communication, 12 March 2011). This is an 
unfortunate outcome, as a more pro-active communication and engagement strategy could 
clear up many of the misunderstandings.  
The deficiency in communication becomes more evident in each additional 
conversation with one of the affected or involved parties. There is a general lack of factual 
information about the project. Accounts differ widely over the size, plans, activities, level of 
investment, employment opportunities, environmental impact, and community involvement. 
The absence of elementary communication channels is painstakingly evident in many aspects 
of the conflict. For one, we have seen how the KWS admits to have scarcely no information 
about water quality and management in the Yala Swamp. And, suggesting that reports from 
another government authority may be ‘compromised’, signals a deep-rooted degree of distrust 
and suspicion. Furthermore there is the matter of community expectations. With no hard and 
vast written promises, management plans and timelines, the community (and third-party 
observers) have ineffective means to hold the investor rightfully accountable. Instead, 
Dominion Farms is unjustly held accountable for all promises – even unrealistic pledges 
made by politicians on behalf of the investor. 
 The foreign investor is often blamed for a cultural insensitive approach and failure to 
engage the traditional inhabitants of the area in the project. Wazungu (foreigners) do not 
grasp the local African context, is often heard. While this may be true, the KWS has 
demonstrated that even well-respected domestic actors are prone to make the same mistakes. 
In the gazettement of the Kanyaboli Reserve the KWS seemed to have followed Dominion 
Farms in its footsteps. The Reserve was established through mere interaction with the County 
Council and failed to engage the local community. Only realising their mistake after the 
gazettement notice was published and communities had displayed clear discontent with the 
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situation, the KWS felt obliged to initiate workshops to ‘sensitise’ and calm down the local 
residents. 
 
Cultural misunderstanding and insensitivity 
Besides unclear management plans and serious communication deficiencies, we have also 
seen various examples of cultural misunderstanding and social insensitivity which form the 
third structural problem underlying the Yala Swamp’s entrenched conflict. Most parties, 
either directly or indirectly involved in the conflict, appear to operate under a different 
cultural, social or economic appreciation of what amounts to ‘development’.  
The investor’s mode of operation is based on the perspective that large-scale 
economies with industrial-size production engenders the most efficient business model to 
develop the swamp, alleviate regional poverty and boost food security in Kenya. This 
approach markedly requires enormous investment in the construction of infrastructure, which 
is propounded by the investor as a type of development which at the end of the day also 
benefits the local communities. 
Local residents are generally divided on the matter of ‘development’. While most 
communities in principle agree that there is a need to develop the region, there is 
disagreement over the type of development and whether investment and development ought 
to be a domestic affair. Those who do welcome the idea of foreign investment, however, 
often oppose the type of development Dominion Farms practises; arguing its benefits for the 
local community are far too limited. On the whole there is an appreciation that Dominion’s 
large-scale industrial food production indeed improves food security, yet there are strong 
feelings that a more inclusive approach that engages small-scale farmers could have resulted 
in a similar boost in food production but also would have generated significantly more 
benefits for the surrounding communities. Later we will consider in more detail this ‘clash of 
visions’.  
Then there are those who strongly believe that development ought to be a domestic 
affair. Surely they recognise the decades of underdevelopment plaguing Nyanza province – 
evident in its staggering poverty level – but steadfastly remain of the belief that 
infrastructural development, access to education, and employment opportunities are matters 
to be addressed by the Kenya Government. The main fear is losing control and (again) 
succumbing to foreign exploitation, perhaps not a surprising stance in a country with such a 
rich colonial history. What’s more, local residents of the rural areas surrounding the Yala 
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Swamp find it difficult to accept that a foreign investor may be better equipped, or simply 
more willing, to provide this type of development. Even so, urban residents of Kisumu, 
regional church leaders, and even national politicians have staunchly defended the project. 
They stood up to emphasise, on the contrary, the invaluable significance and array of benefits 
Dominion Farms brings to Nyanza province. 
Wildlife conservationists and environmental organisations argue that development 
should preserve the natural habitat and biodiversity of the wetland and should therefore focus 
on stimulating the construction of eco-tourism facilities. In fact, there is no wrong or right 
way of understanding ‘development’, yet ignoring or demeaning other perceptions too easily 
brings about the tension so characteristic to the conflict in the Yala Swamp. 
 
Box 4: Cultural Barriers? 
In two sturdy four-wheel drives we leave Dominion’s administrative 
compound for a tour of the Farm. A right turn onto a murram road 
leads us to the farm’s main gate. A security-checkpoint is swiftly 
cleared upon the guard’s sight of Calvin Burgess. We continue onto 
the reclaimed swamp grounds on which Dominion now grows its 
famous ‘Prime Harvest’ rice.  
 
In the distance two massive green John Deere tractors work the 
reclaimed land, “laser-levelling the rice fields”, explains Calvin. 
We make our way to the southern end of the farm where Calvin 
proudly shows us the rehabilitated weir and the fish ponds 
Dominion constructed to practise aquaculture. 
 
We stand under a hot beaming sun, literally on the Equator, and 
admire the vast views of Dominion’s rice paddies. Awed by the 
sheer magnitude of Dominion’s operations, Calvin gives us a 
moment to take it all in, and then starts a story to illustrate the 
difficulty they have encountered in sharing technology and working 
together with the local community. 
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“A couple of years ago Dominion gave one of the local farmers the 
opportunity to work with the latest technology and agricultural 
knowledge. It was a demonstration to show the farmers that with 
our technology and assistance they could significantly increase 
their yields. So I agreed with this local farmer that we would divide 
his plot in two equal parts. On one side he would grow maize 
according to our instructions, and on the others side he would farm 
and grow maize in his own traditional way. To make the experiment 
feasible Dominion Farms financed the project by loaning the farmer 
the funds required for inputs and equipment. After harvesting the 
maize we took a look at what he had produced. His own way of 
farming had yielded two bags of maize, and Dominion’s way of 
farming had yielded 22 bags of maize. The farmer was very pleased 
with the high returns and sold all his maize. He effortlessly repaid 
his loan to Dominion and ended up making quite some money out of 
the operation. The following year we once again gave him the 
option to farm his land with our support, but now we told him to 
farm the whole plot it anyway he liked. Soon it became clear that he 
was indeed farming the whole plot again, but in his own traditional 
way… You can lead a calf (or person) to water, but you cannot 
force him to drink.” (Calvin Burgess, personal communication, 10 
March 2011/6 December 2012) 
 
The above story about cultural barriers is used by Burgess to demonstrate that knowledge and 
technology transfer is sometimes easier said than done. He found that in particular the ‘older 
generations’ have greater difficulty in changing their ways of farming, now that their culture 
and tradition has a solid grip on their ability to change. It is precisely for that reason that 
Burgess believes real change should come from investing in the education of the youth. 
Hence the construction of the aforementioned Youth Centre that should make modern 
farming practises available to younger generations. 
Various other instances of cultural misunderstanding and insensitivity have 
contributed to the friction between community and investor. For one there was the outright 
dismissal by the investor of the ‘backward’ animist religions that had long played an 
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important role in the cultural identity of local communities. This had the unsavoury outcome 
that on one of the locations considered sacred by the locals Burgess ordered a Christian 
pastor to ‘cleanse it of evil’ and then decorated the hill with a large white cross. While 
Burgess insists he did the right thing by combating local witchcraft, it is not surprising that 
the locals feel their religion has been mocked and a great cultural injustice has been done. 
 Another example of misunderstanding and insensitivity is related to Dominion Farms’ 
provision of water-pumps and washrooms to replace conventional bathing and water 
collection from the river and canals. Some activists argue that these ‘modern facilities’ 
actually forces local residents to give up the traditional practises, and if given the opportunity 
they all would rather prefer to go back to the way things were. It turns out, however, that in 
reality the majority of residents seem to prefer the modern facilities over traditional practises. 
Surprisingly maybe, the cultural misunderstanding here comes at the account of the activists. 
 
Political involvement  
Political involvement has been an extremely volatile factor in the development of the Yala 
Swamp by Dominion Farms. It was already long before Dominion Farms arrived on the 
shores of Lake Victoria that Riedmiller (1994) observed how increasing land pressures on the 
densely populated periphery of the swamp had prompted politicians to take a stand in the 
debate on the development of the swamp (see: Okondo, 1989). Thus it is hardly a surprise 
that (aspiring) politicians facilitated the negotiations over the lease between Dominion Farms, 
the LBDA and the County Councils, and subsequently tried to get a stake in the project. Up 
to a point it is understandable that local politicians considered securing foreign investment as 
the key to finally bring development to their poverty-stricken Nyanza province – a region 
habitually ignored by Kenya’s central government. One example is the involvement of 
former Kisumu MP Reverend Ken Nyagudi who was Dominion’s Kenyan face in the early 
days of the investment, and according to Janak (2011) “[drew] through a religious outfit ... 
thousands of followers who believed they would get instant and long term benefits from this 
multi-billion project”. But also the good relationship with current Prime-Minister Raila 
Odinga, who is from Kisumu, has raised suspicion with observers and commentators. When 
asked, however, Burgess avows that Raila Odgina had no role in any of the negotiations over 
the land lease (personal communication, 6 December 2012). But to a certain degree the 
political realm has to be considered in relation to ethnicity, which in turn relates to the 
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previously mentioned stand-off between the Kikuyu and Luo – an issue at the root of the fifth 
structural problem, to which we will turn next. 
Yet, as we have seen, the structural problem of political involvement began when 
politicians (and other influential individuals) made promises and pledges on behalf of the 
investor. Furthermore, after failing to get a stake in the project, some politicians resorted to 
using their position and office to demand support – mostly financial – from Dominion Farms 
to convince their constituencies of the positive nature of the investor’s project. When bribery 
and corruption was resolutely denounced by Burgess, some politicians swiftly did the 
opposite and incited their constituencies against Dominion’s project.  
 Politicians on the campaign trail especially proved to engage in precarious practises. 
Depending on their agenda, they have been found to fire up voters to either support 
agricultural production in the Yala Swamp by making – often hollow – promises or by 
vowing to shut down the whole project and get rid of foreign exploitation. Their behaviour 
has been erratic, jumping forth and back between support and opposition to the development 
in the Yala Swamp. This appears to have been one of the factors playing into the mistrust and 
lack of communication as described previously.  
Interestingly, all of the parties affected or embroiled in the conflict identify political 
involvement as one of the root causes for the protracted conflict. Unfortunately there has 
been a lot of politics surrounding the project, which “has split the local representatives into 
various camps” (Kenya Land Alliance, 2006, p. 7). But especially the local residents are 
disgruntled over the relationship between the company and politicians, generally feeling 
sidelined by their representatives (Oywa, 2008). 
 
A historical socio-ethnic divide 
The last structural problem is not very visible throughout most of the conflict, but certainly 
underpins some of the erratic decisions and volatile protests that rocked the Yala Swamp. As 
touched upon earlier, a majority of the Luo population in Nyanza seems to live with a great 
sense of historical injustice along socio-ethnic lines with the Kikuyu, mostly from the Central 
province. We have seen that Kenya’s first President Kenyatta (a Kikuyu) structurally 
neglected and underdeveloped Nyanza province after disputes and a serious fall-out with his 
Vice-President Jaramogi Oginga Odinga (a Luo) in the late 1960s. But the fear that the 
Kikuyu want to dominate other Kenyans dates even further back, to colonial times. 
According to Wa Wamwere, the British colonialists forbade Kenyans to politically organise 
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themselves on an interethnic basis, allowing only single-community political parties (Wa 
Wamwere, 2003, p. 132). Even so, groups that sought independence were swiftly demonized 
by the British. The Kikuyu were especially eager to liberate themselves from the colonial 
bondage, they were significantly more displaced and affected by the influx of European 
settlers than the nomadic peoples in the north and Luo on the edge of Lake Victoria 
(Azevedo, 1993, p. 48). Consequently their resistance movement, the now famous Mau Mau 
rebels, were not simply portrayed by the British as Kikuyu freedom fighters, rather they were 
painted as power-hungry Kikuyu with the desire to dominate and take over other Kenyan 
communities (Wa Wamwere, 2003, p. 133). Thus, as Wa Wamwere poignantly concludes, 
“the colonialist-engineered fear that the [K]ikuyu wanted and still seek to dominate other 
Kenyans , rules Kenyan politics to this day” (Wa Wamwere, 2003, p. 133). 
Unfortunately, today Nyanza province remains poverty-stricken and lags seriously 
behind in development, which has becomes a deep-rooted frustration for Nyanza’s 
predominantly Luo population. Hence, there was a grateful welcoming of the foreign investor 
by Nyanza’s business and religious leaders as well as their hard-hitting reaction against the 
government’s decision to put the development to a hold for further environmental inspection 
is perhaps best explained with Gurr’s principle of relative deprivation (Gurr, 1970). This 
principle describes the discrepancy between what people perceive they deserve (value 
expectations) and what they actually can get (value capabilities) (Gurr, 1970, pp. 24-25). In 
the case of Nyanza’s neglect and underdevelopment the most relevant version of this 
principle is ‘aspirational deprivation’, which posits that relative deprivation occurs when 
value expectations rise while capabilities remain the same. Thus while the rest of Kenya has 
received since independence regular domestic investment and development boosts, the Luo in 
Nyanza were mostly left out. Yet they took note of their fellow Kenyans’ increased value 
capabilities in the form of welfare, security, self-actualisation, education, and so forth. Hence, 
it is these discrepancies that capture the essence of the Luo grievances, sense of injustice and 
state of mind. But to understand their protests and ‘rebellion’ the identification of relative 
deprivation is only a first step; a deeper comprehension of their grievances is required by 
“[examining] where people stand in society and what goods and bads they experience” (Gurr, 
2011). 
Kenya’s socio-ethnic history provides a structural foundation within which these 
grievances are experienced, which allows us to understand how the Luo ethnic group 
perceives their standing in Kenyan society. Based on this ‘big picture’ we can come to 
understand how the Luo people interpret their situation as one of relative deprivation and 
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explains their eagerness to attract investment – be it foreign or domestic. But, as Gurr points 
out, it is also important to assess “the balance between discontented people’s capacity to 
act—that is, the ways in which they are organized—and the government’s capacity to repress 
or channel their anger” (Gurr, 2011). Long the Luo had not much to fight for, but when an 
American investor set foot on their soil with millions of dollars to invest, people scrambled to 
organise themselves to defend ‘their’ investment and ensure that this new project would not 
fail. Notably, failure of investment and development in the Yala Swamp was notorious – with 
no real benefits coming out of the projects that started in the 1950s until Dominion Farms 
project came into operation. 
No wonder that the Luo sentiment against the Government, and particular against the 
Kikuyu, is harsh at times; illustrative is this excerpt from an online article: 
 
Action Aid Kenya is a Kikuyu mouth piece, being run by cronies of the corrupt 
elements in the Kenya government. Action Aid excels in maintaining Luos poverty 
status quo. Action Aid raises funds worldwide to create posh jobs, and lucrative living 
allowances for their top officials, through the impoverishment of the Luo Widows, 
Aids orphans and other pandemics facing Luos. When Luos are poor and miserable, 
Action Aid makes money. (Otura, 2007) 
 
It must be noted that the above excerpt from an opinion article is signed by Reverend Okoth 
Otura, a Luo who apparently wrote the piece whilst employed at the ‘Humanitarian and 
Spiritual Division’ of Dominion Farms. Burgess, however, states that Okoth Otura was never 
employed at Dominion Farms but only occasionally arranged community meeting for which 
merely his expenses were covered (personal communication, 6 December 2012). But Burgess 
is aware that Okoth Otura fervently defended the farm before he moved to Canada. While 
there may be some conflict of interest at play, the above excerpt certainly delineates one of 
the Luo grievances. It is revealing to see how some Luo interpret the activities of the anti-
poverty NGO ActionAid Kenya, as a ‘Kikuyu mouth piece’ run by the government with the 
aim of maintaining the status quo of neglect and underdevelopment in Nyanza. The 
businessmen, religious leaders and more entrepreneurial urbanites from Nyanza province 
have a distinctly different view on development and foreign investment from the local 
communities and rural residents that actually live around the Yala Swamp. The former group 
welcomes the foreign dollars and sees it as their long-last opportunity to get even with the 
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rest of Kenya, while the latter bears the brunt of losing access to ‘their land’ and rightfully 
questions the modus operandi of the investor.  
The socio-ethnic divide and sense of relative deprivation thus explain why it was 
predominantly the Luo urbanites that so quickly mobilised to set up large scale protests when 
three Ministers blocked Dominion Farms investment in the Yala Swamp in late 2003. They 
perceived the Ministeries’ cease-and-desists letter to Dominion Farms as yet another ploy by 
President Mwai Kibaki’s Kikuyu government to withheld investment and development from 
Nyanza province. 
 
A clash of visions 
With five structural problems identified that elucidate the roots of the conflict surrounding 
Dominion Farms’ development of the Yala Swamp, the next step is to analyse these problems 
within the specific frameworks of food, security, and land that have been discussed in the 
previous chapters. In a study on conflict, environment and poverty in the Yala Swamp, von 
Post (2006) has made a start with analysing how these problems cause the protracted conflict. 
Von Post identified two ‘incompatible goals’ that she contends to be the main drivers of the 
conflict between the investor and community: employment and access to land. Indeed, the 
(perceived) lack of employment opportunities as well as restrictions in land access has put the 
investor at odds with the community. But as the previous chapters have revealed in detail, the 
situation is far more complex with certainly more than two ‘incompatible goals’. 
What’s more, the root of this ‘incompatibility’ is not so much a matter of different 
goals – in fact, many of the goals are not per se incompatible. Instead, it is the way in which 
these goals are hoped to be achieved where a discord emerges. Indeed, most of the involved 
parties genuinely try to make a positive difference, yet all follow their own agenda and work 
within their own terms of reference. Whether these agendas are shrouded in secrecy or 
transparently known to all hardly makes a difference, it is rather the philosophy of what 
amounts to ‘a better world’ that sets one approach distinctively apart from the other. In other 
words, the structural problems encountered in the development of the Yala Swamp are not 
simply a matter of ‘incompatible goals’. Rather, their origin should be sought in the notion of 
a so-called ‘clash of visions’ – as outlined in chapter 1 and further discussed in subsequent 
chapters. 
At the outset the reclamation of the swamp is easily perceived as a manifestation of 
the cultural vision described earlier in chapter 1 as the ‘reckless man’, in which innovative 
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methods are employed to seize large chunks of the world to reap personal benefit, without 
consideration for the other. Indeed, many commentators have labelled Dominion Farms’ 
project a ‘land grab’, arguing that it does nothing but generate a profit for the investor. 
However, upon closer inspection we have found unambiguous indicators that demonstrate 
why this particular instance of foreign agricultural investment is not merely a ‘land grab’ in 
the standard derogative description. While there are certainly some elements that mirror the 
despised land grab practice, at its core this foreign investment project is founded upon a well-
intended objective that fundamentally drives the project to improve the level of food security 
in Kenya and alleviate poverty. With this in mind, Dominion Farms’ food production project 
is closer aligned to what was described as the vision of the ‘scientist’, in which a problem-
solving approach is utilised to improve upon the existing world. In fact, Dominion Farms’ 
reclamation and food production project in the Yala Swamp is by and large rooted in the 
problem-solving approach, namely, it offers technical solutions that are designed to increase 
food production and availability on a large scale in Kenya. The company’s approach can thus 
be classified as ‘private sector problem-solving’ that focuses on developing a program that 
makes use of scientific knowledge and modern technology to improve the existing world. 
This framework of the ‘Why Dichotomy’ as described in chapter 1, should, however, 
not be employed as either/or framing of characteristics. Instead, any individual or 
organisation most likely exhibits traits and qualities from any of its four quadrants, though 
some may be more prominently evident than others. As a company, Dominion Farms 
certainly has a strong foundation in the scientific problem-solving approach. But there are 
also perceptible elements of the ‘reckless man’ approach, which are apparent in the 
company’s meagre interest in the traditional lives of the community and lacklustre 
recognition of the original qualities of the wetland. Moreover, it has a strong inclination to 
believe that the scientific and modern agricultural practices it brings to the Yala Swamp 
represent the singular appropriate approach to improve food security in Kenya – and more 
generally and subtle, that its own cultural and religious beliefs are the one right way to live. 
Up to a point, even the ‘helpless man’ paradigm sporadically makes an ephemeral 
appearance, for instance, when the locals are looked at in disbelief for their ‘backward’ and 
‘nineteenth century’ lifestyle. But the ‘helpless man’ in Dominion Farms is never feeble or 
unable; after a pithy ‘culture shock’ rationality soon summons the ‘scientist’ to come up with 
a program – occasionally thoughtless or insensitive but certainly well-meant – to improve the 
lives of what the company sees as the bona fide underprivileged helpless local men and 
women. 
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But, contrary to common belief, the company certainly ought to get credit for its 
consideration of alternative approaches to the standard scientific problem-solving approach it 
generally relies on. In the early days, Dominion Farms was wholeheartedly determined to 
collaborate and partner with, as well as offer education to, the local small-scale farmers. 
Some early collaborative attempts with the local communities unfortunately failed to deliver 
constructive common ground to further build upon. Then, years of lingering tension and 
flares of conflict with the local community followed. Presently it seems that the enthusiasm 
for critical thought to develop alternative ways to alleviate local poverty and food insecurity 
has diminished significantly. The protracted conflict has ultimately resulted in a situation 
devoid of any more willingness at the side of the investor to step outside of the problem-
solving comfort zone. Yet, there is no doubt that Dominion Farms initially showed great 
commitment to community involvement, for instance with its development of its ‘Youth 
Centre’ – designed to welcome young Kenyans and educate them in sound agricultural 
practices and give them spiritual guidance. Admittedly, the plans for the Youth Centre were 
closer to a ‘program’ than to a genuine alternative ‘vision’ – meaning that the curriculum 
appeared to focus on conveying cultural and religious Western values to reveal the ‘one right 
way to live’ instead of embracing a critical vision founded upon the idea that Western and 
indigenous Kenyan thought, culture and agricultural practices could learn a lot from each 
other. More wholesome critical thought could have envisaged an alternative vision by 
developing a curriculum focused on building bridges instead of enlightening the ‘backward’ 
local youth. It is unfortunate that the Youth Centre, and as it seems most other alternative 
approaches, have been suspended indefinitely. 
At the end of 2012, the characterising paradigm for Dominion Farms’ large-scale rice 
and fish production operation is certainly the problem-solving approach. Now, what does this 
approach hold for the future of both the country and the local communities? And, what are 
the alternatives? To explore these questions we will proceed by topically discussing the 
various fundamental clashes in the Yala Swamp and identify how they shed light on 
underlying different visions on the future of food, land, and security. 
These clashing visions are generally best described as a contemporary strong push of 
foreign agribusiness investors for profitable investment in African agriculture versus the land 
rights and rural livelihoods of traditional owners/occupants of the land. In Kenya, however, 
there has also been stark domestic debate around the development of the Yala Swamp. 
Hence, with the history of the reclamation in mind, the objectives of Dominion Farms and the 
ongoing domestic discussion, there is clearly more to this protracted conflict than just a ‘neo-
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colonial’ land grab to fill the pockets of the investor. There are a number of areas in which 
different visions are at odds with each other. Pretty much all the problems surrounding the 
reclamation of the Yala Swamp essentially boil down to one fundamental matter: one’s vision 
of the purpose and use of the Yala Swamp. Making the intricate problems of the development 
of the swamp manifestations of these clashing visions. 
 For one, there is the most principal question over the actual need for development in 
the Yala Swamp (and Nyanza province in general), followed by which shape or form this 
should take. As OSIENALA notes, there are principally two schools of thought: one 
emphasises the agricultural value of putting the swamp’s fertile soils under production, while 
the other stresses the importance of preserving the unique natural habitat of the wetland 
(OSIENALA, 1998). At first sight it may seem a simple matter of development advocates 
versus anti-development campaigners. And indeed, much of the debate has become extremely 
polarised along these lines. The Kenya Land Alliance perhaps best typifies the situation by 
noting that “raising any issue on the project however genuine it may be, one is quickly 
branded as falling in the pro or anti-Dominion alignment” (Kenya Land Alliance, 2006, p. 7). 
In turn, the ‘Dominion alignment’ is often equated with a pro-development stance, while the 
‘community alignment’ is associated with an anti-development attitude. But, as usual, the 
situation has in reality a greater degree of complexity. In fact, the majority of all actors 
affected by or somehow involved with the reclamation of the Yala Swamp claims to be pro-
development, but of course on their own terms. With hardly anyone identifying as profoundly 
anti-development, the difference of visions is in the details. But almost as a rule, the 
complexities in the debate about the pros and cons of development are acknowledged merely 
in private conversation and by and large forsworn in public discussion. In a way, Pearce 
implicitly does exactly this when he says “for Burgess the swamp is useless, empty boggy 
land; for [the community] it is a valuable resource” (Pearce, 2012, p. 49). These types of 
statements frame the debate as a simple matter of foreign-imposed development of ‘useless, 
empty boggy land’ versus an irrevocable anti-development rhetoric of the locals. 
When we set aside the principal question about the purpose of development, and 
assume that some form of agricultural development is welcome, another fundamental 
dichotomy is revealed. What type of agricultural development will boost food security, and 
for whom? With the continuous expanding reclamation of swamp land and conversion into 
productive farmland, Dominion Farms’ food production will increasingly play a more 
significant role in boosting Kenya’s national level of food security. At the same time the 
company’s operations will continue to impact on the future food availability and access to 
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land for the local communities in the Yala Swamp area. As seen throughout the previous 
chapters, the dichotomy here is stark. On the one hand the large-scale foreign agricultural 
investment project is making a noteworthy contribution to domestic rice production – and 
there is a similar potential for tilapia production. But the approach is based upon highly-
mechanised, industrial farming that leaves limited space for (full-scale) local employment. 
The company rightfully prides itself in hiring and educating Kenyans to operate the farm, but 
the scale of employment is hardly what the local communities desire. Thus, this agribusiness 
approach has the potential to produce large volumes of rice and fish that will contribute to the 
country’s national level of food security. On the other hand many locals and community 
activists point out that an overall increase in food security at the national level is not likely to 
translate in a similar increase in local food security. Restricted access to land, unemployment, 
and a lack of (promised) infrastructural development will see the local communities stay poor 
or in some cases actually fall into poverty. So in terms of food security, the agribusiness 
approach to the development of the Yala Swamp increases food production and availability, 
but it does not necessarily and equally safeguard the human food security dimensions of 
accessibility and vulnerability that are generally associated with subsistence and small-holder 
farming. 
On a more abstract level, this situation indeed presents us with a clash of visions in 
terms of achieving food security. Agribusiness with its large-scale, commercially-oriented 
and industrial production capacity represents “the dominant view on a ‘new agriculture’ for 
Sub-Saharan Africa” (Ansoms, Forthcoming 2012, p. 3). Fortunately Ansoms stresses the 
need to consider the realistic alternative potential of transforming existing small-holder 
farmers into ‘agricultural entrepreneurs’, but she acknowledges that by most accounts it 
requires a combination of both to truly revitalise African agriculture (Ansoms, Forthcoming 
2012). But with the dominant view favouring agribusiness over ‘agripreneurs’, the most 
pressing question in the light of the recent land rush concerns the place of small-scale farmers 
and local communities in the face of large-scale foreign agricultural investment (Ansoms, 
Forthcoming 2012). 
Very illustrative of this ‘clash of visions’ between agribusiness and agripreneurs 
supporters is an example found in a public, online discussion between Chris Owala (Director, 
Community Initiative Action Group Kenya) and Odhiambo T Oketch (Chairman, Yimbo 
Development Network) on Yahoo Groups (2007a, 2007b, 2007c). Several online opinion 
pieces express similar a discontent with the approach taken by the investor, for instance one 
compared the foreign investment with colonialism: 
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Why didn’t this guy [the investor] give us the capital and give us room to do 
production and wait to market. The investment model taken by this American is an 
outdated one and marks the mentality of a real colonialist. Today you can not [sic] 
use the Delmonte model in a civilised society. (Okebe, 2007) 
 
The above statement is exemplary of the fact that most of the local communities are not as 
‘backward’ and ‘19th century’ as the foreign investor often assumes. It is these local people 
that in reality have a reasonable awareness of the cultural clash between proponents of 
agribusiness and supporter of agripreneurs. More specifically, they do understand that in 
terms of food their local standoff with Dominion Farms can be framed as ‘food security’ 
versus ‘food sovereignty’, a distinction outlined in chapter 3. 
Thus, achieving ‘food security’ hangs in the balance between a ‘vision’ of feeding the 
world to be achieved by modernising agriculture into industrial large-scale operations, versus 
an alternative ‘vision’ which instead stresses that hunger can only be truly alleviated by 
strengthening and supporting small-scale farmers. But there is even a more fundamental 
difference here, the former (i.e. agribusiness) approaches the problematic of ‘feeding the 
world’ by increasing food production while the latter (i.e. agripreneurs) seeks a solution in 
sustainable production and fair (re)distribution of resources. Dominion Farms started out 
somewhat hesitantly in the middle. But before long they realised that with 17,050 acres to be 
reclaimed and made productive, their initial choice of employing mainly manual labour to 
perform this humongous task had been erroneous. And soon, local manual labour was made 
superfluous when mechanised equipment took over the job. Perhaps an economically sound 
choice for the investor in the short term, but in the long run it has massively damaged the 
relation with the community and foreclosed any potential to bridge agricultural and cultural 
gaps. The investor claims, however, that whenever there is the choice of manual labour or 
machinery, they prefer manual labour as long as it is competitively utilised. But Burgess 
notes that there is often an inadequate supply of manual labour, and that some jobs such as 
laser-levelling land cannot be done manually (Burgess, personal communication, 27 February 
2013). 
At the same time visions also clashed on other levels, with cultural insensitivity being 
a major battleground. We have seen this over the course of the foregoing two chapters, in 
which it has also become clear that Dominion Farms in reality operates with a somewhat 
confusing mix of objectives. As formally outlined in the project proposal, its priority is to 
improve local and national food security. However, this well-meant intention is in practice 
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presented as part of a wider religious package aimed at alleviating poverty through vocational 
training and spiritual education. In pursuance of spiritual enlightenment for the locals, this 
religious package is an integral part of the company’s operations – dubiously placing 
evangelicalism at the core of the investment project. At the outset Burgess’ religious 
revelation to invest in a highly underprivileged and underdeveloped region in Kenya seemed 
rather harmless. But now that this personal religious call to action has been integrated into 
companywide objectives and operational procedures, the spiritual impetus has become a 
questionable approach. 
For instance, the plans for the company’s Youth Centre will train the youth of Kenya 
in modern agricultural practices but ensures that “a Godly emphasis will be placed on the 
sanctity of life” (Burgess, 2008). This initiative has been part of the plans from day one, and 
largely been built – although in 2011 construction was suspended indefinitely. The Centre is 
“designed for 2,500 campers and 500 counsellors, although the first phase will be limited to 
1,000 beds” (Burgess, 2007).  
 
Photo 8: Construction of the Dominion Farms Youth Centre is suspended indefinitely (Author, 2011). 
 
Burgess had initially invited Youth With A Mission – an organisation ‘committed to global 
evangelism, using groundbreaking strategies to make Jesus Christ known in all nations’ – to 
operate the centre. Burgess further explains the role of religion in the Youth Centre: 
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The spiritual portion of the camp will be done in conjunction with the local churches, 
including all denominations. Hopefully each of the youth attending will leave with a 
firm foundation in their relationship to God and a strong moral base with which to 
move forward in life. (Burgess, 2008) 
 
No wonder that many religious denominations and churches in the region warmly welcomed 
Burgess’ arrival on the shores of Lake Victoria, and could not emphasise enough the spiritual 
and economic significance of having Dominion Farms in their midst. A well-serving example 
is found in the ‘Memorandum from Nyanza church leaders to Nyanza Provincial 
Commissioner’ which was released to the press in April 2008 (Ngede, 2008) in reaction to 
Dominion Farms halting construction and freezing investment over extortion and blackmail 
attempts. At the same time, however, much of the local community appears to be rather 
concerned and divided over the religious message that Burgess brings them. Purportedly, 
locals claim that “the company threatens residents that opposition to the project constitutes 
opposition to God’s will” – a strategy infamously known from colonial eras (Flanders, 2007). 
But the real question now, revolves around the role of religion in clashing visions. 
 Religion has been noted as playing an important role in the distinction between 
‘leavers’ (the realm of the helpless man) and ‘takers’ (the realm of the reckless man) as 
discussed in chapter 1. It was Quinn (1992, 1996, 1997) who linked religion to the notion of 
‘one right way to live’, and accordingly argued that this idea of ‘one right way to live’ is 
fundamentally founded upon religious beliefs. Hence, there is no question that religion has 
played a part in the clash of visions in the Yala Swamp, mainly due to its erroneous 
assumption that religion reveals this ‘one right way to live’. However, it should be noted that 
not only religion, but also cultural values and a sense of morality and empathy play a role. In 
any case, whether religiously or culturally inspired, Burgess forthrightly exclaims that he 
“won’t let African traditions get in the way of what’s right and what needs to be done” 
(Hilliker, 2009). Clearly Burgess adheres to the notion that there is ‘one right way to live’, 
and believes his way is precisely that. At times he does recognise the importance of 
respecting Kenyan culture, but as Hilliker (2009) correctly observes, Burgess does not shy 
away from fixing whatever part of the local traditional culture he believes is broken. The 
local communities, however, are reluctant to give up their ‘broken’ traditions, convinced 
there must be other, better ways to improve their food security. 
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Perhaps predictably, the imposition of values from a wholly different culture and 
religion rubbed the locals the wrong way and made them stand up in arms to defend their 
culture, tradition and livelihoods. The end game is an entrenched conflict in which the role of 
‘food’ is still ambiguous; on the one hand the investor has resorted to far reaching methods to 
improve food security, whilst on the other hand it is exactly the choice of these methods that 
has resulted in the protracted conflict. As a final question, the next chapter will return to the 
role of food as security and contextualise the role of ‘security’ in relation to foreign 
agricultural investment in the Yala Swamp. In other words, we will look at how securitisation 
theory and emancipatory realism apply to this precarious situation in Kenya. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
Rising to the challenges of the times? 
 
 
We (human society in whole or in part) might become what we hope to be. 
(Ken Booth, 1997) 
 
 
 Critical security in practice 
 
 Challenging the status quo 
 
 Emancipatory praxis 
 
 The future of food as security 
 
 Implications for a way forward 
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In considering a way forward it is sensible to take one last look at the Yala Swamp. It is 
essential to determine now what the potential forces are in the Yala Swamp that could move 
the entrenched conflict forward into the direction of mutually beneficial development of the 
area. In many ways the local communities perceive the reclamation, conversion, and food 
production in the Yala Swamp as a dystopia; a grandiose attempt to build a better world that 
unintentionally has gone wrong – but some may say it was doomed to fail from the outset. 
At present, the status quo in the area is a tense but relatively workable situation. This 
is, however, certainly not desirable as a long-term prospect. As we have seen, there is a lot to 
be gained from improving communication, disregarding hearsay, minimising political 
involvement and broadening cultural and social understanding. On the part of Dominion 
Farms there exists a genuine intention to create a better world, but so far its real-world 
practice and implementation has failed to incorporate several important elements: partnering 
with the local community, a solid CSR plan, and transparency in operations and 
communication. Yet it should be emphasised that to progress a dystopia to a process-utopia 
any improvements to the intricate situation are a shared responsibility. Accordingly, there is 
an equal duty for the community to demonstrate an informed understanding of the situation, a 
cooperative approach, and the willingness to work together to make another world possible. 
The process-utopian approach, as part of positive emancipation, is the most suitable 
method to guide all affected parties towards common ground to create a united and mutually 
beneficial future. It is clear that a balance must be sought between, on the one hand, the 
sustainable conservation of the wetland, its biodiversity and the reliance of the communities 
on the natural resources, and on the other, the agricultural potential of the swamp to increase 
food security as well as bring development, education and employment to a region that is 
known for its high level of poverty. Dialogue and genuine engagement are essential tools to 
realise such a balance between conservation, sustainable rural livelihoods and economic and 
agricultural development. But in a true process-utopian manner, the focus should be on small 
steps forward so as to slowly integrate our hopes for a more desirable future with our present 
behaviour.  
Out of the complex conflict in the Yala Swamp we have distilled a range of problems, 
incompatible goals, clashing visions, and security implications. But similarly, we have 
identified several agricultural, philosophical, and security approaches – some of which could 
potentially improve the situation. A brief overview of the key message in the preceding 
chapters will produce a foundation for this final chapter. 
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In the first chapter we took a macro approach to describe the clash of cultural visions 
at its most fundamental, global level. This was expressed in terms of comparing the 
prevailing cultural vision of (human population) growth with visions grounded in a more 
critical approach that can offer realistic and feasible alternatives, such as a so-called ‘vision 
of harmony’. With this as a point of departure, more specific clashes were subsequently 
identified in the following chapters. As such, chapter 2 framed food as a matter of security by 
highlighting its existential nature and discussing the threat of ‘weaponising’ food. 
Compounding the situation is the grim reality of a resource-constrained world, in which 
human vulnerability increasingly demonstrates the plight of the hungry. This was further 
elaborated on in chapter 3 which described the dichotomy that exists within ‘food security’.  
First, food security was contextualised in relation to agricultural development and 
food production, demonstrating the complexity of its definition. It was highlighted that the 
term ‘food security’ traditionally relies upon technological solutions to safeguard humankind 
from hunger and malnutrition, therein heavily confiding in the power of scientific progress, 
modernisation of agriculture, and the promise of large-scale food production. But we came to 
see that another school of thought rather believes that the ‘food problem’ is not scientific or 
technical in nature, but societal, cultural and economic. Indeed, the well-known critical and 
alternative paradigm to ‘food security’ emerged in the mid-1990s under the flag of ‘food 
sovereignty’ – claiming the ‘right’ of local (or indigenous) peoples to define their own food 
and agriculture systems. With the rise of this alternative definition, there is a growing clash of 
visions between the traditional notion of what ought to amount to achieve ‘food security’ and 
the alternative, more critical vision of achieving access to food. In this context and in the light 
of the many new challenges the world will face in the twenty-first century, food will become 
without any doubt an incontestable factor in our understanding of security. To reflect this, 
‘food security’ was reconceptualised as ‘food as security’. 
Building upon this notion of ‘food as security’, Chapter 4 set out to deepen the 
emerging understanding of food in relation to security by equating securitisation theory with 
the problem-solving approach and emancipatory realism with critical theory and an 
alternative vision. Subsequently it emerged that food as a matter of security plays right into 
the dichotomy of food security and food sovereignty. It turned out that according to one’s 
choice of security theory the particular conceptualisation of ‘food as security’ will inform 
one’s vision on the future of food. But the reverse is even more striking; one’s vision of the 
world will shape one’s choice of security theory, and consequently decide the future of food. 
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In tracing the struggle over food, we identified the contemporary phenomenon of 
‘land grabs’, which moved the discussion from food to concerns over (agricultural) land. 
Chapter 5 outlined how the scramble for agricultural land in developing countries is rooted in 
a cultural vision of growth and a manifestation of the problem-solving approach. Formulating 
the antithetical vision to investor or foreign control over agricultural investment projects, the 
potential for an emerging alternative vision of ‘land sovereignty’ was recognised. 
Chapter 6 commenced with an in-depth look at the history of land grabbing in Kenya, 
focussing particularly on exploring and contextualising the complicated case of the Yala 
Swamp. The foreign agricultural investment project in the Yala Swamp turned out to be 
fraught with intricacies over promises and expectations that eventually spiralled into a tense 
situation balancing on the edge of (violent) conflict, which was explored in detail in chapter 
7. 
 Bringing together the previously identified ‘clashes’, chapter 8 applied them to the 
case-study in Kenya to provide a contextualised explanation of the relation between food, 
security, land, and conflict in the Yala Swamp. Finally, the concluding chapter will 
commence with a brief return to the ‘clash of visions’ by discussing the intricacies of the 
Yala Swamp in relation to clashing visions over food, land and security that we have 
identified throughout the preceding chapters. Subsequently we will rise up from the Yala 
Swamp to a more holistic view of the problems relating to the malfunctioning world food 
system, those that are rooted in a cultural vision of growth and symptomatic of the global 
land grab.  
In other words, the conclusion will identify some of the key lessons from the Kenya 
case study for the broader themes of the thesis. Herein drawing some general lessons from the 
experience in Kenya in relation to the traditional notion of achieving ‘food security’ through 
technologically increasing and fixing the faltering food system – which is the typical 
problem-solving approach aimed at improving the existing world. The real challenge, 
however, is to find a critical and realistic alternative to the prevailing problem-solving 
approach of land grabs in the name of boosting food security. We will therefore look how we 
can utilise the lessons from the Yala Swamp in the formulation of an emancipatory 
framework for action, based on the potentials of material capabilities, ideas, and institutions. 
Finally, we go back to the relation between food and security, by outlining a way forward for 
the future of food as security based on the previous concepts. 
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Critical security in practice 
As outlined in Part I of this thesis, the realm of security studies is characterised by a 
fundamental division between traditional approaches to security (where security mainly 
revolves around military power and state actors) and more contemporary approaches to 
security (where the notion of security is broadened by expanding the field horizontally (i.e. 
the sectors included in the agenda for security) and vertically (i.e. the appropriate referent 
object for security) (Bilgin et al., 1998, p. 141). Within the contemporary paradigm, critical 
security studies was subsequently identified as an innovative approach that holds great 
potential to explore the emerging challenges of the twenty-first century. Now that resource 
scarcity is increasingly considered to constitute a contemporary security challenge – if not a 
threat, critical security studies offered an appealing framework to explore the role of food 
within the realm of security studies. 
Accordingly, this thesis employs critical security studies as its specific choice of 
theory in approaching (international) security to explore food as a matter of security. In 
particular, the wider body of work known as critical security studies provides the relevant 
security framework – not to be confused with the capitalised version ‘Critical Security 
Studies’ which is often considered synonymous with the work of the Welsh School. It is 
especially this critical character of theory – inherited largely from the realm of Critical 
Theory – that provides this emerging field in security studies with the tools best suited to 
handle the security challenges and threats of the twenty-first century. Two theories in 
particular, namely securitisation theory and emancipatory realism, have been discussed in 
chapter 4 as possessing both relevant qualities to offer a theoretical framework for questions 
regarding the relation between ‘food’ and ‘security’. Together, in a promising cohesive 
interaction described as ‘a consequentialist theory of security’, they render a viable 
complementary critical approach – laced with normative conceptualisations of security – to 
analyse the security implications of a resource-constrained world and explore the interplay 
between foreign agricultural investment and human security. 
 It is now time to utilise these theories to draw out the security implications of the 
foreign agricultural investment project in the Yala Swamp, particularly in relation to the 
subject matter of food. At the outset there are two key issues to explore. First there is the 
question as to whether or not there has been a securitisation of food in Kenya, and if this 
played any role in granting or supporting the land lease to Dominion Farms. This will require 
the identification of the relevant securitising actor(s) and follow the Copenhagen School’s 
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criteria to determine if a securitisation of food has taken place in Kenya, in any shape or 
form. But keeping in mind the limitations of securitisation theory identified in chapter 4, a 
more flexible application of the theory will be considered, as suggested by Floyd (2007) and 
not dismissed by Wæver (2003). The second significant matter relates to the protracted 
conflict and its clash of visions. This constitutes a need to enter the realm of human security 
to (re)frame the subject of ‘food security’ into a more humane adaptation, as suggested by 
Siegenbeek van Heukelom (2011). For all that, as depicted throughout chapters 6, 7, and 8, 
the food production project in the Yala Swamp is conducive to increasing the national level 
of food security in Kenya, but neglects to properly address ‘food security’ at the community 
and individual level of analysis. After all, human food security revolves mainly around 
accessibility, which by and large has dwindled for the communities surrounding the Yala 
Swamp. 
In considering what counts as a security problem in terms of securitisation theory, the 
subject of ‘food’ was examined in chapter 4 and led to the conclusion that food is technically 
not securitised at a global level. While there is an intensifying global narrative that food poses 
an existential threat, a securitisation of food falls short of widespread evidence that 
emergency measures are employed that go beyond normal political limitations. Even so, to a 
certain, while degree there may be some merit in identifying the phenomenon of land grabs as 
‘emergency measures’, it remains highly questionable if these deals could be considered to go 
‘beyond normal political limitations’. What’s more, we should also not lose sight of the 
importance of the securitising actor, which in the case of the global land grab turns out to be 
predominantly corporate interests instead of the widely assumed notion that merely state 
actors are in pursuit of land to achieve national food security interests. Thus, while land grabs 
serve as a contemporary indicator that food security is indeed increasingly considered as an 
existential threat, they can hardly be seen as fulfilling the criteria of ‘emergency measures’ – 
which would be necessary for a successful securitisation. 
In this context we should be mindful that the securitisation of food can also take place 
at various sub-levels of analysis, allowing us now to move the security analysis in the 
direction of Kenya. We need to assess three criteria that define a successful securitisation of 
food in Kenya: (1) is food presented as an existential threat, that (2) requires and justifies 
emergency measures beyond normal political limitations, which (3) will effect interunit 
relations by breaking free of rules (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 24-26). In Kenya, the relevant 
securitising actors to frame food as a matter of national security are predominantly politicians 
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and state officials, who can use their influential positions to create a discourse that defines 
food as an existential matter of security. 
Insufficient food production, country wide availability problems, and inaccessibility 
have long been part of the political dialogue about food in Kenya – as we have already seen 
in chapter 6. With a rapidly growing population that predominantly relies on the agricultural 
sector the production of food is naturally a sensitive and vital subject matter in Kenya. No 
wonder that over the last decade food has occasionally been set apart as an existential threat 
to the national security in Kenya. Parliamentarians have referred to food as “an issue that we 
must address as a matter of national security. When the entire nation is unable to grow food, 
then we are in trouble.” (Republic of Kenya, 2009). And others noting that “food security is 
of critical importance to national security” (Republic of Kenya, 2002a) and that “as we all 
know, food provides national security, and that needs a lot of seriousness” (Republic of 
Kenya, 2008). But aside these mostly irregular remarks, there is no evidence that food has 
been truly embraced as a existential threat to justify rule-breaking emergency measures that 
have a bearing on other matters of national security. 
On a slightly different track we could consider the wider field of ‘securitisation 
studies’ to allow for a more flexible approach to a securitisation of food. Which brings up an 
interesting question: did the foreign investor perceive food as an existential matter of national 
security for Kenya, which was perceived to allow him to proceed with measures beyond 
normal (political) limitations, and accordingly caused a cascading effect on other security 
issues? As the securitising actor, the first requirement for Dominion Farms would be to create 
a discourse around the existential threat of food insecurity in Kenya that infringes on a matter 
of national security for Kenya. However, as a foreign private sector actor there does not seem 
to be an obvious reason to fashion a discourse around food as a matter of national security in 
Kenya. More likely, the discourse of the foreign investor would focus on poverty alleviation 
through agricultural, infrastructural and economic development – which are all indeed part of 
the company’s project proposal (The Dominion Group of Companies & Lake Basin 
Development Authority, 2002). Assuming, hypothetically, that Dominion Farms would have 
presented a strong discourse that frames food as a matter of national security in Kenya, the 
next step would be the legitimisation of measures that otherwise – without a discourse of 
food as an existential threat – would not have been possible (Buzan et al., 1998). Considering 
the recognition of the important role of the private sector in the case of the Government of 
Kenya, there appears to have been a push at the provincial and district level of bureaucracy to 
ensure that the foreign investor would be able to commence its food production project in 
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Kenya. It seems, however, that considerations for this push to go beyond normal limitations 
(if that was indeed the case) were not based on safeguarding national security but rather on 
securing developmental benefits. Finally, continuing this hypothetical scenario, there is the 
“problem of size or significance” (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 25) Which means that securitisation 
not only requires an existential threat that legitimises breaking free of the rules, but that it has 
corollary “cascading effects on other security issues” (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 25). As we have 
seen in the previous chapters, the food production project of Dominion Farms certainly has 
had a major impact on the human security of local communities and therefore seems to fulfil 
this final requirement for a successful securitisation. Altogether, however, there are 
insufficient grounds to speak of a securitisation of food by Dominion Farms. 
This thesis thus offers a highly exploratory and provisional assessment of a wider 
application of securitisation theory on a sub-state level of analysis with a private sector 
securitising actor. It shows that even with a more flexible approach to securitisation theory, it 
can remain problematical to argue that the securitisation of food – in one form or another – 
has taken place in Kenya. This demonstrates that securitisation theory, even when applied 
liberally in its more flexible version as ‘securitisation studies’, remains at its core a very static 
and strict theory characterised by normative limitations in defining what amounts to a matter 
of security. At the same time, however, securitisation theory does principally offer a 
refreshingly clean and analytical logic to determine the ‘state of security’ by almost clinically 
assessing whether food in Kenya is a matter of ordinary politics or national security. But 
inevitably, its static logic retains such a rigid character that no room is left to appreciate the 
detail of intricate situations at different levels of analysis. Accordingly, we have seen that a 
security analysis of the protracted conflict in the Yala Swamp founded merely in 
securitisation theory leaves us with a highly inaccurate account of the security dimensions of 
this particular situation.  
 Even  more so, it was observed that securitisation theory can certainly be a helpful 
tool to security analysts, but that the elevation of selected matters into the security realm is 
ultimately not seen as a desirable practice since “security should be seen as a negative, as a 
failure to deal with issues as normal politics” (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 25). In fact, the 
founding-father of securitisation theory Ole Wæver agrees and suggests that the ‘optimal 
long-range option’ is to move issues out of the ‘threat-defense sequence’ into the ‘ordinary 
public sphere’ (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 29; Wæver, 1995). Accordingly, we may consider the 
political choice not to securitise food on the national level in Kenya as a positive sign that 
regular politics are still in control of the food security problematic. Actually, this line of 
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reasoning brings us almost naturally to the notion that we ought “to politicise security, not 
securitise politics” (Booth, 2007, p. 31). So in many ways this conclusion demonstrates the 
underlying notion of ‘consequentialist security’ now that both Wæver and Booth contend – 
with respect to their ideas on desecuritisation and emancipatory realism – that security issues 
should be dealt with as important political questions, not as a security threat. For these 
reasons, emancipatory realism with its normative framework aids us better in explaining the 
security dimensions of the protracted conflict in the Yala Swamp. But above all, we should 
recognise that in the case of the Yala Swamp that the concept of ‘food as security’ recognises 
the (human) security implications and dimensions of the conflict without necessitating the 
issue to move from the ordinary public sphere into the realm of national security. Hence, 
more generally this implies that we can discuss ‘security’ dimensions and impacts without 
necessarily entering the ‘official’ realm of securitisation that lies beyond normal politics. 
In chapter 4 we assessed Booth’s version of a critical theory of security, propounding 
its three main functions: to respond to empirical curiosity, to pursue moral politics, and to rise 
to the challenges of the times (Booth, 2007). Our empirical curiosity into the intricacies of 
foreign agricultural investment in relation to food and security should have been satisfied 
profoundly in chapter 6-8. Yet, the next critical element at the heart of the present exploration 
is the pursuit of moral politics. In other words, the normative framework of emancipatory 
realism has elucidated the need for a more humane version of food security, both globally and 
specifically in the Yala Swamp. This means that ‘food security’ should no longer be merely 
perceived in term of production, availability and market access, but in addition include 
human security dimensions such as cultural preferences, historical perspectives, small-scale 
economic considerations, and the consideration of food sovereignty instead of food security. 
But this pursuit of moral politics is inherently framed and limited by the challenges of the 
times: a malfunctioning food system, a growing world population, changing diets, the 
uncertainty of climate change, and the antinomy between problem-solving and imagining 
critical alternatives. At last then, we need to conceive an emancipatory framework for action 
to challenges the status quo. 
We commence by exploring the relevance of applying these three critical operatives 
to the situation in the Yala Swamp. In the first place there is a great curiosity emanating from 
academia, public policy-making, and corporate interests alike, in critical and empirical 
studies on the qualitative implications of foreign agricultural investment. Whilst foreign 
agricultural investment (and ‘land grabbing’ in its more derogative characterisation) is 
certainly not an entirely new phenomenon, the contemporary wave of land deals has not seen 
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much in-depth empirical research. A curiosity into the nature of land deals and the 
recognition that more informed insight is required to create effective policy, drove the 
foregoing contextualised explanation of the situation in the Yala Swamp. But this exploration 
is equally aided by a strong impetus to explore food and security implications in a normative 
framework – which falls outside the scope of securitisation theory. Indeed, in order to pursue 
moral politics we need follow a different path to understand how the observed phenomenon 
in the Yala Swamp influences our thinking about food and security. But, perhaps most 
importantly, we need to rise to the challenge of our times – which chapter 1 identified as the 
faltering world food system. This issue requires us to solicit the question if foreign 
agricultural investment in the Yala Swamp indeed rises to the challenge of a faltering world 
food system, or does if it merely perpetuate a flailing system? To answer this question we 
need to explore more closely the function of emancipatory realism as a crucial element of a 
critical theory of security, but therein appreciate the existence of various levels of analysis 
(national, regional, community, and individual). 
By moving into the realm of emancipatory realism, we appreciate that the level of 
analysis shifts from a country wide focus (i.e. national (food) security) to a central focus on 
the individual human being as the ultimate reference object for (food) security. In the case of 
the Yala Swamp it seems that Booth’s observation that “emancipation, empirically, is 
security” is acutely accurate (Booth, 1991a, p. 323). For the local communities this means 
that attaining or retaining the human freedoms of access to land, food and water are on par 
with safeguarding their human security. The key problem in the Yala Swamp, however, 
appears to be the singular interpretation of ‘emancipation’ as a struggle against oppression by 
the foreign investor. This ‘negative’ formulation presents the traditional perception on 
emancipation. Namely, where Booth elucidates that emancipation equates to security as a 
practice of resistance to confront the ordinary insecurities that determine lives by constraining 
human freedom, he actually frames this statement in a more contemporary view on 
emancipation that highlights the more ‘positive’ side of the concept by focusing on creating 
new structures and power relationships with the promise of enhancing human potentialities 
(Booth, 1999, p. 40). As a matter of fact, the ‘battle of the Yala Swamp’ – as it is often 
reported by the media – is a classic case of negative emancipation fiercely cased as an 
existential struggle against (foreign) oppression. But emancipatory realism reveals another 
side of emancipation and security by offering a more positive attitude of the mind that is 
based on a “systematic set of ideas about being, knowing, and doing” that can transform a 
repressive situation through inclusive approaches (Booth, 2007, p. 91). 
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There is the occasional recognition that a more positive approach is required to 
resolve the entrenched conflict. Take, for instance, the District Commissioner (DC) for Siaya, 
Boaz Cherutich, who observed that the majority of investment problems originate from the 
arduous relationship with the local community (Butunyi, 2008). Whilst far from a profound 
revelation, the DC implicitly recognises the need for a more positive emancipatory approach 
by putting a shared responsibility on all parties “to foster a mutually beneficial relationship” 
(Butunyi, 2008). The main obstacle, however, seems to be the matter of turning a negative 
conception of emancipation into a more positive ‘human potentialities enhancing’ version. 
Integral to such a transformation are two of the concepts delineated in chapter 4: a reciprocity 
of rights and a process-(e)utopian approach. 
A reciprocity of rights is the first principle central to positive emancipation; an idea 
which proclaims that ‘my freedom depends on your freedom’. In the Yala Swamp a particular 
version of this principle seems to be embraced by the foreign investor, but unfortunately its 
notion of shared freedom is strongly rooted in the investor’s dominant cultural vision. 
Specifically, there is indeed abundant testimony of the genuine commitment of the foreign 
investor to enhance food security and alleviate poverty in Kenya. The investor certainly 
enjoys these fundamental human rights at home in the United States, yet has now realised 
through religious revelation that ‘I am not truly free until everyone is free’ and therefore 
made Kenya his destination to break down the barriers between ‘us’ and ‘them’. In the 
process, however, the practical implementation of this envisaged reciprocity of rights turned 
out to be staunchly rooted in a Western/capitalist approach to agriculture and development – 
and more generally in the notion that there is only ‘one right way to live’. With Dominion 
Farms committed to enabling a reciprocity or rights through its investment, the local 
communities assert on the contrary that since the arrival of the foreign investor they in reality 
suffer from a decrease in freedom rather than increase. This throws up an interesting 
antithesis: the investor setting out to smooth the obstacles on the path to freedom for the local 
community, while at the same time giving rise to profound new constraints. For the 
community a reciprocity or rights would rather be reflected in an ‘enabling environment’ that 
would allow themselves to overcome the obstacles of poverty, food insecurity and 
unemployment. More nuanced, this would mean enhancing human potentialities through 
direct investment in the small-scale (agricultural) enterprises of locals, training and education 
of local farmers, and building mutually beneficial relationships between investor and 
community. The creation of these new structures and power relationships would require a 
positive emancipatory approach, yet presently the local communities are by and large still 
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stuck in a negative emancipation in the form of fiery resistance against what they perceive as 
a form of ‘neo-colonial’ oppression. 
An emancipatory refocus, from a negative to a positive conception, could be aided by 
the concept of a process-utopian approach. To avoid abstract utopianism, the process-utopian 
endeavours should consist of genuine, practical, and tangible contributions towards creating a 
eutopia. The emphasis on eutopia instead of utopia is of significance, as we have seen the 
first denotes ‘a good place’ while the second denotes a highly desirable perfect society which 
in reality exists in ‘no place’. Its relevance becomes apparent when we consider the untenable 
expectations held by the local community, who imagined that foreign investment would turn 
the Yala Swamp into a utopia. But as we have seen, utopias are untenable end-points. 
Pursuing a eutopia, on the other hand, is a more plausible approach to give rise to a better 
future. Hence as noted before, eutopias are based on “voluntary actions that yield mutual 
advantage” while utopias cannot but flounder in destitution (Hager, 2003, p. 47). But with 
both the foreign investor and local community entrenched in firm cultural visions on what 
would amount to a eutopia; only compromises can pave the way forward. 
By now a more coherent picture of the intricate situation in the Yala Swamp should have 
emerged. One moment’s reflection shows that at present much of the conflict in fact revolves 
around grudges over what has elapsed and gone by. These feelings of resentment have 
conceived a general attitude that pays no heed to the notion that present behaviour coupled to 
future hopes can be the beginning of a more desirable future, in other words “the future is the 
eventual culmination of the present” (Booth, 2007; Falk, 1980). Unfortunately, the abject 
futility of merely pointing fingers in blame is not sufficiently appreciated, if at all. In fact, 
there is hardly a sense of genuine initiatives to improve the taxing relationships, let alone a 
realisation that making progress towards an eutopia is a shared responsibility.  
Hence, one of the key difficulties for all parties is to overcome the previously identified 
clash of visions that plays a major role in this cycle of distrust and conflict. Of particular 
concern is that all parties have widely different visions of what ‘food security’ is or ought to 
be, but most of all, how it should be achieved with the aid of the Yala Swamp wetland. But in 
this context of clashing visions, the intricate situation playing out in the microcosm of the 
Yala Swamp mirrors in some ways the global debate about food security. In pursuance of the 
notion of ‘food security’, there seem to be roughly two prevailing global visions on the future 
of food: (1) the technical problem-solving approach, and (2) the critical visionaries’ 
alternative food order. 
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As a generalised typification of these visions we can group some of the characteristics 
and principles discussed in previous chapters (Table 3). Even though we can roughly classify 
some of these principles, we can hardly say that both approaches are mutually exclusive. 
 
Problem-solving approach 
 Food security 
 Securitisation theory 
 Land deals/grabs 
 Negative emancipation (i.e. struggle 
against oppression) 
 Supporting actors: (foreign) investors, 
governments, politicians, business 
sector, elites 
Critical visionary approach 
 Food sovereignty 
 Emancipatory realism 
 Land sovereignty 
 Positive emancipation (i.e. imagining 
new structures) 
 Supporting actors: local communities, 
small-scale farmers, NGOs/CBOs, 
environmentalists 
Table 3: Generalised typification of visions, characteristics and principles. 
 
Thus, whereas the foreign investor’s cultural vision dictates the need for technological 
solutions to increase food production and safeguard national food security, the local 
communities struggle to maintain a decent level of human food security in their emancipatory 
struggle of a cultural vision of food sovereignty. As Booth observed, “different worldviews 
and discourses about politics deliver different views and discourses about security.” (Booth, 
1997, p. 106). But at the same time we should remind ourselves that “security is what we 
make it”, which is equally true for food security (Booth, 1997, p. 106). 
At the end of the day, as long as achieving ‘food security’ remains to be perceived as 
merely a technological problem that simply requires a problem-solving approach, we will not 
develop alternative ways of thinking that will inspire the critical changes in visions necessary 
to create a profoundly new world food order. But on top of this, “security interdependence 
must become entrenched in our thinking” (Bilgin et al., 1998, pp. 148-149). This means that 
food as a matter of security should not be conceived in competitive and confrontational 
terms, but rather as a shared responsibility to encourage collaboration between the technical 
solutions of problem-solvers and the alternative solutions imagined by critical visionaries. 
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Challenging the status quo 
The investment project in the Yala Swamp has served as a great example of the many 
possible approaches in response to the imminent threat of food insecurity – one of the 
foremost challenges of our times. Thinking more holistically about the future of food 
security, we have identified two approaches – or perhaps more accurately ‘visions’ – that 
have been discussed throughout the preceding chapters. Both respond in different ways to the 
question ‘how to feed a world in the face of continuing population growth and globally 
changing diets?’ 
It has become evident that problem-solving theory is the predominant approach used 
to address the ailments of the world food system and considered the solution to feeding a 
population of 9 billion people by 2050. Indeed, solutions to feed an expanding world 
population with a growing appetite generally take as point of departure the perspective of the 
existing social and political order and hence operate within existing power relationships. In 
doing so, there is a clear tendency to focus on the supply side of the food equation; 
converging on the question of how we can produce more food. A well-known example is the 
Green Revolution of the 1970s that showed how a powerful idea combined with material 
capabilities and new technology brought about an exceptional increase in food production in 
a number of Third World countries by introducing industrial agriculture. Unfortunately the 
benefits of the Green Revolution now turn out to be unsustainable in nature and the approach 
has been found destructive to the environment. But we have also seen that a similar supply 
side focus lies at the heart of the operations of Dominion Farms in the Yala Swamp. The 
foreign investor assumes that technical solutions – namely increasing food production – will 
increase the level of food security in Kenya. Unfortunately this approach does not 
(appropriately) take the notion of human food security (vulnerability and accessibility) into 
account. Hence it shows that the ‘immediate solution’ approach advocated by problem-
solving theory generally only provides short-terms solutions – and in some cases, as both the 
Green Revolution and the Dominion Farms project demonstrate, they could come with 
negative (long-term) ramifications. 
By taking a step back for a moment, we can assess the situation from a more critical 
perspective. Meaning that we may need to focus on the demand side and ask if we can 
stabilise population growth and perhaps even bring down the size of the human population. 
This is not a new idea; Malthus is famously praised/criticised for his insightful/pessimistic 
essay on the principle of population. Ever since, other commentators have similarly 
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highlighted that population growth should not be underestimated (Bartlett, 1998; Brundtland 
Report, 1987; Dyson, 1996; Ehrlich, 1968; Hardin, 1968). 
As we have seen in chapter 1, Quinn addresses the fundamental ecological principle 
of the perpetual balancing of population in his novel The Story of B (1996) and later discusses 
the topic in more detail in a lecture with Thornhill (Quinn & Thornhill, 1998). Quinn 
contends that this principle is astonishingly simple but often misunderstood. The principle, 
according to Quinn, holds that ‘food’ and ‘feeder’ populations normally balance each other. 
So, when a feeder population expands it automatically reduces the food population. The now 
smaller food population is insufficient to allow the feeder population to grow any more, and 
will eventually force it to diminish. During the period of feeder population decay, the food 
population will grow again, eventually allowing the feeder population to expand. This 
negative feedback system allows the whole process of perpetual balancing to go on 
indefinitely. Humankind, however, has found with the introduction of totalitarian agriculture 
a way to defeat the system and keep increasing the food population, with the consequence of 
unrelenting population growth. 
 This way in which humans have defeated nature’s population balancing system is 
typical of the problem-solving approach. Quinn (2012) highlights this by pointing out that 
this solution tries to solve the Malthusian problem by asking the question “How are we going 
to FEED all these people?”. But by taking a critical perspective we instead face the 
‘Quinnian’ problem that asks “How are we going to stop PRODUCING all these people?”. 
Quinn’s most interesting statement is that this problem-solving approach of increasing food 
production in reality works against solving the population problem. “Malthus’s warning was 
about the inevitable failure of totalitarian agriculture. My warning is about its continued 
success” (Quinn, 1996, p. 268). Even though Quinn contends that this is an “astonishingly 
simple” principle, he “never guessed how very inflammatory this would be” because there is 
very little understanding of how this system works (Quinn & Thornhill, 1998, 1-4 min). 
Creating a wider understanding of this ecological principle and simultaneously 
challenging the ‘culture of contentment’ with its entrenched consumerist mindset, has proven 
to be extremely difficult. The problem-solving approach and the ‘culture of contentment’ can 
be considered as the dominant paradigm of the contemporary social and political order. It 
would therefore make sense to look at Gramsci’s work on hegemony which presents two 
strategies aimed at bringing change to a situation of hegemony. Perchance one of them could 
transform the Western view and attitude towards food.  
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The elemental concept in Gramsci’s ideas on hegemony is his differentiation between 
‘war of movement’ and ‘war of position’ which, as Cox explains, is based on the “difference 
... in relative strengths of state and civil society (1983, pp. 164-165). The war of movement is 
an appropriate method to foster change in states that possess a strong administrative, 
governmental and coercive apparatus but lack an equally developed civil society. Russia 
featured as a prime example of how “a relatively small working class led by a disciplined 
avant-garde was able to overwhelm the state in a war of movement and met no effective 
resistance from the rest of civil society” (Cox, 1983, p. 165). In contrast, the war of position 
is most effective to bring change in states where civil society is fully developed and forms a 
strong foundation for the state’s administrative, governmental and coercive apparatus. The 
idea of a war of position is to start the struggle for change from within civil society by slowly 
building up the strength for an alternative social foundation for a new state (Cox, 1983, p. 
165). The war of position is essentially a form of bottom-up (negative and positive) 
emancipation, aimed at generating a critical mass. The process of creating such a ‘massive 
dynamic’ is process-utopian in nature and based on the idea of integrating present behaviour 
with future desires. 
In order to challenge the status quo of the world food system we no longer ought to 
think in terms of (nation) states, but rather perceive the faltering world food system as a state 
of affairs in need of a war of position. An emancipatory approach, rooted in a struggle against 
narrow minded short-term solutions and building upon the imagination of critical alternative 
structures, could bring the desired change. But as we have seen, there remains a general lack 
of understanding and inaction of the collective of individuals that lies at the heart of the food 
dilemma. In pursuance of producing a massive dynamic to drive the war of position, it 
becomes essential to outline a more concrete emancipatory framework for action based on 
critical security. As such the discussion will conclude by moving from the empirical, 
qualitative study of the Yala Swamp to the more general, holistic question about the future of 
food as a matter of security in the context of rising to the challenges of the times. 
 
Emancipatory praxis 
Chapter 4 outlined the contemporary, theoretical security dimensions of food, with the 
analytic character of securitisation theory as starting point. However, due to the theory’s 
intentional lack of a normative framework it turned out to have limited applicability to 
framing ‘food as security’ from a (human) security perspective. Its confluence with 
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emancipatory realism – as part of the wider realm of critical security studies – sparked hope 
for a more flexible, normative and action-based theory of security. In fact, this branch of 
Critical Security Studies turned out to offer an multitude of elaborately associated concepts – 
emancipation; practice of resistance; a process-utopian approach; the reciprocity of rights; the 
creation of new structures; enhancing human potentialities; and the attitude of mind – which 
together laid ground for a fertile foundation to frame food as a matter of security – that is, at 
least in theory. 
In pursuance of finding long-term solutions to our dysfunctional food system it is 
equally important to frame ‘food as security’ in practical terms. Conventional approaches to 
food security turned out – for the most – to be a graveyard of aspirations (see chapter 1). All 
the while the rising challenges of the twenty-first century demand swift and decisive actions 
on the food front. The application of conventional approaches to an emerging set of 
challenges in a new era of food (in)security is characterised for as a foundational divide 
between agro-industrial and agro-ecological practices. Increasingly, solutions are no longer 
sought exclusively in technical terms; instead, alternative approaches, mindsets, and attitudes 
towards food are gaining ground. Most notably, as we have seen in chapter 3, through social 
movements like La Vía Campesina rooted in the notion of ‘food sovereignty’. 
While the exact tenets of food sovereignty remain somewhat hard to pin down, there 
is no question that its flexible and broad nature is finding wide application as a practice of 
resistance that confronts the ordinary range of food insecurities. After all, food sovereignty 
substantiates the transformative practice of social movements of farmers, peasants, and 
consumers in both developing and – increasingly – developed countries; applying the many 
facets of emancipatory realism. In fact, food sovereignty may not be so much as a novel 
theory explaining and predicting the future of food; rather than an attitude of mind realising a 
profound process-utopian practice towards the future of food. 
As such, food sovereignty strives in practice for what Booth defined as “two sides of 
the same coin”; security and emancipation (Booth, 1991b, p. 539). In this sense food 
sovereignty is the actual embodiment of an emancipatory approach towards food. Where 
“food sovereignty is about democratic control over national food policy and the right of 
people and communities to control how and what food is produced, and for whom” 
(Lawrence & McMichael, 2012, p. 135); Bilgin, Booth and Wyn Jones (1998) outline the 
emancipatory process necessary to obtain this type of democratic control: 
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Emancipation is concerned with freeing people, as individuals and groups, from the 
social, physical, economic, political and other constraints that stop them from 
carrying out what they would freely choose to do. (Bilgin et al., 1998, p. 153) 
 
Hitherto the food sovereignty movement – known widely as La Vía Campesina (the Peasants’ 
Way) – has made significant emancipatory strides with their practice of resistance to actualise 
both short-term and long-term food goals. In terms of the emancipatory potential of 
‘resistance’, we have seen in chapter 4 how Booth (1999) differentiates between negative and 
positive emancipation; the former as a struggle against oppression and the latter as the 
creation of new structures and power-relationships. Food sovereignty offers a powerful fusion 
of both. Innovative real-world instances of transformed structures and power-relationships 
are central instruments in the struggle against oppression – see for example the numerous 
real-world examples of ‘resistance’ collected by Holt-Giménez (2012). 
These authentic examples of food sovereignty in practice demonstrate this 
contemporary, positive version of emancipatory resistance: building new structures and 
power relationships that promise to enhance human potentialities and transform food systems. 
More nuanced, these voluntary transformative actions of farmers, peasants, and consumers 
are process-utopian in nature and upholding the notion of eutopia. At the same time, they 
reproach the twenty-first century aspirations of building a ‘food security’ utopia; therein 
recognising Hager’s instrumental differentiation between attaining the required cooperation 
to build eutopias and utopias: the former uses freedom, the latter coercion (Hager, 2003, p. 
47). Indeed, Shaw’s (2007) portrayal of the ‘graveyard of aspirations’ in twenty-first century 
food history validates Hager’s (2003) discernment that “utopias cannot but flounder in 
destitution”. 
This process-utopian principle reminds us of the important link between theory and 
praxis, formulated as Critical Theory’s main tenet that “theory is always for someone and for 
some purpose” (Cox, 1981, p. 128). Accordingly we can conclude that the proposed notion of 
‘food as security’ equates to the praxis of food sovereignty founded upon the principles of 
emancipatory realism. 
 
The future of food as security 
At last we return to the central question posed in the précis to summarise the theoretical and 
empirical insights that have aided us in answering how contemporary security theory changes 
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the understanding of ‘food security’. We have come to see that food is the indispensable 
fabric of society; making the safeguarding of food provision essential to prevent human 
suffering and, in more holistic terms, assure the survival of the species. The pursuit of 
freedom from hunger through the achievement of ‘food security’ is rooted in the existential 
challenge of adjusting values and perceptions to reflect food as security. Theorising and 
conceptualising food as a matter of security is an exercise in making sense of a challenging 
and misunderstood concept; by emphasising the securitiness of food we come to appreciate 
the emergence of an array of potential future threats to our (human) security. 
Securitising food by means of the philosophical strain of securitisation theory has 
shown, however, to be too limited on the normative and practical level. To genuinely 
transfigure ‘food security’ into ‘food as security’ requires normative considerations, such as 
an emancipatory approach and a critical ontology. As we have seen there are some good 
arguments in favour of classifying ‘food’ as a matter of security, but it makes one wonder if a 
similar discourse could possibly ‘securitise’ any given challenge or threat we face. Perhaps, 
we should see ‘food as security’ as a confirmation of the notion that reaching a state of food 
security cannot be achieved merely through scientific advances and technological fixes but 
requires an alternative vision of an emancipatory approach that builds news structures, 
recognises a reciprocity or rights, and operates as a shared responsibility. 
Yet, the differentiation between ‘food security’ and ‘food as security’ should not be 
interpreted as taking away any of the urgency or significance from the practical objective that 
is ‘food security’. Instead, the aim is to have chipped away at some of the complex and 
confusing meaning of ‘food security’ by proposing to give ‘food’ its own theoretical place in 
security studies theory by conceptualising it broadly as a matter of security. Securitisation 
theory has offered us a way to contemplate how food can be framed as a matter of national 
security. And even though ‘food’ is indeed a prospective area that can be securitised, there 
appears to be no strong indication that ‘food’ indeed has been securitised in Kenya. Even at 
the locality of the case-study site it is hard to substantiate a real ‘securitisation of food’, it 
seems to be rather a normative disagreement over land use and the question which approach 
best yields food security, and for whom. Securitisation theory has therefore been useful to a 
certain extent. With its logical, abstract and theoretical approach it has helped us determine 
that food has not moved out of the political realm into the security realm. And as both Booth 
and Wæver have contended, it is the ‘political’ realm that remains most promising to work 
towards a state of food security. 
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While this is true, and political thinking about food is hardly in its infancy, it has 
become evident that our thinking requires more critical and analytical considerations of the 
world food situation as a whole. Unfortunately this is absent in many efforts aimed at curbing 
a deterioration of the world food situation; they are disciplinary – and often ideologically – 
isolated. This results in sectoral approaches that only marginally improve ‘food security’ 
through technological fixes. What is needed, however, is alternative, realistic and big-picture 
thinking about the world food situation and how it functions as a system, specifically in 
relation to existing and emerging challenges. Slowly our global consciousness is catching up 
with the notion that food will be the next major issue for the world, not only in terms of 
tackling malnutrition and over-consumption but also “ensuring equitable access to food and 
revising our aspirations regarding the food we eat” (World Wide Fund For Nature, 2010, p. 
95). In contemplating ‘a new set of heuristics’ to reshape the food system, Lang’s ecological 
public health perspective (Lang, 2010) reinforces questions of long-term (food) security to go 
hand-in-hand with finding solutions to moral dilemmas; such as “how […] [to] balance 
livelihood with the potential benefits of a roaring global economy” (Rosin et al., 2012, p. 19).  
As Brandt said, “putting an end to hunger is a challenge to the world’s economic 
system, requiring complementary national and international measures” (Independent 
Commission on International Development Issues, 1980, p. 90), but this turns out to be an 
sersious understatement. It is a challenge to the world’s entire system, to our collective vision 
of food. Many have great confidence that humanity’s ingenuity and problem-solving 
approach will guarantee food security, some way or another. These technological fixes are 
seen as viable solutions to increase production and feed a world of 9 billion by 2050. Former 
U.S. President Carter is part of this large group of people believing in the viability of 
problem-solving: “investments in agricultural research today can cultivate peace tomorrow” 
(1999). There may be some truth in this, but increasing food production is not the Holy Grail; 
and as we have seen, more food naturally means more people. And in a world with continued 
population growth there will be no easy victories on the food front. 
The future of food may look grim, with humanity divided over where to seek 
solutions: should we turn to problem-solving to help us in the short term, or rather employ 
critical alternatives to safeguard long-term sustainable outcomes. At any rate, humanity has 
the capacity to imagine infinite alternative future for food. But, as we have seen, there are 
two main constraints and one critically low resource. The constraints are our bias towards 
short-term problem solving and our inability to comprehend the principle of exponential 
growth, and the resource we are already critically low one, is time. While doomsday 
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scenarios that sketch a global collapse may not be very likely to transpire, there remains a 
daunting sense of déjà vu when we relate the stories of civilisations of yore that collapsed 
under very similar circumstances.  
There is no question that now is the time to envisage a fundamental transformation of 
systems to transcend the short-term management of contemporary rights and potentialities by 
emphasising the equal rights for future generations. Indeed, as Booth said, “we (human 
society in whole or in part) might become what we hope to be” (Booth, 1997). This 
emphasises the idea of a massive emancipatory dynamic which confirms everyone’s power 
and responsibility to bring change to the world food system. The concept of ‘food 
sovereignty’ most accurately captures the spirit of emancipatory realism; its process utopian 
approach (ie. implementing small steps towards what we hope ‘food security’ will one day 
be) harnesses the potential power of social movements to drive a massive dynamic that 
gradually transforms short-term food security thinking into long-term sustainably food 
systems. Within this emancipatory approach we are reminded that ‘security’ is fundamentally 
part of the food equation; “food security is sustainability; only sustainable food systems can 
deliver meaningful security” (Lang, 2010, p. 95). 
For Dominion Farms the future looks rather ambitious, with profound plans for a next 
phase to move into new countries utilising the lessons from Kenya. While Burgess has 
admitted that setting up the operation in Kenya has not been easy, he says “we are smarter 
than we were a few years back” (Burgess, 2011). Thus, when Burgess (2009) exclaimed that 
“Dominion is an agent of change!” we can now be certain that he is right, only it seems the 
jury is still out on what kind of change Dominion Farms exactly brings to Kenya, and in the 
future to the rest of Africa. 
 
Implications for a way forward 
Reconceptualising food as a matter of security is neither simple nor without consequences for 
the security agenda and our understanding of ‘food security’. The many serious challenges 
emerging around population, resources, consumption, and the environment offer a timely 
impetus to critically assess our understanding of food in relation to our perception of security.  
This thesis has therefore set out to achieve two objectives; one principally theoretic in 
nature, the other closely aligned to explaining and understanding the empirical world. The 
former objective conceptualised food as a matter of security, and demonstrated the 
importance of such a conceptualisation in relation to existing and emerging global challenges. 
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Through the course of research into the subject of ‘food security’, over roughly the last four 
years, there has already been a shift towards a more prominent recognition of the securitiness 
of food – albeit somewhat hesitant, and not yet wide-spread. Indeed, as we have seen in 
chapters 2 and 3, esteemed commentators such as Brown (2012), Cribb (2010), and Dupont 
(2009) have highlighted the geopolitical, strategic, and above all, security implications of 
food. This emerging acknowledgement of food as a matter of security only confirms that in 
the face of growing uncertainty over future food security, the objective to conceptualise ‘food 
as security’ has not only been timely, but even more so, imperative. 
First and foremost this thesis furthers the understanding of what food in relation to 
security should mean. We have seen in chapter 4 that securitisation theory provides a 
practical and logical approach to determining what security is, but due to the absence of a 
normative framework it cannot tell us what ‘food as a matter of security’ should mean. The 
importance of a normative element in security studies was emphasised in the critical 
approach of emancipatory realism, which asserts that security effectively is emancipation. 
Emancipation, however, is nowadays more than the classic notion of resistance and 
struggling against the establishment, these days it is a more positive interpretation that urges 
the creation of new structures and power relationships. Positive emancipation in process-
utopian style, as described in chapter 4, precisely embodies the approach we ought to take in 
response to the failing world food system. With this in mind, the concept of ‘food as security’ 
thus embraces not only human security concerns, but equally incorporates more classic 
geopolitical, strategic and military considerations pertaining to the future of food. Ultimately, 
we cannot but recognise that food is vital to humanity’s survival; together with water, it is our 
foremost security need. In pursuance of improving the world’s state of ‘food security’, it is 
therefore essential to consider the security dimensions of food. 
The second objective of this thesis took the phenomenon of ‘land grabs’ as the focal 
point for the empirical study of a contemporary and observable manifestation of the emerging 
securitisation of food. By way of a qualitative contextualised explanation of the human 
security implications of such a ‘land grab’, the foreign investment project in the Yala Swamp 
allowed for an extraordinary case-study. The entrenched nature of the situation offered a 
diverse array of problems and insights – as well as numerous structural conflicts over 
fundamental issues such as food, land, water, environment, and livelihoods. 
 The principal contribution of this thesis in relation to the study of ‘land grabs’ is two-
folded. First there is the perhaps obvious, yet sensible observation – even though still not 
widely appreciated – that not every instance of foreign agricultural investment should be 
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labelled a ‘land grab’. Indeed, this type of labelling requires an appropriate qualitative 
assessment of the present situation, consideration of historical and cultural circumstances, 
and discussion with all stakeholders involved, particularly with affected parties. Accordingly, 
the investment project in the Yala Swamp demonstrates that foreign investors should not by 
default be considered to lack any level of concern for the wellbeing of the local population. 
But secondly, there is the notion that even in the face of well-intended instances of foreign 
agricultural investment the process is ultimately more important than the intention. As in the 
case of Dominion Farms, the eagerness to take thousands of Kenyans out of poverty and 
readiness to invest over USD$40 million in a development project, ultimately do not 
guarantee a successful project nor negate the importance of following appropriate cultural 
procedure. Of course, hurdles are inevitable along the way, but can be well-managed with 
adequate processes in place – including those essential elements such as appropriate 
communication, cultural sensitivity, local engagement, community involvement, and a 
willingness to accept the existence of competing visions. For the latter, this means the ability 
and inclination to allow cultural visions to coexist, to share, to compromise, to learn, and not 
to just apathetically accept a clash. 
Altogether, the present study has thus yielded results on broadly two levels. There is 
first the argument that food will increasingly play a vital part in future security considerations 
– across the entire range of national, human, and environmental security concerns. This 
argument has been captured in the conceptualisation of ‘food as security’. Secondly, there are 
key lessons drawn out of the foreign agricultural investment project in the Yala Swamp. 
 
Research limitations 
With the broad implications of this study on food and security in mind, it is meaningful to 
take a moment to appreciate the limitations of the present research. These limitations can best 
be addressed along the lines of the two parts of the thesis: theory and reality. In regard to the 
theoretical considerations on food as a matter of security, it should be noted that the security 
dimensions of food highlighted throughout this thesis have been discussed from the 
perspective of two critical approaches to security – which form part of the wider realm of 
security studies. This means that approaching the same security dimensions of food from an 
entirely different security perspective or theory could therefore lead to other 
conceptualisations of ‘food as security’, or perhaps even repudiate the relevance of such a 
concept altogether. In other words, the security prism that has guided food into the realm of 
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security studies can be described as contemporary, critical, and humane in nature – as 
opposed to other security approaches that may emphasise different aspects, such as 
conventional, military, and strategic elements. However, as we have seen throughout the 
study, the case is made that even from these more conventional security perspectives it is 
increasingly difficult to renounce the emerging securitiness of food. 
The second set of limitations is empirical in nature and relates to data collection and 
observations made in the field. The fieldwork, which took the form of a case-study, has been 
qualitative in nature, which inherently implies some limitations in generalising its findings. 
Even so, some of the observations and lessons learned remain valuable when considering 
other instances of foreign agricultural investment. On another level, we must also recognise 
that the field study was bound by the classics constrains of time and funding, which pose a 
limiting effect on the ability of a researcher to capture a case-study in its entirety. That being 
said, the six months of fieldwork in Kenya over the course of 2011 proved vital in 
contextualising the situation, as well as contributing to an understanding of the cultural 
aspects and socio-economic history of the case-study in the Yala Swamp. It was through the 
stories of the many individuals interviewed during the period of fieldwork that the case-study 
came alive. These stories were hard to verify against facts, let alone the reality of their 
manifold contradictions. In the end it is the task of the researcher to take these stories and fit 
them together into the puzzle that is the case-study. As a result there will always remain 
inaccuracies and the occasional mistake, but by and large the story of the Yala Swamp that is 
presented in this thesis offers a genuine account of the opportunistic development of one of 
Kenya’s wetlands that has produced a protracted and deeply entrenched conflict. 
 
A way forward for research and practice 
Now what are the ways forward in terms of foreign agricultural investment, ‘food as 
security’, and the future of food in general? Research into foreign agricultural investments 
has already embarked onto two broad areas. The first has been the quantification of the 
number of investments and parties involved, followed more recently by qualitative accounts 
detailing the land deal’s specific context and drilling into the objectives and practices of 
foreign investors. A next step should focus more specifically on the role of national host 
governments, as well as the bureaucracy and elites, which generally govern and facilitate land 
deals – often acting as the middleman. Notably, as pointed out earlier, what should be their 
role and responsibilities in aiding land deals? 
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The lessons learned from the Yala Swamp carry an important message: there is the 
need for proactive tools for foreign investors to guide their approach and projects – as 
opposed to the mostly reactive ‘damage-control’ approach that in many cases currently 
addresses any misgivings. Such as ‘toolset’ for foreign investors should be founded upon 
many of the basic principles outlined in this study, including, amongst others, cultural-
sensitivity, communication strategies, local involvement and engagement, corporate social 
responsibility plans, as well as social-economic and historic understanding of the region. 
Notwithstanding that every instance of foreign agricultural investment takes place in a unique 
setting and environment, the development of a basic set of proactive tools – which could be 
adapted to local situations – has the potential to support a foreign investor in making better 
and informed decisions. Benefiting the foreign investor, hosting government, and local 
population. 
From a security perspective, one unanswered question in relation to land deals is how 
foreign investors will react when hosting governments or their populations declare land deals 
void in order to support their own (food) interests. While a parallel to the nationalisation of 
oil in the 1950 and 1960s has been noted, it remains uncertain to what extent foreign 
investors will defend their contractual rights, and in particular in what form – especially in 
the context of an increasingly resource-constrained world. Will global corporate interests 
resort to ‘private security solutions’ in a bid to defend contractual land rights? 
At the same time the critical search for ‘security’ elements in the term ‘food security’ 
has a good guide in Critical Theory, which directed us to the normative and transformative 
potential of emancipatory realism; a security theory of progress for society build upon 
strategies and tactics of resistance to give hope for common humanity ” (Booth, 2005b, p. 
181). But while this critical security approach is surrounded by powerful theoretical concepts 
to support our notion of ‘food as security’, in reality there is scarce real-world praxis of 
emancipatory realism offering a foundation for critical applications of new, transformative 
food systems. Conversely, the critical approach underlying food sovereignty has strong 
practical application to real-world situations that transform food systems, however, in terms 
of theorising the emancipatory role of food sovereignty no definitive link to critical security 
theory has been made explicit. In other words, there is great potential to further explore how 
emancipatory realism can offer a theoretical foundation in security theory for food 
sovereignty, and how food sovereignty is the real-world application of emancipatory security 
principles that has the potential to transform our food systems. 
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